THE GRAND RESULT
I. 7TH BATTALION: BATTLE OF AMIENS
The 7th Battalion of the Buffs on the morning of the 6th August, 1918,
was holding the brigade frontage which was north of the Bray-Corbie
road and was in a trench which had recently been taken from the enemy
and occupied by an Australian force. South of the road at the time
of dawn a relief of companies was in progress, and the East Surrey
Regiment was experiencing certain difficulties in connection with the
operation. The Germans, discovering this fact, seized the opportunity
to launch a very sudden and resolute attack which succeeded in piercing
the British line. This unfortunate event seems to have been due to a
variety of causes, such as incomplete relief and extension of front,
but the element of surprise figured largely. Our troops were holding
the ground very thinly; the men were anything but fresh; the forward
trenches were knee-deep in mud, and their occupants were expecting
to leave them only for a forward and not a retrograde movement. The
German barrage commenced at 4.20 a.m. No “S.O.S.” signal was made for
some time and the general idea seems to have been that the enterprise
was merely a raid, but the bombardment lasted two hours and cut the
telephone wires, which was the greater disaster because the shape of
the ground forbade visual signalling. After about an hour it became
clear enough that this was no raid, but a determined attempt to gain
and hold on to our trenches and position. The hostile troops succeeded
in penetrating along the road to a considerable distance, about eight
hundred yards, in fact. The south of it being held but lightly, the
34th Brigade was requested to be responsible for this portion of the
line, and a counter-attack by men of the East Surreys was attempted
along the highway itself. At 8.36 it was clear to the headquarters
in rear that part of our old first line was now in the hands of the
enemy; but at 9.45 the Buffs were in the Burke line behind it, had
established posts at all the junctions of trenches, and had pushed
patrols out to the front, after which there was a lengthy bombing
fight for the various trench junctions. During the morning the 55th
Brigade had consisted of two battalions only, because the Queen’s had
been sent back to rest and get fit, prior to our attack on the 8th.
The enemy having anticipated our programme and date of fighting, this
battalion was now ordered to the front again and arrived about noon.
At 4.45 a conference was held, the principal point for consultation
being the possibility of a counter-attack by the 54th Brigade. The
leader of this force objected that he required another battalion to
make such an attempt feasible, but this objection being overruled,
the counter-attack was decided on and one company of the East Surreys
placed at the disposal of the 54th Brigade. During the following night
the lines were subjected to very heavy shelling, but at 4.40 a.m.
the counter-attack was launched and proved a great success, the 54th
Brigade gaining all their objectives, as did the detachment of the East
Surreys; the latter at 5.47 reported themselves as being where they had
been told to go and as having several prisoners and two of the enemy’s
machine guns.
[Illustration: Areas retaken by the various armies August to November
1918.]
The following day saw the commencement of the allied offensive, but the
55th Brigade was practically only represented by the 7th Queen’s, which
battalion had been nursed for the occasion. Extraordinary efforts had
been made to keep the coming operations a dead secret. Only battalion
commanders were supposed to know anything whatsoever about the matter,
and they only the barest outline of the plan. The job the Queen’s were
given was to form the extreme left of the defensive flank of the 4th
Army. The battalion was to be accompanied by certain tanks. The morning
was almost as misty as on that dreadful day, the 21st March. The
tanks failed to turn up and the Queen’s were forced to start without
them. In the fog the battalion appeared to have missed its way, and
while endeavouring to get right again and into good order it suffered
a terrible loss, in that its gallant colonel was mortally wounded.
Christopher Bushell, V.C., D.S.O., was a very prominent hero in an army
of good soldiers, and his regiment must deeply have felt his loss.
Lt.-Colonel Ransome, of the Buffs, was, immediately the news came in,
placed in command of all troops in the foremost zone, with directions
to clear up the situation and to establish the flank with all speed.
In the words of the official account, “He handled the situation most
ably.” He was well and worthily assisted by Captain Snell, adjutant of
the Queen’s, by Captain Hayfield, of the Buffs, now attached to brigade
headquarters, and by Captain Heath, who commanded the 55th Trench
Mortar Battery.
The following day, the 9th August, the 55th Brigade was squeezed out
as the English armies advanced and so became reserve troops, the Buffs
proceeding to Warloy, where they received two large drafts from home
which were badly needed. Most of these men were miners and munition
workers who all did good work later on. On the 13th August the Buffs
moved into line beyond Senlis and with them went American soldiers,
one platoon being attached to each Buff company, and the Buffs leaving
four platoons of their own in the transport lines. On the 19th, the
battalion having relieved the Royal Berkshire Regiment west of Albert,
its patrols got touch with the enemy in and about that town, and on
the night of the 21st/22nd assembly positions were taken up for battle
almost on the western edge of Albert.
The great battle, or rather series of battles and pursuits, which now
commenced in this area was fully shared in by other divisions besides
the 18th in which the 7th Buffs were serving. Amongst these was the
12th, and in that division was the 6th Battalion of the regiment.
These two Kitchener units, then, were during the latter part of August
and early September serving shoulder to shoulder, or very nearly so.
Therefore before the tale be told of how the enemy was driven from the
Ancre river step by step over the Tortille and back to his Hindenburg
Line, it would be as well to note how the 6th was spending the time
from the 9th to the 21st August.
II. 6TH BATTALION
At 2 a.m. on the former date the battalion, with the rest of the 37th
Brigade, which, it may be remembered, was near Morlancourt, began
to move into its assembly position, but at 3 o’clock a message came
postponing the attack. This message reached the Queen’s and West Kent
in time and these two units were stopped ere reaching their places,
but the Buffs, having a longer approach to make subsequently, had to
leave their assembly positions much earlier in order to get up to the
artillery barrage. Thus it came to pass that the leading companies had
already commenced operations when the important message came and it was
impossible to stop them, so that the battalion had actually penetrated
the enemy’s position at one point when the order for postponement
reached it. These forward troops therefore detailed one platoon to
occupy a quarry, which was handy, and from there cover the retreat of
its comrades. Under cover of this platoon, the remainder withdrew to
their assembly positions, but the men took with them a prisoner and
a machine gun just to show where they had been. The covering platoon
maintained its position. This little error cost one officer and forty
men wounded.
The new zero hour was fixed for 5.30 p.m., at which time the Buffs were
already in assembly position on the right of the line. The Queen’s
and West Kent were to be in position at the zero hour to commence
the assault fifty minutes later. The attack proceeded now according
to plan, and at the correct moment the Queen’s and West Kent advanced
co-operating with the Buffs. Considerable opposition was met with and
a large number of Germans killed and taken prisoner. A quantity of
machine guns and trench mortars and two 77-mm. cannon were captured.
In fact, the whole thing was done in excellent order, and at eight
in the evening all objectives were gained and outposts put out. This
attack seems to have come as a surprise to the enemy, yet, owing to
their numerous machine guns, our casualties were by no means light. The
night was quiet, but at 3 o’clock next morning the Germans tried an
attack with a few troops, but these were repulsed. The casualties of
the Buffs consisted of Captain J. W. Laurie, Lieuts. V. W. J. Hobbs and
R. J. Pavitt and 12 other ranks killed; 11 officers and 145 men wounded
and 56 missing. With this loss the battalion alone was responsible
for the capture of 340 prisoners, a battery of 4·2-in. howitzers, two
minenwerfer, twelve machine guns, two 77-mm. guns and seven light
minenwerfer.
During the 10th the enemy snipers were very active, and as our front
consisted of a series of shell holes linked up, observation on the
enemy’s part was fairly easy, and consequently any movements on our
side very difficult and dangerous. Lieut. D. A. W. Hill (afterwards
died of wounds), 2nd Lieut. Harris and five men were wounded on this
day. The next few days were spent in this same locality, either in
front line or support, and the shelling and sniping continued to be
severe. There was a report on the 15th that the enemy was withdrawing,
but patrols sent out soon found the falsity of this story. On the 20th
the Buffs were in divisional reserve at Treux, on the Ancre, and next
day were attached temporarily to the 35th Brigade, in order to take
part with it in the grand attack on Albert planned for the 22nd, in
which the 18th Division, with the 7th Battalion of the regiment, was
also to be engaged.
III. 6TH AND 7TH BATTALIONS: ALBERT, ETC.
The enemy was holding the line of the Ancre river, using Albert as a
bridgehead. The stream here is only about fourteen feet wide, but it
averages six feet in depth and has nasty marshy edges and approaches.
Thus it is an obstacle requiring the carrying up of bridging material
and so forth. The Germans were nearly all on the eastern bank of the
river, but the cellars and ruins of the town of Albert, even on the
western side, proved to be full of hidden parties cleverly availing
themselves of what were in truth considerable facilities for defence.
The rôle of the 18th Division was to cover the flank of the main
attack of the 4th Army by taking Albert and the high ground beyond it.
The 12th Division was on the right of the 18th and had the task of
capturing the village of Meaulte, a little to the south, as well as
other points. The 35th Brigade, however, was bound for Meaulte and was
in immediate touch with the 18th Division.
The scheme of the 18th Division was as follows: the 55th Brigade was
to capture Albert itself, and the 54th to operate south of that town
and between it and Meaulte. Commencing at zero and for sixty minutes,
all the houses of Albert which were to the east of the river were to
be submitted to a heavy bombardment while the East Surrey Regiment
worked through those to the west of the stream, “mopping up” the small
hostile parties which were reported by our scouts to be there. Then our
artillery was to lift and devote its attention to certain strong points
on the east edge of Albert while the Surrey men crossed the Ancre and
continued their work through the place. Finally, the guns were to lift
again and allow the battalion to complete its job. Then the 7th Buffs
were to come through the town, advance east-north-east till it got
touch with the 54th Brigade, which would be attacking between Albert
and Meaulte, and then to halt with its left flank on the floods. As it
was quite impossible to reckon at what hour the East Surrey would have
finished their work, the Buffs must make their advance without the help
of a barrage.
As a matter of fact, the battalion debouched from the town at 10 a.m.
and touch was got with the 54th Brigade, but then, heavy machine-gun
fire being met with, progress astride the Albert-Pozieres road became
impossible. All the country just outside Albert is dominated by Usna,
Tara and Shamrock hills, which high ground was the especial objective
of the 18th Division. When the Buffs emerged from the streets a false
report was received that Tara Hill was occupied by the 54th Brigade,
and our artillery got orders not to fire upon it. As a matter of fact,
however, the enemy was still there and all their machine guns, which of
course were not interfered with, were free to play on our battalion as
it came on. This state of things caused a halt a little short of the
Blue Line, for which the Buffs were bound, and the brigadier came to
the conclusion that it would be impossible to push on further without
the assistance of tanks and until it was dark. However, at 2.30 a.m. on
the 23rd the Blue Line was made good. The Buffs had suffered about two
hundred casualties, which were immediately made good by men originally
left out of action.
Meanwhile the 35th Brigade, with which for a day or two the 6th
Battalion served, was in position at 1.30 a.m. and endured heavy gas
shelling during the night. 4.45 a.m. was the zero hour, and then the
6th moved forward, C Company being on the left and D on the right
front, A left support and D right. The battalion moved behind the
7th Norfolk Regiment, to which unit had been assigned the first
objective. The 9th Essex was on the right of the Buffs. The whole
operation this day was completely successful, all objectives being
taken and consolidated. The second of these being secured by the 6th
Buffs at 8.35 a.m., though unfortunately the Essex were held up by
heavy machine-gun fire. There is no doubt that the work was done most
creditably; eleven machine guns and fourteen prisoners fell to the
share of the battalion we are interested in, and its own casualties
were light: 2nd Lieuts. Gibbs and Green were wounded, five men killed,
twenty-nine wounded, thirty missing and one gassed. Furthermore, when
the second objective was gained the remainder of the day was quiet.
