DURING A HALF CENTURY OF DEPRESSION
In 1866, just after the end of the Civil War, the American steam
fleet registered for foreign trade, measured 198,289 tons. The steam
vessels enrolled for coasting traffic measured 885,223 tons. In 1879
the steam tonnage in the foreign trade had fallen to 156,323, while
the coasting tonnage had passed the million mark. In 1896 the coasting
fleets measured more than 2,000,000 tons, while the foreign trade ships
measured 264,289 tons. In 1908 the coasting steamers reached a tonnage of
4,055,295,--double the figures of 1896, and the registered tonnage was
598,737,--more than double that of 1896, but so far below that of the
coasting tonnage as to warrant a serious inquiry into the causes which
had created the contrast.
[Illustration: Four-master _DIRIGO_
First steel ship built in the United States]
Before entering into this inquiry, however, it will be of interest to
consider several features of the growth of the coasting traffic. First
note that the cheap rates of transportation afforded by the ships running
from such Southern ports as Savannah, Charleston, and Norfolk to Boston
and New York have had a most remarkable influence upon the agriculture
of the Southern coast States. Where once cotton only was raised, or
cotton and tobacco, the land-owners are producing cargoes of vegetables
at a season when such truck can be produced at the North only by the use
of hothouses. The health of millions of people at the North, and the
prosperity of other millions at the South, have been greatly promoted
by the coasting steamers. At the same time the coast lines of railroads,
to secure a share of the traffic which was originated by steamers, have
improved their service so far that strawberries and string beans have
right of way over passengers.
A natural evolution of traffic alongshore has been seen in the extension,
so to speak, of the railroads across both salt and fresh water. Soon
after the Boston and Providence Railroad was opened (June 15, 1835),
its directors made an agreement with a line of steamers to New York
under which the vessels of rival lines were excluded from the terminal
facilities of the railroad, and the passengers from the rival lines had to
wait hours for a train on which to continue their journey. In 1845 Daniel
Drew, a director of the Providence and Stonington Railroad, became the
president of the line of steamers running from Stonington to New York,
and the two companies, for the purposes of traffic, were operated as one.
The railroads that terminated on the shores of Lake Erie engaged in the
Lake traffic at an early date by establishing ship lines that gathered
freight at all Lake ports of importance for transportation to the East,
and, of course, carried the traffic from the East to the farthest points
on the Lakes. These steamers had a marked influence on the development of
the West. Of such lines as that which runs from Galveston and New Orleans
to New York in connection with the Southern Pacific Railroad, only mention
need be made, but the fact that the extension of railroads in this way
across wide stretches of the waters of the country, has had a marked
influence upon the prosperity of the country as well as upon that of the
railroads, is memorable.
Another notable feature of the coasting trade is a revival of the old
system, practised by such merchants as Derby, of Salem, when they built
ships especially to carry their own goods to market. Thus, when petroleum
was found in Texas, the Standard Oil Company built many vessels to carry
the crude oil from the wells to the refineries at New York. The oil was
taken through pipes from the wells to the ship, and it was pumped from the
ship into tanks at the refineries. With the aid of such port facilities
the cost of transportation was reduced to the lowest figure.
The United States Steel Corporation, owning ore beds near Lake Superior
and mills near Pittsburg, built a fleet of ships to carry the ore to
points on Lake Erie whence it could be shipped on a private railroad
to the mills. The ore in the beds was scooped up with steam shovels and
dumped into cars, by which it was transported to high trestles on the edge
of the harbor. On the trestles it was dumped into pockets, from which it
fell through chutes into the vessel, the hatches of which were spaced to
correspond with the spaces of the chutes. A cargo of more than 10,000 tons
has been loaded in two hours. At the port of discharge other scoops (a
sort of dredge), made to operate through the hatches, lift the cargo out
of the ship at a rate of more than a thousand tons an hour.
The great coal companies of the East deliver their coal in similar pockets
on the coast, but they transport a large portion of it thence to the
consumer by means of tugs and barges. In proportion to the coal carried,
the tug-and-barge system costs less than cargo-carrying steamers. The
tugs, with their high-priced crews, are kept moving; they tow the barges
in "strings" to their destinations, dropping one here and another there,
until the last is at the pier. Then they return, picking up the barges
that have been unloaded, and take them to the pockets for more coal. The
barges have small crews of low-priced men. The expense of waiting for
the discharge of the coal is therefore less than if a steamer had carried
the coal; it is even less than the expense of a schooner lying thus. The
systems of handling cargoes in coarse freight trades of the American coast
are, perhaps, the most perfect in the world.
Naturally, extensions of the railroad lines have been made across deep
water. The Pennsylvania Railroad established the American line from
Philadelphia to Liverpool in 1871. The Baltimore and Ohio established
the Atlantic Transport line to Europe. The Louisville and Nashville
created lines from Pensacola to several countries, including Japan and
China. The Illinois Central has lines from New Orleans. The Occidental
and Oriental Steamship Company was organized to carry the freight of the
Pacific railroads from San Francisco to the Far East. Near the end of
the nineteenth century the Southern Pacific Railroad bought an interest
in the Pacific Mail. The Northern Pacific was served for years by the
Boston Steamship Company, and the Great Northern Railroad built two of the
largest cargo carriers in the world for an extension of service across the
Pacific. Most of the ships in these extensions of railroads have been of
American build.
In oversea traffic the through bills of lading and special terminal
facilities gave the ships owned by railroads special advantages in the
world's traffic. A great corporation is able to purchase supplies at the
lowest prices. Further than that, it is not infrequently advisable to
carry freight on ships at an actual loss in order to provide freight for
the cars in which it can be carried with profit.
Another American adventure at sea that is of interest here was the
evolution of the United Fruit Company. Individual dealers in perishable
products of the tropics found it profitable to unite in gathering bananas
and other fruits, and in chartering ships to bring them to the United
States. As the business continued to increase, the need of swift ships,
and for fittings to preserve the fruit in the best condition, led to the
building of special kinds of ships (chiefly under foreign flags) and of
machinery for loading and unloading the cargoes at the terminals. In the
meantime, the speedy ships employed had proved attractive to passengers,
and because passengers could be carried without decreasing the efficiency
of the ships as fruit carriers, efforts were made to increase this branch
of the traffic. In time the company built hotels for the comfort of
the passengers at points in the tropics where a comfortable hotel was a
surprise to the experienced traveller. Then because the well-contented
fruit farmers of the tropics were unwilling to keep up with the demands of
the trade in either the quantity or the quality of the fruit, the company
bought land and produced the cargoes needed by their ships.
The Standard Oil Company employs nearly a hundred ships (chiefly under
foreign flags), which it has built for the purpose, to transport its
products to foreign countries. And there are other corporations that own
ships as parts of their business equipment.
