NOTES ON CONVERSATIONS HELD IN THE OFFICE OF M. PICHON AT THE QUAI
D'ORSAY, ON JANUARY 16, 1919--PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION REGARDING THE
SITUATION IN RUSSIA.
Mr. Lloyd George commenced his statement setting forth the information
in the possession of the British Government regarding the Russian
situation, by referring to the matter which had been exposed recently
in L'Humanite. He stated that he wished to point out that there had
been a serious misconception on the part of the French Government as
to the character of the proposal of the British Government. The
British proposal did not contemplate in any sense whatever, a
recognition of the Bolsheviki Government, nor a suggestion that
Bolshevik delegates be invited to attend the Conference. The British
proposal was to invite all of the different governments now at war
within what used to be the Russian Empire, to a truce of God, to stop
reprisals and outrages and to send men here to give, so to speak, an
account of themselves. The Great Powers would then try to find a way
to bring some order out of chaos. These men were not to be delegates
to the Peace Conference, and he agreed with the French Government
entirely that they should not be made members of the Conference.
Mr. Lloyd George then proceeded to set forth briefly the reasons which
had led the British Government to make this proposal. They were as
follows:
Firstly, the real facts are not known;
Secondly, it is impossible to get the facts, the only way is
to adjudicate the question; and
Thirdly, conditions in Russia are very bad; there is general
mis-government and starvation. It is not known who is
obtaining the upper hand, but the hope that the Bolshevik
Government would collapse had not been realized. In fact,
there is one report that the Bolsheviki are stronger than
ever, that their internal position is strong, and that their
hold on the people is stronger. Take, for instance, the case
of the Ukraine. Some adventurer raises a few men and
overthrows the Government. The Government is incapable of
overthrowing him. It is also reported that the peasants are
becoming Bolsheviki. It is hardly the business of the Great
Powers to intervene either in lending financial support to
one side or the other, or in sending munitions to either
side.
Mr. Lloyd George stated that there seemed to be three possible
policies:
1. Military intervention. It is true there the Bolsheviki
movement is as dangerous to civilization as German
militarism, but as to putting it down by the sword, is there
anyone who proposes it? It would mean holding a certain
number of vast provinces in Russia. The Germans with one
million men on their Eastern Front only held the fringe of
this territory. If he now proposed to send a thousand
British troops to Russia for that purpose, the armies would
mutiny. The same applies to U.S. troops in Siberia; also to
Canadians and French as well. The mere idea of crushing
Bolshevism by a military force is pure madness. Even
admitting that it is done, who is to occupy Russia? No one
can conceive or understand to bring about order by force.
2. A cordon. The second suggestion is to besiege Bolshevik
Russia. Mr. Lloyd George wondered if those present realized
what this would mean. From the information furnished him
Bolshevik Russia has no corn, but within this territory
there are 150,000,000 men, women, and children. There is now
starvation in Petrograd and Moscow. This is not a health
cordon, it is a death cordon. Moreover, as a matter of fact,
the people who would die are just the people that the Allies
desire to protect. It would not result in the starvation of
the Bolsheviki; it would simply mean the death of our
friends. The cordon policy is a policy which, as humane
people, those present could not consider.
Mr. Lloyd George asked who was there to overthrow the
Bolsheviki? He had been told there were three men, Denekin,
Kolchak and Knox. In considering the chances of these people
to overthrow the Bolsheviki, he pointed out that he had
received information that the Czecho-Slovaks now refused to
fight; that the Russian Army was not to be trusted, and that
while it was true that a Bolshevik Army had recently gone
over to Kolchak it was never certain that just the reverse
of this would not take place. If the Allies counted on any
of these men, he believed they were building on quick-sand.
He had heard a lot of talk about Denekin, but when he looked
on the map he found that Denekin was occupying a little
backyard near the Black Sea. Then he had been told that
Denekin had recognized Kolchak, but when he looked on the
map, there was a great solid block of territory between
Denekin and Kolchak. Moreover, from information received it
would appear that Kolchak had been collecting members of the
old régime around him, and would seem to be at heart a
monarchist. It appeared that the Czecho-Slovaks were finding
this out. The sympathies of the Czecho-Slovaks are very
democratic, and they are not at all prepared to fight for
the restoration of the old conditions in Russia.
Mr. Lloyd George stated that he was informed that at the
present time two-thirds of Bolshevik Russia was starving.
Institutions of Bolsheviki are institutions of old Czarist
régime. This is not what one would call creating a new
world.
3. The third alternative was contained in the British
proposal, which was to summon these people to Paris to
appear before those present, somewhat in the way that the
Roman Empire summoned chiefs of outlying tributary states to
render an account of their actions.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out the fact that the argument might be used
that there were already here certain representatives of these
Governments; but take, for instance, the case of Sazonov, who claims
to represent the Government of Omsk. As a matter of fact, Sazonov can
not speak from personal observation. He is nothing but a partisan,
like all the rest. He has never been in contact, and is not now in
direct contact with the Government at Omsk.
