(j.) (The soul, being one and simple, is everywhere entire, and has
parts that are identical to the whole; this is not the case with
the body.) If the soul is a body, she will have parts that are not
identical with the whole, as every body is by nature divisible. If then
the soul has a definite magnitude of which she cannot lose anything
without ceasing to be a soul, she will by losing her parts, change her
nature, as happens to every quantity. If, on losing some part of its
magnitude, a body, notwithstanding, remains identical in respect to
quality, it does not nevertheless become different from what it was,
in respect to quantity, and it remains identical only in respect to
quality, which differs from quantity. What shall we answer to those who
insist that the soul is a body? Will they say that, in the same body,
each part possesses the same quality as the total soul, and that the
case is similar with the part of a part? Then quantity is no longer
essential to the nature of the soul; which contradicts the hypothesis
that the soul needed to possess a definite magnitude. Besides the soul
is everywhere entire; now it is impossible for a body to be entire in
several places simultaneously, or have parts identical to the whole.
If we refuse the name of soul to each part, the soul is then composed
of inanimate parts. Besides, if the soul is a definite magnitude, she
cannot increase or diminish without ceasing to be a soul; but it often
happens that from a single conception or from a single germ are born
two or more beings, as is seen in certain animals in whom the germs
divide;[52] in this case, each part is equal to the whole. However
superficially considered, this fact demonstrates that the principle
in which the part is equal to the whole is essentially superior to
quantity, and must necessarily lack any kind of quantity. On this
condition alone can the soul remain identical when the body loses its
quantity, because she has need of no mass, no quantity, and because her
essence is of an entirely different nature. The soul and the (seminal)
reasons therefore possess no extension.