These American enterprises are of the utmost importance to the story of
the American merchant marine, because they are the most modern features of
our water-borne traffic. The great corporation is doing an _ever growing_
share of the world's work, and the growth is an economic evolution that
must be forwarded as well as controlled. In spite of the prevailing fear
of great aggregations of wealth, it is worth while to inquire whether a
further combination of corporate interests might not help on a revival
of the American merchant marine. Suppose that a ship-building "trust"
were united with the steel-making "trust" and the aggregation were to
make a traffic agreement with a combination of railroads extending from
the Atlantic to the Pacific, under which special low freight rates were
obtainable; is it not conceivable that this powerful corporation might
solve the problem of ships able to compete on deep water? Although the law
now prohibits such combinations as this, may we not hope that the American
people will yet learn how to preserve themselves from oppression, and the
fear of it, without hampering the men who are able and eager to do the
world's work on the world's terms?
In any consideration of a revival of the American merchant marine, it
is necessary to view candidly the conditions which our ships must face.
Emphasis is laid upon the need of candor, because in such discussions
of the matter as have been had in periodicals, and before committees of
Congress, the plainest facts of history have been frequently misstated,
and, at times, deliberately misrepresented. If one-half the ingenuity
and energy that have been used in arguing for the subsidy policy had been
expended in evolving a revolution-making type of ship, we should have had,
long since, a merchant marine worthy of the flag. Further than that, while
an appeal to sentiment is justified, the matter ought to be viewed first
as a cold matter of business.
Is the deep-water carrying trade worth the attention of American
capitalists? It is a curious fact that in the hearings before the
committees of Congress that have investigated the state of our shipping
since the Civil War, not one word has been said about the dividends paid
by the ocean carriers of the world. The reports of the committees assume
that there is great profit in such shipping. One adroit advocate of the
subsidy system says "the European steamship combinations ... now derive
an income of about $200,000,000 a year from their control of our carrying
trade" (_Atlantic Monthly_, October, 1909), leaving the reader to suppose
that that great sum is divided as net profits.
As a matter of fact, the International Mercantile Marine Company, one
of the larger corporations thus engaged (it is largely in the hands of
American capitalists, too), has paid no dividends as yet (1909), and
even its bonds sell below par. When the Cunard Company wished to build
two ships to excel the swiftest of the German liners, it was unable
to do so until the British government loaned it the necessary capital
under conditions that amounted to a gift of the total cost of the ships.
According to the _Financial Times_ (London), dated Wednesday, April 14,
1909, the highest dividend paid by this most highly favored of all the
British subsidized lines during the last fourteen years (1895-1908) was 8
per cent, which was distributed in 1900. The average distribution for the
fourteen years has been 3.17 per cent a year. In 1895, instead of making
a profit, the company lost £40,000. In 1904 there was a loss of £66,700.
In 1908, while operating the two splendid and thoroughly well-advertised
record breakers which it had received as a free gift from the British
government (the _Mauretania_ and _Lusitania_), it made the enormous loss
of £249,800. A letter from the company to the writer admits that these
figures are correct.
Said James A. Patton, then one of the foremost grain exporters of the
United States, in a hearing before the Merchant Marine Commission of
Congress in 1904 (Sen. Rep. 2755, 58 Cong. 3 sess. p. 714):--
"The ocean freight market has been so low during the past two years that
at times the ship agents have offered to transport grain to Liverpool and
London for nothing, to take it as ballast. Recently we have shipped corn
from Boston to London at a price less than that ... less than nothing,
owing to duties the port dues in London, which absorbed more than the
freight rate received."
The conditions described by Mr. Patton are out of the ordinary, of course,
but conditions which have kept the dividends of the well-subsidized Cunard
Company under 3 per cent have prevailed for thirteen years. The company
was able to earn the 8 per cent dividend in 1900 only because the war
with the Boers created an extraordinary demand for ships to be used as
transports, and these having been taken from the general carrying-trade
freight rates rose to an abnormal point. Leaving out the abnormal dividend
of 1900, the average distribution has been but 2.8 per cent.
The ocean carrying-trade is performed by two distinct classes of services;
the line traffic, like that of the Cunard Company, and the independent
cargo carrier or tramp service. The tramp will go anywhere and at any time
for a charter price. The income received by the tramps is as uncertain
as that of a prospector in the mining region. In spite of the ease with
which the demand for tonnage is telegraphed around the world the tramps
accumulate on this or that coast in numbers far beyond all needs of the
trade, and rates drop to a point where many of them are glad to get away
in ballast. At such a time, however, a lucky (perhaps a far-seeing) owner
has a ship at a port barren of tonnage, and receives for a cargo that must
go quickly a price that pays half the cost of the ship. It is the lucky
stroke that keeps the seafaring people hoping against hope, just as the
prospector remembers how Creede, of Colorado, made a million out of the
Amethyst.
Then consider the effect of the tides in the business world upon the
carrying-trade. After the war with the Boers the freight rates went to
pieces. Owners ceased building new tonnage. The ship-builders, to keep
their forces together, offered to construct the best of modern vessels at
cost of construction. Thereupon new capital came into the trade, and some
men of experience also placed orders. In this way an excess of tonnage
was kept afloat. Meantime much old tonnage in the progressive countries
like England and Germany was placed on the market at forced sale, and
these ships were bought by continental owners who patched them up ("cheap
repairs for the cheap ones"), and sent them, with cheap crews, looking for
cargoes. It must be kept in mind that Chinese owners, who can hire stokers
at $6 a month, are competing in the world's traffic, as well as owners
who have to pay $40 a month for the same kind of work. Where the Chinese
owner can make money, and the owner of the best of modern freighters can
live, and even make a lucky stroke, now and then, the owner of the average
tramp keeps her running because the losses while she is in commission are
less than when she is laid up in ordinary. The tramp traffic is precisely
like mining in that the luck of the few keeps the many trying. Moreover
the trend of business has been, for some time, away from tramps and into
regular line ships, and that is a fact worth serious consideration.
The average profit of the lines of steamers is well set forth in the
statement of the Cunard Company, unless, indeed, that statement is more
favorable than the average facts warrant. The Hamburg-American Line
dividends during the past fourteen years have averaged 5¾ per cent per
annum, and it is likely that but one other ship-owning corporation has
done as well on deep water. It is a world's traffic even for a line that
plies between New York and Liverpool only. The price that a Swedish tramp
will accept for wheat in the River Plate, and the rate which the Japanese
will accept on the coast of China, both affect the North German Lloyd at
Bremen. A few lines, especially those having special trades, make good
dividends. The United Fruit Company's ships are among the exceptions
because of the peculiarities of the business. But every ship-owner knows
that on the average there is no great part of the world's work that pays
smaller dividends than carrying cargoes across deep water.
The people of the United States, before taxing themselves to add to the
congestion upon the high seas, should ask themselves whether success, when
attained, will be worth the cost. Would a sensible American farmer, able
to earn $3 a day grafting orchards, work overtime in order to compete with
a foreign ditch digger receiving $1.50?
