THE ENTELECHY IS NOT A FORM OF THE BODY, AS THE SOUL TRANSMIGRATES.

Besides, as the soul is indivisible, the entelechy of the divisible

body could not become divisible as is the body. Besides, the same soul

passes from the body of one animal into the body of some other. How

could the soul of the first become that of the second, if she were only

the entelechy of a single one? The example of animals that metamorphose

demonstrates the impossibility of this theory. The soul, therefore, is

not the simple form of a body; she is a genuine "being," which does

not owe its existence merely to her being founded on the body, but

which, on the contrary, exists before having become the soul of some

individual animal. It is, therefore, not the body that begets the soul.

THE SOUL IS AN INCORPOREAL AND IMMORTAL ESSENCE. THE SOUL BEING NONE OF

CORPOREAL POSSIBILITIES, MUST BE INCORPOREAL.

c. What then can be the nature of the soul, if she is neither a

body, nor a corporeal affection, while, nevertheless, all the active

force, the productive power and the other faculties reside in her, or

come from her? What sort of a "being," indeed, is this (soul) that

has an existence independent of the body? She must evidently be a

veritable "being." Indeed, everything corporeal must be classified as

generated, and excluded from genuine "being," because it is born, and

perishes, never really exists, and owes its salvation exclusively to

participation in the genuine existence, and that only in the measure of

its participation therein.

THE PERSISTENCE OF THE CHANGEABLE IMPLIES THE ETERNAL IN THE

BACKGROUND.[80]

9. (14). It is absolutely necessary to postulate the existence of

a nature different from bodies, by itself fully possessing genuine

existence, which can neither be born nor perish. Otherwise, all other

things would hopelessly disappear, as a result of the destruction of

the existence which preserves both the individuals and the universe,

as their beauty and salvation. The soul, indeed, is the principle of

movement (as Plato thought, in the Phaedrus); it is the soul that

imparts movement to everything else; the soul moves herself. She

imparts life to the body she animates; but alone she possesses life,

without ever being subject to losing it, because she possesses it by

herself. All beings, indeed, live only by a borrowed life; otherwise,

we would have to proceed from cause to cause unto infinity. There

must, therefore, exist a nature that is primarily alive, necessarily

incorruptible and immortal because it is the principle of life for

everything else. It is thereon that must be founded all that is divine

and blessed, that lives and exists by itself, that lives and exists

supremely, which is immutable in its essence, and which can neither

be born nor perish. How indeed could existence be born or perish? If

the name of "existence" really suited it, it must exist forever, just

as whiteness is not alternately black and white. If whiteness were

existence itself, it would, with its "being" (or nature) (which is, to

be whiteness), possess an eternal existence; but, in reality, it is no

more than whiteness. Therefore, the principle that possesses existence

in itself and in a supreme degree will always exist. Now this primary

and eternal existence can not be anything dead like a stone, or a piece

of wood. It must live, and live with a pure life, as long as it exists

within itself. If something of it mingles with what is inferior, this

part meets obstacles in its aspiration to the good; but it does not

lose its nature, and resumes its former condition on returning to a

suitable condition (as thought Plato, in his Phaedo[81]).

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 174 / 467 题