words with which the natives designate their relatives by blood and
marriage. The reason is far from obvious. Why should not this topic be
left in the hands of a linguist-lexicographer? It is true that primitive
usage in this regard is very quaint from our point of view, but so are
primitive conceptions on a variety of subjects that likewise find
expression in speech. The refinement of spatial distinctions in North
American languages, the classification of colors or animals or other
groups of natural phenomena are of equal intrinsic interest from a
psychological point of view. Why, then, single out a particular
department of the aboriginal vocabulary in a treatise on culture? The
answer is simply this, that kinship terms have a direct relation to
cultural data.
The very fact that primitive tribes frequently use terms of kinship as
words of address where we should substitute personal names is a social
practice of ethnological interest. But the essential point is that the
terms used are often very definitely correlated with specific social
usages. Generally speaking, the use of distinct words for two types of
relatives is connected with a real difference in their social relations
to the speaker. Thus, a majority of primitive tribes draw no distinction
between the father’s sister’s daughter and the mother’s brother’s
daughter. But among the Miwok of California, where one of the cousins
may be married while the other is within the prohibited degrees, a
discrimination is made in language. Again, in many regions of the globe
an altogether special bond connects the maternal uncle with the sister’s
son, and accordingly we find that he is very often sharply distinguished
from the paternal uncle in nomenclature.
On the other hand, we can often explain very naturally the use of a
single word for two or more relatives whom we designate by as many
distinct words. The Vedda of Ceylon, for example, call the man’s
father-in-law and maternal uncle by the same term. The reason is that
here a man commonly marries his mother’s brother’s daughter; the
mother’s brother _is_ his father-in-law, and this identity is expressed
in the terminology. A different illustration is supplied by the Crow of
Montana, who have one term for the man’s mother-in-law and his wife’s
brother’s wife. The simple explanation is that both stand to him in the
relationship of mutual avoidance, and it is this social fact that is
expressed by the common designation. The same Indians apply the word
for ‘father’ in a very inclusive manner, possibly to dozens of
individuals; but closer examination shows that all of the people so
addressed are entitled to the same kind of treatment by the speaker, to
a peculiar form of reverence, and to a preferential rank in the
distribution of gifts.
These few and casual examples possibly suffice to show why kinship terms
deserve the ethnologist’s attention. Terms of relationship are, in some
measure, indices of social usage. Where relatives whom other people
distinguish are grouped together, there is some likelihood that the
natives regard them as representing the same relationship because they
actually enjoy the same privileges or exercise the same functions in
tribal life. Where relatives whom other peoples group together are
distinguished, there is some probability that the distinction goes hand
in hand with a difference in social function.
Lewis H. Morgan, the pioneer in this domain of knowledge, was keenly
alive to the social implications of kinship nomenclature. But while he
endeavored to give an ultimate interpretation of it in terms of various
social conditions, he was confronted with the fact that not every tribe
had a terminology _sui generis_, but that nomenclatures of remote
peoples were sometimes marvelously similar. Morgan boldly argued that
such community of nomenclature established ultimate racial unity and on
this ground coolly suggested a racial connection between the Hawaiians
and the South African Zulu, between the natives of India and those of
the Western Hemisphere.[1]
These speculations as to racial affinity have been rightly disregarded
by later students, because to accept Morgan’s premises means running
counter to the most obvious facts of physical anthropology. As Lubbock
pointed out, we cannot assume that the Two-Mountain Iroquois are more
closely akin to remote Oceanians than to their fellow Iroquois because
some of their kinship terms resemble in connotation those of the
Hawaiians. Nevertheless, Morgan was right in feeling that _some_
historical conclusions could be drawn from similarities of relationship
nomenclature. We must simply bring this particular group of ethnological
data under the same principle as other cultural phenomena. When the same
feature occurs within a definite continuous region, we shall assume that
it has developed in a single center and spread by borrowing to other
parts of the area. When the same feature occurs in disconnected regions,
we shall incline to the theory of independent development and shall
inquire whether the course of evolution may have been due to the same
cultural determinants, _i.e._, in this case, to the same social
institutions.
