WHY OUR ASCENT CANNOT STOP WITH THE SOUL.

4. Why should we not, on arriving at the Soul, stop there, and consider

her the first principle? Because Intelligence is a power different

from the Soul, and better than the Soul; and what is better must, by

its very nature, precede (the worst). The Stoics[121] are wrong in

thinking that it is the Soul which, on reaching her perfection, begets

Intelligence. How could that which is potential pass into actualization

unless there were some principle that effected that transition? If

this transition were due to chance, it could not have occurred at

all. The first rank must therefore be assigned to that which is in

actualization, which needs nothing, which is perfect, while imperfect

things must be assigned to the second rank. These may be perfected

by the principles that begat them, which, in respect to them, play a

paternal part, perfecting what they had originally produced that was

imperfect. What is thus produced is matter, as regards the creating

principle, and then becomes perfect, on receiving its form from it.

Besides, the Soul is (often) affected; and we need to discover some

thing that is impassible, without which everything is dissolved by

time; therefore there is need of some principle prior to the soul.

Further, the Soul is in the world; now there must be something that

resides outside of the world, and which consequently would be superior

to the Soul; for since that which inheres in the world resides within

the body, or matter, if nothing existed outside of the world, nothing

would remain permanent. In this case, the (seminal) reason of man,

and all the other reasons could be neither permanent nor eternal. The

result of all these considerations, as well as of many others that

we could add thereto, is the necessary assertion of the existence of

Intelligence beyond the Soul.

INTELLIGENCE IS IN ACTUALIZATION BECAUSE ITS THOUGHT IS IDENTICAL WITH

ITS ESSENCE OR EXISTENCE.

5. Taking it in its genuine sense, Intelligence is not only

potential, arriving at being intelligent after having been

unintelligent--for otherwise, we would be forced to seek out some

still higher principle--but is in actualization, and is eternal. As

it is intelligent by itself, it is by itself that it thinks what it

thinks, and that it possesses what is possesses. Now since it thinks

of itself and by itself, it itself is what it thinks. If we could

distinguish between its existence and its thought, its "being" would be

unintelligent; it would be potential, not in actualization. Thought,

therefore, must not be separated from its object, although, from

sense-objects, we have become accustomed to conceive of intelligible

entities as distinct from each other.

REASONS, AS ARCHETYPES, MUST HAVE EXISTED BEFORE STOIC "HABIT," NATURE

OR SOUL.

Which then is the principle that acts, that thinks, and what is the

actualization and thought of Intelligence, necessary to justify the

assertion that it is what it thinks? Evidently Intelligence, by its

mere real existence, thinks beings, and makes them exist; it therefore

is the beings. Indeed, the beings will either exist outside of it, or

within it; and in the latter case they would have to be identical with

it. That they should exist outside of Intelligence, is unthinkable;

for where would they be located? They must therefore exist within

it, and be identical with it. They could not be in sense-objects, as

common people think, because sense-objects could not be the first

in any genus. The form which inheres in their matter is only the

representation of existence; now a form which exists in anything

other than itself is put in it by a superior principle, and is its

image. Further, if Intelligence must be the creative power of the

universe, it could not, while creating the universe, think beings as

existent in what does not yet exist. Intelligible entities, therefore,

must exist before the world, and cannot be images of sense-objects,

being on the contrary, their archetypes, and constituting the "being"

of Intelligence. It might be objected that the (seminal) reasons

might suffice. These reasons are, no doubt, eternal; and, if they be

eternal and impassible, they must exist within the Intelligence whose

characteristics we have described, the Intelligence which precedes

the "habit,"[122] nature,[123] and the soul,[124] because here these

entities are potential.[125]

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