The proof that bodies are activated only by incorporeal faculties may
be proved as follows: Quantity and quality are two different things.
Every body has a quantity, but not always a quality, as in the case of
matter, (according to the Stoic definition, that it was a body without
quality, but possessing magnitude[63]). Granting this, (you Stoic) will
also be forced to admit that as quality is something different from
quantity, it must consequently be different from the body. Since then
every body has a quantity, how could quality, which is no quantity, be
a body? Besides, as we said above,[64] every body and mass is altered
by division; nevertheless, when a body is cut into pieces, every
part preserves the entire quality without undergoing alteration. For
instance, every molecule of honey, possesses the quality of sweetness
as much as all the molecules taken together; consequently that
sweetness cannot be corporeal; and other qualities must be in a similar
case. Moreover, if the active powers were corporeal, they would have to
have a material mass proportional to their strength or weakness. Now
there are great masses that have little force, and small ones that have
great force; demonstrating that power does not depend on extension, and
should be attributed to some (substance) without extension. Finally,
you may say that matter is identical with body, and produces different
beings only by receiving different qualities (the Stoics considering
that even the divinity was no more than modified matter, their two
principles being matter and quality;[65] the latter, however, was also
considered as body). How do you (Stoics) not see that qualities thus
added to matter are reasons, that are primary and immaterial? Do not
object that when the spirit (breath) and blood abandon animals, they
cease to live; for if these things are necessary to life, there are
for our life many other necessities, even during the presence of the
soul (as thought Nemesius).[66] Besides, neither spirit nor blood are
distributed to every part of the body.
THE SOUL CAN PENETRATE THE BODY; BUT TWO BODIES CANNOT PENETRATE EACH
OTHER.
(10). The soul penetrates the whole body, while an entire body cannot
penetrate another entire body. Further, if the soul is corporeal, and
pervades the whole body, she will, with the body, form (as Alexander
of Aphrodisia pointed out) a mixture,[67] similar to the other bodies
(that are constituted by a mixture of matter and quality, as the Stoics
taught). Now as none of the bodies that enter into a mixture is in
actualization[68] the soul, instead of being in actualization in the
bodies, would be in them only potentially; consequently, she would
cease to be a soul, as the sweet ceases to be sweet when mingled with
the bitter; we would, therefore, have no soul left. If, when one body
forms a mixture with another body, total penetration occurs, so that
each molecule contains equal parts of two bodies and that each body
be distributed equally in the whole space occupied by the mass of the
other, without any increase of volume, nothing that is not divided will
remain. Indeed, mixture operates not only between the larger parts
(which would be no more than a simple juxtaposition); but the two
bodies must penetrate each other mutually, even if smaller--it would
indeed be impossible for the smaller to equal the greater; still, when
the smaller penetrates the larger it must divide it entirely. If the
mixture operates in this manner in every part, and if no undivided
part of the mass remain, the body must be divided into points, which
is impossible. Indeed, were this division pushed to infinity, since
every body is fully divisible, bodies will have to be infinite not only
potentially, but also in actuality. It is therefore impossible for
one entire body to penetrate another in its entirety. Now as the soul
penetrates the entire body, the soul must be incorporeal (as thought
Nemesius).[69]
THE STOIC DEVELOPMENT FROM HABIT TO SOUL AND INTELLIGENCE WOULD MAKE
THE PERFECT ARISE FROM THE IMPERFECT, AN IMPOSSIBILITY.
(11). (If, as Stoics claim, man first was a certain nature called
habit,[70] then a soul, and last an intelligence, the perfect would
have arisen from the imperfect, which is impossible). To say that
the first nature of the soul is to be a spirit, and that this spirit
became soul only after having been exposed to cold, and as it were
became soaked by its contact, because the cold subtilized it;[71] this
is an absurd hypothesis. Many animals are born in warm places, and do
not have their soul exposed to action of cold. Under this hypothesis,
the primary nature of the soul would have been made dependent on the
concourse of exterior circumstances. The Stoics, therefore, posit as
principle that which is less perfect (the soul), and trace it to a
still less perfect earlier thing called habit (or form of inorganic
things).[72] Intelligence, therefore, is posited in the last rank
since it is alleged to be born of the soul, while, on the contrary,
the first rank should be assigned to intelligence, the second to the
soul, the third to nature, and, following natural order, consider
that which is less perfect as the posterior element. In this system
the divinity, by the mere fact of his possessing intelligence, is
posterior and begotten, possessing only an incidental intelligence.
The result would, therefore, be that there was neither soul, nor
intelligence, nor divinity; for never can that which is potential pass
to the condition of actualization, without the prior existence of some
actualized principle. If what is potential were to transform itself
into actualization--which is absurd--its passage into actualization
will have to involve at the very least a contemplation of something
which is not merely potential, but actualized. Nevertheless, on the
hypothesis that what is potential can permanently remain identical, it
will of itself pass into actualization, and will be superior to the
being which is potential only because it will be the object of the
aspiration of such a being. We must, therefore, assign the first rank
to the being that has a perfect and incorporeal nature, which is always
in actualization. Thus intelligence and soul are prior to nature; the
soul, therefore, is not a spirit, and consequently no body. Other
reasons for the incorporeality of the soul have been advanced; but the
above suffices (as thought Aristotle).[73]
II. THE SOUL IS NEITHER THE HARMONY NOR ENTELECHY OF THE BODY--THE SOUL
IS THE HARMONY OF THE BODY; AGAINST THE PYTHAGOREANS.
(12). a. Since the soul is not corporeal, its real nature must be
ascertained. Shall we assert that she is something distinct from the
body, but dependent thereon, as, for instance, a harmony? Pythagoras,
indeed, used this word in a technical sense; and after him the harmony
of the body has been thought to be something similar to the harmony
of a lyre. As tension produces in the lyre-strings an affection
(or, manner of being, or state) that is called harmony, likewise,
as contrary elements are mingled in our body, an individual mixture
produces life and soul, which, therefore, is only an individual
affection of this mixture.