BANK RESOURCES TO PREVENT STRAIN

"The further use of the existing financial agencies for cooperation of

the banks in all sections to mass resources and apply them to prevent

undue local strain upon credit dispels the fear of any necessary injury

to the financial fabric in effecting this change.

"Grover Cleveland, whose character and principles I have long revered,

seemed to me in the application of his plan for tariff reform to have

endangered at once the success and the permanence of his reform of the

tariff--which you recall was confessedly and very properly not a

reformation to free trade--by failing to provide in it a method for

avoiding or at least minimizing and shortening any incident disturbance

to the business world. His plans, further, failed by not reasonably

insuring for the transition period from the old tariff to the new one

sufficient national income for national expenses."] have virtually

prevented all that? When I sent that plan, which I had stated in an

interview in the _Baltimore Sun_ of December 24, 1910, to the

various members of the Finance Committee of the United States Senate and

to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, very

many of them wrote me affirmatively on the subject.

To revert, however to the due order of our tale. It was on January 17,

1893, that Secretary of the Treasury John G. Carlisle, without any new

legislative authority, offered to sell $50,000,000 Government bonds

already mentioned. If issued during the Silver-repeal fight when Gorman

proposed his compromise, and if Carlisle had made it clear very early

that as many such issues for gold would be made as were needed to keep

the trading public safeguarded against any monetary-business cramping

caused by the governmental policy affecting the tariff, a minimum rather

than something approaching a maximum of disturbance would have followed.

In better spirits because of the issuance of the $50,000,000 Government

bonds for gold, the business world worked along. The House had passed

the Tariff Bill early in February by a big majority. Business soon

looked up decidedly. But the Seigniorage Bill was adopted in March.

President Cleveland, that sturdy upholder of the Nation's credit, vetoed

it. He knew that any new moral obligation to keep at a parity with gold

dollars worth in themselves less than one hundred cents in gold would

materially shake domestic and foreign credit.

The veto had a deservedly splendid effect upon all our trading

interests. This was increased by the failure of the House to override

the President's veto of the Seigniorage Bill. But the Senate had not

acted on the Tariff Bill. Business dwindled and there occurred strikes

and other widespread labor troubles, especially in the bituminous coal

trade. In many parts of the country the militia, and in Chicago United

States troops, had to be employed to maintain order. Call money was a

drug on the market. The net gold in the Treasury was very low. The

Tariff Bill dragged its weary length along. President Cleveland and

Chairman William L. Wilson of the Ways and Means Committee of the House

insisted that the bill would produce sufficient revenue for the expenses

of the Government. Senator Gorman and others in the United States Senate

insisted to the contrary and demanded that the tariff on sugar should be

kept at a high figure. A bitter controversy ensued. Finally, on August

13th, the House accepted the Senate Tariff Bill. It was time for some

affirmative action, for among other threatening conditions the net gold

in the Treasury had fallen to the lowest figure since resumption of

specie payments in 1879.

Business began to revive. The issue of $50,000,000 Government bonds for

gold to replenish the Treasury stock was a very stimulating influence.

The improvement dated virtually from the agreement in February between

the Government and the Morgan-Belmont Syndicate to prevent the export of

gold. In June, 1895, the Government gold was thus brought up to a round

$100,000,000 for the first time since December, 1894. But

notwithstanding the fact that the business outlook was decidedly better,

the inevitable disturbances to business following a general change in

the tariff, unsettled political conditions in Europe and the selling of

American securities owned abroad, the shortage of the American cotton

crop, President Cleveland's Venezuela message, which many persons

thought might bring on war with England, and another decline in the

Treasury free gold, again shook business confidence.

Improvement, however, was stimulated by a remarkable increase in the

supply of money in our balance of trade and by the virtual settlement of

the Venezuelan question. The business situation was steadily clearing.

The ills from the panic of 1893-4 were well behind us. The

Spanish-American war proved to be harmless to us financially, while it

tended to show that National neighborliness could be exercised in a

splendidly unselfish way. By our treaty of peace with Spain on December

10, 1898, an additional emphasis was given to the revival of trade.

During 1899 a great rush to speculate brought the pinches in money

inevitable in those pre-Reserve Bank days, but could not stop the

general broadening of business interests although the industrial

situation was unsatisfactory in spots. Indeed, the succeeding year was

to witness severe industrial trouble destined to cause a general

set-back in business. The situation cleared considerably when the

November elections of 1900 showed the country to be safe from the Bryan

silver policy.

