Lisle had heard of the operations that had been carried on by the
brigade under General Gazelee, under the general supervision of Sir
William Lockhart. The object was to cross by the Zolaznu Pass, to
punish two of the hostile tribes on the other side; to effect a
meeting with the Khuram column; and to concentrate and operate
against the Chamkannis, a tribe of inveterate robbers. On the 26th
General Gazelee started, and the newly-arrived wing of the Scottish
Fusiliers, and two companies of the Yorkshires was to follow, on
the 28th.
The approach to the pass, which was four miles to the left, was
across a very rough country; and as, after advancing four and a
half miles, a severe opposition was met with, most of the day was
spent in dislodging the tribesmen from the villages, and turning
them out of the spurs which covered the approach to the pass.
Finding it impossible to make the summit that night, they encamped
and, although they were fired into heavily, but little damage was
done.
At dawn the expedition started again but, by accident, they
ascended another pass parallel with the Lozacca. At nine o'clock
the Ghoorkhas and Sikhs arrived at the top of the pass. It was very
difficult and, as the baggage animals gave great trouble on the
ascent, and were unable to go farther, the party camped on the top
of the pass.
General Lockhart left the camp early that morning, but was also
opposed so vigorously that he was obliged to encamp, three miles
from the top of the pass, after having burnt all the villages from
which he had been fired upon. In the morning he joined the advance
party, and went ten miles down the pass. On arriving there, he
found that the Queen's and the 3rd Sikhs had pushed on farther to
Dargai. This was not the place previously visited of this name,
which appears to be a common one in the Tirah. Plenty of hay and
straw stores were found, and the troops were vastly more
comfortable than on the previous night.
It was here that Lisle had overtaken the column.
Next day the whole force was encamped at Dargai, where they were
received in a friendly manner by the villagers; who expressed
themselves willing to pay their share of the fines imposed, and
also to picket the hills. The rear guard, of two companies of
Ghoorkhas and two companies of Scottish Fusiliers, arrived late in
the day. They had met with great opposition. The tribesmen would,
indeed, have succeeded in carrying off the guns, had not a company
of the Ghoorkhas come up and, fighting stubbornly, driven them off.
Next morning the headmen of the village were summoned, to explain
why they had failed to pay the number of rifles they had promised;
and fire was applied to one of their houses. This had an
instantaneous effect and, in a quarter of an hour, the rifles were
forthcoming and the fine paid.
The force then moved on to Esor, where helio communication with the
Khuram column had been effected and, that day, Sir William Lockhart
and Colonel Hill--who commanded it--met. The country traversed was
a beautiful one. It was admirably cultivated, and the houses were
substantially built.
That day two columns went out: one under General Gazelee, to
collect the fines from one of the tribes; the other commanded by
Colonel Hill, to punish the Chamkannis. This was a small, but
extremely warlike and hardy tribe. A short time before, they had
raided a thousand head of cattle from across our border, and got
clear away with them.
A portion of the force was told off, to work its way into the
valley by the river gorge, while the main body ascended the path
over the Kotal. They reached this at a quarter-past ten and, while
they were waiting for the head of the column that had gone up the
gorge to appear, fire was opened upon them. This, however, was kept
down by the guns. It was an hour before the column appeared, but
the whole force was not through the defile until it was too late to
carry out the destruction of the villages. The column therefore
retired, severely harassed, the while, by the enemy.
Next day Colonel Hill was again sent forward, with the Border
Scouts, the 4th and 5th Ghoorkhas, part of the Queen's, and the
Khoat Battery. They were over the Kotal at nine o'clock, and the
5th Ghoorkhas and the scouts were sent to hold the hills on the
left. The Chamkannis had anticipated a sudden visit, and were in
force on the left, where they had erected several sangars.
The little body of scouts, eighty men strong, fought their way up
the hill; and waited there for the leading company of the 5th.
Lieutenant Lucas, who commanded them, told off half his company to
sweep the sangar, and then the remainder dashed at it.
The Chamkannis stood more firmly than any of the tribesmen had
hitherto done. They met the charge with a volley, and then drew
their knives to receive it. The fire of the covering party
destroyed their composure and, when the scouts were within thirty
yards, they bolted for the next sangar.
Lucas carried three of these defences, one after another, and drove
the enemy off the hill. The Ghoorkhas scouts, who had been engaged
thirty-six times during the campaign, had killed more than their
own strength of the enemy, and had lost but one man killed and two
wounded; and this without taking count of the many nights they had
spent in driving off prowlers round the camp.
