river Apsus, between Apollonia and Dyrrachium, having ordered Lucius
Apustius, lieutenant-general, thither, sent him with part of the
forces to lay waste the enemy's territory. Apustius, after ravaging
the frontiers of Macedonia, and having, at the first assault, taken
the forts of Corragos, Gerrunios, and Orgessos, came to Antipatria, a
city situated in a narrow gorge; where, at first inviting the
leading men to a conference, he endeavoured to entice them to commit
themselves to the good faith of the Romans; but finding that from
confidence in the size, fortifications, and situation of their city,
they paid no regard to his discourse, he attacked the place by force
of arms, and took it by assault: then, putting all the young men to
death, and giving up the entire spoil to his soldiers, he razed the
walls and burned the city. This proceeding spread such terror, that
Codrion, a strong and well-fortified town, surrendered to the Romans
without a struggle. Leaving a garrison there, he took Ilion by force,
a name better known than the town, on account of that of the same name
in Asia. As the lieutenant-general was returning to the consul with
a great quantity of spoil, Athenagoras, one of the king's generals,
falling on his extreme rear, in its passage over a river, threw the
hindmost into disorder. On hearing the shouting and tumult, Apustius
rode back in full speed, ordered the troops to face about, and drew
them up in order, arranging the baggage in the centre. The king's
troops could not support the onset of the Roman soldiers, many of them
were slain, and more made prisoners. The lieutenant-general, having
brought back the army without loss to the consul, was despatched
immediately to the fleet.
28. The war commencing thus brilliantly with this successful
expedition, several petty kings and princes, neighbours of the
Macedonians, came to the Roman camp: Pleuratus, son of Scerdilaedus,
and Amynander, king of the Athamanians; and from the Dardanians, Bato,
son of Longarus. This Longarus had, in his own quarrel, supported a
war against Demetrius, father of Philip. To their offers of aid,
the consul answered, that he would make use of the assistance of the
Dardanians, and of Pleuratus, when he should lead his troops into
Macedonia. To Amynander he allotted the part of exciting the Aetolians
to war. To the ambassadors of Attalus, (for they also had come at the
same time,) he gave directions that the king should wait at Aegina,
where he wintered, for the arrival of the Roman fleet; and when joined
by that, he should, as before, harass Philip with attacks by sea. To
the Rhodians, also, an embassy was sent, to engage them to contribute
their share towards carrying on the war. Nor was Philip, who had by
this time arrived in Macedonia, remiss in his preparations for the
campaign. He sent his son Perseus, then very young, with part of his
forces to block up the pass near Pelagonia, appointing persons out of
the number of his friends to direct his inexperienced age. Sciathus
and Peparethus, no inconsiderable cities, he demolished, lest they
should become a prey and prize to the enemy's fleet; despatching at
the same time ambassadors to the Aetolians, lest that restless nation
might change sides on the arrival of the Romans.
29. The assembly of the Aetolians, which they call Panaetolium, was
to meet on a certain day. In order to be present at this, the king's
ambassadors hastened their journey, and Lucius Furius Purpureo also
arrived, deputed by the consul. Ambassadors from the Athenians,
likewise, came to this assembly. The Macedonians were first heard, as
with them the latest treaty had been made; and they declared, that
as no change of circumstances had occurred, they had nothing new to
introduce: for the same reasons which had induced them to make peace
with Philip, after experiencing the unprofitableness of an alliance
with the Romans, should engage them to preserve it now that it was
established. "Do you rather choose," said one of the ambassadors, "to
imitate the inconsistency, or levity, shall I call it, of the Romans,
who ordered this answer to be given to your ambassadors at Rome: 'Why,
Aetolians, do you apply to us, when, without our approbation, you have
made peace with Philip?' Yet these same people now require that you
should, in conjunction with them, wage war against Philip. Formerly,
too, they pretended that they took arms on your account, and in your
defence against Philip: now they do not allow you to continue at peace
with him. To assist Messana, they first embarked for Sicily; and a
second time, that they might redeem Syracuse to freedom when oppressed
by the Carthaginians. Both Messana and Syracuse, and all Sicily, they
hold in their own possession, and have reduced it into a tributary
province under their axes and rods. You imagine, perhaps, that in the
same manner as you hold an assembly at Naupactus, according to your
own laws, under magistrates created by yourselves, at liberty to
choose allies and enemies, and to have peace or war at your own
option, so the assembly of the states of Sicily is summoned, to
Syracuse, or Messana, or Lilybaeum. No, a Roman praetor presides at
the meeting; summoned by his command they assemble; they behold him,
attended by his lictors seated on a lofty throne, issuing his haughty
edicts. His rods are ready for their backs, his axes for their necks,
and every year they are allotted a different master. Neither ought
they nor can they, wonder at this, when they see all the cities of
Italy bending under the same yoke,--Rhegium, Tarentum Capua, not to
mention those in their own neighbourhood, out of the ruins of which
their city of Rome grew into power. Capua indeed subsists, the grave
and monument of the Campanian people, that entire people having been
either cut off or driven into banishment; the mutilated carcass of a
city, without senate, without commons, without magistrates; a sort of
prodigy, the leaving which to be inhabited, showed more cruelty than
if it had been utterly destroyed. If foreigners who are separated from
us to a greater distance by their language, manners, and laws, than by
the distance by sea and land, are allowed to get footing here, it is
madness to hope that any thing will continue in its present state.
Does the sovereignty of Philip seem in any degree incompatible with
your freedom, who, at a time when he was justly incensed against you,
demanded nothing more of you than peace; and at present requires no
more than the observance of the peace which he agreed to? Accustom
foreign legions to these countries, and receive the yoke; too late,
and in vain, will you look for Philip as an ally, when you shall have
the Roman as a master. Trifling causes occasionally unite and disunite
the Aetolians, Acarnanians, and Macedonians, men speaking the same
language. With foreigners, with barbarians, all Greeks have, and ever
will have, eternal war: because they are enemies by nature, which is
always the same, and not from causes which change with the times. My
discourse shall conclude with the same argument with which it began.
Three years since, the same persons, assembled in this same place,
determined on peace with the same Philip, contrary to the inclinations
of the same Romans, who now wish that the peace should be broken,
after it has been adjusted and ratified. In the subject of your
deliberation, fortune has made no change; why you should make any, I
do not see."