Big business interests took hold of market conditions. Huge combinations

of trade interests became the order of the day. The United States Steel

trust was the vastest and was the transcendent achievement of J.

Pierpont Morgan. The Stock Exchange was wild with speculation. The

collapse came there in the famous decline of the 9th of May, 1901,

precipitated by the Northern Pacific corner. In a month the market was

tranquil again. The shooting of President McKinley produced great

financial nervousness. The over-trading abroad, especially in Germany,

was influencing us and all the rest of the world, which had not yet

recovered from the vast financial cost of the English Boer War.

The ever increasing closeness of business relations the world

over--their virtual solidarity, in fact--was being illustrated again

with us. A chief example was trouble in the copper groups following a

slackened world demand for their products.

Overtrading was doing its usual work. This induced loss of business

courage in many quarters, or shall I say a realization that nowhere in

the American business system was there any arrangement empowered so to

marshal the competent strength of financial America that large and

overwhelming disturbances should become impossible in business

generally. Indeed, the Government forces seemed to tend contrariwise to

big business practices. They took virtually their first step in

"trust-busting" when they tried to break up the Northern Securities

Company, which had been concocted to handle the celebrated Northern

Pacific case. Labor troubles supervened. Many great speculative stock

campaigns collapsed. The banks yielded to the imperative need to reduce

credits. The year 1902 had almost experienced a widespread panic: but

the marshaling of great private resources had restored confidence

temporarily, and it closed in peace.

PANIC OF 1903.--Then came the real beginning of the protracted "trust

busting" campaign. Business took fright, for it believed it was to be

bullied rather than soundly regulated. Great failures oh the Stock

Exchange were its sure indications. Fear and distrust was upon all the

American business world. Industries languished. Money was easy because

less and less employed in trade. The great captains of industrial

finance, however, patched up troubles and differences here and there

and, availing themselves of the plentiful supply of money, soon had a

notable speculation at work. Gradually the country took heart again and

business experienced a revival.

It was thought that President Roosevelt, elected in November, 1904,

would help bring about discrimination between "good" trusts and "bad"

trusts, and whose "trust" is bad! But "trust busting" became an even

more popular and political pursuit. Indeed, the abuses practised by many

of them had created a situation regarding which the question was

becoming in the popular mind simply this, "Shall trustdom rule the

people or the people rule the trusts?" The sound control of both before

the Constitution of their country must be the happy solution.

The Bill of May 9th of the House of Representatives, giving the

Interstate Commerce Commission power to fix railroad rates, was ominous,

and little noticed by the general business world; but some noticed and

acted. The Senate had not voted; nor did they realize what

rate-regulation implied to railroad balance sheets and so to the Stock

Exchange. Some interest was selling securities. The business public was

awakening to the fact that legislators, legislation, the people, and the

law were hot after the business methods of many organizers. Fear,

founded on a tardy awakening to facts, declared itself, but

spasmodically, for now and again the great captains of finance and

industry were trying to save the situation. They successfully aided

whatever of momentum there was in general business. But Congressional

activity as to any combinations in restraint of trade was unabated. It

called upon the President for such information as the Interstate

Commerce Commission might have as to a combination in restraint of trade

between the Pennsylvania Railroad and certain lines allied with it.

The battle between the old style and the new style of managing great

corporations was fairly on. Labor troubles added to the existing

disarrangement of business. San Francisco's vast earthquake and

consuming fire sucked much capital away from financial centres in order

to replace the $350,000,000 of capital destroyed. The money market was

greatly restricted. The stock market showed signs of panic. The

Secretary of the Treasury continued to help the situation as best he

knew how. Notably, he offered $30,000,000 Panama Canal Bonds, and very

successfully sold them. That afforded an additional basis for bank-note

issuing. The stock market responded with a fine upward swing. Heavy

dividends were declared by certain leading railroad and other

corporations. Indeed many high records were made by securities and so

distracted attention from that steady tide of keener inspection and

stricter regulation by the agents of the people which was destined to

unmoor and toss and injure many a financial craft. Railroads asserted

that the country needed a great increase in railroad trackage, but that

the actual treatment of the roads deterred extensions through

frightening capital. So the year 1906 wore away after having sorely

tried the nerves of the whole business world which it left in a most

justly apprehensive state.

