One point still remains to be discussed, though we need only touch on
it very briefly. How far can music represent external things--ought
it, indeed, to try to represent external things at all? It was
Schopenhauer, I think, who said that music was not a representative
but a presentative art. But that was very superficial psychologising
even in his day, and it is still more superficial in ours. The whole
problem is exceedingly simple if people, in their anxiety to prove
that music cannot "imitate," would not confuse it unnecessarily.
Heaven only knows how much bastard æsthetic has been born of that
unfortunate remark of Beethoven's about the Pastoral Symphony, which
we have already had occasion to examine. As a specimen, look at this
quotation from Victor Cousin, intended to demonstrate, in its own
way, that music must not be "painting," but only an "expression of
emotion." "Give the wisest symphonist a tempest to render. Nothing is
easier than to imitate the whistling of the winds and the noise of the
thunder. But by what combination of ordered sounds could he present
to our sight the lightning flashes which suddenly rend the veil of
night, and that which is the most terrific aspect of the tempest, the
alternate movement of the waves, now rising mountain high, now sinking
and seeming to fall headlong into bottomless abysses? If the hearer
has not been told beforehand what the subject is, he will never divine
it, and I defy him to distinguish a tempest from a battle. In spite
of scientific skill and genius, sounds cannot represent forms. Music,
rightly advised, will refuse to enter upon a hopeless contest; it will
not undertake to express the rise and fall of the waves and other like
phenomena; it will do better; with sounds it will produce in our soul
the feelings which successively arise in us during the various scenes
of the tempest. It is thus that Haydn will become the rival, even the
conqueror of the painter, because it has been given to music to move
and sway the soul even more profoundly than painting."[37]
The point is, be it observed, that unless you were told beforehand, you
could not say whether a given orchestral piece was meant to represent
a tempest or a battle; the composer is therefore advised not to try
to paint a tempest, but to "produce in our soul the feelings which
successively arise in us during the various scenes of the tempest."
Why, how in the name of all æsthetic innocence does this help us? How
are we, in the absence of a verbal indication, to distinguish "the
feelings which successively arise in us during the various scenes of
the tempest" from the feelings which would arise in us during the
various scenes of a battle? We only hear, that is, a certain mass of
sound; how are we to know, from the mere "feeling" this arouses in us,
that it refers to a battle or a tempest or anything else? What man, for
example, listening to solemn music, can possibly know whether it is
meant to describe the death of Napoleon, the funeral of Mr. Gladstone,
the poetic contemplation of nature, the opening of the St. Louis
Exhibition, the life-work of John Stuart Mill, or anything else under
the sun? The "feelings" are perfectly incompetent to pierce through
the indefinite tone to the definite scene that inspired it. What the
composer has to do is to tell us what this definite scene is; nobody,
for example, would have guessed that the fourth movement of Schumann's
_Rhenish_ symphony had its origin in the installation of the Archbishop
of Geissel as Archbishop of Cologne, if the composer himself had not
told us so. Nobody would have known that a certain part of the Pastoral
Symphony represents a peasant's gratitude after a storm, if Beethoven
had not said so himself. The "feelings" are no more reliable guides in
cases of this kind than the "painting" is. And if the composer has to
give us a verbal clue in order to let us know definitely what feelings
he is representing, he has only to give us a verbal clue to make it
quite clear to us what his painting is intended to represent; and there
is no more odium in needing the verbal clue in the latter case than
there is in the former.
No one in his senses has ever pretended that music alone could depict
external things so accurately that we could recognise them infallibly
at once, without any assistance from the sight, as in opera, or from
a verbal accompaniment. As M. Alfred Ernst has put it: "It is not a
question of painting an object--music could not succeed in doing that;
nor is it a question of reproducing exactly the sounds of nature,
such as the murmur of flowing water, the rumbling of thunder, the
song of birds; but, when these phenomena are in the subject that is
being treated, of recalling them to the mind by means of tone.... Thus
conceived, music does not materialise itself in becoming descriptive;
it would be more accurate to say that it spiritualises the phenomena of
nature...." And he shows how Mozart, for example, employs description.