The following day, the 23rd of the month, revealed the fact, however,
that the situation on the right of the Buffs required much clearing
up, so much so that tanks were sent up to investigate matters, and
preparations were made for forming a defensive flank which necessitated
some small rearrangement of the troops. It is interesting to note that
during this day an aeroplane, in response to a call, managed to drop
three thousand rounds of small-arm ammunition by means of a parachute.
On the 23rd the 18th Division had been busy. As has been seen, the
original objective of the 7th Buffs had been gained at 2.30 a.m., but
this move was chiefly made to enable other troops to get possession of
the hills which up till then had dominated the British front. This was
done, in spite of tremendous difficulties, by the 53rd Brigade with
the 7th Queen’s from the 55th, and it was greatly aided by seven tanks
which had to approach from Meaulte along the east bank of the Ancre.
The work was supported by a brigade of the 38th Division on the left
of the 18th, which brigade had to get through Albert and then more
to the north and pass the floods so close that many men were wading
nearly breast high. Everything now going well, the 55th Brigade, less
the Queen’s, was temporarily withdrawn to divisional reserve west of
Albert. The first stage of the attack had been a marked success, and
all went so well during the time the 55th Brigade was away that when
it returned to the front line in relief of the 53rd, which occurred
on the night of the 24th/25th, it bore orders to push on the advance
relentlessly. This relief was very different from those to which
everyone was so well accustomed. It was a mobile business. No taking
over of dug-outs and trenches, but the 7th Buffs simply walked into the
place of the West Kent on the right of the brigade near the Becourt
Wood and took up the running, so to speak.
[Illustration: ALBERT]
As regards the 12th Division, the 6th Buffs, on the 24th, returned to
their own 37th Brigade, which was ordered to carry on the advance,
relieving the 35th, which had been ahead so far. At 1 a.m. the brigade,
under an artillery barrage, attacked the enemy’s position in front.
At 1.30 the Buffs reported that all was going well but that they were
facing heavy machine-gun fire, and they asked for the assistance of
tanks to clear away certain pockets of the enemy which were giving
trouble. Two hours later the Queen’s reported that their right was held
up, so, at 7 o’clock, three whippet tanks were placed at the disposal
of the brigadier. At 1.30 these tanks, with the West Kent, attacked,
but they were back again in an hour, having completely failed; one
tank had its guns jammed, and one was badly damaged, for on crossing
the ridge they had met with heavy machine-gun and trench-mortar fire.
The enemy was still a force in being and knew exactly where to make a
resolute stand. A consultation now took place as to the best mode of
carrying on the advance on the morrow, and it was determined to leave
the German strong place, which was giving so much trouble, and to pass
on either side of it, so at 9.30 p.m. orders were issued for the task
of the 25th: the Buffs were to advance on the right, and Queen’s on
the left, with the West Kent in support. At midnight the Corps cavalry
was placed at the disposal of the 37th Brigade. It was now found that
the enemy had withdrawn, and it was pretty evident that he had gone
back some considerable distance. On the 25th, therefore, the 36th
and 37th Brigades, with the 35th in reserve, advanced, in order to
maintain their touch with the retiring Germans. The move commenced in
the middle of the night and was quite successful, so that by 5.15 the
Buffs were holding a new line, once more in contact with the enemy,
and with patrols pushed out in front. 2nd Lieuts. Barr and H. J. Hine,
with eight other ranks, were wounded during the morning, Hine unhappily
dying of his wounds. There was no doubt about the enemy’s temporary
stand--indeed, the British line was shelled all day; and at five in
the evening the 55th Brigade came up from the reserve and went through
as an advance guard, in conjunction with similar movements in the
flanks. These troops drove the Germans back about two thousand yards
and consolidated a new line, while the Buffs and Queen’s, with the
West Kent in reserve, held the old one. The tactics of the 25th were
renewed on the 26th. On this day the 36th Brigade took up the advance
guard duties, passed through the 35th and carried on the drive for
about 3,500 yards. The 37th Brigade remained in position. On the 27th
the fighting part of the programme was transferred to the 37th Brigade.
Its units came through those of the 36th and at 4.45 a.m. attacked the
enemy’s position north of the Somme, captured the village of Carnoy and
assisted the 58th Division to take Maricourt. It also took a valuable
position north of Hardecourt. During these operations the brigade had
been assisted by the cavalry, and after so prolonged a period of trench
warfare it was strange to be working with so mobile an arm. The West
Kents reporting themselves at 7.32 as being on their objective, and
the Buffs doing the same at 7.45, the horsemen were sent forward to
occupy the Maurepas ridge far ahead. At 9.20 a counter-attack appeared
to be developing south of Bernafay Wood, and the 35th Brigade was
ordered to send a battalion up to La Briqueterie to be at the disposal
of the brigadier of the 37th, and at 10 o’clock a company of the
Machine Gun Corps was added to his force. At 10.45 the Buffs found
themselves being seriously enfiladed by machine-gun fire, so much so
that their position became untenable and the battalion withdrew in
good and correct order some two hundred yards. About this same time
the cavalry, after reporting that Faviere Wood, between Hardecourt and
Maricourt, was still occupied, had to be recalled as the ground was
impossible to work over, owing to wire, shell holes and trenches. At 2
p.m. the brigade was directed to advance its line sufficiently to join
up with the 18th Division east of Bernafay Wood, and later on a message
came informing the brigadier that the 18th Division intended to attack
at seven that evening, its objective being the east edge of Trones
Wood, and directing that the battalions of his brigade should keep
touch. The casualties to the 6th Battalion the Buffs on the 27th August
were Captain L. P. Figgis and ten men killed, 2nd Lieuts. Findley,
Hobbs, C. Hunt and H. M. Hunt and forty others wounded; twelve men were
missing.
As regards the 7th Battalion, it too was moving forward at 2.30 a.m.
On the 25th August the 54th and 55th Brigades, the latter on the left,
pushed on without much opposition, the Buffs being on the right and
East Surreys on the left of their own brigade. All went well until the
neighbourhood of Montauban was reached, and here the opposition began
to strengthen somewhat, the enemy showing that he thoroughly understood
the scientific use of machine guns in rear-guard action. Lieut. G. B.
Mason, commanding A Company, was wounded crossing the crest north of
Bottom Wood and progress became slow owing to very wet weather, but
by nightfall the battalion had reached a line south of the western
edge of Mametz Wood and were in touch with the troops on both flanks.
The day’s fighting had resulted in an advance of about a mile and a
half. As soon as it was light on the 26th B Company, under Captain A.
J. Whitmarsh, was sent forward to continue the advance, but now the
enemy’s resistance became more stubborn. The ground east of Montauban
was very suitable for machine-gun rear guards, and each little position
occupied by these had to be located before they could be first
outflanked and then rushed in front. Captain Whitmarsh, with A Company
on his left flank, which again kept pace with the East Surreys, took
his own men on with great steadiness and skill, and at about 3.15 p.m.
assaulted the village of Montauban, taking about sixty prisoners and
killing the remainder of the garrison. He was greatly aided by flanking
fire brought to bear by machine guns to the north of him. Whitmarsh was
awarded the D.S.O. for his work on this day. At 6 p.m. the 7th Queen’s
was ordered up as vanguard to the division, the Buffs remaining east of
Montauban, with Bernafay Wood full of Germans just in front of them.
The next day B Company went back to Caterpillar Valley, where C already
was, and these companies were joined by the other two on the 28th, the
whole brigade being on that day withdrawn into divisional reserve.
The fighting described above was quite a revelation to most of the
young officers and men of both the Buffs’ battalions. Long experience
of trench work, only varied by occasional raids or a battle, in the
course of which one side or the other gained two or three hundred
yards, made it difficult for most men to understand what open warfare
really meant, and probably many wondered why such stress is laid in
England on the necessity of field days, with their extensive movements.
Yet now they saw cavalry at work, infantry skirmishing and artillery
galloping into action as if on Salisbury Plain, and behold it was very
good.
On the morning of the 29th August the 54th Brigade advanced with very
little opposition to the western edge of Combles, but was unable to get
further because the enemy still held the ridge where the remains of
Morval stood, and thus threatened the flank of any troops which tried
to move further eastward.
Meanwhile the 6th Battalion, with the 6th West Kent on their left, had
got as far as Maurepas, for that part of the enemy which was opposite
them had withdrawn some distance during the night of the 27th/28th, so
that in the morning these two battalions had pushed on, in artillery
formation, and got into touch again at Maurepas. Here it was found that
there was no sign of troops further to the south: the 58th Division,
which should have been there, had apparently failed to come up. This
meant, of course, that the Buffs had to form a defensive flank in this
direction, but after a while the patrols managed to discover some
Australians. During this day B Company completely outflanked a similar
German unit, taking from it seventy-nine prisoners. Six of our men were
wounded.
The several divisions and brigades relieved each other with great
frequency during the grand allied advance we are describing. Of course,
strong bodies of troops must always be behind those actually in touch
with the enemy, and it was so arranged that everybody should have a
turn at work nearest the foe and then be passed by some of those in
rear, and so take on the business of reserve troops. On the 30th of
August, therefore, the 12th Division was relieved by the 47th, the
24th London Regiment taking the place of the 6th Buffs, who retired to
Faviere Wood and remained there till the 4th September. On that date
the 12th Division relieved the 18th in the left divisional sector of
the 3rd Corps front, the Buffs going into trenches east of Fregicourt.
The 18th Division was now faced with the difficulty of passing the high
ground about Morval. On the 30th an attempt to advance on Rancourt in
conjunction with the 47th was met with very heavy machine-gun fire,
particularly from Priez Farm, which was strongly held by the enemy. It
was therefore found that for the present the pursuing tactics lately in
use must be abandoned and a regular attack undertaken, for here was an
obstinate stand. So on this date the 7th Buffs, with the rest of the
55th Brigade, were hurried up by bus to the neighbourhood of Montauban
and Bernafay Wood, the Buffs being south of the latter place. It was
decided that the 47th Division was to capture Rancourt and to the east
of it as far as St. Pierre Vaast Wood. The 38th Division was to take
Morval and Sailly Saillisel, while the 18th Division was to assail
the north-west corner of St Pierre Vaast Wood and form line facing
north-east across the Sailly Saillisel-Rancourt road, the idea being
to cut off the enemy holding the Fregicourt-Morval position. The 55th
Brigade represented its division in this partition of work, and to the
East Surreys was assigned the assault in the corner of the wood; the
Buffs were to follow them, form to the left and attack northwards, and
the Queen’s to mop up the area north-east of Combles. Smoke barriers
were arranged to cover the movements of the 55th Brigade. The day for
the fight was at first fixed for the 31st August, but the position
appeared so strong and the enemy’s artillery so much more in evidence
than had recently been the case, that it was resolved to first make
exhaustive preparation with artillery and postpone infantry action for
twenty-four hours. The operations necessitated for the Buffs a night
march from their bivouac south of Montauban. Little time was given for
the issue of orders or reconnaissance, and the manœuvre contemplated
was, if not intricate, at any rate somewhat out of the ordinary and
the map issued the only guide to the ground. For these reasons, and in
case of any accident, Colonel Ransome left B Company, under Captain
Whitmarsh, in the assembly area of the East Surrey Regiment. The
remainder were to advance in platoon columns for as long as possible
in order to facilitate changes of direction. The move to the assembly
area was a slow and tedious business; it was intensely dark, roads were
scarce, landmarks few and country pitted with shell holes and strewn
with wire; however, it was accomplished and in time. The next morning
the attack developed according to plan. All accounts of it agree in
according the highest possible praise to the 8th East Surrey Regiment,
which unit bore the brunt of an action which was a complete success,
all objectives being carried with comparatively few casualties. The
principal opposition met with came from Priez Farm, which from the very
start caused much trouble to the East Surreys, which was, however, not
sufficient to stay that regiment’s triumphant progress. The leading
companies of the Buffs were also temporarily held by machine guns
which had allowed the Surrey men to pass them; these guns necessitated
a somewhat wider detour for those that followed than had been
anticipated. However, with considerable management and able leadership,
especially perhaps on the part of Captain Stronge, of D Company, the
difficult advance and still more difficult wheel, during which seven
thousand yards was covered, was accomplished. When near Rancourt C
and D Companies wheeled to the north and occupied the high ground
east-north-east of Fregicourt. The enemy was completely surprised and
demoralized and began to stream away northward from Fregicourt, many
being killed by C and D Companies while trying to escape to Sailly
Saillisel along the valley. The difficult task of seizing the high
ground in rear of the enemy holding Fregicourt was successfully carried
out and the division had done its part in the Second Battle of Bapaume.