If we decide to make the fight for a share of the business of the sea
it will then be of the utmost importance to consider the strength of
the opposition to be overcome. In this inquiry no account will be taken
of ships of the sail. For while schooners fit to carry from 3000 up to
perhaps 10,000 tons' dead weight came into use in the coast coal trade
at the end of the nineteenth century, and proved profitable, it is absurd
to think of any kind of sailing ship in connection with future traffic on
deep water.
According to the last Report of the Commissioner of Navigation (1908), the
United Kingdom had, in 1907, 4105 steamships, measuring 9,156,356 tons,
with crews aggregating 185,867 men (this "includes masters as well as
Asiatics and Lascars"), in the foreign trade, besides 239 ships of 240,983
tons, manned by 5362 men, engaged partly in the home, and partly in the
foreign, trade. The tonnage of 1907 was about four times as great as it
was in 1880.
The German Empire had, in 1908, 2521 steamships, of 4,070,242 tons, manned
by 65,568 men. This tonnage was twice as large as the tonnage of 1900.
In 1908 the Japanese had 626 steamships of 1,076,070 tons, which was twice
the tonnage registered in 1900. The number of men in the fleet is not
given, but it was at least 16,000.
The steamships of the world, exclusive of those of the United States,
measured, in 1906, more than 30,000,000 tons. Perhaps 800,000 men were
employed on these ships, and there was an experienced force of owners and
managers on shore to look after the interests of the fleet.
The quality of this vast sea power must now be considered. In this
point of view it is a most discouraging fact that about all important
improvements of recent years in the steam engine have been made by
Europeans. Between 1855 and 1865 steam pressures in boilers ranged from
20 to 35 pounds per square inch, and the consumption of fuel was about
3 pounds per horse-power-hour. Compound engines came into general use
between 1865 and 1875, when boiler pressures rose to 125 pounds, and the
consumption of fuel decreased to 2.2 pounds and even less. Between 1885
and 1895 twin screws and quadruple expansion engines were adopted for the
swiftest ships, and the improved engines were used on many cargo carriers.
Boiler pressures reached 225 pounds and upward, and the coal consumption
dropped as low as 1.4 pounds. Then came the far-reaching change to the
steam turbine, on ships of 14 knots and upward. For slower ships the
turbine in combination with reciprocating engines has been found more
efficient than the old-style engines, while a combination of the turbine
with the dynamo for still slower ships is now in hand and sure to make
headway. In all these matters Europe has taken the lead.
In the turbine, with its combinations, it is believed that the
steam-engine reaches its highest possible efficiency, just as sails
reached their highest efficiency as used on the American clipper. But
a new machine, still more economical, has been invented--the gas motor.
Coal is used for the generation of gas, which drives internal-combustion
motors, much like those seen on automobiles. The consumption of fuel is
thereby reduced far below that of steam engines.
While the marine steam-engine has been perfected in Europe, it is
worth noting by the way that the producer-gas engine, though yet in the
experimental stage for ship use, has been brought to a higher state of
perfection for land use in America than in Europe. Magazine articles by
marine engineers have been published, urging American ship-owners to adopt
this new method of propulsion, because it is to make a revolution almost
as far-reaching as the iron screw steamer made in 1855. But the American
ship-owner refuses to see his opportunity. Having certain profits with
old-style engines in the coasting trade, he is willing to let foreigners
do the experimenting.
All of this is to say that the ship-owners of foreign countries are at
least as far-sighted and enterprising as those of the United States.
Some of the facts in the story of our coasting steamer trade are
of interest in this point of view. The most interesting division of
this fleet is found upon the Great Lakes. The screw propeller and the
compound engine were successfully introduced on the Great Lakes before
1850--several years before the iron screw steamer of the British began its
deadly inroads upon our salt-water trade--but the Atlantic coast remained
indifferent.
After the Civil War tugs came into use for towing the sailing vessels
through the Detroit and Huron rivers, and from these the use of barges in
"strings" behind steamers that carried cargoes as well as served as tugs,
was developed. This system ruled upon the lakes until the evolution of the
iron ore trade led to the building of ships so large that they were unable
to handle barges. In 1902 the ship able to carry 10,000 tons arrived.
Still larger ships have been built since 1902. A ship that can carry
12,000 tons' dead weight needs but thirty-five men, all told. The average
cost of carrying freight on the best ships of the lakes is less than .8 of
a mill per ton-mile. Through natural development this splendid efficiency
has been attained, and the fleet in 1908 numbered 1942 ships measuring
2,341,686 tons.
[Illustration: Seven-masted Schooner _THOMAS LAWSON_]
A feature of these ships to be considered is that they are all built for
passing through certain shoal channels, the Welland Canal, and the canal
at the rapids at the outlet of Lake Superior, for example. These channels
have compelled the designers to adopt one cross-section of hull for all
ships (at least below the water-line), and that cross-section is the
largest that will pass through the channels. Because of this similarity
of models the lake builders have been able to carry specialization in
the work of construction as far as any builders in the world, and much
further than it is carried in the Atlantic coast yards, where builders
may have a battleship, a harbor tug, and a side-wheel passenger boat on
adjoining ways. The lake ships can be built for the lowest price of any
in the United States.
Contemplation of these facts, and upon the further fact that lake
engineers seemed to be about the best the world had ever seen, led the
lake capitalists to organize the American Navigation Company, which built
two large cargo carriers, sent them down to salt water, and entered the
general cargo trade. Those vessels were among the most economical ever
built in the United States, all things considered, _but they were unable
to compete with the European ship_.
A story told by A. B. Wolvin to the Merchant Marine Commission is
significant here. A company of which he was president operated a line of
steamers from Duluth and Chicago to Montreal and Quebec. The steamers
numbered ten of the maximum size for passage through the Welland
Canal--250 by 42 feet large, with a draft of fourteen feet, and a
carrying capacity of 2200 tons. The cost of these ships, built under the
best American conditions of specialization, was $140,000 each, and the
operating expense was $135 a day each. While the company was engaged in
its work, a steamship man from Sweden came and offered to put on twelve
ships of the same size, each at a charter price of $2900 per month. His
ships cost but $90,000 each, and the wages of crew and other operating
expenses were so much lower than the American standard that he could make
money at a charter price of $1000 a month less than the cost of operating
the American ships. Having used these Swedish ships long enough to know
them (for it was necessary to accept the offer to keep the Swede from
starting in opposition), Captain Wolvin testified:--
"They are better from the standpoint of construction.... The vessels carry
well; they run well. We have no trouble with the crews."
The crew of the Swedish ship numbered seventeen; that of the American,
twenty-two. And the Swedish wage was far less.
The bearing of these facts in any consideration of the power of the
ship-owners who are now in control of the deep water traffic of the world
is obvious.
Other views of the world's carrying trade are of interest here. The
Hamburg-American Company runs steamships in sixty-eight different lines.