"In his _Don Juan_ he has more than once translated the gesture, the
mimic, of his personages. We may cite, for instance, the ascending
scales in the orchestra in the duel between the Commandant and Don
Juan. The figures in the bass refer to the old man, those above to
Juan; each time that one of the two adversaries steps towards the other
and attacks, this figure comes out, strident, quick as the thrust of a
sword, and at the moment when Don Juan presses the Commandant, lunges
at him time after time, strikes him and kills him, the violin scales
succeed each other without giving the auditor time to breathe....
At the beginning of the sextet, when Leporello tries to slip away,
fearing to be taken for Don Juan, the orchestra reproduces his stealthy
movements; we see the unhappy wretch creeping along cautiously, his
back bent, feeling round for a way out."[38] Nor does one need to be
reminded of the numerous pieces of "description," of "imitation," in
Wagner--of the water-music, the fire-music, the swish of Klingsor's
spear, the voices of the forest, and so on. Every dramatic, or, indeed,
vocal writer is full of passages of this kind; it simply cannot be
avoided in music that aims at something beyond abstract note-spinning.
But in every case, as we can see, the music is not left to tell its
story alone; we are not compelled to guess the subject represented
merely from the tones themselves. The subject is told us in some way
or other--we see Don Juan thrusting at the Commandant, or the spear
flying at Parsifal's head, or the fire licking the couch of Brynhilde;
or else there is, in the words of the song or opera, some suggestion
of the external thing that is being illustrated in the music. And in
the symphonic poem, all that we require in order that everything may
be perfectly clear is a statement, in the programme, of the picture
upon which the music is based. I am not expected to know, merely from
the tones alone, what the "giant" motive in the _Rheingold_ is meant
to represent; but when I am told that it relates to the giants, I
can take delight in the expressiveness of its lumbering, unwieldy
movements. Similarly I must be told that the opening pages of _Also
sprach Zarathustra_ are meant as a representation of the majesty and
spaciousness of Nature. And--again to draw upon the argument of the
foregoing pages--there is nothing that can be done in this line in
the song or the opera that cannot be done quite as effectually in
the symphonic poem, if composers would only give their hearers the
same full insight into their literary intentions as the song or opera
writer does, and if hearers would only take the trouble to master
these intentions before they listen to the music that is based upon
them. If they would do this, their pleasure in the symphonic poem
would be enormously increased; everything in it would be alive to
them. For myself, at any rate, to listen to _Till Eulenspiegel_ or
_Ein Heldenleben_ or _Don Quixote_ is not only to enjoy the music but
to see the whole action as clearly as if I were reading it in a book
or watching it on the stage. I get none of the boredom, none of the
unfortunate provocations to laughter, that are inseparable from that
artificial, stagey form of art, the opera. I miss, of course, some of
the factors that make opera so glorious--the inexpressible thrill
communicated by the human voice, the quickening of the pulse that is
given by the movements of the actors and the catastrophes of the stage;
but on the other hand I am spared a great many things, and I have the
satisfaction of knowing that my sense of form is receiving the purest,
most undiluted pleasure it is possible for it to receive in poetic
music. The case for programme music is quite as strong as the case for
opera or for the symphony. That many stupid things have been done in
its name, that many fools and weaklings have fought under its banner,
counts for nothing; how many symphonies, how many operas, are there
that the world would willingly let die! The rightness of the form is
not affected by the wrongness of the people who choose to work in it;
and that the form itself is essentially right, I have, I hope, given
adequate proof. Finally, to the question of how far music is justified
in trying to suggest external things, we can only say that it is better
not to be too dogmatic. Things that would have seemed impossible a
hundred years ago are done with ease to-day. Who would believe that a
windmill could be represented in music? Yet Strauss's windmill in _Don
Quixote_ is really extraordinarily clever and satisfying; he suggests
wonderfully, too, the caracoling of the horse as the knight puts him
through his paces. His pictorial faculty, indeed, is something unique
in the history of music; Wagner's is only an imperfect instrument by
the side of it. The representative power of music is growing day by
day. The only æsthetic fact we can be sure of is this, that no piece
of representation will be tolerated unless it is at the same time
_music_. That is the ultimate test; the imitative passages that make us
smile are the passages that are merely imitative, without sufficient
musical charm to keep them alive for us. But here, of course, we simply
get back to the position already advanced in this article--that in all
poetic music there must be as thorough a satisfaction as possible not
only of the literary or the pictorial but of the musical sense.