30. Next, after the Macedonians, with the consent and at the desire
of the Romans, the Athenians were introduced; who, having suffered
grievously, could, with the greater justice, inveigh against the
cruelty and inhumanity of the king. They represented, in a deplorable
light, the miserable devastation and spoliation of their fields;
adding, that "they did not complain on account of having, from an
enemy, suffered hostile treatment; for there were certain rights of
war, according to which, as it was just to act, so it was just to
endure. Their crops being burned, their houses demolished, their
men and cattle carried off as spoil, were to be considered rather as
misfortunes to the sufferer than as ill-treatment. But of this they
had good reason to complain, that he who called the Romans foreigners
and barbarians, had himself so atrociously violated all rights, both
divine and human, as, in his former inroad, to have waged an impious
war against the infernal gods, in the latter, against those above.
That the sepulchres and monuments of all within their country had been
demolished, the graves laid open, and the bones left unprotected by
the soil. There had been several temples, which, in former times, when
their ancestors dwelt in the country in their separate districts,
had been consecrated in each of their little forts and villages, and
which, even after they were incorporated into one city, they did not
neglect or forsake. That around all these temples Philip had scattered
his destructive flames, and left the images of the gods lying scorched
and mutilated among the prostrated pillars of their fanes. Such as
he had rendered the country of Attica, formerly opulent and adorned,
such, if he were suffered, would he render Aetolia and the whole of
Greece. That the mutilation of their own city, also, would have been
similar, if the Romans had not come to its relief: for he had shown
the same wicked rage against the gods who are the guardians of the
city, and Minerva who presides over the citadel; the same against the
temple of Ceres at Eleusis; the same against Jupiter and Minerva at
Piraeeus. In a word, having been repelled by force of arms not only
from their temples, but even from their walls, he had vented his fury
on those sacred edifices which were protected by religion alone. They
therefore entreated and besought the Aetolians, that, compassionating
the Athenians, and with the immortal gods for their leaders, and,
under them, the Romans, who, next to the gods, possessed the greatest
power they would take part in the war."
31. The Roman ambassador then replied: "The Macedonians first, and
afterwards the Athenians, have obliged me to change entirely the
method of my discourse. For, on the one hand, the Macedonians, by
aggressively introducing charges against the Romans, when I had come
prepared to make complaint of the injuries committed by Philip against
so many cities in alliance with us, have obliged me to think of
defence rather than accusation; and, on the other hand, what have the
Athenians, after relating his inhuman and impious crimes against the
gods both celestial and infernal, left for me, or any one else, which
I can further urge against him. You are to suppose, that the same
complaints are made by the Cianians, Abydenians, Aeneans, Maronites,
Thasians, Parians, Samians, Larissenians, Messenians, on the side of
Achaia; and complaints, still heavier and more grievous, by those whom
he had it more in his power to injure. For as to those proceedings
which he censures in us, if they are not deserving of honour, I will
admit that they cannot be defended at all. He has objected to us,
Rhegium, and Capua, and Syracuse. As to Rhegium, during the war
with Pyrrhus, a legion which, at the earnest request of the Rhegians
themselves, we had sent thither as a garrison, wickedly possessed
themselves of the city which they had been sent to defend. Did we then
approve of that deed? or did we exert the force of our arms against
that guilty legion, until we reduced them under our power; and then,
after making them give satisfaction to the allies, by their stripes
and the loss of their heads, restore to the Rhegians their city, their
lands, and all their effects, together with their liberty and laws? To
the Syracusans, when oppressed, and that by foreign tyrants, which
was a still greater indignity, we lent assistance; and after enduring
great fatigues in carrying on the siege of so strong a city, both
by land and sea, for almost three years, (although the Syracusans
themselves chose to continue in slavery to the tyrants rather than be
taken to us,) yet, becoming masters of the place, and by exertion
of the same force setting it at liberty, we restored it to the
inhabitants. At the same time, we do not deny that Sicily is our
province, and that the states which sided with the Carthaginians, and,
in conjunction with them, waged war against us, pay us tribute and
taxes; on the contrary, we wish that you and all nations should know,
that the condition of each is such as it has deserved at our hands:
and ought we to repent of the punishment inflicted on the Campanians,
of which even they themselves cannot complain? These men, after we had
on their account carried on war against the Samnites for near seventy
years, with great loss on our side; had united them to ourselves,
first by treaty, and then by intermarriages, and the relationships
arising thence; and lastly, by the right of citizenship; yet, in the
time of our adversity, were the first of all the states of Italy which
revolted to Hannibal, after basely putting our garrison to death, and
afterwards, through resentment at being besieged by us, sent Hannibal
to attack Rome. If neither their city nor one man of them had been
left remaining, who could take offence, or consider them as treated
with more severity than they had deserved? From consciousness of
guilt, greater numbers of them perished by their own hands, than by
the punishments inflicted by us. And while from the rest we took away
the town and the lands, still we left them a place to dwell in, we
suffered the city which partook not of the guilt to stand uninjured;
so that he who should see it this day would find no trace of its
having been besieged or taken. But why do I speak of Capua, when even
to vanquished Carthage we granted peace and liberty? The greatest
danger is, that, by our too great readiness to pardon the conquered,
we may encourage others to try the fortune of war against us. Let
so much suffice in our defence, and against Philip, whose domestic
crimes, whose parricides and murders of his relations and friends, and
whose lust, more disgraceful to human nature, if possible, than his
cruelty, you, as being nearer to Macedonia, are better acquainted
with. As to what concerns yourselves, Aetolians, we entered into a
war with Philip on your account: you made peace with him without
consulting us. Perhaps you will say, that while we were occupied
in the Punic war, you were constrained by fear to accept terms of
pacification, from him who at that time possessed superior power;
and that on our side, pressed by more urgent affairs we suspended
our operations in a war which you had laid aside. At present, as
we, having, by the favour of the gods brought the Punic war to a
conclusion, have fallen on Macedonia with the whole weight of our
power, so you have an opportunity offered you of regaining a place in
our friendship and alliance, unless you choose to perish with Philip,
rather than to conquer with the Romans."
32. When these things had been said by the ambassador the minds of
all leaning towards the Romans, Damocritus, praetor of the Aetolians,
(who, it was reported, had received money from the king,) assenting in
no degree to one party or the other, said,--that "in consultations of
great and critical importance, nothing was so injurious as haste. That
repentance, indeed, generally followed, and that quickly but yet too
late and unavailing; because designs carried on with precipitation
could not be recalled, nor matters brought back to their original
state. The time, however, for determining the point under
consideration, which, for his part, he thought should not be too
early, might yet immediately be fixed in this manner. As it had been
provided by the laws, that no determination should be made concerning
peace or war, except in the Panaetolic or Pylaic councils; let them
immediately pass a decree, that the praetor, when he chooses to treat
respecting war and peace, may have full authority to summon a council,
and that whatever shall be then debated and decreed, shall be, to all
intents and purposes, legal and valid, as if it had been transacted
in the Panaetolic or Pylaic assembly." And thus dismissing the
ambassadors, with the matter undetermined, he said, that therein
he had acted most prudently for the interest of the state; for the
Aetolians would have it in their power to join in alliance with
whichever of the parties should be more successful in the war. Such
were the proceedings in the council of the Aetolians.