The Buffs’ casualties on this occasion were only two; Captain Stronge,
Lieut. Wellman and 2nd Lieut. Lawrence were awarded the M.C. for their
gallant conduct on this occasion.
A very large number of prisoners were taken. Receipts, for instance,
were given to the Buffs for fourteen officers and nearly eight hundred
men, though a good many of these were not actually captured by the
battalion. Captain Whitmarsh, of B Company, was after the action
ordered to send forward two platoons as patrols into St Pierre Vaast
Wood and towards Sailly Saillisel, and as the enemy appeared to be
greatly demoralised the 7th West Kent was ordered to attack the village
at 7 p.m., which move necessitated a further advance on the Buffs’ part
to conform. During the operations between the 22nd August and the 1st
September the 7th Buffs had 3 officers killed and 14 wounded; 26 men
killed, 84 wounded and 55 missing.
On the 2nd the 53rd Brigade passed through to continue the pursuit.
This day was a proud if a sad one for the 7th Battalion, for the
commanding officer, Lt.-Colonel Ransome, D.S.O., M.C., who had so often
led it to victory or stood in the gap during a necessary retreat, was
removed on promotion to command the 170th Infantry Brigade of the
57th Division.[32] Next day Lt.-Colonel Curtis, D.S.O., joined on
appointment to the command. On the 4th September the battalion marched
to Trones Wood, the division, as has been seen, being relieved by the
12th, and it remained there training till the 16th of the month.
Two days after this relief of divisions the 6th Buffs marched into
Riverside Wood on the Tordille stream. While it had been in rear the
other troops had, of course, driven the enemy considerably to the
eastward, for the 53rd Brigade had taken up the pursuit after the
turning of the Morval position. Therefore, when on the 7th the 37th
Brigade advanced through the others to take up the duties of advance
guard to its division, it became its duty to attack a line of trenches
which ran from Heudicourt to Guyencourt, some eight miles east of St
Pierre Vaast Wood. The 6th Buffs moved into its assembly position at
4.30 a.m., having C Company on the left, D on the right, A left support
and B right support. The battalion had the West Kent on its left with
the Queen’s in support, and the objectives were: first, the east edge
of Guyencourt; second, the high ground beyond; and third, the eastern
outskirt of Epehy and the railway east of Peiziere. Both the Buffs and
the West Kent had with them a section of Field Artillery, another of a
Trench Mortar Battery and two sections of the Machine Gun Corps. The
zero hour was 8 a.m., when an artillery barrage commenced. The enemy’s
machine guns were very active from the start, and his artillery fire,
though somewhat feeble at first, gradually increased in density. At
9.30 the Buffs had to report that they were held up by numerous machine
guns opposite their centre and they asked for artillery aid, which was
at once arranged for, with the result that at 10.10 a.m. the battalion
was in possession of Guyencourt. The second objective, the hill line
east of the village, was taken at 11.15 and consolidation commenced.
At 5.50 p.m. orders came to endeavour to make good Epehy and Peiziere.
That evening, patrols were pushing on, and at 8 o’clock both the
leading battalions reported that they were moving forward; but a little
later orders came that the 47th Division would continue the attack the
next morning. The day had been a successful one, but the Buffs had
Captain Tuke, 2nd Lieut. Thompson and twenty men wounded, four killed
and six missing.
The 47th Division experienced some trouble the next day in gaining
their objective, a line of trenches two thousand yards west of the
Hindenburg Line, as the nearer the Germans were driven to their vaunted
series of defences the stronger their opposition became, but at last
the advance, which had been temporarily held up, was successfully
renewed and a line of trenches gained and consolidated. The 12th
Division again relieved the 47th on the evening of the 8th, but the
Buffs were told off as divisional reserve and retired to St Pierre
Vaast Wood, where they remained till the 17th, training, resting and
playing football.
On the 16th of September the 7th Battalion embussed for Moislains and
marched east to Longavesnes in a very heavy rainstorm, and next day the
officers reconnoitred the approaches to Ronssoy from the high ground
near Saulcourt; meanwhile the 6th Battalion was moving into assembly
positions three hundred yards west of Guyencourt, cheered before going
into action again by the news that Lt.-Colonel Smeltzer had a bar to
his D.S.O., and that C.S.M. Coffin and Sgt. Ashby were each to wear the
D.C.M. The enemy’s opposition was now getting quite determined, and
on the 18th it was arranged to assail him in force. For this purpose
the 21st Division on the left, the 18th in the centre and the 12th on
the right prepared to carry on the great eastward push, which had now
gained some five-and-twenty miles from Albert. Put very briefly, the
35th and 36th Brigades captured the villages of Peiziere and Epehy, but
owing to strong machine-gun resistance were unable to make further
headway; so the 37th Brigade went forward at 3.30 p.m. to clear up the
situation. The objectives were then gained and everything settled by 6
p.m.
Also, a couple of miles or so to the south-east, the 7th Battalion
co-operated in an attack by the 55th Brigade on Ronssoy and the
exploitation of the enemy’s position beyond the village. To amplify the
stories of these attacks a little: in both cases it was noticed that
the confidence of our soldiers was supreme; after years of fighting
what had seemed more or less a drawn battle, victory was now daily
crowning our arms, and success was looked upon as a certainty. At 6.30
the 37th Brigade, being then in reserve just north of Guyencourt,
was informed that the Norfolk Regiment on its front was being hardly
pressed. At 8.25 it was reported that our troops were seen retiring
from Epehy pursued by a tank which appeared to be an English one,
manned by a German crew. At 8.40 the brigadier of the 36th Brigade
reported that his troops had gained their first objective, but had
then been heavily enfiladed from the north and by three tanks, one of
them being English; so the West Kent were sent off in this direction.
There is no doubt that the German defence of Epehy was a resolute one
and of a different type to what the British had now become accustomed
to, and the Queen’s battalion, which of course belonged to the 37th
(or reserve) Brigade, was ordered to keep touch with the troops to the
south and, if necessary, to move round south of Epehy to do so; also
a divisional order came to the brigade soon after 9 o’clock that the
Buffs were to be kept in hand. By 10 o’clock the West Kent were in
Peiziere, with their forward company east of the village, though the
enemy’s machine guns and trench mortars were still holding out in the
place. The Queen’s, with a battery, were in action two hundred yards
west of Epehy. It was now decided, as things were not progressing too
well, to attack formally at 3.50 p.m. with the Buffs and Queen’s, so
the barrage started and these two battalions went forward, but both
were held up by machine guns before the objectives were gained. Captain
S. S. Beall, Lieut. R. W. Durdle, 2nd Lieut. A. Mount and eleven men
were killed, twenty-two wounded and two missing.
A considerable amount of dogged attack and equally dogged defence on
the part of the enemy formed the story of the 6th Battalion up to
the end of September. On the 19th the Buffs and Queen’s attacked the
Germans in what were called Mule Trench, Bird Trench and Braeton Post.
The Buffs had been given the two latter as objective. Very considerable
machine-gun opposition was met with, but a line a hundred yards short
of the objective was consolidated at 1.30 p.m. At 7.45 the “S.O.S.”
signal went up from part of the 18th Division’s front and there was
heavy artillery fire on our forward line, but no infantry action
followed. Lieut. Brooke was wounded, one man killed, twenty-seven
wounded and seven missing. The shelling continued next day, one
projectile falling close to battalion headquarters and wounding two
servants and three runners. At midnight on the 21st/22nd, under an
artillery barrage, the West Kent, with D Company of the Buffs, made
another assault which was at first unsuccessful--the opposition being
most resolute. A second attempt, at 3 p.m., had better fortune and a
new position was consolidated. Buffs’ casualties: seven killed and
twelve wounded.
Then the 37th Brigade was relieved by the 35th and the Buffs went
into the sunken road south of Epehy, where a comparatively quiet time
was enjoyed till the 29th, the only time that action was called for
being that on the 27th of the month the Queen’s, who were temporarily
attached to the 36th Brigade, carried out another attack in conjunction
with troops to the north and south of them, and this battalion was
supported by C Company The Buffs in the eastern outskirts of Epehy.
Sgt. Alexander got a bar to his M.M. about this time, and C.S.M. Ashby
and Pte. Bellchambers that medal itself.
Meanwhile the 7th Battalion had been far from idle. In conjunction with
the rest of the 55th Brigade it attacked Ronssoy on the 18th. The work
was at first extremely difficult owing to adverse weather conditions,
which, however, fortunately improved during the day. The attack was
led by the 54th Brigade, who were to capture and pass the village of
Ronssoy. This force was to be followed by the 55th, which brigade was
to emerge from the eastern edge and form up on the Green Line at 100
minutes after zero. This arrangement had the effect of so limiting the
time available to the leading brigade for properly clearing or “mopping
up” the village as it passed through, that it was necessary to warn the
troops following to move to their places by a route south of the houses
and to avoid street fighting as far as possible. The Germans, it was
quite evident, expected an attack on this day and the assembly position
was heavily bombarded, gas shells being so extensively used that
respirators had to be worn for a considerable time. The East Surreys
led its brigade, which was intended to leap-frog or pass through the
54th. The morning was wet and misty, which interfered sadly with visual
signalling and caused some difficulty in keeping the proper direction.
It was soon found that the ground was by no means clear, and machine
guns and snipers gave a great deal of trouble. However, the men of
Surrey pushed on and, emerging from the houses at the stipulated time,
endeavoured to reach the Red Line, but were held up by machine guns
from Lempire and Z Copse. Even the other battalions which followed met
with much trouble in Ronssoy or on its borders, so many little parties
remaining in hiding. The general state of this place at 9 a.m. is
exemplified by the fact that the brigadier, walking alone along the
road, captured thirty-four Germans himself out of various dug-outs.