There is a line of its ships from Europe to each port of importance from
Montreal to Newport News. It maintains other lines to the important ports
of the West Indies, to Ports Limon and Colon on the narrow mainland, and
to every important port on the north, the east, and the west coasts of
South America. It reaches nearly every port of importance on the coasts
of Europe, and down the west coast of Africa. Indeed, on the west coast
of Africa the natives see two German steamers to one under the British
flag. It sends other ships through the Suez Canal to skirt the coast of
Asia as far as Vladivostok; it maintains cargo gatherers among the islands
along shore, and then, from Japan, it reaches across to Portland, Oregon,
where it connects with our Northern Pacific Railroad. It runs every kind
of ship from the 23-knot passenger packet to the economical cargo carrier
that uses perhaps little more than ten tons of coal a day. The traffic
of the world is, in a way, within the touch of this one corporation. The
worldwide tides of commerce are felt and noted daily in the home office,
and while losses are suffered, here and there, through depressions in
business, _or through competition_, the profit made by the vast fleet as
a whole is sufficient to yield regularly the modest dividends that satisfy
the owners.
The fact that the powerful North German Lloyd is allied with the
Hamburg-American in all matters that affect German commerce and trade is
also a matter of interest in this place.
To show now how an effort to force a new company into an established trade
affects freight rates, it is necessary only to refer to such an instance
as the "war" that prevailed in the trade from New York to South Africa in
1902. As Smith notes in _The Ocean Carrier_, the rival steamships lost
from $10,000 to $15,000 on every trip. Moreover, the low rates were of
no advantage to commerce, for commerce demands stability first of all.
It is worth noting, too, by the way, that in the course of this war,
goods were carried by English steamers from New York to Africa for less
than was charged by the same companies on ships from London to the same
destination.
When American capitalists tried to establish a line of ships from New York
to Brazil some years ago, the venture failed. One reason for this was
the higher cost of American ships and crews. Another was extravagance,
especially in providing terminal facilities at Rio de Janeiro. Old
merchants in Brazil still smile when they talk of what the American
line did in that way. But the most important reason for failure was the
advantage enjoyed by British rivals in the triangular line route followed
by their steamers. In the currents of commerce on the Atlantic the British
manufacturer ships large quantities of goods to South America, the South
American producer ships large quantities of coffee to the United States,
and the American producer ships large quantities of food-stuffs to Great
Britain. The British ships had profitable cargoes from home to Brazil. At
Rio de Janeiro and Santos they cut the rates far below cost, and then on
arrival in the United States they secured cargoes for home at a profitable
rate. The profits on the two trips enabled them to endure the cut on the
middle passage. But because American manufacturers had little to ship to
Brazil the American ship lost money on both passages.
Every business man understands the advantages of one who is
well-established in any trade, over one who is just beginning, but one
method by which established lines of ships hold their trade must have
mention. The merchant who sends all his goods by the established line
receives a rebate of 10 per cent on the amount of his freight bill, the
rebate being calculated once in six months, say, and the payment being
made six months later. If the merchant ships an ounce of stuff by a rival
line he loses all the rebate, and he may be punished in addition, if the
rival is a new line. The merchant, having rivals in trade, feels the loss
of the rebate seriously; his rivals by loyalty to the established line
continue to enjoy the rebate even when rates are cut below those of the
new line, and below cost. In such trades as that between New York and
Rio de Janeiro, where a number of lines are plying, the established lines
unite their entire resources to kill off a new line trying to enter the
trade.
When the American people have before them any proposition for the revival
of the American merchant marine, they should keep in mind that ships
designed for the purpose and at least in sufficient numbers, are afloat
in every trade of the world; that the freight rates are maintained
at a point where the profits are as low as any afforded by any branch
of the world's work; that the men doing the work have been developed
with the steam carrying trade, just as the splendid American sailor of
the sail was developed by his environment, and they are therefore at
once well-informed, alert, enterprising, resourceful, persistent, and
merciless. Observe, too, that in the work of the high seas man faces
primeval conditions, brute force prevails as nowhere else, and the fittest
survives.
Perhaps a definition of terms is needed here. By fitness we mean the
ability to do the world's work on the terms which the world offers.
We have learned to build bridges and locomotives on those terms, but,
in spite of the fact that our ship-builders and ship-owners are fully
protected in the "home market," they have not yet learned how to combine
the locomotive and the bridge into a ship fit to compete with the
unsubsidized ships--the cargo carriers--now in the world's traffic.
In connection with the known degree of efficiency of the world's merchant
marine, as now afloat, consider a statement that can be found on page
1248 of the _Report of the Merchant Marine Commission_. It is, perhaps,
the most discouraging statement that has been made in connection with our
merchant marine.
"The statistics of loss of ships at sea afford matter for reflection....
They show, as the United States Commissioner of Navigation has summarized
them, that out of every 100 American seagoing steamships over 100 tons,
for the past seven years, on the average 2.24 have been lost each year;
that out of every 100 foreign seagoing steamers over 100 tons, for the
same period on the average 1.98 have been lost each year." (See also An.
Rep. Com. Nav., 1904, p. 19.)
[Illustration: A Modern Clipper Ship and a Modern Brig
By courtesy of _Munsey's Magazine_]
When American ships were supreme they were insured at a less rate than
those of any other nation, and the insurance was placed, to a large
extent, in England. Because the American sailor of the sail, who had
been evolved by 200 years of American environment, was able to handle his
ship better than any other, he paid lower premiums to the underwriters.
But if this be true (and no one disputes it), it follows that the higher
percentage of losses among modern American steamers proves that the
American environment, since the steamer era, has produced a steamship
sailor who is less efficient in his work than our old-time sailor of the
sail was in his, and less efficient, too, than the foreign steamship
sailor of the present day. It is an important fact that a man may win
laurels upon the weather yard-arm in reefing topsails and yet be of no
particular value as an oiler or an assistant engineer in the engine-room.
At any rate, any effort to revive the American merchant marine will have
to be made in the face of the record of American losses, and the influence
of that record upon insurance rates.
Then in spite of the "boundless resources of our country," and "the
intelligence of the masses," and a "protective tariff" of twenty-five
cents a bushel, the farmers of "the overcrowded nations of Europe" are
able to sell potatoes in New York at a profit. And millions of dollars'
worth of factory goods made in Europe pay ocean freights, pay the
tariff tax, pay the commissions of agents, pay the freight rates on our
railroads, pay the margin of our retail merchants, and are then sold at
our doors in competition with the products of our workmen.
The fact that the tariff wall fails to keep out foreign goods is a matter
for serious attention in every point of view, but it seems especially
necessary here to consider the influence of "protection," as it is called,
upon those features of American character which we call self-reliance and
the spirit of enterprise. Under the prevailing system how is it possible
for the American people to develop the aggressive manhood that is needed?
One other feature of the opposition that will be encountered in any effort
to create a new American merchant marine is yet to be described--the
support which the existing carriers will receive from their governments
during the conflict; but before that is considered it may be well to
review the means by which it has been proposed to increase our shipping.
Naturally a people accustomed to "protection"--a people who make boast of
a system that is at best a confession of a lack of ability to meet open
competition--have turned, first of all, to "government aid."