33. Meanwhile Philip was making vigorous preparations for carrying
on the war both by sea and land. His naval forces he drew together at
Demetrias in Thessaly; supposing that Attalus, and the Roman fleet,
would move from Aegina in the beginning of the spring. He gave the
command of the fleet and of the sea-coast to Heraclides, to whom he
had formerly intrusted it. The equipment of the land forces he took
care of in person; considering that he had deprived the Romans of two
powerful auxiliaries, the Aetolians on the one side and the Dardanians
on the other, by making his son Perseus block up the pass at
Pelagonia. The consul was employed, not in preparations, but in
the operations of war. He led his army through the country of the
Dassaretians, conveying the corn untouched which he had brought from
his winter quarters, for the fields afforded supplies sufficient for
the consumption of the troops. The towns and villages surrendered to
him, some through inclination, others through fear; some were taken
by assault, others were found deserted, the barbarians flying to the
neighbouring mountains. He fixed a standing camp at Lycus near the
river Bevus, and from thence sent to bring in corn from the magazines
of the Dassaretians. Philip saw the whole country filled with
consternation, and not knowing the designs of the consul, he sent a
party of horse to discover whither he was directing his course. The
same state of uncertainty possessed the consul; he knew that the
king had moved from his winter quarters, but in what direction he had
proceeded he knew not: he also had sent horsemen to gain intelligence.
These two parties, having set out from opposite quarters, after
wandering a long time among the Dassaretians, through unknown roads,
fell at length into the same track. Neither doubted, as soon as the
noise of men and horses was heard at a distance, that the enemy was
approaching, therefore, before they came within sight of each other,
they got their arms in readiness, nor, when they saw their foe, was
there any delay in engaging. As they happened to be nearly equal in
number and valour, being picked men on both sides, they fought during
several hours with vigour, until fatigue, both of men and horses, put
an end to the fight, without deciding the victory. Of the Macedonians
there fell forty horsemen; of the Romans thirty-five. Still, however,
neither did the one party carry back to the king, nor the other to the
consul, any certain information in what quarter the camp of his enemy
lay. But this was soon made known to them by deserters, whom their
recklessness of disposition supplies in all wars in sufficient number
to discover the affairs of the contending parties.
34. Philip, judging that he should make some progress towards
conciliating the affections of his men, and induce them to face danger
more readily on his account, if he bestowed some pains on the burial
of the horsemen who fell in that expedition, ordered them to be
conveyed into the camp, in order that all might be spectators of the
honours paid them at their funeral. Nothing is so uncertain, or so
difficult to form a judgment of, as the minds of the multitude. That
which seems calculated to increase their alacrity, in exertions of
every sort, often creates in them fear and inactivity. Accordingly,
those who, being always accustomed to fight with Greeks and Illyrians,
had only seen wounds made with javelins and arrows, seldom even by
lances, came to behold bodies dismembered by the Spanish sword, some
with their arms lopped off, with the shoulder or the neck entirely cut
through, heads severed from the trunk, and the bowels laid open, with
other frightful exhibitions of wounds: they therefore perceived, with
horror, against what weapons and what men they were to fight. Even the
king himself was seized with apprehensions, having never yet engaged
the Romans in a regular battle. Wherefore, recalling his son, and the
guard posted at the pass of Pelagonia, in order to strengthen his
army by the addition of those troops, he thereby opened a passage into
Macedonia for Pleuratus and the Dardanians. Then, taking deserters
for guides, he marched towards the enemy with twenty thousand foot
and four thousand horse, and at the distance of somewhat more than a
thousand paces from the Roman camp, and near Ithacus, he fortified a
hill with a trench and rampart. From this place, taking a view of the
Roman station in the valley beneath, he is said to have been struck
with admiration, both at the general appearance of the camp, and the
regular disposition of each particular part; then with the disposition
of the tents, and the intervals of the passages; and to have declared,
that, certainly, that could not be regarded by any as the camp of
barbarians. For two days, the consul and the king, each waiting
for the other's making some attempt, kept their troops within the
ramparts. On the third day, the Roman led out all his forces, and
offered battle.
35. But the king, not daring to risk so hastily a general engagement,
sent four hundred Trallians, who are a tribe of the Illyrians, as we
have said in another place, and three hundred Cretans; adding to
this body of infantry an equal number of horse, under the command of
Athenagoras, one of his nobles honoured with the purple, to make an
attack on the enemy's cavalry. When these troops arrived within a
little more than five hundred paces, the Romans sent out the light
infantry, and two cohorts of horse, that both cavalry and infantry
might be equal in number to the Macedonians. The king's troops
expected that the method of fighting would be such as they had been
accustomed to; that the horsemen, pursuing and retreating alternately,
would at one time use their weapons, at another time turn their backs;
that the agility of the Illyrians would be serviceable for excursions
and sudden attacks, and that the Cretans might discharge their arrows
against the enemy, as they advanced eagerly to the charge. But the
onset of the Romans, which was not more vigorous than persevering,
entirely disconcerted this method of fighting: for the light infantry,
as if they were fighting with their whole line of battle, after
discharging their javelins, carried on a close fight with their
swords; and the horsemen, when they had once made a charge, stopping
their horses, fought, some on horseback, while others dismounted and
intermixed themselves with the foot. By this means neither were the
king's cavalry, who were unaccustomed to a steady fight, a match
for the others; nor were the infantry, who were only skirmishing and
irregular troops, and were besides but half covered with the kind
of harness which they used, at all equal to the Roman infantry, who
carried a sword and buckler, and were furnished with proper armour,
both to defend themselves and to annoy the enemy: nor did they sustain
the combat, but fled to their camp, trusting entirely to their speed
for safety.
36. After an interval of one day, the king, resolving to make an
attack with all his forces of cavalry and light-armed infantry, had,
during the night, placed in ambush, in a convenient place between the
two camps, a body of targeteers, whom they call Peltastae, and given
orders to Athenagoras and the cavalry, if they found they had the
advantage in the open fight, to pursue their success; if otherwise,
that they should retreat leisurely, and by that means draw on the
enemy to the place where the ambush lay. The cavalry accordingly
did retreat; but the officers of the body of targeteers, by bringing
forward their men before the time, and not waiting for the signal, as
they ought, lost an opportunity of performing considerable service.