It would be manifestly absurd for those who are responsible for
bringing about the Peace Conference, to come to any agreement and
leave Paris when one-half of Europe and one-half of Asia is still in
flames. Those present must settle this question or make fools of
themselves.
Mr. Lloyd George referred to the objection that had been raised to
permitting Bolshevik delegates to come to Paris. It had been claimed
that they would convert France and England to Bolshevism. If England
becomes Bolshevist, it will not be because a single Bolshevist
representative is permitted to enter England. On the other hand, if a
military enterprise were started against the Bolsheviki, that would
make England Bolshevist, and there would be a Soviet in London. For
his part, Mr. Lloyd George was not afraid of Bolshevism if the facts
are known in England and the United States. The same applied to
Germany. He was convinced that an educated democracy can be always
trusted to turn down Bolshevism.
Under all circumstances, Mr. Lloyd George saw no better way out than
to follow the third alternative. Let the Great Powers impose their
conditions and summon these people to Paris to give an account of
themselves to the Great Powers, not to the Peace Conference.
Mr. Pichon suggested that it might be well to ask M. Noulens, the
French Ambassador to Russia, who had just returned to France, to
appear before the meeting to-morrow morning, and give those present
his views on the Russian situation.
President Wilson stated that he did not see how it was possible to
controvert the statement of Mr. Lloyd George. He thought that there
was a force behind this discussion which was no doubt in his mind, but
which it might be desirable to bring out a little more definitely. He
did not believe that there would be sympathy anywhere with the brutal
aspect of Bolshevism, if it were not for the fact of the domination of
large vested interests in the political and economic world. While it
might be true that this evil was in process of discussion and slow
reform, it must be admitted, that the general body of men have grown
impatient at the failure to bring about the necessary reform. He
stated that there were many men who represented large vested interests
in the United States who saw the necessity for these reforms and
desired something which should be worked out at the Peace Conference,
namely, the establishment of some machinery to provide for the
opportunity of the individuals greater than the world has ever known.
Capital and labor in the United States are not friends. Still they are
not enemies in the sense that they are thinking of resorting to
physical force to settle their differences. But they are distrustful,
each of the other. Society can not go on that plane. On the one hand,
there is a minority possessing capital and brains; on the other, a
majority consisting of the great bodies of workers who are essential
to the minority, but do not trust the minority, and feel that the
minority will never render them their rights. A way must be found to
put trust and cooperation between these two.
President Wilson pointed out that the whole world was disturbed by
this question before the Bolskeviki came into power. Seeds need soil,
and the Bolsheviki seeds found the soil already prepared for them.
President Wilson stated that he would not be surprised to find that
the reason why British and United States troops would not be ready to
enter Russia to fight the Bolsheviki was explained by the fact that
the troops were not at all sure that if they put down Bolshevism they
would not bring about a re-establishment of the ancient order. For
example, in making a speech recently, to a well-dressed audience in
New York City who were not to be expected to show such feeling, Mr.
Wilson had referred casually to Russia, stating that the United States
would do its utmost to aid her suppressed people. The audience
exhibited the greatest enthusiasm, and this had remained in the
President's mind as an index to where the sympathies of the New World
are.
President Wilson believed that those present would be playing against
the principle of the free spirit of the world if they did not give
Russia a chance to find herself along the lines of utter freedom. He
concurred with Mr. Lloyd George's view and supported his
recommendations that the third line of procedure be adopted.
President Wilson stated that he had also, like Mr. Lloyd George,
received a memorandum from his experts which agreed substantially with
the information which Mr. Lloyd George had received. There was one
point which he thought particularly worthy of notice, and that was the
report that the strength of the Bolshevik leaders lay in the argument
that if they were not supported by the people of Russia, there would
be foreign intervention, and the Bolsheviki were the only thing that
stood between the Russians and foreign military control. It might well
be that if the Bolsheviki were assured that they were safe from
foreign aggression, they might lose support of their own movement.
President Wilson further stated that he understood that the danger of
destruction of all hope in the Baltic provinces was immediate, and
that it should be made very clear if the British proposal were
adopted, that the Bolsheviki would have to withdraw entirely from
Lithuania and Poland. If they would agree to this to refrain from
reprisals and outrages, he, for his part, would be prepared to receive
representatives from as many groups and centers of action, as chose to
come, and endeavor to assist them to reach a solution of their
problem.
He thought that the British proposal contained the only suggestions
that lead anywhere. It might lead nowhere. But this could at least be
found out.
M. Pichon referred again to the suggestion that Ambassador Noulens be
called before the meeting.
Mr. Balfour suggested that it might be well to call the Dutch Consul,
lately in Petrograd, if it was the desire of those present to hear the
anti-Bolshevik side.
Baron Sonnino suggested that M. Scavenius, Minister of Denmark,
recently in Russia, would be able to give interesting data on the
Russian situation.