Among the first provisions of Congress for the benefit of American
shipping after the adoption of the Constitution was a 10 per cent
discriminating duty on all goods imported in foreign ships. It is
asserted that this discriminating duty supplied our ships with cargoes
from foreign ports to American, and was thus a feasible and satisfactory
"protection." A 10 per cent duty amounted then, and it would amount now,
to more than the whole freight, upon some goods. It is also asserted that
this discrimination was made in order to "protect" our shipping. But in an
extended argument, which was made before the Merchant Marine Commission
(in the _Report_ of which the curious reader can find it), by Hon. E.
T. Chamberlain, Commissioner of Navigation, it was proved that "in the
minds of those that applied" it (Jefferson, Clay, Gallatin, John Quincy
Adams, etc.), the law was provided as a means of retaliation only--for
the purpose of preventing discrimination against American shipping. The
fact that our government anxiously strove from the first to secure fair
reciprocity confirms this view. Further confirmation is found in the
fact that our old-time ship-owners were unanimous in their support of the
government in its efforts to secure reciprocity.
Those who advocate the policy of discrimination for modern application
assert that our shipping reached supremacy at sea while the discriminating
policy prevailed as to Great Britain, and that is true, because the
British did not accept our offers of reciprocity until 1849. But the
assertion that our shipping became supreme _because_ of this policy
is made only by those who are unable to appreciate in full the facts
of the case. For our ships that were engaged in the trades between
foreign countries, beyond the reach of any "protection" afforded by
"discrimination" or any other artificial stimulation, at one time measured
a million tons. Why were those ships favored beyond all others by the
merchants who loaded them? Why did merchants of rival nations--why did
the British merchants, for instance--charter these "Yankee" ships, if it
were not because they were the most efficient in the world?
It is a slander upon the American sailor of the sail to say that he won
the long pennant through coddling.
As a system for modern adoption "discrimination" is objectionable for
three reasons. One is that it provides at best for keeping our ships in
trades between home and foreign ports only; it does not provide for trade
between foreign ports. Next it is a system for supporting ships that are
confessedly inferior to those already in the trades--it places a premium
upon inefficiency. Last of all it is a system that must excite all foreign
governments to retaliation; and that those governments will be eager to
retaliate, and that they will find ways enough for doing so, is beyond
doubt. In connection with this statement it is necessary to keep in mind
that we shall soon cease to export wheat in any form, and the growth of
population is so great that we shall soon cease to export other, perhaps
all other, food products. Before inviting retaliation we must look ahead.
Indirect discrimination has been proposed. Under this the ships of any
country were to be permitted to bring in without discrimination goods
produced under their flag; but goods brought from any other country were
to be subjected to a discriminating tax. Any analysis of our imports,
however, shows that if British goods were taxed when brought here in any
but British ships, all such goods would be forced into British ships at
once, to the great advantage of the British shipping. They could not at
present, nor for years to come, be forced into American cargo carriers.
As the system would in like manner help German shipping, the policy would
but make our task the harder.
Before considering the policy of paying direct subsidies a glance at the
oft-repeated assertion that our shipping is "our one unprotected industry"
seems necessary. What does "protection" provide for any industry, or what
does it pretend to provide? Simply the home market--this and nothing more,
at best. This is done by laying a tariff upon imports. But the American
shipping is now and always has been protected that far--absolutely
protected, in fact, by prohibition. The importation of ships has been
forbidden, and the use of foreign ships in the "home market" has been
reserved to home-built ships for nearly 100 years. If "protection" could
enable any industry to expand from the "home market" to the foreign, then
the coasting trade industry should have expanded long since over all the
world. Unhappily, however, the profit found in well-protected industries
does but tend to make the beneficiaries contented, and willing to let well
enough alone.
Ever since the Civil War efforts have been made to induce Congress to
modify the navigation laws far enough to enable Americans to buy ships
in the cheapest market and sail them under the flag. It is said that this
would give our shipyards so much employment in repairing the foreign fleet
so to be purchased that our builders would soon learn how to set afloat
ships as cheap as any in the world. It is not easy to treat seriously
one who supposes that repairing tramps would develop the distinctive
type of ship able to produce results in ton-miles, which is imperatively
needed; but when it is remembered that free trade in ships quickly drove
the British from the sailing ship to the screw steamer, the proposition
looks attractive. For free trade--the necessity of swimming unaided in
rough water or drowning--might compel the American builder to produce the
revolution-making ship for which we are to hope.
We now come to the policy of paying direct bounties as a means of creating
a merchant marine; and nowhere are candor and accuracy of statement more
important.
Bounties were paid in the colonial days. Virginia gave a subsidy of
tobacco to induce her people to build ships, and they built one ship. When
the whale fishery was depressed, just after the Revolution, Massachusetts
gave a bounty on Massachusetts oil, with the result that the market was
flooded, and the fishery was depressed more than ever. In spite of a
bounty paid on oil by Rhode Island, her sailors continued to favor the
slave-trade. For some reason those who favor subsidies as a means of
reviving our shipping never quote these facts.
Of the effect of subsidies upon the Collins Line and of other subsidies,
something has already been said. The first grant to the Cunard Company
was made for military and diplomatic purposes only, but when subsidized
American ships appeared, the Cunard grant was increased to maintain the
British flag in the trade. That is a fact beyond dispute.
It is manifest that the subsidy was of benefit to the receiver. It helped
the company to build improved ships. It gave the builders some experience.
It provided schools for the instruction of seamen in the art of handling
steamships. The subsidizing of the Royal Mail, and of the lines to other
parts of the world, where private enterprise was unequal to the occasion,
created an increase of commerce as well as some addition to the shipping
of the country.
With equal candor the evils of the system apparent in those days ought
to be told. The subsidized Cunarders not only drove off the American
subsidized lines but they drove away the unsubsidized Great Western line.
_They depressed all British shipping that entered the trade to New York
and Boston._ If they had had a larger subsidy they would have spread to
Philadelphia, and thus would have prevented or delayed the establishment
of the Inman Line. The British shipping in the trade to the northern ports
of America was not increased by the subsidy to the Cunard Company; it was,
on the contrary, restricted. Paying a subsidy to establish a line where
no steamers had traded before, and none could trade without government
aid, was a very different thing from forcing a new line of steamers into
trade already supplied with shipping, and even congested. Paying a fair
price per pound to a ship for carrying the mail ought not to be confused
with paying a subsidy. The first Cunard mail pay was not a subsidy; it
was a low price for the work done. Senator Rusk declared, in the document
already quoted, that the British Post Office Department "derived a _clear_
income of no less than $5,280,800" from the contract in the first six
years it was in force. After Collins began running his ships by aid of a
subsidy the British subsidized Cunard to enable him to compete.
When the Collins Line reduced freights from £7 10_s_ to £4, _commerce_
was certainly benefited, but the reduction was ruinous to _shipping_. It
was especially injurious to the American packet lines. The advent of the
subsidized Collins Line did more to injure the American _shipping_ of its
day than any other influence except that of the iron screw steamer.
