(The Stoics), like almost everybody, insist that visual beauty consists
in the proportion of the parts relatively to each other and to the
whole, joined to the grace of colors. If then, as in this case,
the beauty of bodies in general consists in the symmetry and just
proportion of their parts, beauty could not consist of anything simple,
and necessarily could not appear in anything but what was compound.
Only the totality will be beautiful; the parts by themselves will
possess no beauty; they will be beautiful only by their relation with
the totality. Nevertheless, if the totality is beautiful, it would seem
also necessary that the parts be beautiful; for indeed beauty could
never result from the assemblage of ugly things. Beauty must therefore
be spread among all the parts. According to the same doctrine, the
colors which, like sunlight, are beautiful, are beautiful but simple,
and those whose beauty is not derived from proportion, will also be
excluded from the domain of beauty. According to this hypothesis, how
will gold be beautiful? The brilliant lightning in the night, even
the stars, would not be beautiful to contemplate. In the sphere of
sounds, also, it would be necessary to insist that what is simple
possesses no beauty. Still, in a beautiful harmony, every sound, even
when isolated, is beautiful. While preserving the same proportions, the
same countenance seems at one time beautiful, and at another ugly.
Evidently, there is but one conclusion: namely, that proportion is
not beauty itself, but that it derives its beauty from some superior
principle. (This will appear more clearly from further examples). Let
us examine occupations and utterances. If also their beauty depended on
proportion, what would be the function of proportion when considering
occupations, laws, studies and sciences? Relations of proportion could
not obtain in scientific speculations; no, nor even in the mutual
agreement of these speculations. On the other hand, even bad things may
show a certain mutual agreement and harmony; as, for instance, were we
to assert that wisdom is softening of the brain, and that justice is a
generous folly. Here we have two revoltingly absurd statements, which
agree perfectly, and harmonize mutually. Further, every virtue is a
soul-beauty far truer than any that we have till now examined; yet it
could not admit of proportion, as it involves neither size nor number.
Again, granting that the soul is divided into several faculties, who
will undertake to decide which combination of these faculties, or of
the speculations to which the soul devotes itself, will produce beauty?
Moreover (if beauty is but proportion), what beauty could be predicated
of pure intelligence?