After these preliminary remarks, we may turn to a closer scrutiny of the
facts.
‘_Systems_’. Abstractly considered, it is conceivable that every
individual relative might be designated by a different term of
relationship by every other individual, just as each object in nature
might theoretically be defined by some distinctive word instead of being
placed in some such category as ‘tree’, ‘animal’, or ‘book’. Indeed,
primitive people go rather far in their distinctions. Thus, in the
Menomini family circle boys are not called ‘son’ or ‘brother’, but each
is addressed by a word indicating the order of his birth, the oldest
being ‘mudjikiwis’, the second ‘osememau’, the third ‘akotcosememau’,
the fourth ‘nanaweo’.[2] But in this, as in every other department of
language, economy has been exercised and instead of a chaotic number of
distinct terms for every possible relationship, there is always a
limited series, many distinct individual relationships being always
grouped together under a single head. Thus, in English we apply the word
‘brother’ to a number of individuals regardless of their age relatively
to ourselves or to one another and irrespective of the sex of the
speaker. Yet, as the Menomini instance shows, the age distinction might
very well have been expressed in speech and there are many Indian
languages in which one set of terms is used by female and another by
male speakers.
All the terms used by a people to designate their relatives by blood or
marriage are jointly called their ‘kinship system’. This phrase is
wholly misleading, if it is understood to imply that all the constituent
elements form a well-articulated whole, for this probably never applies
to more than a limited number of them, as will appear presently. But as
a convenient word for the entire nomenclature of relationship found in a
particular region the word ‘system’ may be provisionally retained. We
may say, then, that systems of different peoples vary in their mode of
classifying kin and it seems the ethnographer’s first duty to determine
the types of system found and their geographical distribution.
At the present moment a satisfactory grouping of the world’s kinship
systems is impossible, owing to our lack of knowledge of many areas. The
task is also rendered very difficult by the frequent coexistence of
distinct and even contradictory principles in the same ‘system’. Each of
these may be defined separately, but to weld both or all of them into a
unified whole defies our efforts. For example, the Masai of East
Africa, in referring to the paternal uncle, simply combine the stems for
‘father’, _baba_, and ‘brother’, _alasche_, thus forming by
juxtaposition of these primary terms the compound expression _ol alasche
le baba_, which means literally ‘the brother of the father’. This mode
of defining a relative’s status by combining primary terms of
relationship or a primary term with a qualifying adjective as in our
‘grandfather’, is technically known as ‘descriptive’, and ethnologists
are wont to speak of descriptive systems. As a matter of fact, this
descriptive principle is highly characteristic of the Masai--but not
when relatives are directly addressed by them. In such vocative usage,
as it may be called, the father’s brother is called _baba_ like the
father himself; the mother’s brother is not designated by a phrase
composed of primary stems but by a new stem, _abula_, which is also used
reciprocally for the nephew; while _koko_ serves to call both a paternal
and a maternal aunt. These connotations introduce into the Masai
‘system’ a discordant principle by which relatives, instead of being
defined descriptively, are grouped together in classes. But this
‘classificatory’ feature by no means characterizes all the vocative
nomenclature. By far the majority of relatives are addressed by terms
suggestive of the presents of live stock presented to them by the
speaker; if the gift consisted of a bull, the word used is _b-ainoni_,
from _oinoni_, bull; if an ass was given away, the vocative term is
_ba-sigiria_, from _sigiria_, ass; and so forth. Accordingly, the
vocative terms cited above are only employed by children, who have not
yet presented stock to their kin.[3] In short, Masai terminology is
molded by at least three entirely disparate principles.
We shall, accordingly, do well to amend our phraseology and to speak
rather of kinship categories, features, or principles of classification
than of types of kinship systems.