General Wood threw lumps of chalk and old boots into these places and
took the surrender of the men who came tumbling out. These men were
fully armed, but dazed and cowed. By 11 a.m. the three battalions were
concentrated in the objective trenches and sunken road, but Lempire
and the Copses X, Y and Z still held out. Prisoners informed our
people that the Red Line was only held by two German companies, so
arrangements were made to advance upon it at 5 p.m. under a creeping
barrage. On the right the assaulting troops reached this line in parts,
but on the left progress was very slow, as machine guns in Lempire
enfiladed the advance and the copses gave much trouble; moreover, it
was clear that fresh German troops had come up during the afternoon. At
7 o’clock the attempt had to be abandoned for the time and, to prevent
complete isolation, those parties which had succeeded in getting
ahead were ordered back again. The struggle to get on proved a very
protracted one. It is true that the 53rd Brigade captured Lempire post
on the 19th, but it was not till 7 a.m. on the 20th that the Queen’s
got X Copse and the Buffs Y and Z. The progress of the East Surreys was
stayed by opposition from Duncan’s post. At 10 a.m. the enemy commenced
a very heavy bombardment on our position, causing our advanced posts
to be temporarily withdrawn to avoid casualties. The 53rd and 54th
Brigades attacked the Red Line at 5.40 a.m. on the 21st, and when these
were well up the 55th was brought back into divisional reserve in the
village of Ronssoy. The two first-named found very bitter resistance
and, indeed, only captured parts of their objectives. However, on the
night of the 22nd, the 55th Brigade, marching up again to relieve the
front line, managed to place the Buffs from Cat’s post to Duncan’s
post and the Queen’s to the north of that, the Surreys being in
brigade reserve. The 23rd of the month was a quiet day and devoted to
reconnaissance, and at 6.45 on the 24th the Buffs tried Guillemont
Farm, but failed owing to very strong opposition. During that night the
brigade was relieved by American troops and retired to Combles. It was
afterwards found that this action at Ronssoy had stayed a contemplated
counter-attack on a large scale which had been planned by the enemy,
the 231st German Division having been diverted to Ronssoy and rushed up
to that post of danger by motor buses.
It was on the 28th that the 7th Battalion came up again into the area
of active operations, moving on that day by bus to Guyencourt and
bivouacking in a sunken road two thousand yards east of the village,
ready for an attack next morning, their comrades of the 6th being close
by just outside Epehy. On this Michaelmas Day the 12th Division, with
an American one on the right and the 47th English on the left, attacked
the Hindenburg defences in the neighbourhood of Vendhuille, while the
rôle of the 7th Buffs was to assist in protecting the left flank of the
Americans and to “mop up” Vendhuille village later on.
[Illustration: COMBLES AND MORVAL]
[Illustration: RONSSOY]
The 37th Brigade passed through the 35th with the 6th Buffs on the
right and West Kent on the left. The 9th Battalion of the Essex were
attached to the Buffs and the 6th Queen’s to the 6th West Kent. The
objective of the brigade was a line just west of the St Quentin Canal.
The zero hour was 5 a.m. when, after a short artillery barrage, the
forward move was commenced, the Buffs having A Company on the left, B
on the right, C left support and D right support. Owing to the very
strong resistance of the enemy, mostly by means of machine guns, the
progress was rendered very slow, but at 8.45 the Buffs reported all
going well, and at 9 o’clock the Americans were on all objectives.
As the canal was approached the opposition became stronger, and this
was particularly so at the Quarries, which fell to the lot of the Buffs
to take. Indeed, at 10.30 the battalion had to report its left company
as being held up here. However, delay was the worst misfortune that
befell; gradual advance was made and the objectives were at length
reached about 5 p.m. and consolidated after really stubborn fighting,
which lasted all day without a break. The Buffs were, however, the only
unit of the division that had attained the Blue Line. They captured
120 prisoners and about 40 machine guns, but lost Lieut. H. Thompson
killed, Lieut. Dunkerley wounded, 2nd Lieut. Beard missing and about 40
killed or wounded.
The following day the battalion, working forward, reached the canal
bank, having picked up four prisoners on the way, captured a 77-mm. gun
and bombed many of the enemy’s dug-outs.
The 12th Division was then relieved by the 18th, the 6th Battalion
marching back to Guyencourt, while the 7th, who had marched off at 8.20
a.m. on the 29th and, moving south of Epehy, crossed the Epehy-Ronssoy
road into St Patrick’s Valley, where it halted about 10.10 a.m.
Orders were then received to push on into the Macquincourt Valley
to a position of deployment, but trouble came now and the further
movements of the newly arrived battalion of the Buffs and others were
altered more than once by varying circumstances, the end of the day
coming without any marked episode, and evening finding the men in
Sart Farm and the neighbouring trenches. The Buffs had moved forward
according to order, following the 7th Queen’s, and these were held
up by enemy’s machine guns near Guillemont Farm. Further movements
not being possible, orders came to occupy an area of trenches in
the neighbourhood. An abortive attempt at attack on the Knoll was
commenced soon after one o’clock, but the situation was found to be too
obscure and the fire too hot to advance against, so the brigade settled
into the trenches for the night. During the morning of the following
day an officer’s patrol from A Company pushed on and established a post
in Macquenet trench, and orders came about 1 p.m. to make all progress
possible in the direction of Vendhuille, so by 5 p.m. A Company was
established in Macquenet trench, losing its leader, Lieut. A. N.
Widdop, while moving there, and B and C well forward; but at night the
battalion position was taken over by the East Surreys and the Buffs
were placed in brigade reserve, and on the 2nd October were taken away
to Contay, some ten miles west of Albert, for a fortnight’s rest and
recreation, which of course included training.
An endeavour has been made to trace the history of the 6th Battalion
and the 7th together from the capture of Albert to that of the
Hindenburg Line at Vendhuille, that is from the 22nd August till
the end of September, because during that very strenuous and
historic period the 12th and 18th Divisions, to which the Buff units
respectively belonged, were working hand in hand, supporting and
relieving each other and so on, but from the 1st October till the end
of the war the 6th and 7th were far apart again; the former, together
with the whole division in which it was serving, was transferred to
the 1st Army very early in October, and therefore the area of their
activities was no longer identical, and the 6th Buffs were at Rumegies,
ten miles south of Tournai, when the war came to an end; while the 7th
celebrated that event at the village of Pommereuil, not very far from
Le Cateau. It will therefore be convenient now to complete the war
story of the 6th Battalion and then consider that of their comrades of
the 7th.
IV. 6TH BATTALION
On the 1st October, then, the 6th Buffs proceeded by bus and by march
route into billets at Caucourt, which village may be about twelve miles
or so north-west of Arras, but rest here was for an extremely short
period and the 6th of the month found the battalion in buses again
for Avion, from whence it marched into trenches at Mericourt, just
south-east of Lens. This region was not yet clear of the enemy, who had
been driven back since August considerably further in some directions
than in others. The old and familiar machine gun was soon heard again,
therefore, and they were very active the day after the battalion
arrived, and the usual patrols which went out in front experienced also
their fire on the 8th. However, these patrols established themselves
at Molly Villers, a thousand yards in front of our own line, being
relieved by the West Kent soon afterwards. On the 13th the 6th Royal
West Kent advanced from Mericourt to the Drocourt-Queant trenches,
and they had the Buffs in support during the move which brought both
regiments into this line for the night, the Buffs’ headquarters being
at Floquieres. At this time there was a certain amount of movement
occasioned by the readjustment of the larger commands preparatory to
a grand processional march towards the east; the enemy was at his
last gasp, so to speak, and there was no longer any very strenuous
opposition. The 37th Brigade ultimately concentrated at Auby on
the 18th October and the advance commenced the next day, the units
taking turn to lead and encounter any opposition that might have been
organized. Thus the West Kents led off and the Buffs followed, the
first day taking the brigade to Flines. On the 20th the Buffs led and
advanced as far as Beuvry, arranging the front line at Orchies-Beuvry.
This was a very satisfactory day, because the Buffs were able to set
free hundreds of unfortunate civilians who had been in the power of
the beastly Germans, who, of course, had not actually evacuated the
country which was now being passed over. There was always an attempt
to sting during the great retreat, even if no regular resistance was
made. Thus a soldier was killed on the way to Beuvry, and 2nd Lieut.
Roper-Curzon and four men wounded.
On the 21st the Queen’s led the way, and the West Kent, being in front
on the 22nd, reached the banks of the River Scarpe, where it was found
that all civilians had been released by the retreating German. On the
23rd, when the Buffs were in front, a little more opposition was met
with, in so far that a fairly strong machine-gun fire was encountered
at Cubray; but this was successfully dealt with, heavy casualties
inflicted on the enemy and several prisoners taken. During the night
the Buffs rushed what was in front of them and established themselves
in Haute Rive. Captain H. Hunter, M.C., and nine men were wounded on
this day, the success of which was marred by the death on the same day
of the gallant captain from the result of his injuries.
The enemy were making a better stand now than had been the case
during the last week, and on the 24th it was found that the villages
of Bivridon and Bruille were strongly held. Nothing however at this
time, when success had been ours for days, was at all likely to stop
the British dash. The Buffs attacked at 9 a.m. and so rapidly and
unexpectedly that the enemy was taken by surprise during his breakfast
meal and utterly discomfited, so that our line was established upon the
River Escaut, after capturing some prisoners, four machine guns and
two trench mortars, the Buffs being the first on the whole Corps front
to reach that stream; but they lost 2nd Lieut. J. D. Thornley, M.C.,
and one man killed, Captain Kidd, M.C., Lieuts. Fiske and Hoskyn, 2nd
Lieut. Foreman and sixteen wounded.
The General Officer Commanding the Army Corps appreciated the work done
on the 24th, for he sent a message to the 12th Division: “Please convey
to the officers, N.C.O.’s and men of the 6th Buffs my appreciation of
the well-thought-out plan and good organization and fine offensive
spirit that led to the capture of Bruille on the 24th of October. It
is an operation that reflects great credit not only on all who took
part in it, but also on the brigade and the fine division to which
they belong.” Thus this good and glorious battalion finished up their
war history, for it was its last action. Very few old officers of four
years back, not even perhaps Colonel Eaton himself, could have thought
it possible to manufacture and train a new fighting unit, even though
that unit bore an ancient and honourable name, that could do the deeds
that the 6th Buffs had done, not once or twice, but over and over
again, and could earn at the last such an eulogy from an experienced
general as is quoted above.
The battalion now moved back in support and ultimately found itself
in billets at Coutiches, where it remained till the 10th November,
on which date it marched to Rumegies, so that it was at this latter
village that Armistice Day was spent. The great news came through at
10 a.m., and at 11 o’clock, the hour of cessation of hostilities, a
thanksgiving service was held in front of battalion headquarters, the
commanding officer and the padre both addressing the battalion, which
then marched through the village with its drums beating and the men
singing at the top of their voices. On the 14th of November Captain
Gullick, M.C., 2nd Lieut. Ayres and forty men formed part of a guard
of honour for the Army Commander on the occasion of his entering Mons
accompanied by H.R.H. The Prince of Wales. On the 25th the battalion
moved south-west to Auberchicourt, there to be quartered, the time
being taken up with salvage fatigues and the soldiers kept fit by
means of running drill. Christmas Day was properly and religiously
kept, and for once the stereotyped wish of the season contained some
sense in it. The interval between the great peace day and the end of
the year brought some honours to the 6th Battalion which were awarded
at different dates. Thus Sgt. and Acting C.S.M. J. Smith obtained a bar
to his M.M., and Sgt. Sparks and Corpls. Mount and Penfold were given
that decoration itself. Captain Gullick was awarded a clasp to his
M.C., Lieut. Fiske got the M.C. and Pte. Mitchell the D.C.M. L.-Corpl.
McDonald a little later headed a batch by virtue of a clasp to his
M.M., and the following got that coveted decoration for the first
time: Sgts. Fisher, Latter, Odell, Pennell, Shelley and Smurthwaite;
L.-Sgt. Knappett; Corpls. Allbright, Buxton, Holman, Miller, O’Rourke
and Williams; L.-Corpls. Istead, Richardson, Soulsby and Stobart;
Ptes. Brazier, Jones, Setchfield, Smithers and Wise. Also at the end
of the year Lt.-Colonel Smeltzer, D.S.O., M.C., was again mentioned in
despatches, as was Corpl. Pilcher.
V. 7TH BATTALION: THE SELLE, ETC.
The story of the 7th Battalion for October and afterwards is as
follows: on the 16th October, when the well-earned fortnight’s rest was
completed and the unit fit and ready again, it was taken by train to
Roisel and marched to Templeux la Fosse, moving on again on the 18th by
familiar Ronssoy to Beaurevoir, and after a night in billets there to
Elincourt, where the men were interested to find civilians once again.