The Romans, having gained the victory in open fight, and also escaped
the danger of the ambuscade, retired to their camp. Next day the
consul marched out with all his forces, and offered battle, placing
his elephants in the front of the foremost battalions. Of this
resource the Romans then for the first time availed themselves; having
a number of them which had been taken in the Punic war. Finding that
the enemy kept himself quiet behind his intrenchments, he
advanced close up to them, upbraiding him with cowardice; and as,
notwithstanding, no opportunity of an engagement was afforded, the
consul, considering how dangerous foraging must be while the camps
lay so near each other, where the cavalry were ready at any moment to
attack the soldiers, when dispersed through the country, removed his
camp to a place called Ortholophus, distant about eight miles, where
by reason of the intervening distance he could forage with more
safety. While the Romans were collecting corn in the adjacent fields,
the king kept his men within the trenches, in order to increase both
the negligence and confidence of the enemy. But, when he saw them
scattered, he set out with all his cavalry, and the auxiliary Cretans,
and marching with such speed that the swiftest footmen could, by
running, but just keep up with the horse, he planted his standards
between the camp of the Romans and their foragers. Then, dividing
the forces, he sent one part of them in quest of the marauders, with
orders to leave not one alive; with the other, he himself halted, and
placed guards on the roads through which the enemy seemed likely to
fly back to their camp. And now carnage and flight prevailed in all
directions, and no intelligence of the misfortune had yet reached the
Roman camp, because those who fled towards the camp fell in with the
guards, which the king had stationed to intercept them, and greater
numbers were slain by those who were placed in the roads, than by
those who had been sent out to attack them. At length, a few effected
their escape, through the midst of the enemy's posts, but were so
filled with terror, that they excited a general consternation in the
camp, rather than brought intelligible information.
37. The consul, ordering the cavalry to carry aid to those who were in
danger, in the best manner they could, drew out the legions from
the camp, and led them drawn up in a square towards the enemy. The
cavalry, taking different ways through the fields, missed the road,
being deceived by the various shouts raised in several quarters. Some
of them met with the enemy, and battles began in many places at once.
The hottest part of the action was at the station where the king
commanded; for the guard there was, in numbers both of horse and foot,
almost a complete army; and, as they were posted on the middle road,
the greatest number of the Romans fell in with them. The Macedonians
had also the advantage in this, that the king himself was present to
encourage them; and the Cretan auxiliaries, fighting in good
order, and in a state of preparation, against troops disordered
and irregular, wounded many at a distance, where no such danger was
apprehended. If they had acted with prudence in the pursuit, they
would have secured an advantage of great importance, not only in
regard to the glory of the present contest, but to the general
interest of the war; but, greedy of slaughter, and following with too
much eagerness, they fell in with the advanced cohorts of the Romans
under the military tribunes. The horsemen who were flying, as soon as
they saw the ensigns of their friends, faced about against the enemy,
now in disorder; so that in a moment's time the fortune of the battle
was changed, those now turning their backs who had lately been the
pursuers. Many were slain in close fight, many in the pursuit; nor was
it by the sword alone that they perished; several, being driven into
morasses, were, together with their horses, swallowed up in the
deep mud. The king himself was in danger; for his horse falling, in
consequence of a wound, threw him headlong to the ground, and he very
narrowly escaped being overpowered while prostrate. He owed his safety
to a trooper, who instantly leaped down and mounted the affrighted
king on his horse; himself, as he could not on foot keep up with the
flying horsemen, was slain by the enemy, who had collected about the
place where Philip fell. The king, in his desperate flight, rode about
among the morasses, some of which were easily passed, and others not;
at length, when most men despaired of his ever escaping in safety,
he arrived in safety at his camp. Two hundred Macedonian horsemen
perished in that action; about one hundred were taken: eighty horses,
richly caparisoned, were led off the field; at the same time the
spoils of arms were also carried off.
38. There were some who found fault with the king, as guilty of
rashness on that day; and with the consul, for want of energy. For
Philip, they say, on his part, ought to have avoided coming to
action, knowing that in a few days the enemy, having exhausted all the
adjacent country, must be reduced to the extremity of want; and that
the consul, after having routed the Macedonian cavalry and light
infantry, and nearly taken the king himself, ought to have led on his
troops directly to the enemy's camp, where, dismayed as they were,
they would have made no stand, and that he might have finished the war
in a moment's time. This, like most other matters, was easier to be
talked about than to be done. For, if the king had brought the whole
of his infantry into the engagement, then, indeed, during the tumult,
and while, vanquished and struck with dismay, they fled from the field
into their intrenchments, (and even continued their flight from thence
on seeing the victorious enemy mounting the ramparts,) the king might
have been deprived of his camp. But as some forces of infantry had
remained in the camp, fresh and free from fatigue, with outposts
before the gates, and guard properly disposed, what would he have done
but imitated the rashness of which the king had just now been guilty,
by pursuing the routed horse? On the other side, the king's first
plan of an attack on the foragers, while dispersed through the fields,
would not have been a subject of censure, could he have satisfied
himself with a moderate degree of success: and it is the less
surprising that he should have made a trial of fortune, as there was
a report, that Pleuratus and the Dardanians had set out from home with
very numerous forces, and had already passed into Macedonia; so that
if he should be surrounded on all sides by these forces, there was
reason to think that the Roman might put an end to the war without
stirring from his seat. Philip, however, considered, that after his
cavalry had been defeated in two engagements, he could with much less
safety continue in the same post; accordingly, wishing to remove from
thence, and, at the same time, to keep the enemy in ignorance of his
design, he sent a herald to the consul a little before sun-set, to
demand a truce for the purpose of burying the horsemen; and thus
imposing on him, he began his march in silence, about the second
watch, leaving a number of fires in all parts of his camp.