The work of destruction now began. Over sixty villages were
destroyed in the valley and, on the following day, the expedition
started to withdraw. The lesson had been so severe that no attempt
was made, by the tribesmen, to harass the movement.
The column marched down to the camp in the Maidan--the Adam Khels,
through whose country they passed, paying the fine, and so
picketing many of the adjacent heights as to guard the camp from
the attacks of hostile tribesmen. When they reached Bara they
decided to rejoin the Peshawar column, without delay, as the
outlook was not promising. The evacuation began on the 7th of
December, but the rear guard did not leave till the 9th. It was
divided into two divisions in order, as much as possible, to avoid
the delay caused by the large baggage column. The 1st Division was
to march down on the Mastura Valley, while General Lockhart's 2nd
Division would again face the Dwatoi defile. Both the forces were
due to join the Peshawar column, on or about the 14th.
General Symonds, with the 1st Division, was unmolested by the way.
It was very different, however, with Lockhart.
The movement was not made a day too soon. Clouds were gathering,
the wind was blowing from the north, and there was every prospect
of a fall of snow, which would have rendered the passage of the
Bara Pass impossible. The 3rd Ghoorkhas led the way, followed by
the Borderers, with the half battalion of the Scottish Regiment and
the Dorsets. Behind them came the baggage of the brigade and
headquarters, the rear of the leading column being brought up by
the 36th Sikhs. General Kempster's Brigade followed, in as close
order as possible; having detached portions of the 1st and 2nd
Ghoorkhas, and the 2nd Punjab Infantry, to flank the whole force.
The Malikdin Khels were staunch to their word, and not a single
shot was fired till the force had passed through the defile. The
difficulties, however, were great, for the troops, baggage, and
followers had to wade through the torrent, two-thirds of the way.
The flanking had used up all the Ghoorkhas, and the Borderers now
became the advance guard.
Everything seemed peaceful, and the regiment was halfway across the
small valley, when a heavy fire was opened on the opposite hill.
General Westmacott was in command of the brigade. The Borderers
were to take and hold the opposite hill, supported by a company of
Dorsets and of Scottish Fusiliers. The battery opened fire, while a
party turned the nearest sangars on the right flank. By three
o'clock the whole of the crests were held, and the baggage streamed
into camp. Fighting continued, however, on the peaks, far into the
night.
No explanations were forthcoming why the enemy should have allowed
the force to pass through the defile, without obstruction, when a
determined body of riflemen could have kept the whole of them at
bay; for the artillery could not have been brought into position,
as the defile was the most difficult, of its kind, that a British
division had ever crossed.
The day following the withdrawal of the rear guard, it rained in
the Bara Valley, which meant snow in the Maidan. The pickets on the
heights had a bad time of it that night, as some of them were
constantly attacked; and it was not till three in the morning that
the baggage came in, the rear guard arriving in camp about ten.
The camp presented a wonderful sight that day, crowded as it was
with men and animals. The weather was bitterly cold, and the men
were busy gathering wood to make fires. On the hills all round, the
Sikhs could be seen engaged with the enemy, the guns aiding them
with their work. The 36th Sikhs, as soon as they arrived, were sent
off to occupy a peak, two miles distant, which covered the advance
into the Rajgul defile. The enemy mustered strong, but were turned
out of the position.
The next morning the villages were white with snow. A party was
sent on into the Rajgul valley, where they destroyed a big village.
Immediately after leaving Dwatoi, the valley broadened out till it
was nearly a mile wide. On the right it was commanded by steep
hills; on the left it was, to some extent, cultivated. The 4th
Brigade this time led the way, the 3rd bringing up the rear.
From the moment when the troops fell in on the 10th, till they
reached Barkai on the 14th, there was a general action from front
to rear. The advance guard marched at half-past seven. At eight
o'clock flanking parties were engaged with the enemy in the hills
and spurs. Serious opposition, however, did not take place until
five and a half miles of the valley had been passed.
Here the river turned to the right, and the front of the advance
was exposed to the fire of a strongly-fortified village, nestling
on the lower slope of a hill, on a terrace plateau. The village was
furnished with no fewer than ten towers, and from these a very
heavy fire was kept up.
The battery shelled the spur; while the Sikhs, in open order,
skirmished up the terraces to the plateau and, after a brisk
fusillade, took the village and burnt it.
