8. If, in any sense whatever, the soul were a body, we could not think.
Here is the proof. If feeling[58] is explained as the soul's laying
hold of perceptible things by making use of the body, thinking cannot
also of making use of the body. Otherwise, thinking and feeling would
be identical. Thus, thinking must consist in perceiving without the
help of the body (as thought Aristotle[59]). So much the more, the
thinking principle cannot be corporeal. Since it is sensation that
grasps sense-objects, it must likewise be thought, or intellection,
that grasps intelligible objects. Though this should be denied, it will
be admitted that we think certain intelligibles entities, and that we
perceive entities that have no extension. How could an entity that
had extension think one that had no extension? Or a divisible entity,
think an indivisible one? Could this take place by an indivisible part?
In this case, the thinking subject will not be corporeal; for there
is no need that the whole subject be in contact with the object; it
would suffice if one of its parts reached the object (as Aristotle said
against Plato).[60] If then this truth be granted, that the highest
thoughts must have incorporeal objects, the latter can be cognized only
by a thinking principle that either is, or becomes independent of body.
Even the objection that the object of thought is constituted by the
forms inherent in matter, implies that these forces cannot be thought
unless, by intelligence, they are separated from matter. It is not by
means of the carnal mass of the body, nor generally by matter, that
we can effect the abstraction of triangle, circle, line or point. To
succeed in this abstraction, the soul must separate from the body, and
consequently, the soul cannot be corporeal.