39. The consul was now taking refreshment, when he was told that the
herald had arrived, and on what business; he gave him no other answer,
than that he should be admitted to an audience early the next morning:
by which means Philip gained what he wanted--the length of that night,
and part of the following day, during which he might get the start on
his march. He directed his route towards the mountains, a road which
he knew the Romans with their heavy baggage would not attempt. The
consul, having, at the first light, dismissed the herald with a grant
of a truce, in a short time after discovered that the enemy had
gone off; but not knowing what course to take in pursuit of them,
he remained in the same camp for several days, which he employed in
collecting forage. He then marched to Stubera, and brought thither,
from Pelagonia, the corn that was in the fields. From thence he
advanced to Pluvina, not having yet discovered to what quarter the
Macedonian had bent his course. Philip, having at first fixed his camp
at Bryanium, marched thence through cross-roads, and gave a sudden
alarm to the enemy. The Romans, on this, removed from Pluvina, and
pitched their camp near the river Osphagus. The king also sat down
at a small distance, forming his intrenchment on the bank of a river
which the inhabitants call Erigonus. Having there received certain
information that the Romans intended to proceed to Eordaea, he marched
away before them, in order to take possession of the defiles, and
prevent the enemy from making their way, where the roads are confined
in narrow straits. There, with great haste, he fortified some places
with a rampart, others with a trench, others with stones heaped up
instead of walls, others with trees laid across, according as the
situation required, or as materials lay convenient; and thus a road,
in its own nature difficult, he rendered, as he imagined, impregnable
by the works which he drew across every pass. The adjoining ground,
being mostly covered with woods, was exceedingly incommodious to the
phalanx of the Macedonians, which is of no manner of use, except when
they extend their very long spears before their shields, forming as
it were a palisade; to perform which, they require an open plain. The
Thracians, too, were embarrassed by their lances, which also are of
a great length, and were entangled among the branches that stood
in their way on every side. The body of Cretans alone was not
unserviceable; and yet even these, though, in case of an attack made
on them, they could to good purpose discharge their arrows against
the horses or riders, where they were open to a wound, yet against the
Roman shields they could do nothing, because they had neither strength
sufficient to pierce through them, nor was there any part exposed at
which they could aim. Perceiving, therefore, that kind of weapon to
be useless, they annoyed the enemy with stones, which lay in plenty in
all parts of the valley: the strokes made by these on their shields,
with greater noise than injury, for a short time retarded the advance
of the Romans; but quickly disregarding these missiles also, some,
closing their shields in form of a tortoise, forced their way through
the enemy in front; others having, by a short circuit, gained the
summit of the hill, dislodged the dismayed Macedonians from their
guards and posts, and even slew the greater part of them, their
retreat being embarrassed by the difficulties of the ground.
40. Thus, with less opposition than they had expected to meet, the
defiles were passed, and they came to Eordaea; then, having laid waste
the whole country, the consul withdrew into Elimea. From thence
he made an irruption into Orestis, and attacked the city Celetrum,
situated in a peninsula: a lake surrounds the walls; and there is but
one entrance from the main land along a narrow isthmus. Relying on
their situation, the townsmen at first shut the gates, and refused
to submit; but afterwards, when they saw the troops in motion, and
advancing in the tortoise method, and the isthmus covered by the enemy
marching in, they surrendered in terror rather than hazard a struggle.
From Celetrum he advanced into the country of the Dassaretians, took
the city Pelium by storm, carried off the slaves with the rest of the
spoil, and discharging the freemen without ransom, restored the
city to them, after placing a strong garrison in it, for it was very
conveniently situated for making inroads into Macedonia. Having thus
traversed the enemy's country, the consul led back his forces into
those parts which were already reduced to obedience near Apollonia,
from whence the campaign had commenced. Philip's attention had been
drawn to other quarters by the Aetolians, Athamanians, and Dardanians:
so many were the wars that started up on different sides of him.
Against the Dardanians, who were now retiring out of Macedonia, he
sent Athenagoras with the light infantry and the greater part of the
cavalry, and ordered him to hang on their rear as they retreated; and,
by cutting off their hindmost troops, make them more cautious for the
future of leading out their armies from home. As to the Aetolians,
Damocritus, their praetor, the same who at Naupactum had persuaded
them to defer passing a decree concerning the war, had in the next
meeting roused them to arms, after the report of the battle between
the cavalry at Ortholophus; the irruption of the Dardanians and of
Pleuratus, with the Illyrians, into Macedonia; of the arrival of the
Roman fleet, too, at Oreus; and that Macedonia, besides being beset on
all sides by so many nations, was in danger of being invested by sea
also.
41. These reasons had brought back Damocritus and the Aetolians to the
interest of the Romans. Marching out, therefore, in conjunction with
Amynander, king of the Athamanians, they laid siege to Cercinium. The
inhabitants here had shut their gates, whether of their own choice or
by compulsion is unknown, as they had a garrison of the king's troops.
However, in a few days Cercinium was taken and burned; and after great
slaughter had been made, those who survived, both freemen and slaves,
were carried off amongst other spoil. This caused such terror, as made
all those who dwelt round the lake Baebius abandon their cities and
fly to the mountains: and the Aetolians, in the absence of booty,
turned away from thence, and proceeded into Perrhaebia. There they
took Cyretiae by storm and sacked it unmercifully. The inhabitants of
Mallaea, making a voluntary submission, were received into alliance.
From Perrhaebia, Amynander advised to march to Gomphi, because that
city lies close to Athamania, and there was reason to think that it
might be reduced without any great difficulty. But the Aetolians,
for the sake of plunder, directed their march to the rich plains of
Thessaly. Amynander following, though he did not approve either of
their careless method of carrying on their depredations, or of their
pitching their camp in any place which chance presented, without
choice, and without taking any care to fortify it. Therefore, lest
their rashness and negligence might be the cause of some misfortune
to himself and his troops, when he saw them forming their camp in low
grounds, under the city Phecadus, he took possession, with his own
troops, of an eminence about five hundred paces distant, which could
be rendered secure by a slight fortification. The Aetolians seemed to
have forgotten that they were in an enemy's country, excepting that
they continued to plunder, some straggling about half-armed, others
spending whole days and nights alike in drinking and sleeping in the
camp, neglecting even to fix guards, when Philip unexpectedly came
upon them. His approach being announced by those who had fled out of
the fields in a fright, Damocritus and the rest of the officers were
thrown into great confusion. It happened to be mid-day, and when most
of the men after a hearty meal lay fast asleep. Their officers
roused them, however, as fast as possible; ordered them to take arms;
despatched some to recall those who were straggling through the fields
in search of plunder; and so violent was their hurry, that many of
the horsemen went out without their swords, and but few of them put
on their corslets. After marching out in this precipitate manner, (the
whole horse and foot scarcely making up six hundred,) they met the
king's cavalry, superior in number, in spirit, and in arms. They were,
therefore, routed at the first charge; and having scarcely attempted
resistance, returned to the camp in shameful flight. Several were
slain; and some taken, having been cut off from the main body of the
fugitives.
42. Philip, when his troops had advanced almost to the rampart,
ordered a retreat to be sounded, because both men and horses were
fatigued, not so much by the action, as at once by the length of their
march, and the extraordinary celerity with which they had made it.