_The Descriptive Principle._ When we approach our subject in a purely
empirical way, we are confronted with the fact that features do not, as
a rule, occur sporadically but are distributed over continuous areas.
Imperfect as is our knowledge of African systems, for example, we know
that the descriptive feature of the Masai nomenclature does not appear
everywhere, but flourishes especially among East African tribes, such as
the Shilluk, Dinka, and other Upper Nile populations, and perhaps more
widely where Arabic influence extends, the Arabian terminology being of
a markedly descriptive character. In East Africa, indeed, there is
almost quantitative proof of the dependence of kinship terminology on
historical connection and geographical proximity. Among the Baganda, as
among most Bantu Negroes, the descriptive feature is lacking and such a
relative as the mother’s brother’s son, instead of being designated by a
compound expression, is classed with the brother.[4] The Masai, who live
surrounded by Bantu tribes, have a purely descriptive system for
non-vocative usage but their vocative forms are in part classificatory,
while some neighboring Bantu peoples have a correspondingly mixed
system. The Shilluk and Dinka seem to use the descriptive principle
exclusively, as do the Arabs. The Masai are undoubtedly closely allied
with the Nilotes and markedly different from the Bantu. The conclusion
is, therefore, inevitable that their terminology--whatever may be its
ultimate _raison d’être_--is a function of their historical relations.
They have descriptive features because they belong to a group of peoples
of whom such features are characteristic. They have classificatory
features because they have come into contact with peoples whose systems
were characterized by such features and from whom they have borrowed
them. The Shilluk lack the classificatory principle because they have
not had the same alien influences as the Masai. The restriction of
descriptive features to a definite part of Africa and their amalgamation
with other features in the marginal section of this area show that
kinship nomenclatures follow precisely the same rules as other elements
of culture and that their distribution indicates probable or
corroborates known tribal relations.
The descriptive principle is not restricted to East Africa and the
Semitic family, but has been found in the Persian, Armenian, Celtic,
Esthonian, and Scandinavian languages.[5] Although guesses might be
offered, I do not feel that our present knowledge permits definite
statements as to the historical relations suggested by the total range
of the descriptive principle on the face of the globe.
_The Hawaiian Principle._ While the term ‘descriptive’ admits of a
fairly unambiguous definition, the same cannot be said for the word
‘classificatory’. Morgan, after explaining his use of the former, states
that a system of the second type reduces blood-relatives to great
classes by a series of apparently arbitrary generalizations, applying
the same terms to all the members of the same class. “It thus confounds
relationships, which, under the descriptive system, are distinct, and
enlarges the signification both of the primary and secondary terms
beyond their seemingly appropriate sense.”[6] This is looking at the
matter from the arbitrarily selected point of view of our own
nomenclature (which Morgan improperly, as Rivers has shown, regarded as
descriptive). Objectively considered, even descriptive terminologies are
classificatory, inasmuch as they do not individualize, but content
themselves with such generalizations as classing together, say, all the
father’s brothers instead of uniformly specializing according to age.
For this reason I regard as misplaced Dr. Rivers’ emphasis on whether a
term designates a single individual or a wider group. What, then, lies
at the basis of the classificatory principle? Dr. Rivers, following
Tylor, reduces it to the clan factor or rather to the influence of the
dual organization of ancient society, by which it was divided into
exogamous moieties. But this important suggestion, to which we shall
have to revert, applies avowedly only to one form of the classificatory
system and involves, therefore, the hypothesis that this preceded other
forms. This may prove to be valid, but we cannot prejudice an empirical
survey by taking its proof for granted and cannot, therefore, simply
substitute ‘clan’ for ‘classificatory’ systems--apart from the fact that
to talk of systems instead of principles or features in this connection
is demonstrably misleading.