Those present seemed to think that it might be desirable to hear what
these gentlemen might have to say.
Senator KNOX. Do you know anything about a letter that Buckler wrote
to the President in relation to his mission? Have you ever seen a copy
of his report in the form of a letter?
Mr. BULLITT. I have read a copy of his report, but I have not the
copy. The only reference I have to it that I find, in the short time I
have had to go over my papers since I came down from the woods, is in
a memorandum to Col. House in reference to the withdrawal of the
American troops from Archangel [reading]:
Buckler discussed the matter of the withdrawal of these troops with
Litvinov, who said that unquestionably the Bolsheviki would agree to
an armistice on the Archangel front at any time; and, furthermore,
would pledge themselves not to injure in any way those Russians in and
about Archangel who have been cooperating with the Allies. He,
furthermore, suggested that such Russians as did not care to trust
their lives to such a promise should be taken out with the troops.
Senator KNOX. Do you know anything about whether Litvinov communicated
directly with the President in reference to this Buckler mission?
Mr. BULLITT. Litvinov had written a letter to the President, which has
since been widely published, on December 24.
Senator KNOX. That is the letter I had in mind. I had seen some
references to that. Do you have a copy of that letter?
Mr. BULLITT. I do not know whether I have any copies of this
letter--that is, authentic. I think I have a newspaper copy some
place, but I have no actual copy of the letter.
Senator KNOX. Can you tell us anything more about the discussion in
reference to the withdrawal of troops from Russia that took place at
that time--anything more than is indicated by your letter, there?
Mr. BULLITT. There were very serious discussions, all the time.
Telegrams were being received frequently from the various commanders
at Archangel, the American and the British notably, in regard to
conditions, which they described as likely to be disastrous, and
discussions of real gravity were taking place all the time. The
subject was very much in the air. I have, I will say, very few
references to that particular condition. I have here this memorandum
which takes up some of these subjects. I do not know if the committee
would care to hear it.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Senator KNOX. This is a memorandum that you sent to Col. House?
Mr. BULLITT. Yes; Col. House.
Senator KNOX. Please read it.
Mr. BULLITT [reading]:
JANUARY 30, 1919.
Memorandum for Col. House.
Subject: Withdrawal of American troops from Archangel.
DEAR COL. HOUSE: The 12,000 American, British, and French
troops at Archangel are no longer serving any useful
purpose. Only 3,000 Russians have rallied around this force.
It is the attacked, not the attacker, and serves merely to
create cynicism in regard to all our proposals and to
stimulate recruiting for the Red Army.
Furthermore, the 4,000 Americans, 6,000 British, 2,000
French, and 3,000 Russian troops in this region are in
considerable danger of destruction by the Bolsheviki. Gen.
Ironside has just appealed for reinforcements and the
British war office has directed the commanding general at
Murmansk to be prepared to dispatch a battalion of Infantry
to Archangel.
Instead of transferring troops from Murmansk to Archangel,
it seems to me that we should at once transfer to Murmansk
and bring home the troops which are now at Archangel. Aside
from the needless suffering which these men are enduring,
aside from the demands of the public in the United States
and England for the return of these men, it seems to me that
the withdrawal of these troops would be of great value as a
proof that we have made the Prinkipos proposal in full good
faith.
I have asked Gen. Churchill to obtain the most expert
opinion available on the practicability of moving the 12,000
American, British, and French troops and such Russians as
may wish to accompany them from Archangel to Murmansk. The
appended memorandum and map which he has prepared show that
unless the ice in the White Sea suddenly becomes thicker it
is at present possible with the aid of six ice breakers
which are now at Archangel to move these troops by water to
Kem on the Murmansk Railroad, whence they may be carried by
train to Murmansk.
Buckler discussed the matter of the withdrawal of these
troops with Litvinov, who said that unquestionably the
Bolsheviki would agree to an armistice on the Archangel
front at any time and, furthermore, would pledge themselves
not to injure in any way those Russians in and about
Archangel who have been cooperating with the Allies. He
furthermore suggested that such Russians as did not care to
trust their lives to such a promise should be taken out with
the troops.
The provisional government at Archangel has just notified us
that it will not accept the proposal for a conference at
Prinkipos. It seems dignified and honorable at this moment
to inform the Archangel government that since it can not
agree to the allied proposal, presented after the most
serious consideration, we shall decline to support it
further with arms, but will make provision for the safety of
all Russians who are unwilling to remain at Archangel.
I have discussed this Archangel business at some length with
Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's secretary, who says that L.G.
intends to bring the British troops out on the 1st of May,
which he believes to be the first practicable moment. The
first practicable moment, however, seems to be now.
The situation at Archangel is most serious for the soldiers
who are stationed there, but it is also serious for the
Governments which sent them out and seem to have abandoned
them. Unless they are saved by prompt action, we shall have
another Gallipoli. Very respectfully yours,