He therefore despatched the horsemen by troops, and the companies of
light infantry in turn, to procure water and take refreshment. The
rest he kept on guard, under arms, waiting for the main body of the
infantry, which had marched with less expedition, on account of the
weight of their armour. As soon as these arrived, they also were
ordered to fix their standards, and, laying down their arms before
them, to take food in haste; sending two, or at most three, out of
each company, to provide water. In the mean time the cavalry and light
infantry stood in order, and ready, in case the enemy should make
any movement. The Aetolians, as if resolved to defend their
fortifications, (the multitude which had been scattered about the
fields having, by this time, returned to the camp,) posted bodies
of armed men at the gates, and on the rampart, and from this safe
situation looked with a degree of confidence on the enemy, as long as
they continued quiet. But, as soon as the troops of the Macedonians
began to move, and to advance to the rampart, in order of battle, and
ready for an assault, they all quickly abandoned their posts, and
fled through the opposite part of the camp, to the eminence where the
Athamanians were stationed. During their flight in this confusion,
many of the Aetolians were slain, and many made prisoners. Philip
doubted not that, had there been daylight enough remaining, he should
have been able to make himself master of the camp of the Athamanians
also; but the day having been spent in the fight, and in plundering
the camp afterwards, he sat down under the eminence, in the adjacent
plain, determined to attack the enemy at the first dawn of the
following day. But the Aetolians, under the same apprehensions which
had made them desert their camp, dispersed, and fled during the
following night. Amynander was of the greatest service; for, by his
directions, the Athamanians, who were acquainted with the roads,
conducted them into Aetolia, whilst the Macedonians pursued them
over the highest mountains, through unknown paths. In this disorderly
flight, a few, missing their way, fell into the hands of the
Macedonian horsemen, whom Philip, at the earliest dawn, on seeing the
eminence abandoned, had sent to harass the marching body of the enemy.
43. About the same time also Athenagoras, one of the king's generals,
overtaking the Dardanians in their retreat homeward, at first threw
their rear into disorder; but these unexpectedly facing about, and
forming their line, the fight became like a regular engagement. When
the Dardanians began again to advance, the Macedonian cavalry and
light infantry harassed those who had no troops of that kind to aid
them, and were, besides, burdened with unwieldy arms. The ground, too,
favoured the assailants: very few were slain, but many wounded; none
were taken, because they rarely quit their ranks, but both fight and
retreat in a close body. Thus Philip, having checked the proceedings
of those two nations by these well-timed expeditions, gained
reparation for the damages sustained from the operations of the
Romans; the enterprise being as spirited as the issue was successful.
An occurrence which accidentally happened to him lessened the number
of his enemies on the side of Aetolia. Scopas, a man of considerable
influence in his own country, having been sent from Alexandria by king
Ptolemy, with a great sum of gold, hired and carried away to Egypt six
thousand foot and four hundred horse; nor would he have suffered one
of the young Aetolians to remain at home, had not Damocritus, (it is
not easy to say, whether out of zeal for the good of the nation, or
out of opposition to Scopas, for not having secured his interest by
presents,) by sometimes reminding them of the war which threatened
them, at other times, of the solitary condition in which they would
be, detained some of them at home by severe reproaches. Such were the
actions of the Romans, and of Philip, during that summer.
44. In the beginning of the same summer, the fleet under Lucius
Apustius, lieutenant-general, setting sail from Corcyra, and passing
by Malea, formed a junction with king Attalus, off Scyllaeum, which
lies in the district of Hermione. The Athenian state, which had for
a long time, through fear, restrained their animosity against Philip
within some bounds, in the expectation of approaching aid afforded
them, gave full scope to it all. There are never wanting in that city
orators, who are ready on every occasion to inflame the people; a
kind of men, who, in all free states, and more particularly in that
of Athens, where eloquence flourishes in the highest degree, are
maintained by the favour of the multitude. These immediately proposed
a decree, and the commons passed it, that "all the statues and images
of Philip, with their inscriptions, and likewise those of all his
ancestors, male and female, should be taken down and destroyed; that
the festal days, solemnities, and priests, which had been instituted
in honour of him or of his predecessors, should all be abolished;
and that even the ground where any such statue had been set up,
and inscribed to his honour, should be held abominable." And it was
resolved, that, "for the future, nothing which ought to be erected or
dedicated in a place of purity should be there erected; and that the
public priests, as often as they should pray for the people of Athens,
for their allies, armies, and fleets, so often should they utter
curses and execrations against Philip, his offspring, his kingdom,
his forces by sea and land, and the whole race and name of the
Macedonians." It was added to the decree, that, "if any person in
future should make any proposal tending to throw disgrace and ignominy
on Philip, the people of Athens would ratify it in its fullest extent:
if, on the contrary, any one should, by word or deed, endeavour to
lessen his ignominy, or to do him honour, that whoever slew him who
should have so said or done, should be justified in so doing." Lastly,
a clause was annexed, that "all the decrees, formerly passed against
the Pisistratidae, should be in full force against Philip." Thus the
Athenians waged war against Philip with writings and with words, in
which alone their power consisted.
45. Attalus and the Romans, having, from Hermione, proceeded first to
Piraeus, and staid there a few days, after being loaded with decrees
of the Athenians, (in which the honours paid to their allies were as
extravagant as the expressions of their resentment against their enemy
had been,) sailed from Piraeus to Andros, and, coming to an anchor in
the harbour called Gaureleos, sent persons to sound the inclinations
of the townsmen, whether they chose voluntarily to surrender their
city, rather than run the hazard of an assault. On their answering,
that they were not at their own disposal, but that the citadel
was occupied by the king's troops, Attalus and the Roman
lieutenant-general, landing their forces, with every thing requisite
for attacking towns, made their approaches to the city on different
sides. The Roman standards and arms, which they had never seen before,
together with the spirit of the soldiers, so briskly approaching
the walls, were particularly terrifying to the Greeks. A retreat was
immediately made into the citadel, and the enemy took possession of
the city. After holding out for two days in the citadel, relying more
on the strength of the place than on their arms, on the third both
they and the garrison surrendered the city and citadel, on condition
of their being transported to Delium in Boeotia, and being each of
them allowed a single suit of apparel. The island was yielded up by
the Romans to king Attalus; the spoil, and the ornaments of the city,
they themselves carried off. Attalus, desirous that the island, of
which he had got possession, might not be quite deserted, persuaded
almost all the Macedonians, and several of the Andrians, to
remain there: and, in some time after, those who, according to the
capitulation, had been transported to Delium, were induced to return
from thence by the promises made them by the king, in which they were
disposed the more readily to confide, by the ardent affection which
they felt for their native country. From Andros they passed over to
Cythnus; there they spent several days, to no purpose, in assaulting
the city; when, at length, finding it scarcely worth the trouble, they
departed. At Prasiae, a place on the main land of Attica, twenty barks
of the Issaeans joined the Roman fleet. These were sent to ravage the
lands of the Carystians, the rest of the fleet lying at Geraestus, a
noted harbour in Euboea, until the Issaeans returned from Carystus:
on which, setting sail all together, and steering their course through
the open sea, until they passed by Scyrus, they arrived at the island
of Icus. Being detained there for a few days by a violent northerly
wind, as soon as the weather was fair, they passed over to Sciathus,
a city which had been lately plundered and desolated by Philip. The
soldiers, spreading themselves over the country, brought back to the
ships corn and what other kinds of provisions could be of use to them.