THE PANIC OF 1907.--The panic of 1907 opened with great but feverish

activity in business. Driven by necessity the railroads adopted the

issuance of short-time notes for new capital, as the market would absorb

no long-time obligations except at forbidding interest rates. Any

signally untoward happening could promptly precipitate a panic. The

United States Treasury withdrawal of Government deposits from the banks,

and the collapse of the Knickerbocker Trust Company in New York were

such happenings.

On March 14th, the panic declared itself and pandemonium ruled on the

New York Stock Exchange,--that prominent barometer of business

conditions. In its coming it had exemplified again the characteristic

symptoms of a panic which I have set forth on pages 7-16 of the

introduction to this book. After the spasm of March 14th and the

business cataclysm of the following October, the business world

staggered along, but with the strength merely that results from courage

and the exercise of reserve power husbanding its resources and

lightening its load. The decrescendo movement of another business cycle

had begun. Runs on financial institutions were prominent in our country.

But throughout all the western world resources were strained. Money had

been overused. Money rates were extremely high. Failures were frequent

everywhere. In our own country painful disturbances, relaxation, and

unrest were everywhere apparent. The radical doctrines of many political

leaders tended to further unrest.

The business of the country was halting between the need sanely to

regulate "big business" and the fact that "big business" had been

obliged to fight for prosperity in the welter of unallowable but very

often undeniable conditions. The railroads justly claimed that they were

forbidden living rates. Their opponents accused them of carelessness and

waste. The railroads and the Interstate Commerce Commission were the

protagonists respectively of the conservative and the radical thought of

the country, which is so rich in natural wealth and is inhabited by so

resourceful a people that though by statutes they be well managed or

not, their National wealth increases. So ran the business world away,

but with a very slow and steady approach towards a rational

rectification of disputed legislation as affecting business. Meanwhile

the courageous "captains of industry" were leading in business as best

they could and were better appreciating the temper and needs of the

American people.

Added to the difficulties resulting from our languishing trade at home,

we suffered reflectedly from the constriction of business in Europe,

which was acutely aware that the disturbance in the Balkans threatened

to destroy the peace of Europe. Conditions were not yet quite ready

there for a cataclysmic war. For example, statistics had not quite

demonstrated to Germany that the physique of her people and the rate of

increase of their families were declining while the expenditures for

superpreparedness for war was demanding either retroaction in that

regard or else an expenditure from the principal of their property.

Germany did make in one year the sacrifice of five per cent. of her

principal for yet fuller preparedness for war. Indeed since late in

1908, it is fair to say that consciously or unconsciously the whole

world has been in travail. Whatever broad measures statesmen anywhere

have promulgated, have been subjected to the unusual stress and strain

of world-wide unrest. Like the treacherous undertow that wrenches those

who venture in, has been the world unrest upon all phases, incidences,

and predicates of business. Some of us have long realized this; some

have not.

With November, 1908, came the election of that great constitutionist,

Taft, to the American Presidency upon a platform less radical than that

of his opponent. This heartened the constructive forces of the country.

But very little upbuilding resulted. The coming revision of the tariff

was of itself sufficient further to restrict business undertakings, and

to cause many great producers of goods to arrange to unload at lowering

prices their actual and their future outputs. But the conserving of

resources since the panic had helped the superficial situation, and the

spasmodic stimulus that so often follows a general heightening of the

tariff showed itself after the adoption of the tariff bill in August,

1909.

The illness and after a month or two the death of the great business

leader, Harriman, caused in the securities market a great decline.

Fundamental conditions were unsettled. The best that could be expected

was a see-saw movement until some power should set our country and the

business world at large once more securely on their respective bases.

The Anti-Trust Law, the Interstate Commerce Law, and such like

influences continued to disturb the United States, while Europe was

beneath the surface unendingly agitated.

General business marked time while statesmen or pseudo-statesmen planned

and promised panaceas. President Taft joined that populous group. The

securities market, that barometer of business, fell beneath such

assurance of further unsettlement. How can you continue to trade unless

reasonably sure that conditions will remain fairly constant! All this

militated against a normally quick recovery from a great panic. Little

scares were frequently experienced. Influences matured and presented one

great political party split into two great factions, while the other

chief party endured something of the same development.