Then the effect of admiralty supervision upon the subsidized ships
was an incubus upon progress. Naval men are usually conservative, and
conservatism often means stupidity. Thus, after the British _Dreadnought_
had demonstrated the efficiency of the turbine engine our American naval
engineers provided one battleship with turbines and another of the same
model with reciprocating engines in order to learn whether the turbine
was worth installing in future ships! The Cunard ships were built of
wood, long after iron was known to be a better material, because of naval
stupidity. Worse yet, when the requirements of the merchant service became
imperative the rules of the admiralty were evaded--ships were reported to
be fit for war cruisers when in fact they were useful as transports only.
After the Civil War, Congress provided subsidies by which a line from
New York to Rio Janeiro, another from San Francisco to China and Japan,
and a third from San Francisco to Hawaii, were established. Under these
contracts the policy did not have quite a fair trial. The beneficiaries
by activity in politics created so much opposition that the subsidies were
withdrawn before the effect was fully apparent.
By the Act of March 3, 1891, a subsidy was again provided under the thin
disguise of paying for carrying the mail--a reprehensible plan, because
if subsidies are justified, they ought to be paid openly. The fact is that
the methods of indirection employed by the advocates of subsidy have done
much to discredit their system. Under this act ships of 8000 tons and a
speed of 20 knots receive $4 a mile "by the shortest practicable route for
each outward voyage." Ships of 5000 tons and a speed of 16 knots receive
$2 a mile. Ships of 2500 tons and a speed of 14 knots receive $1 a mile,
while those of 1500 tons and a speed of 12 knots receive "two-thirds of
a dollar a mile." This act was designed to maintain lines of ships which
would be useful as scouts, transports, etc., in time of war.
Before stating the effect of this law upon American shipping, certain
facts in connection with the subsidizing of ships by the continental
nations of Europe will be useful. It is a curious fact that while
the annual reports of our Commissioner of Navigation have for years
given much space to the "progress" of the British, the German, and the
Japanese shipping, nothing has been said about the "progress" of the
shipping of France, of Italy, or Austria. The progress of the shipping
of England, Germany, and Japan is stated because government aid is given
to shipping in those countries and shipping makes progress; but in the
other countries, where still more liberal aid is given to shipping, no
progress worth mention is made. The annual report of the Commissioner of
Navigation is made a vehicle for the dissemination of arguments in favor
of the subsidy policy.
A candid examination of the policy of Germany shows that some aid has been
given to lines of ships in the form of liberal pay for carrying mails.
The North German Lloyd receives $1,330,420 per annum for its service to
China, Japan, Australia, and the German possessions in the Pacific. The
Germans thought it better policy to subsidize a line of merchantmen than
to maintain a line of transports to its colonies as the United States
has been doing in connection with the Philippines. The payment to the
North German Lloyd is properly called a subsidy; to give the name of
subsidy to all payments made to German steamers for carrying the mail is
to misrepresent the facts in a way that injures the cause of the subsidy
advocates materially in the eyes of all who know the facts.
The German railroads, which are owned by the government, not only give low
rates on goods intended for export, but extremely low rates are provided
for all materials used in building ships. The fact that special rates
on railroads are used to promote the German merchant marine is worth
serious consideration in the United States, even though such rates are
here viewed with suspicion. The national laws governing our railroads, as
enforced now (1910), are in some respects an incubus upon legitimate and
praiseworthy enterprise. Through ignorance and prejudice the efforts of
our transportation lines to increase our export trade have been seriously
hampered.
Unquestionably subsidies and special rates were provided to extend German
influence by means of shipping. The payment of bounties has been one
feature of the expansion of German shipping. To assert that the bounty
has been the sole, or even the chief, cause of that expansion, however,
is to misstate the facts. The experience of France, for instance, shows
conclusively that a subsidy in itself is not enough to create a merchant
marine. Although the French subsidy is so liberal that French cargo
carriers are able to sail half-way around the world in ballast to get
a cargo at rates that would be less than cost of maintenance for any
other ship, the French merchant marine grows so slowly as to justify the
assertion, made by the late Captain John Codman, that the French mariners
are working against a fiat of nature. The tonnage of 1881, 914,000, was
but 1,952,000 in 1908.
Further than that the German subsidies have been less than those paid
by the British (especially those paid to the Cunard Company), and yet
German steamers are steadily encroaching upon those of the British. The
reason for the progress of German shipping is readily found in the spirit
and habits of the people. Consider the work of the patient, spectacled
scientist in his laboratory--his methods and his aims; consider the growth
of the factory system; consider the effect of the training which all men
receive in the army or navy--how the whole people learn to move as one
man, and as comrades, for the attainment of a worthy national object;
consider how all the people--the men with the hoe as well as the men
behind the guns--are stirred by an attack, or a seeming attack, upon the
Fatherland.
The effect of government bounties upon German shipping is like that seen
when the spectacled German professor of agriculture applies inorganic
fertilizers to crops planted in well-cultivated, humus-filled soils. The
effect in France, and other nations not well prepared for expansion, is
like that when those fertilizers are applied to arid, acid, uncultivated
land. In Germany the soil for the production of shipping was in excellent
condition before the fertilizer was applied. What is the condition of that
soil in the United States?
The American subsidy law has been in operation since 1891. For the service
rendered it provides more liberal compensation than that given to any
German ship. The American Line (now operated as a part of the fleet of
the International Mercantile Marine Company), owns two American ships that
were built for the line and two British ships that were placed under the
American flag by special act of Congress. The subsidy maintains this line
in existence but does not increase it. The Mallory line has been extended
somewhat since the subsidy was given to it. Elsewhere ships that were
maintained under the subsidy have been driven from their route by foreign
competition. The ships run in connection with the Great Northern Railroad,
for instance, were unable to compete with the Japanese line between the
same ports, partly because the Japanese subsidy was more liberal, and
partly because of the greater expense of running American ships. In short,
the law of 1891 has failed to provide an American merchant marine.
Further measures for providing subsidies have therefore been proposed. The
Merchant Marine Commission, after a lengthened inquiry, offered a bill to
Congress which was to provide a line from "a port of the Atlantic coast of
the United States to Brazil," with "ships of not less than fourteen knots
speed," at a subsidy rate of $150,000 a year, "for a monthly service,"
or $300,000 for a fortnightly service. A similar line to the River Plate
was to receive $187,500 and $350,000 according to the service. The same
subsidy was to be paid to a 12-knot line to South Africa. Three lines from
Gulf ports to Cuba, Brazil, and Mexico were to be paid sums in proportion
to the service rendered, and three lines were to be provided for the
Pacific on similar terms.
In addition to providing these lines an attempt was to be made to set
afloat cargo carriers by giving an annual bounty of $5 a ton gross
measurement to all cargo ships continuously in service. On the whole ten
new lines of ships were to be established at an expense of $2,590,000,
and it was supposed that $10,000,000 might be the necessary limit of the
subsidy for the tramps. In the meantime it was supposed that the existing
lines working under the law of 1891 would continue in the service for the
compensation provided.