A mile farther, the head of the column reached the camping place,
which was a strong village built into the river cleft. On the left
the 36th Sikhs and part of the Ghoorkhas cleared the way; while the
Bombay Pioneers, and the rest of the Ghoorkhas, became heavily
engaged with the enemy in some villages on the right. All along the
line a brisk engagement went on. The camp pickets took up their
positions early in the afternoon, and a foraging party went out and
brought in supplies, after some fighting.
Kempster's Brigade had not been able to reach the camp, and settled
itself for the night three miles farther up the valley. It, too,
had its share of fighting.
All night it rained heavily, and the morning of the 11th broke cold
and miserable. It was freezing hard; the hilltops, a hundred feet
above the camp, were wrapped in snow; and the river had swollen
greatly. The advance guard waded out into the river bed, and the
whole of the brigade followed, the Ghoorkhas clearing the sides of
the valley. In a short time they passed into the Zakka-Khel section
of the Bara Valley.
Curiously enough, the opposition ceased here. It may be that the
enemy feared to show themselves on the snow on the hilltops; or
that, being short of ammunition, they decided to reserve themselves
for an attack upon the other brigade. Scarcely a shot was fired
until the valley broadened out into the Akerkhel, where some small
opposition was offered by villagers on either bank. This, however,
was easily brushed aside.
The advance guard of the 3rd Brigade almost caught up the rear
guard of the 4th and, by four in the afternoon, its baggage was
coming along nicely, so that all would be in before nightfall. The
rear guard of the brigade, consisting of the Gordons, Ghoorkhas,
and 2nd Punjab Infantry, had been harassed as soon as they started
and, as the day wore on, the enemy increased greatly in numbers. As
the flanking parties fell back to join the rear guard, they were so
pressed that it was as much as they could do to keep them at bay.
When about three miles from camp, the baggage took a wrong road. In
trying a piece of level ground, they became helplessly mixed up in
swampy rice fields. The enemy, seeing the opportunity they had
waited for, outflanked the rear guard, and began pouring a heavy
fire into the baggage. The flanking parties were weak, for the
strain had been so severe that many men from the hospital escort
and baggage guard had been withdrawn, to dislodge the enemy from
the surrounding spurs.
The Pathans were almost among the baggage, when a panic seized the
followers. As night began to fall, the officer commanding the
Gordons, with two weak companies of his regiment, two companies of
the Ghoorkhas, and a company of the 2nd Punjab Infantry and some
Ghoorkhas, found himself in a most serious position. The guns had
limbered up and pushed on, and the rear guard remained, surrounded
by the enemy, hampered with its wounded, and stranded with doolies.
As the native bearers had fled these doolies were, in many cases,
being carried by the native officers.
The enemy grew more and more daring, and a few yards, only, divided
the combatants. Captain Uniacke, retiring with a few of the
Gordons, saw that there was only one course left: they must
entrench for the night. He was in advance of the actual rear guard,
attempting to hold a house against the fire of quite a hundred
tribesmen.
Collecting four men of his regiment, and shouting wildly, he rushed
at the doorway. In the dusk the enemy were uncertain of the number
of their assailants and, in their horror of the bayonet, they fired
one wild volley and fled. To continue the ruse, Captain Uniacke
climbed to the roof, shouting words of command, as if he had a
company behind him. Then he blew his whistle, to attract the rear
guard as it passed, in the dark.
The whistle was heard and, in little groups, they fell back with
the wounded to the house. It was a poor place, but capable of
defence; and the Pathans drew off, knowing that there was loot in
abundance to be gained down by the river.
As night wore on the greatest anxiety prevailed, when transport
officers and small parties straggled in, and reported that
tribesmen were looting and cutting up followers, within a mile of
camp; and that they had no news to give of the men who composed the
rear guard. So anxious were the headquarter staff that a company of
the Borderers were sent out, to do what they could.
Lieutenant Macalister took them out and, going a mile up the river,
was able to collect many followers and baggage animals, but could
find no signs of the rear guard. Early in the morning a company of
the 2nd Punjab Infantry went out, as a search party, and got into
communication with the rear guard. They were safe in the house; but
could not move, as they were hampered with the wounded, and were
surrounded by the enemy. Two regiments and a mountain battery
therefore went out and rescued them from their awkward predicament,
bringing them into camp, with as much baggage as could be found.