It was really wonderful how the brave French peasants, both men and
women, clung to their homes. On the 21st to Maurois, four miles further
on, where at last hostile signs were met with once more, shells coming
over and bombs arriving per aeroplane at night time. The next day took
the brigade to Reumont and the concentration area west of Le Cateau.
The 3rd Army was now engaged in important operations in the strip of
country to the immediate north of the region awarded to the 4th, of
which the 18th Division now formed a unit, and on the 23rd October
it fell to the lot of the latter army to attack for the purpose of
protecting the major operations to be carried out by the former. The
country now forming the theatre of operations was widely different
to the Somme Valley and other parts to which the troops had become
so accustomed. The numerous hedgerows and ditches affected the style
of attack and defence. The arrangements for the attack by the 18th
Division on the 23rd October, which formed part of the battle of the
Selle, were made with most elaborate care. The area over which the
advance was to take place was most exactly divided into portions with
an objective at the further end of each portion and, of course, troops
detailed to take each objective; moreover, each piece of ground was to
be gained by a certain time and each halting place left for further
adventure exactly so many minutes afterwards. (See diagram on next
page.)
The 53rd Brigade on the right, with the 54th, less the Northamptonshire
Regiment, on the left, were to make good the first and second
objectives, and the 55th Brigade, with the Northamptonshire and certain
details, were to capture the third, fourth and fifth. The 55th and
Northamptonshires’ attack was arranged to be carried out leap-frog
fashion, so that the ground between the second and fourth objectives
was to be made good by the Buffs and East Surreys, the latter being on
the right. The advance was not to be covered by a creeping barrage, but
was to be proceeded with at the regular rate of one hundred yards in
four minutes, and no one unit, if instructions were carried out, could
ever find itself unsupported by another through advancing too fast.
This leap-frog system of advance obtained even amongst battalions. At
any rate, the Buffs arranged that C Company on the right and B on the
left should be responsible for the ground from the second objective
to a certain line, where A and B should pass through them bound for
the fourth objective, at which the Northamptonshire would leap-frog
the Buffs and go on to the end. A section of machine guns and one
trench mortar was with the battalion reserve and a section of tanks
in the immediate rear; the idea being that any company getting into
trouble was to apply to the commanding officer, who would send tanks
to its aid. Communication was carefully arranged with the accompanying
aeroplanes. The zero hour was 2 a.m.
[Illustration: DIAGRAM OF ADVANCE OF 18TH DIVISION AT BATTLE
OF THE SELLE[33]
Oct. 23rd, 1918
Depart Z+612} +--------------+-----+ 4th Objective:
Arrive Z+492} | | | Northants pass
| 2000 yds | Buffs
| | |
| | |
+--------------------+ A & B pass C & D
| 600 yds | | (Bousies village
| | | | is here)
| | | |
Depart Z+400} +--------------------+ 3rd Objective
Arrive Z+360} | | |
| 1000 yds |
| | |
Depart Z+320} +--------------------+ 2nd Objective:
Arrive Z+200} | | | | Buffs Pass
| 800 yds | | other troops
| | | |
+--------------------+ Buffs forming up
| 2000 yds | line
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
Depart Z+140} +--------------------+ 1st Objective
Arrive Z+100}]
The Buffs arrived at their assembly position at 4.15, suffering
fifteen casualties from shell fire on the way. At five they moved in
artillery formation towards the forming-up line. Before reaching this
the leading companies came under heavy machine-gun fire from the right
flank, the brigade in front having only established the line of the
first objective. This little trouble, however, was obviated by our
aeroplanes dropping bombs on the machine guns. The second objective
was passed at 8 o’clock, or forty minutes late. D Company (Captain E.
V. Morse, M.C.), on the left, cleverly outmanœuvred and captured a
battery of guns, but soon afterwards the captain was killed. He had
ably led his company and dealt with many difficult positions. C Company
also captured its battery, but, after passing the second objective,
the enemy’s opposition stiffened and a great deal of machine-gun fire
came from the village of Bousies. However, at 10 o’clock the leading
companies were close up to the third objective, which, by the way,
should have been reached four hours earlier. At twenty minutes past
ten a message was dropped from the air: “Huns still in Bousies. Our
boys in eastern part ‘mopping up.’ Huns’ transport just galloped from
village.” Ten minutes later Colonel Curtis ordered Captain Whitmarsh
to take command of all troops in the battalion sector and endeavour to
establish the Green Line, or third objective. At 12.30 the officer in
charge of tanks reported that he had been in the village of Bousies
with A Company (the right support) and that he had left that company
there “mopping up” the village. At 2.40 p.m. all the Buffs’ companies
were on a road which is beyond the point where B and A Companies were
to relieve the other two. The battalion was in touch on their right,
but its left flank was exposed, though patrols were busy in this
direction, and these soon reported that the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, though in rear of the Buffs’ position, were pushing
forward. A and B Companies were then directed to hold the road, with
the others in close support. Heavy machine-gun fire was experienced
from the high ground a little distance in front. At 6 o’clock A and
B moved forward and made good their objective by 7.15, and an hour
afterwards were relieved by the Northamptonshire Regiment, the Buffs
going into brigade reserve. Great credit was given in connection with
this day’s work to the accompanying tanks under Lieut. Grey, who very
fearlessly reconnoitred to the front and dealt with the machine-gun
difficulty.
During the afternoon of the following day the Buffs moved into
positions in Bousies and there formed a line of resistance. While still
in this village on the 25th a report came in that the right sector of
the brigade was withdrawing and C Company was pushed forward to deal
with any possible German counter-attack, but found the battalion of
the Queen’s alert for that duty. The Buffs relieved the East Surreys
on outpost duty. On the 26th the brigade on the left made a determined
effort to gain ground, but without much success, owing to the usual
machine-gun fire. The next day the Buffs became divisional reserve in
billets in Bousies, but were back again in forty-eight hours.
There was a considerable pause in the proceedings after the fight just
recorded, and no further advance was made until the 4th November, the
brigade taking its turn with the others both in the front line and
in the trenches, but never very far from the village of Bousies. For
the above-mentioned date, however, another blow had been planned. The
enemy was despairing and discouraged, but must not be given too much
time in which to pull himself together. The task set was very similar
to that of the 23rd October. The 53rd and 54th Brigades were first to
capture Preux and Hecq and get into the western part of the Mormal
Forest, which is a very extensive one, but easy to pass by reason both
of the numerous roads and paths and by the absence of thick underwood.
After this the Buffs and Queen’s were to pass through at a certain
fixed hour. For this purpose Bousies was left at 8.15, two hours after
zero, and a sunken road west of Landrecies reached after a few shell
casualties had been suffered by the way. Here the headquarters of a
Bedfordshire battalion informed the Buffs that the attack on the left
had developed satisfactorily; but the 54th Brigade on the right, having
come up against strong nests or pockets of hostile machine guns just
west of Preux, had made but poor progress through the orchards on its
line. Owing to this the 10th Essex had been unable to reach their
forming-up position, and as it was the Buffs’ job to pass through this
10th Essex they were, of course, looking out for them. The officer
commanding the Buffs therefore decided not to proceed till the Essex
had got on a bit, but put his battalion for a while into the trenches
with the Bedfords, and sent on patrols with a request to be kept
informed of the movements of those they were to relieve. At last, at
12.50, orders came to advance gradually and an hour later to push on
with speed to the third objective, and so, after passing Preux, the Red
Line was reached at 3.40 without further incident. After the morning’s
first stubborn resistance the enemy had, as a matter of fact, retired
hurriedly through the forest and put up no further fight. At 10.50 at
night orders came to continue the advance at 6.30 in the morning, and
at that hour the 8th East Surrey started as divisional vanguard, the
Buffs following at the head of the main guard. Very little resistance
was met with, and the final objective, the bank of the River Sambre at
Sassegnies, was gained about noon.
At 7.50 a.m. on the 6th the 55th Brigade was by arrangement squeezed
out, as it was termed, and so had finished its long fighting record.
The Buffs marched back to Preux tired and very cold and wet, for the
weather throughout these operations had been bad. The 8th of November
took the battalion further back to Pommereuil, and there, as nothing
must be left to chance, immediate reorganization and making up of
deficiencies was commenced. Then came the armistice and with it the
finish of the war record of the 7th Battalion of the Buffs, a record
which is comparable with any battalion in the army and which includes
the First Battle of Albert in 1916, the Battle of Bazentin Ridge,
Thiepval Ridge, the Ancre heights, the Battle of the Ancre, the Battles
of Arleux, of Poelcappelle, St Quentin, Amiens, Second Battle of Albert
in 1918, the Second Battle of Bapaume, the Battle of Epehy, Battle of
St Quentin Canal, the Battle of the Selle and the Battle of the Sambre.
There is not much to record for the remainder of the year. The 7th
Buffs was not one of the units told off to move into Germany on the
13th November; it went into billets at Elincourt, and on the 17th there
took place a brigade thanksgiving service. Then a great deal of salvage
work was done, as was the case with most corps. On the 4th December
His Majesty The King came to Elincourt and passed on foot between the
rows of his soldiers. On the 12th of this month the battalion moved to
Mallincourt, and five days later came a most unfortunate occurrence,
which strikes one as particularly bad luck after the armistice had
been concluded only a month or so. During salvage operations a blind
shell exploded, killing seven men and wounding twenty, as well as four
more who, being only slightly injured, remained at work. There was a
distribution of medals, etc., to the Buffs and East Surreys on the 23rd
December.
VI. 10TH BATTALION
The great Allied advance to victory began with our 10th Battalion near
St Floris, which is seven miles south of the town of Hazebrouck. This
unit and the 74th Division, to which it belonged, was part of the 5th
Army, whose area was considerably north of the country in which the 6th
and 7th Battalions operated. During the very strenuous and important
month of September, however, the division went south to the 4th Army
where the others were, and there saw fighting at the Battle of Epehy
before it returned to its regular area and wound up its military
experiences at Tournai in November.
The advance, as far as the 10th was concerned, commenced on the 6th
August, for on that date an attempt was made to push forward. The
brigade on the right succeeded, but, owing to considerable opposition,
the Buffs were unable to do the same except on their right, where B
Company threw out three posts to keep in touch with the 16th Devons.
The battalion had one man killed and three wounded. The next day,
however, C and D Companies got ahead with but little trouble, and
on the 8th a further advance was made. The companies in front were
now B and C, and they went forward about one thousand yards and
crossed the enemy’s trenches. This progress might perhaps have been
continued had other parts of the British line in the neighbourhood been
equally successful. Next morning, the other two companies being in
front, the advance started again, but A Company was somewhat heavily
counter-attacked on its right flank, which drew back to maintain touch
with the 229th Brigade on its right, which was stationary. However,
at 7 o’clock D and A Companies got on to the west bank of the River
Lys and would have crossed had not all the bridges been destroyed. The
crossing, in fact, had to be delayed till the Royal Engineers brought
up three bridges, which were quickly in place, and then the infantry
dug themselves in on the far bank. The Buffs had six killed and Lieut.
Atkinson and thirteen wounded.
Patrols, working to the front, soon discovered that the Germans, armed
with many machine guns, were prepared to dispute any further progress,
so that an effort made at 9.30 p.m. on the 12th to get forward had
to be a properly organized one. It was extremely dark and the ground
all shell holes and irregularities, so that the attempt to advance
was a failure, though it was the means of ascertaining that it was a
considerable force to which our people were opposite and not merely a
small rear guard, mostly consisting of machine guns. The battalion had
three killed and seventeen wounded, one of whom died, and seven missing.