Passing over the claptrap in the bill about the use of these liners
as scouts,--fancy a 16-knot merchantman scouting around a squadron of
Dreadnoughts!--the bill ought to be considered on its merits because it
sets forth the amount of subsidy supposed to be sufficient to create a
real revival of our shipping, and thus gives an idea, perhaps, of what
sum would be adequate.
Accepting the Commission's statement that the subsidies would prove
sufficient to place the more expensive American ships upon an equality
with the foreign, and "a little more," as was said, it may be assumed that
the new lines would eventually employ sixty or seventy ships. At $5 a ton
the $10,000,000 might put afloat from 300 to 400 modern cargo carriers.
Thus we should, at best, about double our present registered fleet,
which, in 1908, numbered 478 ships. But if we compare that fleet with
the German, which now numbers more than 2500 ships, or with the British,
which now numbers more than 4000, we shall see that even under the best
circumstances we should yet be a far cry from the supremacy of which we
made boast in other days. Indeed, the fleet of liners would not number as
many ships as the Standard Oil Company now employs to carry abroad its
products, while the fleet of cargo carriers could not be compared, with
any satisfaction, to the fleet now in use by the allied German companies
of which mention has been made.
And the ships thus to be set afloat, as they crossed the seas, would
proclaim to the world that they were in the carrying trade, not by right
of efficiency, but by grace of a subsidy.
But now we are to consider whether any subsidy heretofore proposed would
really be sufficient to sustain either liner or tramp. The effect of such
ships upon freight rates, for instance, was stated before the Merchant
Marine Commission, by B. N. Baker, formerly president of the Atlantic
Transport Company, and an advocate of the subsidy system. He said:--
"If you added any more to the open sea traffic (the foreign traffic) of
the United States than 100,000 tons a year you would so demoralize the
general carrying business in rates, both as to freight and passengers, it
would be so unprofitable that no one could go into it, _unless you would
double, and triple that compensation_."
The effect of that building programme upon the organized mechanics of our
shipyards--the strikes for higher wages, and the consequent increase of
prices--need only be mentioned.
Then figure up the expense of the war between the lines from New York
to South Africa in 1902, wherein ships lost $15,000 in a single voyage.
Manifestly the American liners would need all of their subsidy ($15,625,
per voyage) to meet the reductions in freight rates which the opposition
would make. They would thus be no better off than they would be if
they were permitted to enter the trade on even terms with the present
lines--without war and without subsidy. The line to Brazil would yet have
to face the disadvantages due to the triangular service which British
ships maintain, though the decreasing exports of American food products
would reduce those disadvantages somewhat.
In short, one may well doubt whether the proposed subsidy would enable
our ships to overcome the opposition of the powerful foreign interests
that are already in the trade. But if we suppose it to suffice that
far, we have yet to inquire what the governments behind those powerful
corporations would do. Recall the story of the Cunarders _Mauretania_ and
_Lusitania_. The British government gave those two ships to the company
outright on the understanding that it should operate and maintain them
in a condition fit to cross the Atlantic at a speed of 25 knots an hour.
This was done at the time that American capitalists acquired control of
a number of British lines, under the name of the International Mercantile
Marine Company, and formed a working agreement with the two leading German
companies. This combination threatened British supremacy on the North
Atlantic, or was believed to threaten it, and the whole British nation
rose up to defend, figuratively speaking. If that were possible under
those circumstances, it is certain that the "subventions" now given to the
British lines would be increased the moment any American subsidized ships
began to cut into the British carrying trade. Increased subsidies would
then be needed by the American ships. If the American people were to enter
into a subsidy war it is likely that they could endure the strain longer
than any other nation; but is such a war worth while to secure a part in
a traffic that pays the well-subsidized Cunard line no higher profit than
2.8 per cent a year?
[Illustration: Cunard S. S. _LUSITANIA_
By courtesy of the Cunard Steamship Company]
One more argument in favor of subsidy is yet to be considered. With
the Panama Canal and the Monroe Doctrine to defend, it is necessary to
provide sufficient transports and colliers for the exigencies of war. The
spectacle of our splendid war fleet steaming around the world with its
fuel carried in ships under foreign flags, was humiliating to the nation.
Congress should build auxiliaries more rapidly by direct appropriation, or
it should give ample subsidies, however great the sums needed, to maintain
auxiliary ships in the merchant service. Many Americans would gladly pay
their share of the tax for the pleasure of seeing the American flag above
a ship's taffrail, now and then on salt water, in spite of the humiliation
of the fact that it was the tax and not efficiency that kept the flag in
place. A merchant fleet so provided would be a kind of insurance against
the exigencies of war, and even against war itself. With a thousand
American merchant ships afloat on deep water there would be less danger
of an aggressive nation of Europe invading Rio Grande do Sul or menacing
the Panama Canal.
Whether to provide the auxiliaries by direct appropriation or by subsidy
is, or should be, a question of relative expense and efficiency. Such a
question, one would think, might be solved by the rules of arithmetic;
at any rate it is not necessary in the discussion to misrepresent the
attitude of senators from Southern States, nor to say that the former
American supremacy was due to "protection" instead of the ability of the
sailor of the sail.
There are excellent and perhaps imperative diplomatic and military reasons
for maintaining at least one line of swift steamers from the Pacific coast
to the coast of Asia and the Philippine Islands. The ships of this line,
if established, should be fitted, as battleships are, for a cruising
speed of say sixteen knots, with a reserve of power for an emergency,
when they should be able to develop real scout speed--should be able
to run away from the modern twenty-one knot battleships. The value of a
fleet of ships of this kind, in a military point of view, and especially
upon the Pacific, is obvious. A dozen ships of the kind would not be too
many. A fleet of smaller ships, fit for use as naval colliers, might well
be maintained to gather and distribute cargo along the Asiatic coast and
among the islands. We have undertaken the work of developing civilization
in the Far East, and we need to do everything possible to prevent an
attack upon our position there. After squadrons of war-ships nothing
will create a higher respect for our flag among the people of that region
than a fleet of superior merchantmen _avowedly maintained for diplomatic
and military reasons_. In fact a fleet so maintained would impress other
peoples than those of the Far East.
The same argument may be made for the maintenance of swift lines to both
coasts of South America, where we have the Monroe Doctrine and the Panama
Canal to defend. If we establish these lines, a war of subsidies is to be
expected, and the well-established and powerful companies already in the
trades will be wholly unscrupulous in their opposition, not because their
present profits are high, but because they are low; a division of the
traffic will still further reduce the profits which are already too narrow
for comfort. We may be sure, too, that extravagance and inefficiency of
the Collins kind will be found in the management of some of our companies;
but as a diplomatic and military measure the experiment seems to be
worth making. We have a very good precedent in the action of Germany in
establishing a line to its Pacific possessions by a subsidy of a million
a year, which is given for the precise reasons urged herein. It will cost
the United States many times as much as it does Germany, but one who looks
at the matter broadly may well suppose that such an increase of expenses,
avowedly made as a measure for increased military efficiency, might be
worth while, in the end, as a peace measure. For we shall be obliged in
any event, to go on increasing our naval budget to keep even with the
growth of European navies, until the war burden becomes intolerable in
Europe as well as in the United States; and then we shall have measures
for preserving peace more rational than those now in vogue. The sooner
the burden is made intolerable the better.