Plunder there was none, nor had the Greeks deserved to be plundered.
Directing their course thence to Cassandrea, they first came to
Mendis, a village on the coast of that state; and, intending from
thence to double the promontory, and bring round the fleet to the very
walls of the city, a violent tempest arising, they were near being
buried in the waves. However, after being dispersed, and a great part
of the ships having lost their rigging, they escaped on shore. This
storm at sea was an omen of the kind of success which they were
to meet on land; for, after collecting their vessels together, and
landing their forces, having made an assault on the city, they were
repulsed with many wounds, there being a strong garrison of the
king's troops in the place. Being thus obliged to retreat without
accomplishing their design, they passed over to Canastrum in Pallene,
and from thence, doubling the promontory of Torona, conducted the
fleet to Acanthus. There they first laid waste the country, then
stormed the city itself, and plundered it. They proceeded no farther,
for their ships were now heavily laden with booty, but went back to
Sciathus, and from Sciathus to Euboea, whence they had first set out.
46. Leaving the fleet there, they entered the Malian bay with ten
light ships, in order to confer with the Aetolians on the method of
conducting the war. Sipyrrhicas, the Aetolian, was at the head of the
embassy that came to Heraclea, to hold a consultation with the king
and the Roman lieutenant-general. They demanded of Attalus, that,
in pursuance of the treaty, he should supply them with one thousand
soldiers, which number he had engaged for on condition of their taking
part in the war against Philip. This was refused to the Aetolians,
because on their part they had formerly showed themselves unwilling to
march out to ravage Macedonia, at a time when Philip, being employed
near Pergamus in destroying by fire every thing sacred and profane,
they might have compelled him to retire from thence, in order to
preserve his own territories. Thus, instead of aid, the Aetolians were
dismissed with hopes, the Romans making them large promises. Apustius
with Attalus returned to the ships, where they began to concert
measures for the siege of Oreus. This city was well secured by
fortifications; and also, as an attempt had formerly been made on
it, by a strong garrison. After the taking of Andros, twenty Rhodian
ships, all decked vessels, had formed a junction with them, under the
command of Agesimbrotus. This squadron they sent to the station off
Zelasium, a promontory of Isthmia, very conveniently situate beyond
Demetrias, in order that, if the ships of the Macedonians should
attempt any movement, they might act as a defensive force. Heraclides,
the king's admiral, kept his fleet there, rather with a view of laying
hold of any advantage which the negligence of the enemy might afford
him, than with a design of attempting any thing by open force. The
Romans and king Attalus carried on their attacks against Oreus on
different sides; the Romans against the citadel next to the sea, the
king's troops against the lower part of the town, lying between the
two citadels, where the city is also divided by a wall. As their posts
were different, so were their methods of attack: the Romans made their
approaches by means of covered galleries, applying also the ram to
the walls; the king's troops, by throwing in weapons with the balista,
catapulta, and every other kind of engine, and stones also of immense
weight. They formed mines, too, and made use of every expedient,
which, on trial, had been found useful in the former siege. On the
other side, not only did more Macedonians protect the town and the
citadels, than on the former occasion, but they exerted themselves
with greater spirit, in consequence of the reprimands which they had
received from the king for the misconduct they had committed, and also
from remembrance both of his threats and promises with regard to the
future. Thus, when time was being consumed there, contrary to their
expectation, and there was more hope from a siege and works than from
a sudden assault, the lieutenant-general thought that in the mean time
some other business might be accomplished; wherefore, leaving such a
number of men as seemed sufficient to finish the works, he passed over
to the nearest part of the continent, and, arriving unexpectedly, made
himself master of Larissa, except the citadel,--not that celebrated
city in Thessaly, but another, which they call Cremaste. Attalus also
surprised Aegeleos, where nothing was less apprehended than such an
enterprise during the siege of another city. The works at Oreus had
now begun to take effect, while the garrison within were almost spent
with unremitted toil, (keeping watch both by day and night,) and also
with wounds. Part of the wall, being loosened by the strokes of the
ram, had fallen down in many places; and the Romans, during the night,
broke into the citadel through the breach which lay over the harbour.
Attalus, likewise, at the first light, on a signal given from the
citadel by the Romans, himself also assaulted the city, where great
part of the walls had been levelled; on which the garrison and
townsmen fled into the other citadel, and a surrender was made two
days after. The city fell to the king, the prisoners to the Romans.
47. The autumnal equinox now approached, and the Euboean gulf, called
Coela, is reckoned dangerous by mariners. Choosing, therefore, to
remove thence before the winter storms came on, they returned to
Piraeus, from whence they had set out for the campaign. Apustius,
leaving there thirty ships, sailed by Malea to Corcyra. The king was
delayed during the celebration of the mysteries of Ceres, that he
might assist at the solemnities, immediately after which he also
retired into Asia, sending home Agesimbrotus and the Rhodians. Such,
during that summer, were the proceedings, by sea and land, of
the Roman consul and lieutenant-general, aided by Attalus and the
Rhodians, against Philip and his allies. The other consul, Caius
Aurelius, on coming into his province and finding the war there
already brought to a conclusion, did not dissemble his resentment
against the praetor, for having proceeded to action in his absence;
wherefore, sending him away to Etruria, he led on the legions into the
enemy's country, and, by laying it waste, carried on the war with more
spoil than glory. Lucius Furius, finding nothing in Etruria that
could give him employment, and at the same time intent on obtaining a
triumph for his success against the Gauls, which he considered would
be more easily accomplished in the absence of the consul, who envied
and was enraged against him, came to Rome unexpectedly, and called a
meeting of the senate in the temple of Bellona; where, after making
a recital of the services which he had performed, he demanded to be
allowed to enter the city in triumph.