On the 14th the Buffs were relieved and became supports, and two days
afterwards occupied a reserve line just outside St Venant and facing
east-north-east. Here the men set to work on the reserve trenches
and remained at this job for a week. Soon after this the 10th Buffs
entrained at Lillers for Heilly, and by the end of the month the 74th
Division was down with the 4th Army in the Somme Valley, the Buffs on
the 31st August being at Maurepas, near Combles. It will be remembered
that this was the day first arranged for the fight round Fregicourt,
which was, however, postponed for twenty-four hours; it was in this
fight that the 7th Battalion took so prominent a part in cutting
off the Germans who tried to defend the Morval position on the 1st
September.
It was on the 2nd of the month that the 74th Division made their
attack and the scene was just south of Moislains, some four miles
from the other battlefield. The 229th Brigade, aided by one battalion
of the 230th, made the attack. It failed to reach the objective, the
machine-gun fire being too heavy. The Buffs were in reserve in a valley
to the south-west of Moislains and were heavily shelled all day with
high explosive and gas; two men were killed and Captain Vickery (the
doctor) and twelve men wounded.
The enemy’s rapid retreat did not commence till the 5th of the month;
in the interval the 10th Buffs had, on the 3rd, moved into the front
line, 2nd Lieut. Onions being on that day wounded by gas shell. The
battalion had what was called the Midenette trench in front of it, and
this was reported to be occupied by Germans; but on the morning of the
5th two platoons of C Company, pushing forward to keep touch with the
47th London Division on the left, captured the trench without much
opposition, and at 6 p.m. the battalion advanced, captured another line
and tried to get on still further; but the usual machine-gun opposition
began to get heavy and the whole line remained for the present along
the Peronne-Cambrai road. The next day the advance continued and with
rapidity. The battalion started at 8 a.m. with D and A Companies, C in
support and B in reserve. At 3.45 p.m., finding that the 47th Division
on the left had dropped behind, and having passed through Templeux
la Fosse and reached Longavesne, a halt was called, an outpost line
arranged and a defensive flank formed for security till the Londoners
arrived. Three men were killed and twelve wounded this day.
On the 7th September the 230th Brigade was relieved in the front line
and became reserve to the division, in which capacity it remained for
a couple of days, taking a forward place again on the 10th of the
month and passing, on its way to do so, the village of Villers Faucon.
The ensuing little tour of four days before going into reserve again
at Longavesnes was more or less uneventful, for heavy and consistent
shelling can hardly be termed an event. During this short time Lieut.
Mathews and 2nd Lieut. Jackson were wounded, two men killed and sixteen
wounded, one of whom died.
On the 16th September the battalion moved into the Faustine
Quarries, ready for a further advance. The rain was heavy, and gas
and high-explosive shelling were heavier and aeroplane bombing very
severe. Having taken its place in the front line on the 17th, the 10th
Battalion next day took its share with the 1st, 6th and 7th Battalions
of the Buffs in the Battle of Epehy. The 74th Division on the opening
day of this fight was more immediately successful than the 12th or
18th, which units, it will be remembered, met with considerable
opposition about Epehy and Ronssoy. The 15th Suffolk and 16th Sussex
were to lead the way up to the first objective and the whole began to
move up very early in the morning, which was an exceedingly wet one.
A pitched battle on French soil was a novelty for the 10th Battalion,
and the severity of the opening barrage impressed the men considerably.
The German opposition in this part does not appear to have been quite
as resolute as at most points in front of the Hindenburg Line. At
Templeux le Guerard there are some quarries where pits, refuse heaps
and holes and corners generally, offer an exceptionally good position
for defence, but these were soon given up, as the Suffolk and Sussex,
with the Buffs and Somerset in close support, came resolutely on; these
quarries were passed and the Hargicourt trench, which was the first
objective, taken without a check at 8 o’clock. Here half an hour’s
breathing time was given and then the advance resumed; this time with
the Buffs in front, the next objective being what were called the Zogda
trench and Rifle-pit trench another mile away. Success continued with
the division. The artillery barrage was perfect and the infantryman’s
confidence in it supreme, which is exactly as it should be. The enemy’s
machine guns presented difficulties, and indeed held up the oncoming
line for a little while, but at noon, or soon after, the Zogda trench
was ours and a short further advance commenced. But now the trouble
which was being experienced at Epehy and Ronssoy began to make itself
felt; the stoppage of the 18th Division prevented the left brigade of
the 74th getting on, so there was a check all along the line, which
extended to the Australians on the right of the Yeomanry Division.
About 5 p.m. Very lights were put up on the left of the division,
which meant that a counter-attack was expected. This drew our own
barrage which came down along the line of the second objective. The
Buffs, with others, being by now about three hundred yards in front
of this, were very much in the way, and an immediate withdrawal into
the Zogda and Rifle-pit trenches was the result. An enormous number of
prisoners and considerable booty had been taken. Indeed, many Germans
seemed most anxious to come in and so end their fighting days. Captain
H. L. Allfrey, 2nd Lieut. E. G. Porter and ten men were killed this
day, forty-eight wounded and two missing. The Buffs remained in their
captured trenches for a couple of days and were under a good deal of
shell fire. In fact, eight men were wounded on the 19th.
The next advance was arranged for the 21st, the objective being about
1,200 yards in front of the Zogda trench and up-hill towards Quennemont
Farm. At 5.40 a.m. D and C Companies formed in front line, with A in
support, and advanced to take the Blue Line. The country to be crossed
was like an old-fashioned glacis, very bare of cover and of a more or
less regular slope, the summit of which was well protected by wire
and full of machine guns. The Australians were on the right, then the
230th Brigade and on the left, but a little in rear, the 231st Brigade.
The start was made behind a barrage, almost before it was light, and
was successful enough in so far that regular progress was made until
the day broke, when the assaulting troops got among thick belts of
wire near Zoo trench, which, of course, checked the infantry while the
barrage went on. A few men got through the wire, and then the enemy
emerged from his dug-outs and commenced a tremendous fire of shells and
machine-gun bullets. C and D Companies, which were in front, could do
nothing but take cover in shell holes, wait and hope. The supporting A
Company was just as badly off as C and D and could not move, and troops
on the left fell back before a counter-attack, so that the Germans
who made it were, in the nature of things and merely as a result of
their success, now threatening the Buffs in rear and the battalion
was in a tight place; the telephone was disconnected, no movement was
possible, and, though two gallant runners got back with a report of the
situation, both men being wounded over their job, no message could come
up from behind to the forward companies. The troops on the left took
up a new line parallel to the Zogda trench, and when darkness fell the
Buffs managed to get back in small parties to this shelter, having lost
Captain C. E. Hatfield, M.C., 2nd Lieut. H. A. Oxley and 12 men killed,
Lieut. Turnpenny, 2nd Lieut. Hoare and 58 wounded, Lieut. Wilkinson
and 6 other ranks “wounded and missing,” also 20 more “missing.”
After this action the battalion, being relieved by the 15th Suffolk
on the following day, remained in reserve under intermittent shell
fire till the 25th, during which period three more men were killed
and four wounded, one of whom died. The authorities now decided that
the 74th Division would again be required in its own army, so, after
being relieved by American troops, the Buffs entrained at Peronne for
Villers Bretonneux, and again on the 27th at Heilly for Lillers, from
whence the battalion marched to billets at Allovagne and remained
there refitting and so on till the end of the month. The total
casualties during the fighting epoch of the month of September were
very considerable, namely, 11 officers and 218 men killed, wounded and
missing. Previous to his death Captain Hatfield was given the M.C.
for his share in the business, and eleven men the M.M., namely, Sgts.
Denton and English, Corpl. Dunn, and Ptes. Dennett, Dier (both of whom
died), Forscott, Hibbs, Mather, Sidwell, Sutch (R.A.M.C.) and Willis;
and Captain Haughton, M.C., was mentioned in despatches.
On the 1st October the Buffs relieved the 9th Royal Welch Fusiliers in
the Richebourg sector, advancing to the front line just west of Lillers
next day. This was the commencement of a slow but certain push eastward
on the part of the 74th Division, and indeed of the army to which it
belonged. There were many delays. The roads and bridges were destroyed
by the retreating foe, and a delay caused to one unit on account of
either these reasons or by a hostile rear guard meant a check to the
whole movement, for the German resistance was not so wholly broken down
as to render it wise or safe for the pursuers to break their line by
pushing one body of troops in front of another. Sainghin was reached
on the 3rd October and there ensued a halt for some days, chiefly
because the 55th Division on the right was stayed by the La Bassee
Canal. The enemy refused to allow this halt to be a quiet one, and
the troops were shelled pertinaciously and thoroughly. The Buffs took
their turn in front line and in support and, when in the former, sent
out many patrols; in fact, patrolling at this time was kept up both by
day and by night, as it was of the utmost importance to keep in touch
with the enemy. These parties were able to discover some of the hostile
machine-gun nests, and on the 9th of the month our artillery was able
to deal with several of these which had been located.
On the 15th the forward move was resumed and the patrols pushed through
Rosoir. On the 17th, the Suffolks leading and the Buffs following,
Emmerin was reached at 12.10, and the Buffs, passing through, pushed
onward in the afternoon towards the road east of Faches, for the
division was to pass to the southward of the great town of Lille. Owing
to the darkness, progress after leaving the Suffolk was slow and the
road was not reached till 6.30 a.m., after which posts were established
slightly to the east of the roadway. This country had been for four
years in the possession of the Germans, and it is impossible to
describe the joy manifested by the French inhabitants at their release
at last from their horrible servitude. The Buffs never experienced,
nor are they likely to again, such exuberant tokens of welcome and
gratitude as they met with in the neighbourhood of Lille. The Frenchman
feels very deeply indeed, and he is a demonstrative man. The march
continued, every day adding a few miles to the completed journey,
and on the 24th the Buffs were at Marquain, only three miles west of
the city of Tournai. Here it became pretty evident that the enemy
intended making a stand. The shelling, both gas and high explosive,
became very severe; night patrols met with heavy machine-gun fire and
in every detail resistance was stiffening on the line held by the
Germans between our front and the city. Hertain, Marquain and Orcq are
all villages just outside the western edge of Tournai, and all these
were occupied by the English during the last few days of October, and
up till the 7th November the Buffs were first in one and then in the
other, according to the nature of their duty as front-line troops or
reserve. The brigadier-general commanding inspected the 10th Battalion
of the Buffs on the 4th November just as if they had all been at
Aldershot, and he took that opportunity of presenting the M.M. ribband
to Ptes. Mather and Sidwell. The battalion made a very smart appearance
on parade, for the men were ready to enter Tournai and this was not to
be done in a slovenly, untidy manner. On the 8th came news that the
enemy had withdrawn, and the Buffs, moving up at 11.15 a.m., made a
grand entry into the Faubourg de Lille well groomed and turned out and
with the band playing triumphantly. All went very well up to a certain
point, and then machine-gun fire from the town itself commenced. The
German was not so far off, after all, so the march was stayed and all
was war again in so far that street fighting continued during the
night. The British intelligence might have been somewhat at fault when
the Faubourg de Lille was entered in parade style, but it was only a
little premature. The German rear guard quitted the place next day,
but, of course, blew up all the bridges over the Scheldt. The Germans
evacuated the city of Tournai only on the 9th November, and the very
next day it was entered by the good King Albert of the Belgians, who
was accompanied by his Queen. They came to congratulate their faithful
people on their release from German thraldom which had oppressed them
for so long.
The next day was the 11th November and at eleven o’clock in the morning
there was no more war in France nor Flanders, and the Yeoman of Kent
had done his work even if it was not done on horseback. The 10th
Battalion was, on receipt of the great news, in the Faubourg de Lille.