The casualties of the day amounted to a hundred and fifty animals,
and a hundred followers killed. Of the combatants two officers were
wounded, and fourteen Gordons were wounded, and four killed.
Owing to the necessity of sending out part of the 4th Brigade, to
support the cut-off rear of the 3rd Brigade, it was impossible to
continue the march that day. Next morning, the order of the brigade
was changed. The 23rd was to lead, handing over a battery of
artillery to the 4th, for service in the rear guard. It was also
ordered that flanking parties were to remain in position, until the
baggage had passed. The advance guard consisted of the 2nd Punjab
Infantry, and the 1st and 2nd Ghoorkhas. The others were told off
to burn and destroy all villages on either side of the nullah. The
baggage of the whole division followed the main guard.
Directly the camp was left, the sides of the nullah enlarged and,
for half a mile, the road lay through a narrow ravine. The drop was
rapid; for the river, swollen by the fallen snow, had become
literally a torrent; and the scene with the baggage was one of
extreme confusion. The recent disaster had given a frenzied impulse
to the generally calm followers, and all felt anxiety to press
forward, with an impetus almost impossible to control. The mass of
baggage became mixed in the ravine, but at last was cleared off
and, when the valley opened, they moved forward at their greatest
speed, but now under perfect control.
After this the opposition became less, and the village of Gulikhel
was reached by the 3rd Brigade. The village stands on the left bank
of the Bara. Immediately below it a nullah becomes a narrow gorge,
almost impassable in the present state of the river. It is several
miles long. There was, however, a road over a neighbouring saddle.
The path up from the river was narrow, but sufficient to allow two
loaded mules to pass abreast. It wound for some seven miles, over a
low hill, until the river bed was again reached.
The next ford was Barkhe. The advance guard was well up in the
hills by midday, when it met the Oxfordshire Regiment, which had
come out seven miles to meet the force; but the baggage of a
division, filing out of the river bed in pairs, is a serious
matter, and there was necessarily a block in the rear.
General Westmacott moved as soon as the baggage was off but, long
before it was through the first defile, his pickets were engaged,
and a general action followed. The enemy, fighting with
extraordinary boldness, kept within a few yards of the pickets.
Followers with baggage animals were constantly hit, as they came up
but, at half-past ten, the rear guard regiments marched out of
camp, under cover of artillery fire.
The fighting was so severe that, within an hour, the ammunition of
the 3rd Ghoorkhas was expended and, shortly afterwards, the two
regiments of the rear guard were forced to call up their first
reserve ammunition mules. The march was continued at a rapid pace,
until they reached the block caused by the narrowness of the path.
Here the whole river reach became choked with animals and doolies.
The wounded were coming in fast, when the Pathans, taking advantage
of the block, attacked in great force, hoping to compel the
retreating force to make their way down the long river defile.
General Westmacott, however, defended his right with energy; the
rear-guard regiments supporting each other, while the batteries
were in continual action. The Borderers, Sikhs, and Ghoorkhas stood
well to their task, till the last of the baggage animals were got
out of the river bed.
The country now had become a rolling plateau, intersected by
ravines and thickly covered with low jungle, in which the enemy
could creep up to within three or four yards of the fighting line.
Progress was, consequently, very slow. To be benighted in such a
country would have meant disaster, so General Westmacott selected a
ridge, which he determined to hold for the night. The wearied men
were just filing up, when a tremendous rush was made by the
Afridis. For a moment, it seemed as if they would all be enveloped
and swept away; but the officers threw themselves into the ranks,
magazines were worked freely, and the very bushes seemed to melt
away before the hail of shot. The tribesmen were swept back in the
darkness, and they never tried a second rush. Their firing also
slackened very much, and this permitted the men to form a camp, and
see to the wounded.
That day the rear guard lost one officer killed and three wounded,
eighteen men killed, eighty-three wounded, and six missing. The
night in camp was a terrible experience. The troops had been
fighting since early morning, the frost was bitter, and they had
neither water, food, nor blankets. General Westmacott passed the
night with the sentry line.
Early in the morning the action recommenced and, stubbornly
contesting each foot, at times almost in hand-to-hand conflict with
tribesmen in the bushes, the rear guard fell back. The summit of
the Kotal was passed; but the enemy continued to harass their
retirement down to the river, where the picket post of the 9th
Ghoorkhas was reached. The retirement from the Tirah had cost a
hundred and sixty-four killed and wounded. As a military
achievement, this march of Lockhart's 2nd Division should have a
prominent place in the history of the British army.