48. With a great part of the senate he prevailed, owing to private
interest and the importance of his services. The elder part refused
him a triumph, both "because the army, with which he had acted,
belonged to another; and because he had left his province through
an ambitious desire of snatching that opportunity of procuring a
triumph,--but that he had taken this course without any precedent."
The senators of consular rank particularly insisted, that "he ought
to have waited for the consul; for that he might, by pitching his camp
near the city, and thereby securing the colony without coming to an
engagement, have protracted the affair until his arrival; and that,
what the praetor had not done, the senate ought to do; they should
wait for the consul. After hearing the business discussed by the
consul and praetor in their presence, they would be able, more
correctly, to form judgment on the case." Great part were of opinion,
that the senate ought to consider nothing but the service performed,
and whether he had performed it while in office, and under his own
auspices. For, "when of two colonies, which had been opposed, as
barriers, to restrain the tumultuous inroads of the Gauls, one had
been already sacked and burned, the flames being ready to spread (as
if from an adjoining house) to the other colony, which lay so near,
what ought the praetor to have done? For if it was improper to enter
on any action without the consul, then the senate had acted wrong
in giving the army to the praetor; because, if they chose that the
business should be performed, not under the praetor's auspices, but
the consul's, they might have limited the decree in such a manner,
that not the praetor, but the consul, should manage it; or else the
consul had acted wrong, who, after ordering the army to remove from
Etruria into Gaul, did not meet it at Ariminum, in order to be present
at operations, which were not allowed to be performed without him. But
the exigencies of war do not wait for the delays and procrastinations
of commanders; and battles must be sometimes fought, not because
commanders choose it, but because the enemy compels it. The fight
itself, and the issue of the fight, is what ought to be regarded now.
The enemy were routed and slain, their camp taken and plundered,
the colony relieved from a siege, the prisoners taken from the other
colony recovered and restored to their friends, and an end put to the
war in one battle. And not only men rejoiced at this victory, but the
immortal gods also had supplications paid to them, for the space of
three days, on account of the business of the state having been wisely
and successfully, not rashly and unfortunately, conducted by Lucius
Furius, praetor. Besides, the Gallic wars were, by some fatality,
destined to the Furian family."
49. By means of discourses of this kind, made by him and his friends,
the interest of the praetor, who was present, prevailed over the
dignity of the absent consul, and the majority decreed a triumph to
Lucius Furius. Lucius Furius, praetor, during his office, triumphed
over the Gauls. He carried into the treasury three hundred and twenty
thousand _asses_,[1] and one hundred and seventy thousand pounds'
weight of silver. There were neither any prisoners led before his
chariot, nor spoils carried before him, nor did any soldiers follow
him. It appeared that every thing, except the victory, belonged to
the consul. The games which Publius Scipio had vowed when consul in
Africa, were then celebrated, in a magnificent manner and with respect
to the lands for his soldiers, it was decreed, that whatever number
of years each of them had served in Spain or in Africa, he should,
for every year, receive two acres; and that ten commissioners should
distribute that land. Three commissioners were then appointed to fill
up the number of colonists at Venusia, because the strength of that
colony had been reduced in the war with Hannibal: Caius Terentius
Varro, Titus Quintius Flamininus, Publius Cornelius, son of Cneius
Scipio, enrolled the colonists for Venusia. During the same year,
Caius Cornelius Cethegus, who in the capacity of proconsul commanded
in Spain, routed a numerous army of the enemy in the territory of
Sedeta; in which battle, it is said, that fifteen thousand Spaniards
were slain, and seventy-eight military standards taken. The consul
Caius Aurelius, on returning from his province to Rome to hold the
elections, made heavy complaints, not on the subject on which they had
supposed he would, that the senate had not waited for his coming, nor
allowed him an opportunity of arguing the matter with the praetor;
but, that "the senate had decreed a triumph in such a manner, without
hearing the report of any one of those who had taken part in the war,
except the person who was to enjoy the triumph: that their ancestors
had made it a rule that the lieutenant-generals, the military
tribunes, the centurions, and even the soldiers, should be present
at the triumph, in order that the Roman people might ascertain the
reality of his exploits, to whom so high an honour was paid." Now, of
that army which fought with the Gauls, had any one soldier, or even a
soldier's servant, been present, of whom the senate could inquire how
much of truth or falsehood was in the praetor's narrative? He then
appointed a day for the elections, at which were chosen consuls,
Lucius Cornelius Lentulus and Publius Villius Tappulus. The praetors
were then appointed, Lucius Quintius Flamininus, Lucius Valerius
Flaccus, Lucius Villius Tappulus, and Cneius Baebius Tamphilus.
[Footnote 1: 1033l. 6s. 8d.]
50. During that year provisions were remarkably cheap. The curule
aediles, Marcus Claudius Marcellus and Sextus Aelius Paetus,
distributed among the people a vast quantity of corn, brought from
Africa, at the rate of two _asses_ a peck. They also celebrated the
Roman games in a magnificent manner, repeating them a second day; and
erected in the treasury five brazen statues out of the money paid as
fines. The plebeian games were thrice repeated entire, by the aediles,
Lucius Terentius Massa, and Cneius Baebius Tamphilus, who was elected
praetor. There were also funeral games exhibited that year in the
forum, for the space of four days, on occasion of the death of Marcus
Valerius Laevinus, by his sons Publius and Marcus, who gave also a
show of gladiators, in which twenty-five pairs fought. Marcus Aurelius
Cotta, one of the decemviri of the sacred books, died, and Manius
Acilius Glabrio was substituted in his room. It happened that both the
curule aediles, who had been created at the elections, were persons
who could not immediately undertake the office: for Caius Cornelius
Cethegus was elected in his absence, when he was occupying Spain
as his province; and Caius Valerius Flaccus, who was present, being
flamen Dialis, could not take the oath of observing the laws; and no
person was allowed to hold any office longer than five days without
taking the oath. Flaccus petitioned to be excused from complying with
the law, on which the senate decreed, that if the aedile produced a
person approved of by the consuls, who would take the oath for him,
the consuls, if they thought proper, should make application to the
tribunes, that it might be proposed to the people. Lucius Valerius
Flaccus, praetor elect, was produced to swear for his brother. The
tribunes proposed to the commons, and the commons ordered that this
should be as if the aedile himself had sworn. With regard to the other
aedile, likewise, an order of the commons was made. On the tribunes
putting the question, what two persons they chose should go and take
the command of the armies in Spain, in order that Caius Cornelius,
curule aedile, might come home to execute his office, and that Lucius
Manlius Acidinus might, after many years, retire from the province;
the commons ordered Cneius Cornelius Lentulus and Lucius Stertinius,
proconsuls, to command in Spain.