ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIA'S POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOICS.

In this case, even if we possessed the power of doing something by

ourselves, we would not be any the less than the remainder of the

universe subjected to necessity, because Fate, containing the whole

series of causes, necessarily determines each event. Now since Fate

includes all causes, there is nothing which could hinder the occurrence

of that event, or alter it. If then everything obeys the impulsion of

a single principle, nothing is left to us but to follow it. Indeed,

in this case, the fancies of our imagination would result from

anterior facts, and would in turn determine our appetites; our liberty

would then have become a mere word; nor would we gain any advantage

from obeying our appetites, since our appetites themselves will be

determined by anterior facts. We would have no more liberty than the

other animals, than children, or the insane, who run hither and yon,

driven by blind appetites; for they also obey their appetites, as fire

would do, and as all the things which fatally follow the dispositions

of their nature. These objections will be decisive for those capable of

apprehending them; and in the search for other causes of our appetites

they will not content themselves with the principles which we have

examined.

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