But while we can provide an ample fleet of naval auxiliaries by means of
subsidies, if we are willing to pay the price, let no one suppose that
such a measure will give the country any share of the world's traffic
worth consideration, not to more than mention supremacy upon deep water.
One method by which the Merchant Marine Commission thought to increase
American sea power is memorable. A heavy tonnage tax was to be laid upon
all ships coming from foreign countries to American ports, and the money
so raised was to be paid to American ships in the foreign trade in return
for carrying a certain proportion of American citizens enrolled as members
of a corps of naval volunteers. The measure looked toward an increase in
the number of American seamen, but it did not become a law.
The communities that have supported nautical schools (New York and
Boston, for example) have had the end in view for which the measure of
the commission was designed. Graduates of these schools are among the best
officers in our merchant marine, and this, too, in spite of the fact that
antiquated ships of the sail formerly served as school rooms, and the boys
were taught to handle the obsolete marline-spike instead of the throttle.
But, at best, these efforts to turn ambitious young Americans from the
opportunities they find on land are inadequate. Congress might have turned
the naval academy into a splendid nautical university for the education
of all Americans who wish to learn the ways of the sea. We appropriate
millions a year for the farmers, not as bounties on their products, but
to teach them, _through experiment stations_, how to do their work. No
one seems to have thought it worth while, however, to make a national
appropriation for the education of merchant seamen.
To confess the truth we have done nothing adequate to the situation
since the Civil War, nor has anything adequate been attempted; but the
people who have promoted the work of our nautical schools have seen
dimly what the whole story of the American merchant marine proclaims.
The pretty pinnace _Virginia_ thirty feet long, as she crossed and
recrossed the Atlantic; the _Trial_ in the Azores and the West Indies;
the _Mount Vernon_ as she dodged pirates, privateers, and war fleets in
her seventeen-day passage from Salem to Gibraltar; the _Empress of China_
in her venture to the Far East; the sealers among the icy rocks of the
Antarctic; the whalers beyond Bering's Straits; the packets of the sail as
they crossed from New York to Liverpool; and the clippers that flaunted
the Stars and Stripes off the weather beam of every ship they met on the
Seven Seas,--in short, the whole story of the American merchant marine has
been worth consideration here because it sets forth unmistakably that the
superior intrinsic efficiency of the American sailor of the sail, during
the contest that culminated with the perfection of the ship of the sail,
gave supremacy to the American flag. We can buy ships--whole fleets of
them--if we are willing to pay the price, and we can maintain them upon
the high seas in like manner; but we shall never again see the Stars
and Stripes triumphant upon the high seas until the American environment
evolves, once more, by natural process, the nautical unit as efficient
for the modern day as was our ship of the sail in the days long past.
FOOTNOTES
[1] This board was created by an Order in Council dated July 4 (nowhere
mentioned as "a beautiful coincidence"), 1660, "to receive, hear, examine
and deliberate" upon all matters concerning the colonies, and report the
facts and their conclusions to the king.
[2] _The Story of New England Whalers_ gives a satisfactory history of
the American whale fishery.
[3] Many vessels went out without cannon, expecting to capture guns from
the enemy.
[4] The following is the inventory of the cargo of the sloop _Charming
Sally_, which "cleared out from Dominica to Newfoundland," and was
eventually considered as a prize by the Continental Congress: "1300
bushels of salt; 14 hogsheads of molasses; 120 gallons of rum; 65 reams
of writing paper; 1 hogshead and 27 demijohns of claret wine; 27 bottles
of French cordials; 5 cases of oil of olives and anchovies; 4 ankers of
brandy; 150,000 pins; 24 pairs of wool cards; 10 pieces of linen and
checks; 500 pounds of shot; 1 cask of powder; 150 pounds of coffee; 4
umbrellas; 100 yards of osnaburghs; 4 beaver hats; 1 Negro man; 1 suit
of velvet; 1 suit of black cloth; 1 suit of light-colored cloth; 1 suit
of purple cloth; 2½ dozen of shirts; 2 dozen of neck cloths; 3 dozen of
handkerchiefs; 4 dozen of silk and thread stockings; 3 dozen of linen
waistcoats and breeches; 2 chintz nightgowns; several short coats; great
coat and cloak; ½ piece of cambrick; 8 yards of crimson silk; 1 dozen
pair of French laced ruffles; bedding; table linen; musket sword; pistols;
2 blunderbusses; quadrant and other instruments; small library of books."
[5] The sea letter given to Captain Green read as follows: "Most serene,
most puissant, puissant, high illustrious, noble, honorable, venerable,
wise and prudent emperors, kings, republics, princes, dukes, earls,
barons, lords, burgomasters, councellors, as also judges, officers,
justiciaries, and regents of all the good cities and places, whether
ecclesiastical or secular, who shall see these patents or hear them read:
"We the United States in Congress assembled, make known, that John Green,
captain of the ship called the Empress of China, is a citizen of the
United States of America, and that the ship which he commands belongs
to citizens of the said United States, and as we wish to see the said
John Green prosper in his lawful affairs, our prayer to all the before
mentioned and to each of them separately, where the said John Green shall
arrive with his vessel and cargo, that they may please to receive him
with goodness, and treat him in a becoming manner, permitting him upon
the usual tolls and expenses in passing and repassing, to pass, navigate
and frequent the ports, passes and territories, to the end, to transact
his business where and in what manner he shall judge proper, whereof we
shall be willingly indebted."
This letter was signed by the president and the secretary of Congress.
[6] See _James Rogers and His Descendants_, by James Swift Rogers, Boston,
1902. There is also other evidence that it was Captain Moses Rogers,
but the New York papers of the period do not give the first name of the
captain in what they say about this first passage. Captain Rogers left
the _Clermont_ on reaching Albany.
[7] To show what the packets carried, here is the invoice of the
_Dreadnought's_ first cargo: 3827 barrels of flour, 24,150 bushels of
wheat, 12,750 bushels of corn, 304 bales of cotton, 198 barrels of potash,
150 boxes of bacon, 5600 staves, 60 tons of ballast, a total dead weight
of 1559.65 tons.
The ship was 200 feet long on deck, 40.25 feet wide, 26 feet deep. With
this cargo on board she drew 21½ feet of water aft and 21 forward. Her
main yard was 79 feet long.
* * * * * *
Transcriber's note:
Inconsistent hyphenation and spelling in the original document have
been preserved.
Obvious typographical errors have been corrected.