A conservative handling of National policies, or a radical one was the

question in each case. The November elections indicated a popular revolt

against the party in power--the Republican. Unshaken, President Taft

followed his convictions and in his Presidential message, of December,

1910, to Congress called for a halt in legislating to regulate

corporations, until the effect of the laws on the statute books could be

studied. The stock, money, and industrial markets were marking time. Not

to go forward in business or elsewhere is in itself to retrograde. Thus

opened the year 1911. Under the influence of easy money, better business

on some of the western railroads, better dividend declarations here and

there, a rosy "prediction as to the early future of the iron market, and

the belief that the Interstate Commerce Commission would grant better

rates to the railroads, general business felt encouraged and prices

advanced somewhat. But in February the Interstate Commerce Commission

forbade the railroads any increase whatever in rates. The roads were

obliged to institute many cramping economies which to them very often

meant the using up of their corpus and to the business world of the

United States a permeating retrogressive influence. Reductions in

railroad dividends were symptomatic of that. To add to all this there

developed additional business unrest predicated in the general tariff

change favored by the House of Representatives in April.

The United States Supreme Court decision interpreting the Sherman

Anti-Trust Law of 1890 as affecting the Standard Oil Company case and

the American Tobacco Company case were delivered late in May and were

unexpectedly reassuring to business. This was another evidence that the

best thought of the Nation everywhere was seeking to rectify the

looseness of the past without killing business initiative and continued

endeavor. So matters see-sawed in the business world. It was indeed in a

state of unstable equilibrum. Stocks declined now abruptly; then, after

some slight recovery, gently; but the slant was decidedly downward.

The Government felt that its duty required it to push forward the

investigation of industrial corporations; and that the Nation so

demanded. And it was in October that the chief of such corporations--the

United States Steel Trust--had a Government suit for dissolution filed

against it. The sturdy bell-wether of the corporation flock was attacked

by the great United States Government. What would happen to the humbler

members of the flock! Certain court decisions were reassuring to

corporations in November and business brightened for the time being and

during much of December in certain notable instances, for in that month

the Interstate Commerce Commission report appeared and seemed less

drastic in tone.

The year 1912 opened with an additional influence promising increased

alarm and marking of time. I mean that candidates for the Presidential

nomination began their canvasses, which, of course, implied new plans

for making new laws to govern business conditions. Former President

Roosevelt announced his candidacy in February. President Taft was

already constructively in the field. Governor Harmon of Ohio was

mentioned in many quarters as a successful reformer who wished soundly

to guide but not unwittingly injure business, while Underwood was

similarly praised in addition to his record on the recasting of the

tariff into a further revenue measure. Champ Clark, Speaker of the House

of Representatives, was a popular candidate. And Woodrow Wilson loomed

up as though forecast by destiny. At first and in many important

sections of the country considerably more delegates to the Republican

National Presidential Convention were chosen for Mr. Taft than for Mr.

Roosevelt. This and brisker business served to hearten conservative

interests, and the general market revived despite the decidedly downward

influence in our country of the gigantic strike among English coal

operators, who thereby spread trouble throughout the British Empire,

and, through the solidarity of the financial world to-day, affected

every financial centre.

The remainder of the year was dominated by the Presidential canvass.

Taft, called by many a "stand-patter"; Roosevelt, "the insurgent," who

proposed to mend all the troubles of the political public by his usual

brusque methods; and Woodrow Wilson, the "conservative with a move on,"

made their appeals for popular support. Until the verdict in November

a see-saw market took place in the United States, while Europe and

reflectedly the remainder of the world became alarmed lest the war

declared in October by the Balkan States against Turkey should produce

world-wide trouble.

The November Presidential election showed that Woodrow Wilson received

435 votes, Mr. Roosevelt 90, and Mr. Taft 8. However, the popular vote

for Woodrow Wilson was more than 1,000,000 below that cast for Messrs.

Roosevelt and Taft jointly, and about 2,000,000 short of a majority of

all the votes cast for the Presidential nominees--Socialist, Republican,

Democratic, and so on. But the vitally significant fact is that the

popular vote for the "stand-pat" candidate--Mr. Taft--was very small in

comparison with the joint vote of the three candidates whose platforms

called for a drastic handling of National policies,--Debs, Roosevelt,

and Wilson.