At 11.45 it marched through Tournai and moved away to the eastward,
halting at Montreuil au Bois and Herquecies till, on the 14th of the
month, it reached Barry, where it remained for nearly a month. During
the operations which culminated in the capture of Tournai and which
ended in the armistice, the Military Cross was awarded to Captain J.
I. H. Friend and the Military Medal to Sgt. Rudman and to Pte. Hale.
The casualties were 2 officers and 18 men killed, 2 officers and 71 men
wounded.
On the 7th December a visit was received from His Majesty King George.
It was, at his own request, a very informal affair. The men were drawn
up on each side of the Tournai-Leuze road just outside Barry, and the
King walked quietly down between them, but the welcome he received was
one which it is pretty safe to believe was pleasing to our monarch.
The demobilization of such of the men as were miners commenced on the
10th December; but the total dispersal to their homes of an army the
size of the British one at this period is a long and tedious job.
VII. 1ST BATTALION
We left the 1st Battalion in the Malin House area in the vicinity of
Dickebusch. It did not immediately take part in the great triumphant
and final push, and indeed its history up to the middle of September
is not so exciting or full of incident either as that of the sister
battalions or as certain periods of its own recent history. It remained
in the neighbourhood of Dickebusch, taking its turn in trench work,
till the 23rd August; during this period two American companies were
attached for a few days, which not only gave our men the pleasure of
making new and interesting friends, but was a tangible proof that
matters were going well and a successful end to a very awful and
strenuous existence fairly in sight; during August, too, came the news
of honours, which is always pleasant. First Sgt. Hills got the M.M.;
then 2nd Lieut. Lister the M.C. The D.C.M. fell to Sgt. Ayres; and on
the 19th there was news of the M.M. for Corpl. Swaine, L.-Corpl. Voyle,
and Privates Cook, Dockerill, Lovesey, Stapley and Whiskin.
On the 23rd August the 16th Infantry Brigade was relieved by the 106th
American Infantry Regiment and withdrew for training into the St Omer
area, the training consisting of the practice of open warfare, and on
the 1st September a long railway journey, which was completed next
day, took the Buffs with the others all the way to Heilly (between
Amiens and Albert). The 16th Brigade spent nearly a fortnight in this
neighbourhood, first at Bonnay and then at Fouilloy and Aubigny; and
so it was not till the 14th, or five weeks after the British offensive
had begun, that the first brigade move was made to Montecourt, the
Buffs going to Trefcon, a few miles west of St Quentin. On the 17th the
battalion moved to St Quentin Wood and into the battle line after dark,
Captain Morley being wounded.
The 1st Battalion, like all the other Buffs in France, was now in
the 4th Army, which, as we have seen, was busily engaged in pushing
on and fighting its way from Albert to the Hindenburg Line. On the
8th September and following days was fought the great and prolonged
Battle of Epehy, the limits of which battle area is officially given as
extending from St Quentin (exclusive) to Villers Plouich, a distance
of nearly twenty miles as the crow flies. Sir Douglas Haig in his
despatches makes use of the words: “Next day at 7 a.m. on the 18th
September the 4th and 3rd Armies attacked in heavy rain on a front of
about seventeen miles from Holnon to Gouzeaucourt, the 1st French Army
co-operating south of Holnon”; and a little later on he writes: “On the
extreme right and in the left centre about Epehy the enemy’s resistance
was very determined, and in these sectors troops of the 6th, 12th, 18th
and 58th Divisions had severe fighting.”
The country over which the 16th Brigade and its immediate neighbours
were working during the battle of September may briefly be described
as follows: Three miles or so west of St Quentin is a large wood
called the Holnon, but sometimes described as the St Quentin Wood. St
Quentin itself is commanded to the west and south by high ground; the
Hindenburg Line ran just outside this town to the canal at Bellenglise.
Holnon village lies in a hollow commanded by Round and Manchester
Hills, which latter height lies in the area that was allotted to the
French. From the east edge of the wood the ground is a bare slope
rising to the high ground overlooking St Quentin. At the highest point
and opposite where the centre of the 6th Division was to attack was a
network of trenches called the Quadrilateral, which could be reinforced
unseen from the enemy’s side of the hill. It was expected that the
Germans would stand on the heights commanding St Quentin, but they were
reported as being much disorganized and that resistance might not be
very obstinate.
The 1st and 6th Divisions, in co-operation with the French, were to
capture, on the 18th September, a starting-place for the assault of
the Hindenburg Line, and to do this the 11th Essex had, on the 16th,
after tremendous effort, secured trenches clear of the Holnon Wood for
an assembly position, while with the same object the West Yorkshire
had endeavoured to secure Holnon village, but had only gained a part,
because the French on the right had failed to take the hills. This
failure had its effect on the forming-up arrangements of our troops,
as had the fact that the Holnon Wood had become almost impassable from
gas shells and wet weather, so much so that the 16th and 71st Brigades
had to move round to the north and south of it to get to their places.
This fatigued the troops and rendered communications difficult. There
was not much time for reconnaissance, for the advance had to be timed
in accordance with the movement of the troops to the northward. So
on the afternoon of the 17th the 16th Brigade concentrated west of
St Quentin Wood preparatory to forming up the next morning. The 18th
Brigade had attacked at dawn on the 17th in order to capture the
starting-place for the later date, but without success. It was at
6 p.m. that the brigadier of the 16th went out with the commanding
officers of the Buffs and the York and Lancaster and chose assembly
positions.
On the morrow, with the 71st Brigade on the right and the 16th on the
left, the 6th Division attacked the Quadrilateral, being the point
where the two joined, and the left of the 16th Brigade being on Fresnoy
le Petit. Zero hour was at 5 a.m., the barrage started and the York
and Lancaster Regiment moved to the attack. The Buffs were at the
north edge of the wood and the objective was south of the village of
Gricourt. The York and Lancaster were to capture a line east-south-east
of Fresnoy le Petit, and then the Buffs and K.S.L.I. to pass through
to their objective. Two tanks were taken to assist the attack, but
one failed to start, and the other, after being seen going through
Fresnoy le Petit, was never heard of again. At 6.40 the York and
Lancaster were reported on their objective, and A, B and C Companies
of the Buffs, who had already advanced some distance and suffered a
little from shell fire, prepared to play their part. At first they lost
direction somewhat owing to the darkness and rain, and then discovered
that the satisfactory report about the York and Lancaster Regiment
was not quite accurate and that the whole of its objective had not
been reached; so that the left company of the Buffs had been held up
by machine guns from Fresnoy le Petit, and the support company, after
reaching the outskirts of the village, had had to withdraw somewhat.
All these causes prevented the remainder of the Buffs with the K.S.L.I.
from advancing beyond the position gained by their comrades. Nothing
could be heard or seen of the 71st Brigade, which should have been on
the right, so this flank was exposed and D Company the Buffs had to
be placed on guard there. By evening the different events of the day,
together with the difficulty of maintaining direction in the early
morning, had completely mixed up the units of the 16th Brigade so much
so that the immediate unravelling seemed almost impossible, and the
senior officers at various points had to collect all troops in their
immediate vicinity and take command of them, thus forming temporarily
three composite battalions wherewith to carry on. The 1st Buffs lost 6
officers and 150 men killed and wounded on the 18th.
On the 19th the two more forward of the composite battalions were
ordered to attack again at dawn, but the Germans evidently anticipated
this move, for they opened a very heavy artillery and machine-gun
barrage before the attackers had even started. Fighting went on
throughout the day, the Buffs having seventeen more casualties; but
no success crowned the British effort, and it became evident enough
that the Germans were making a real stand and not merely fighting
a rear-guard action. Indeed, it was very noticeable all along the
line how the opposition to our advance increased the nearer to the
Hindenburg Line we penetrated. Everybody had now experienced heavy
fighting and some battalions had suffered heavy loss, and so it
was determined to remain comparatively quiet for a day or two and
to prepare the way for another regular attack by means of a proper
artillery preliminary work. About this time the officer commanding
received a petition, signed by thirty men, asking that the gallantry
of their company commander might be recognized by the authorities.
Captain W. T. Johnston was the officer concerned, and he was awarded
the Military Cross.
The renewed attack was commenced on the 24th. The 18th Brigade was
on the right and the 16th on the left. The 18th failed to take the
Quadrilateral, which was its objective. The front of the fighting, as
regards the 16th, was allotted this day to the York and Lancaster and
K.S.L.I., the Buffs being in support. It was a very gallant affair and
all objectives were taken, but the right of the brigade was exposed as
it advanced, owing to the Quadrilateral still being in German hands;
so bombing operations on that stronghold were commenced by the Buffs
and K.S.L.I. and most of the northern face was taken. The 3rd Brigade,
assisted by the York and Lancaster, took Gricourt in the afternoon, and
at night the Buffs relieved the K.S.L.I. in first line. The battalion
had a list of twenty casualties.
On the 25th the 18th Brigade made good the objectives before which they
had at first failed. They took the Douai trench, and by midnight the
25th/26th the 16th and 18th, in co-operation, had completed the capture
of the Quadrilateral, which the enemy had considered an impossibility.
Two German counter-attacks on the 16th Brigade were repulsed, though
the enemy managed to rush and to hold one of the forward posts; but the
opposition was now obviously dying down and the German spirit sadly
broken, and our patrols were able to gain further ground. On the 27th a
prisoner was captured, who stated that he was the last patrol covering
the withdrawal of the enemy, and this proved correct, for next day our
people could by no means get touch of him.
The 6th Division was relieved during the 29th and 30th of September by
the 4th French Division, and by this time our posts were round three
sides of the village of Fayet, which was ultimately captured by a
patrol under Lieut. Lushington, and Manchester Hill was in the hands of
our allies. The Buffs went back to camp at Trefcon.
While the fighting recorded above had been in progress on the right of
the British Army, the 47th Division, with the 1st protecting its right
flank and an American force on its left, had by means of a magnificent
attack on the 29th September broken the Hindenburg Line and crossed
the canal, together with the 32nd Division, after which these units
experienced very severe fighting about Ramicourt and Sequehart. It was
therefore necessary that they should rest, and when the 6th Division
had had four days in the back areas, which was largely utilized in
absorbing reinforcements and generally reorganizing, it was ordered to
relieve these others with a view to attacking, on the 8th October, in
the direction of the little town of Bohain.
Therefore on the 4th October the Buffs marched, complete with transport
and all else, to the Bellenglise area and billeted by the banks of
the canal, and on the night of the 5th/6th the 16th Brigade relieved
the 3rd Brigade about Preselles Farm, which is between Ramicourt and
Sequehart and opposite the position to be attacked. This position was
in a country of rolling downs, divided by a valley opening out towards
the British and closed at the far end by a ridge on which stood the
village of Mericourt. In the valley itself stood Mannikin Wood and
other points suitable for hidden machine guns. The 6th Division was
to attack up the left spur which bounded the valley, and the French
up the right one; but our allies had been delayed in passing through
St Quentin and by opposition on the way, and although the whole
operation had been postponed for twenty-four hours, namely from the
7th to 8th October, it was pretty obvious that at first, at any rate,
the British right flank would be exposed. A battalion of the West
Yorkshire Regiment and three whippet tanks had the task of clearing the
valley, but, as a matter of fact, the tanks were knocked out almost
immediately. The 16th Brigade was on the right next the valley, and the
71st on the left next the Americans.
[Illustration: ST. QUENTIN]
On the night of the 7th/8th the Buffs moved up to their forming-up
line for the second time, for when the operation was postponed the
battalion had gone back to Bellenglise for a day, and the marching and
counter-marching had proved a strain on the men. The hour was 5.10
a.m., at which time the Shropshire Light Infantry were to move off and
secure the first objective, after which the Buffs, passing through,
were to go on to the second, which was in front of Beauregard Farm.