It is quite clear that ‘classificatory’ can be used only in a loose
sense, to indicate wider groupings of kin than those to which we are
accustomed; and that there is no _necessary_ evolutionary relation
between the two forms usually classed under this head. The empirical
data are simply these. In certain systems, blood-relatives are classed
according to generation regardless of nearness of kinship and of their
maternal or paternal affiliations; in others, there is bifurcation, the
maternal and paternal kin of at least the generations nearest to the
speaker being distinguished. We may call the former the ‘unforked
merging’, or geographically the ‘Hawaiian’ mode of classification; the
latter may be correspondingly referred to as ‘forked merging’, or
‘Dakota’. One point which it is essential to remember even at this early
stage of our survey is that these principles, together with the
descriptive one, are very far from exhausting the varieties found.
Let us now consider the ‘unforked’ principle somewhat more closely as it
finds expression among the Hawaiians. These people apply a single term,
_makua_, to both parents and to all their parents’ brothers and sisters,
sex being distinguished only by qualifying words meaning ‘man’ and
‘woman’. All related individuals of one’s generation are classed as
brothers and sisters, certain distinctions being drawn according to the
age of their parents relatively to that of one’s own parents and also
according to the speaker’s sex, but none resulting from the differences
in _nearness_ of kinship. The children of all these brothers and sisters
are classed with one’s own children, and _their_ children with one’s
grandchildren, while a single term embraces grandparents and all related
members of their generation.[7] This age-stratification of
blood-relatives with disregard of differences as to father’s or mother’s
side occurs not only in Hawaii, but also in New Zealand, Kusaie, the
Gilbert and Marshall Islands.[8] It is not uninteresting to note that
Hawaii and New Zealand, though far removed from each other, coincide
closely in other cultural features not shared with fellow-Polynesians,
as Professor Dixon has recently shown in his treatment of Oceanian
mythology. The geographical proximity of Micronesia to Hawaii hardly
requires mention. Dr. Rivers points out[9] that certain Polynesian
tribes in contact with Melanesians, whose systems display essentially
the forked principle, _e.g._, the Tongans, use an intermediate
nomenclature. We are thus again able to summarize the data in terms of
historical connection. The assumption may be made that the ancient
Polynesian terminology was that of Hawaii and New Zealand, which was
modified where the Polynesians came into contact with diverse
populations, and is shared by populations whose territory was presumably
traversed by the Hawaiians. Dr. Rivers also states that the Burmese,
Karen, Chinese and Japanese systems conform to the Hawaiian principle.
He seems to depend on Morgan’s statement of the case, which may require
revision. But, accepting the data as given and assuming that the Malay
proper classify kin according to the unforked method, we should still
have a perfectly continuous distribution for the Hawaiian features.
This would no longer hold if we accepted Morgan’s view that the Zulu of
South Africa share the Hawaiian form, on which slender basis he advances
the hypothesis that Kaffir and Polynesian have a common ancestry.[10] As
a matter of fact, the Zulu nomenclature secured by Morgan does in some
instances slur over the difference of paternal and maternal lines, to
the exclusive dominance of the generation factor. Thus, man and woman
call all the brother’s and sister’s children their sons and daughters
without distinction, and the children of the father’s sister are classed
with one’s brothers and sisters.
Nevertheless, even Morgan’s list reveals fundamental deviations from the
Hawaiian principle. As he notes, the mother’s brother is _not_ classed
with the father’s brother and father, and the assumption that he
formerly was is mere guesswork. What particularly astonished Morgan,
however, was that the father’s sister was not called mother, but father.
This is, indeed, amazing, if we start from our own notions as to the
necessity of distinguishing parental sex, and in addition assume that
the Zulu system is a variant of the Hawaiian one. If we free our minds
from these preconceptions, there is no mystery; the father’s sister is
classed with the father simply in order to express the difference from
the maternal line in accordance with the principle of bifurcation.