Drastic recasting of the rules of any game unsettles play. The market

dropped. But fortunately for the country the ripe and balanced and

active intellect and character of Woodrow Wilson, elected President,

lent much re-assurance against the extensive political surgery he had

been chosen to perform. All knew that he would be thorough and

reasoning. All the grievous handicaps that business suffers from

uncertainty of regulation, it was thought would be overcome as promptly

as possible. But the pledged great change of the tariff was enough to

induce retrenchment of business endeavor. With a major factor unusual in

any proposition, how can stability, much less progress, be expected in

any interest?

THE PANIC OF 19l3.--Retrogression in business began very early in 1913

and increased until mid-October, 1914. On October 3, 1913, the new

Tariff had become a law; but other reforms still jostled business.

However, by mid-October, 1914, the Interstate Commerce Commission seemed

to have become less radical in its views, the Industrial Trade

Commission was at work apparently studying the essentials of the

industrial situation, the United States Supreme Court was delivering

opinions in check of indeterminate statutory meddling with business and

the splendid potential of the Reserve Bank system was offering for use.

It is hard not to overstate the vast re-assurance offered to business by

linking together the banking power of the country through the Reserve

Bank system. Just as an enormously large number of troops skilfully

thrown into an endangered--a panicky--position will ensure success, so

can the vast resources of the Reserve Bank system restore financial

order when panic fear is declaring itself. During the past two years of

threatening from the disturbances in Mexico, our country has learned to

forecast the benefit that the Reserve Bank system predicates; but our

stay and confidence has been the cool and far-seeing statesmanship of

our great President, Woodrow Wilson.

The breaking out of the "World War" in August, 1914, had so flooded our

market with securities held in Europe that the Stock Exchange, following

the continental example, closed from July 31st till November 28th, when

the New York Stock Exchange and other American stock exchanges opened

for restricted business in bonds and on December 15th to unlimited

trading in stocks and bonds. Other kinds of exchanges acted much the

same. This checked business in every direction, despite the great

issuance of temporary Clearing House certificates. In two months the

latter tendency was changed in many quarters.

Then began the "war boom." Gradually it has spread, bringing such

enormous profits in all our lines of business supplying the needs of the

"Great War," that the first twelve months of it showed more than a

billion dollars trade balance in our favor, and that balance then began

increasing on a progressive scale. Money is yet plentiful. All business

is stimulated. Our crops are unexampled in quantity and money value.

Everything points to great prosperity unchecked until the "Great War"

ceases and withdraws the stimulating demand for our supplies.

Then will come a readjustment of our trade. Money will have become

actually or potentially scarce because of the previous vast expansion of

our business, and all the banking power of our country will be requisite

to prevent a crashing panic. The Reserve Banks will have gotten fully to

work by then, it is to be hoped. They will be needed to lead in the

life-saving operations. Such first aid to the injured will obviate such

financial sufferings as the old-time panics presented. They can hardly

be expected to reduce the casualties to the volume of the slow panic in

securities in the year 1913, for the volume of business involved at

present is vastly more swollen and the kind more circumscribed.

It is interesting to note that panics have continued to appear about as

regularly as usual, but less crushingly, since 1890, the date up to

which the first and second editions of this book had traced them.

Remedial or partially preventive measures have been more and more

utilized by the financial powers to control them. Never will panics

cease so long as trade and fear are exemplified on this earth, but just

as modern medicine is overcoming the dangers threatening the physical

man, so is modern finance overcoming panic and the other dangers which

threaten financial stability. After all, reserve power and only a

rational use of financial resources are the surest preventive of panic.

And that the American people have not been forced through entrance into

the "World War" to deplete their reserve strength, especially in a

financial way, is due to the splendid conduct of our great President. He

is leading this country to unexampled prosperity. Instead of consenting

that old abuses in the business world should continue until an

over-indignant public had grown riotously injurious, he has guided the

current of their wrath, initiated or promulgated the methods for

redressing their grievances, and has saved to the country, to its

people, and to general business itself, the splendid and full service of

business enterprise freed from the abuses and handicaps that unregulated

conditions had forced it to employ in the unrestrained struggles of the

open mart.

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