The men were not in position till a quarter of an hour before zero, on
account of the darkness and the difficulty of guiding, and Lieut. H. H.
Carter and his batman were killed on the way; but the attack started
in good order, the Buffs having B and D Companies in front line, C
and half A in support and the remainder of A in reserve. The first
objective was soon in the hands of the Salopians and the Buffs quickly
on the move for the second. The shelling was now, however, very heavy
both from the other side of the valley, which had not yet been reached
by the French, and also from Mannikin Wood, in the valley itself, which
kept up fire for some time, in spite of some magnificent work done by
the West Yorkshire Regiment. A counter-attack appeared to be likely,
and Lieut. Stainforth, with the two reserve platoons, was ordered up to
get touch with the front line and reinforce it, if necessary. At 11.45
battalion headquarters, moving forward, found the situation well in
hand on the battalion front, though no reorganization was possible,
as the slightest movement was observed by the enemy from the right. In
fact, A and C Companies were harassed by ·77 guns all day. However,
a defensive flank was formed later on. By 3 p.m. the French, too,
began to advance and completely changed the situation. The West Yorks
pushed up the valley and got touch with them, and so towards evening
the companies were reorganized and patrols pushed forward through
Beauregard Farm and Copse and the line established east of these. By
nightfall Mericourt was taken and the 6th Division had done all it
had set out to do. Captains Hamilton and Moss were both wounded early
in the day, but remained with their companies until the objective was
reached. The latter was again seriously wounded whilst waiting for a
stretcher at battalion headquarters.
The work of the day had hardly been accomplished when orders came for
the 6th Division to take over part of the American front on the left
and hand over some of their own to the 46th Division on the right;
in fact, to side-step to the left, as it was called. As far as the
Buffs were concerned, their reorganization during the night was barely
complete when, about 3 a.m., the 4th Battalion of the Leicestershire
Regiment arrived in relief with orders that they were at once to move
off to a position two miles away to support a new attack, this time
on Bohain, timed for 5.30 a.m., which was to be made by the K.S.L.I.
and York and Lancaster Battalions of the 16th Brigade. This meant,
of course, that a brigade of very tired troops had to move off two
miles to a new position, issue all detailed orders, make elaborate
arrangements and take up position all in less than three hours in pitch
darkness and over unreconnoitred country. It was a most extraordinary
performance, but it was done and the 16th Brigade duly advanced at the
correct zero hour, though the Buffs themselves were not called upon
to take part. Both the 16th and 71st Brigades carried their first
objectives successfully, and the whole operation ended during the
following night by the capture of Bohain, the release of some four
thousand French civilians and the acquisition of considerable war booty.
After returning to Doon Mill, from whence the start on the 9th had
been made, coming back to the front line again and having Lieut. Lloyd
wounded on the 15th, the Buffs on the 16th October were preparing for
another battle. On that date A and C Companies were in billets and
bivouacs east of Bohain, and B and D in the outskirts of Becquiguy,
the battalion being under the temporary command of Major Lord Teynham.
Orders were issued for an attack on the 17th from Vaux Audigny and the
Buffs formed up to the north-west of that place. The objective, or Blue
Line, was a trench system which included the Bois St Pierre and a level
crossing on the railway and was in front of the village of Wassigny.
Then the 1st Division was to pass through and take Wassigny. The Buffs
attacked on a two-company frontage, A on the left, C with a platoon of
B on the right, D in support, and B in reserve.
The morning proved to be one of the foggiest that had been experienced
during the war. Nothing could be seen anywhere and direction was
naturally extremely difficult to maintain. The Buffs had to pass the
village of Vaux Audigny in fours and to deploy outside it. The advance
was made by compass bearings, and more than one instance occurred
of sergeants taking the compasses from their injured officers and
leading their companies on, so that the battalion reached its objective
correctly, which was more than all the troops contrived to do. The
railway which runs from Vaux Audigny to Vaille Mulatre is not by any
means a straight one, but it was of considerable assistance in keeping
direction. With the exception of making it so difficult to keep the
line, the fog was an advantage to the British advance, because parties
of the enemy were come upon unseen and in one or two cases machine
guns were outflanked unobserved. Both the leading companies reached
their objective about 7.30 a.m. Lieut. Stainforth, who commanded C,
found that his flank was exposed, so he at once established a post and
pressed into the service of the defence certain stragglers of the 1st
Division. He remained here himself for some hours and until a battalion
of Cameron Highlanders arrived. Nothing could be found of the 11th
Essex which should have been on the Buffs’ right. They had utterly lost
their way in the fog, though it was afterwards discovered that the men
had resorted to the expedient of attempting to advance arm in arm. Our
artillery barrage was excellent and the enemy’s shelling somewhat light
after leaving the railway station. The hostile machine guns were very
active throughout the fight. At 11.45 a report came that the enemy had
a division in reserve for a counter-attack and preparations were made
to meet it, but nothing materialized; headquarters moved forward, and
the battalion set to work to consolidate. The casualties, considering
the nature of the operation, were slight, though four officers were
killed and one wounded, five of the men killed and thirty-one were
wounded.
On the 19th October battalion headquarters moved back to Vaux Audigny,
and next day the whole battalion was billeted there, and the battle
surplus, as small bodies kept back from action to reinforce in case
of heavy casualties were called, as well as a draft of eighty-eight
men, was sent up. On the 21st the complete unit marched to St Souplet
and was billeted in that village. Two days later the 71st Brigade was
in action again and the Buffs moved up to its support, starting at
very short notice. They bivouacked round Baziel, and on the 25th took
over the line in Bois L’Eveque from the K.S.L.I.; there were three men
killed and fifteen wounded on this date.
[Illustration:
_Imperial War Museum_ _Crown Copyright_
CAMBRAI ON THE MORNING THE ENEMY WAS DRIVEN OUT]
On the 26th the list of Military Medals awarded for gallant conduct
at the Battle of St Quentin on the 18th was issued, and no less
than twenty came to the Buffs, namely: C.S.M. Bones; Sgts. Carr and
Jenkins; Corpl. Millen; L.-Corpls. Cain, Child, Ellis, Hobbs, Hook
and Hutchison; Ptes. Blackford, Brown, Carpenter, Colley, Ericksen,
Stapley, Walters, Whiddett, Wicken and Wright. On this day battalion
headquarters went to Pommereuil.
The 30th of October was the last day of actual fighting that fell to
the lot of the 1st Battalion, and its long record, which as far as
the Great War is concerned began four years before, closed well and
gloriously, for what is termed a minor enterprise was on that date
carried out under the command of a subaltern officer, an enterprise
which in the old days would have made a field officer’s name for
the rest of his service: orders had been received for the relief of
the division, and in order to hand over to the relieving troops a
satisfactory position for continuing the forward movement on the line
of the canal, it was determined to capture on the 30th an important
farm and spur which overlooked the waterway. The business was entrusted
to Lieut. L. W. Barber, M.B.E., of the Buffs, who had at his disposal
B and C Companies and, later on, a platoon of D, also a section of the
Machine Gun Battalion and two light trench mortars. Zero was at six, at
which hour a creeping barrage opened, heavy artillery bombarding the
railway. The attack was made on a platoon frontage, with other platoons
on either flank to protect the advance. The attempt on the farm was
at first frustrated by our own barrage falling too short and causing
casualties in the leading platoon. When it lifted, another was brought
up, but at first could not get in by reason of the hostile machine
guns, and it was not till 10 o’clock that the farm and another behind
it was taken. Meanwhile a separate small body, which had advanced on
the high ground, had also attained its object and had captured some
machine guns, our barrage here being correct. The enemy now heavily
bombarded the farm with medium and light trench mortars and with field
artillery, after which a counter-attack was the cause of the withdrawal
of Barber’s men, but two sections of Lewis gunners and some riflemen
succeeded in preventing the enemy from advancing beyond the buildings.
The last reserves were now brought up and the line reorganized and
reinforced by a platoon of D Company. Under a well-directed bombardment
by our light trench mortars the farm was again attacked and captured
at the point of the bayonet. Two heavy and three light machine guns
were taken and heavy casualties inflicted, and by evening the village
of Happegarbes was practically cleared. Casualties: 2nd Lieuts. Hart,
Herrmann and Simpson and twenty-seven men wounded, eight killed
and four missing. And so the last fight of the 1st Battalion ended
in congratulations, the divisional commander expressing his great
appreciation.
The first few days of November were spent at Fresnoy le Grand and
at Bohain, to which small town the move was made on the 5th. This
early period of the month was brightened by no less than three little
batches of honours awarded, and joy, of course, culminated on the 11th
November, when the officers dined together to celebrate the occasion,
and four days afterwards the battalion commenced its march into Germany.
For their work at St Quentin the following were awarded bars to their
M.M.: Sgts. Goodall, Holloway, Stuart and Swaine; Corpl. Dockerill;
L.-Corpl. Rainsbury and Pte. Wright. The M.M. was awarded to Sgts.
Harris, Lawrence, Morey and Waby; L.-Sgt. Caley; Corpl. Pragnell;
L.-Corpls. Kibble and Elsey and Pte. Shackcloth. For Barber’s fight on
the 30th the M.M. was given to Corpls. Cotton and Oliver and L.-Corpl.
Todman.
The oldest unit of the Buffs was thus the only one to represent the
regiment in the enemy’s country. It had been the first to take part
in the war, though, of course, the battalion, so far as individual
members were concerned, was an entirely different one to that of 1914.
However, the unit was the same one that had fought in Flanders over
three hundred years before, and, being the oldest representative of
the Buffs, it was perhaps fitting that it should have the honour.
Therefore Lieut. Milles was despatched to England to fetch the Colours.
These have not been carried in war since the Zulu campaign of 1879,
as the tactical use of such flags is obsolete; but the Colours were
to be planted on German soil, all the same, so Milles went off on his
mission. It is not necessary here to describe the march, which was
a long one: first of all, the army destined for the Rhine had to be
collected and reorganized into brigade groups with divisional troops;
there were long halts upon the way until the 2nd December, owing
chiefly to the difficulty of feeding the leading troops, because the
railways had been destroyed and, as far as the frontier, roads had been
cratered and bridges blown up.
This crossing of the frontier was made an impressive function by the
Buffs. Colours were uncased, as afterwards they always were on entering
a town, drums were beating, bayonets fixed and the men were beautifully
groomed and turned out--equipment polished, the harness and saddlery
of the mounted men shining, pomp and circumstance of glorious war once
more in evidence. Once across the frontier, the roads were excellent
and delay only caused by the necessity of closing up now and again, as
there was only one road to each division.
It seems a pity that Christmas Day could not be adequately kept by
the Buffs in 1918, but the wherewithal, in the way of extra provisions
and so on, failed to arrive from England in time. However, perhaps
the general joy and triumph which reigned in every heart, even if
the extraordinary reserve of Englishmen failed to show or advertise
the same, compensated for the lack of extra cheer. It was a notable
Christmas, in any case, and could be nothing else. On the 30th December
the battalion was quartered in the little village of Vettweiss,
strength 43 officers, 786 other ranks, and demobilization soon
commenced. During the march into Germany notification of the following
honours was received: M.C. for Captains Barber, M.B.E., Johnston and
Stainforth; Lieuts. Milles and Piper; 2nd Lieuts. Chater and Hendin,
and a bar to the same for Captain G. F. Hamilton; the D.C.M. for C.S.M.
Poole, Sgt. France, M.M., L.-Sgt. Souster and L.-Corpl. J. Smith, M.M.
(since killed in action); and the M.M. to L.-Sgt. Waby.