After a quiet day, the force marched into Swaikot. Next morning the
troops in camp there gathered on each side of the road, cheering
their battle-grimed comrades, and bringing down hot cakes to them.
It was a depressing sight. The men were all pinched and
dishevelled, and bore on their faces marks of the terrible ordeal
through which they had just passed.
The advance guard were followed by the wounded. The 4th Brigade
followed. They were even more marked by hardship and strife than
those who had preceded them. Then the rear guard marched in, and
the first phase of the Tirah expedition was at an end.
The expedition had carried out its object successfully. The Afridis
had been severely punished, and had been taught what they had
hitherto believed impossible, that their defiles were not
impregnable, and that the long arm of the British Government could
reach them in their recesses. The lesson had been a very severe
one, but it had been attained at a terrible cost. It is to be hoped
that it will never have to be repeated.
But while the regiment were resting quietly in their cantonment,
there had been serious fighting on the road to Chitral. After some
hesitation, the government had decided that this post should remain
in our hands, and a strong force was therefore stationed at the
Malakand. This, after clearing the country, remained quietly at the
station; until news was received of the attack on our fort at
Shabkadr, near Peshawar, by the Mohmunds and, two days later, news
came that a large council had been held by the fanatics of various
tribes, at which they decided to join the tribes in the Upper
Valley of Swat.
On the 14th of August the force set out from Thana, under Sir
Bindon Blood, on their march for the Upper Swat. The 11th Bengal
Lancers were sent forward in order to reconnoitre the country. The
enemy were found in force near Jelala, at the entrance to the Upper
Swat river, their advance post being established in some Buddhist
ruins on a ridge. The Royal West Kent, however, advanced and drove
them off.
Then news came that several thousand of the enemy occupied a front,
of some two miles, along the height; their right flank resting on
the steep cliffs, and their left reaching to the top of the higher
hills. The battery opened fire upon them; and the infantry, coming
into action at nine o'clock in the morning, did much execution
among the crowded Ghazis.
The 31st and 24th Punjab Infantry, under General Meiklejohn, had a
long and arduous march on the enemy's left. The movement was
successfully carried out; and the enemy, knowing that their line of
retreat towards the Morah Pass was threatened, broke up, a large
portion streaming away to their left. The remainder soon lost heart
and, although a desperate charge by a handful of Ghazis took place,
these only sacrificed their lives, without altering the course of
events.
The enemy gathered on a ridge in the rear but, by eleven, the
heights commanding the road were in the hands of our troops, and
the Guides cavalry began to file past. When they got into the pass
behind the ridge, the enemy were more than a mile away; and could
be seen in great numbers, separated by several ravines.
Captain Palmer, who had pushed forward in pursuit, soon found
himself ahead of his men. Near him were Lieutenant Greaves and,
thirty yards behind, Colonel Adams and Lieutenant Norman. Seeing
that the enemy were in considerable force, Colonel Adams directed
the troop of cavalry who were coming up to hold a graveyard,
through which they had passed, until the infantry could arrive.
Owing, however, to the noise of the firing, Palmer and Greaves did
not hear him; and charged up to the foot of the hill, hoping to cut
off the tribesmen who were hurrying towards them. Palmer's horse
was at once killed, and Greaves fell among the Pathans.
Adams and Fincastle, and two soldiers, galloped forward to their
assistance, and were able to help Palmer back to the shelter of the
graveyard. Meanwhile Fincastle, who had had his horse killed, tried
to help Greaves on to Adams' horse. While doing so, Greaves was
again shot through the body, and Adams' horse wounded. The two
troopers came to their assistance; and Maclean, having first
dismounted his squadron in the graveyard, pluckily rode out with
four of his men. In this way the wounded were successfully brought
in; but Maclean was shot through both thighs, and died almost
instantly. The loss of the two officers, who were both extremely
popular, was greatly felt by the force.
The infantry and guns now having arrived, the enemy retired to a
village, two miles in the rear. Here they were attacked by a
squadron of the Guides, who dispersed them and drove them up into
the hills. In the meantime our camp had been attacked, but the
guard repulsed the assailants, with some loss.
The enemy had lost so heavily that they scattered to the villages,
and sent in to make their submission. This fight effectually cooled
the courage of the natives, and the column marched through their
country unopposed, and the tribesmen remained comparatively quiet
during the after events.