In order to gain greater clearness in this matter it is necessary to
extend our investigation to other Bantu tribes, preferably to those
whose territories approach that of the Zulu. The essential point to
ascertain is whether paternal and maternal uncles and aunts are merged
in one group or are distinguished.[11] Among the Thonga, who live north
of the Zulu, the father’s sister, as in Zulu, is classed with the
father, the word meaning literally ‘female father’ and thus emphasizing
her separation from the mother’s side of the family. The Herero,
according to Schinz, seem to class all aunts with the mother in
vocative usage, but when not directly referring to these relatives they
employ quite distinct expressions for the father’s and the mother’s
sisters. In Baganda the difference between the two sides is marked.
_Mange_ is mother, and the same word with the qualifier _muto_ means
mother’s sister, while father’s sister is _sengawe_. Even clearer is the
case for the maternal uncle. In the Ronga group of the Thonga he is
called by a distinct word, _malume_, which almost coincides with
Morgan’s Zulu term. In the Djonga division he is classed with the
grandfather, not the father. By a quite distinct stem, the Herero
sharply distinguish the mother’s brother from the father and his
brothers. The same applies to the Baganda. As for the correlative term,
from which Morgan infers that the Zulu once called the maternal uncle
‘father’, the Ronga have a distinct word for nephew, _mupsyana_, while
the Djonga who class the mother’s brother with the grandfather
consistently enough call the sister’s son ‘grandson’. Among the Herero,
though uncles and aunts generally regard their nephews and nieces as
their own children, the maternal uncle applies to them a distinct term,
_ovasia_. Among the Baganda a man calls his son _mutabani_ or _mwana_,
but his sister’s son is _mujwa_. I may add that the altogether peculiar
bond of familiarity that links together mother’s brother and sister’s
son[12] among some Bantu people is inconsistent with Morgan’s assumption
that the relationships of maternal uncle and father were once grouped
under a single head among tribes of this family, for as stated above,
such specific social relationships are generally expressed by specific
terms for the relatives.
The conditions obtaining within the speaker’s generation at first seem
to lend some support to the conception of the Bantu system as dominated
by the Hawaiian principle, since the terms for brother and sister are
more widely employed by some Bantu than is compatible with the forked
division of kin. But closer inspection proves that, whatever may be at
the root of the Bantu classification, it is not the Hawaiian notion of
marking off generations. Even in Morgan’s Zulu series, while a man calls
his maternal uncle’s children by a special term, they address him as
brother; that is to say, members of the same generation and sex are not
all classed together. Among the Herero, where the children of a brother
and sister (but not of _Geschwister_ of the same sex) regularly
intermarry, they are placed in a category distinct from that of the
children of two brothers and two sisters, who are one another’s brothers
and sisters. In Thonga a boy calls his mother’s brother’s daughter
‘mother’, and she calls him ‘son’. To be sure, the Baganda draw no
distinction between the brother, the father’s brother’s, the father’s
sister’s, the mother’s brother’s and the mother’s sister’s son. On the
other hand, only the father’s brother’s daughter and the mother’s
sister’s daughter are a man’s sisters; his father’s sister’s and his
mother’s brother’s daughter belong to the special category of
_kizibwewe_, quite distinct from that of the sister, _mwanyina_.
To cut a long story short, all the evidence is opposed to Morgan’s
assumption that the Bantu systems are patterned on the Hawaiian
principle of grading relatives by generations. There are merely
occasional suggestions of that principle which will be discussed below
as to their theoretical bearing.
So far as I know, there is only one region of the globe outside of
Oceania and the possible Asiatic range defined above, where a definitely
Hawaiian classification of relatives by generations has been reported,
_viz._, among the Yoruba of West Africa.[13] Unfortunately, no more
recent check data for this section seem available. For another part of
West Africa we have Mr. Northcote W. Thomas’ tables,[14] which reveal a
rather perplexing condition of affairs that seems to demand intensive
reinvestigation together with linguistic analysis. The principle of
bifurcation seems to hold sway only in a very limited measure.