WITH MAUDE IN MESOPOTAMIA
I. THE POSITION IN 1916
The summer of the year 1916 was more or less an uneventful one for
the Mesopotamia Force. The situation is very plainly set forth in the
despatches of Sir Percy Lake, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. He
says: “No operations on a large scale have been undertaken since the
fall of Kut. On the Tigris line the troops immediately facing the enemy
were, with the exception of those actually on duty in the trenches,
resting and recuperating and, at the same time, consolidating their
position. Fatigues were very heavy, the heat of the summer came on
rapidly and a good deal of sickness prevailed.”
A Russian advance from Persia began to make itself felt on the Turks,
however, and on the 20th May the right bank of the Tigris as far as the
Hai, with the exception of bridge guards on the latter water, was clear
of the enemy. This, and the fact that the Turks still held the Sanna i
Yat lines on the other side of the Tigris, materially influenced the
plan of campaign which came later.
As far as the Buffs were concerned their summer work consisted mostly
in harvesting barley early in the hot weather, and in road making.
There was also a great deal of work in connection with the necessary
supply of water. The battalion was between four and five miles from
the river--the only supply, and consequently water had to be carried,
Indian fashion, on mules in “packals,” which held about eight gallons
each. These, made of zinc and covered with felt, soon got knocked
about and, as they began to leak, much water was lost in transit.
The so-called friendly Arabs were consistent and determined thieves,
and if the water-carrying mules had been left under the sole care of
their Indian drivers, they would soon have disappeared. Consequently
water convoy work became a very heavy and regular duty amongst the
many others our soldiers had to perform. The local Arabs were very
enterprising marauders and gave considerable trouble sneaking about the
camp. On one occasion some of them actually entered the orderly room
tent, but they found nothing which they considered worthy of removal.
Sir Stanley Maude took over supreme command on the 28th August, 1916,
a time of the year when active operations might soon be possible and
when the improvement in communications, inaugurated by Sir Percy Lake,
had begun to bear fruit. When early in the year every man’s mind was
eagerly bent on the relief of Kut he could, as soldiers in former
campaigns always had to, digest his bully beef and biscuit somehow and
sustain life on it; moreover, when sick, he contrived to do without
luxuries and to bear discomforts. But now all this was rapidly changing
for the better, and with improved communications came greatly superior
comfort. The Turks seemed very full of enterprise and to be planning
various ambitious campaigns, and Maude very rightly considered that the
best way to stop all that sort of thing was to aim at the heart of the
beast and to make Baghdad the object of resolute and determined attack.
First of all, however, there was still a good deal to do in the way of
preparation, and August was too early a date, in any case, for active
work. The men were, of course, still suffering from heat and were not
by any means fit for a strenuous campaign. Then the communications
still wanted perfecting, and large reserves of ammunition and stores
of all kinds must be brought up to the fighting area. “By the end of
November,” he says, “preliminary arrangements were well advanced, a
steady stream of reinforcements had been moving up stream and drafts
joining. The health of the soldiers was improving and the training
for war was advancing.” The general concentration was at Sheikh Saad.
The River Tigris was by no means a straight line, but still it flowed
from Baghdad to Sheikh Saad, and, in order to defend himself against
an advance up it, it is plain that the Turk should continue to hold
positions astride the river; for these positions could be selected to
rest with their flanks on marshes so that they could not be turned, and
so would necessitate one frontal attack after another.
II. BATTLE OF KUT, 1917
As has already been seen, however, the enemy had withdrawn the bulk
of his troops from the main river’s right bank, though as a matter
of fact he held a strong line of trenches across the Hai covering a
bridge over that water just south of Kut and bending back to the Tigris
at each end. His main line, however, was along the left bank of that
river, his right flank, of course, being almost in the direction of
Baghdad, while his left was thrown back along the Sanna i Yat lines,
which he still held strongly. Seeing this, Maude determined to attack
him up stream and so make him bolt back to his only road to his base
or else cut him off from Baghdad altogether. One party of ours, under
Lt.-General Cobbe, V.C., faced the Sanna i Yat lines on the left bank
of the Tigris, and another, under Lt.-General Marshall, in which were
serving the Buffs, were as much as eleven miles up stream of them and
on the other side of the river. The first thing to do was to seize the
Hai stream, and this was done by Marshall by surprise on the night
of the 13th/14th December, 1916, while Cobbe demonstrated in front of
the Sanna i Yat lines as if about to attack furiously. After getting
possession of the Hai, which he crossed at Bessouia and Atab, Marshall
extended towards the north and at the same time wheeled up the bulk of
his command to attack the bridgehead. He broke through on the night of
the 18th opposite Kut and reached the main river, thus securing command
of the Tigris up stream of the Khadaira Bend. This was important
because, after he advanced, his food and stores had to go up by land
for some miles.
In connection with all this manœuvring the Buffs had on the 13th
December struck their camp and marched out to reserve trenches, in
support of the movement of that date, and had followed up and formed a
backing to the troops in advance. At 7 a.m. on the 16th the battalion
appeared to be going into a serious action and B Company was sent
out to take a certain ridge in front, with C in support. Everything
appeared to be working satisfactorily, but at 12.30 orders came for
withdrawal to another position, where the men dug in as far as possible
and connection was obtained with the 13th Division on the left of the
Buffs. B Company had three men wounded in this advance and D had one
during the retirement to the new position. On the 17th a concentration
on Bessouia was ordered and carried out, and the next day a
demonstration was made without much result, Captain Harrison receiving
a shrapnel wound and the little expedition returning to Bessouia in the
evening.
In connection with Maude’s plan of getting up stream of his enemy,
Major-General Crocker with his command attempted on the 20th to throw a
bridge over the Tigris at the Shumran Bend and the 35th Brigade marched
up to that place to assist, the Buffs being in reserve; but somehow the
enemy had got wind of this attempt, the enterprise proved a failure
and the men returned to their old bivouac. The remainder of the old
year and up to the 10th January was spent working west of the Hai and
exercising in drill and musketry in the neighbourhood of Bessouia, the
work being interrupted only on the 9th, when the cavalry attempted a
raid supported by the Buffs; but the horsemen lost their way in a dense
fog and the force returned to camp early, having effected nothing, on
account of the weather.
During these early days of January, Cobbe’s party, which, in addition
to demonstrating in front of the Sanna i Yat lines, had the task of
manning the right bank of the Tigris up to the point where Marshall was
working, got orders to clear the Khadaira Bend, which occasioned some
heavy fighting by the 3rd Indian Division and necessitated a diversion
on the Hai bridgehead by Marshall and his men; so on the 11th of the
month the Buffs went into the trenches and had four men killed and
as many wounded on the first day. The clearing of the bend by Cobbe
proceeded satisfactorily after this and by the 18th all was ready for
the final assault, which was arranged for the following day. When dawn
broke, however, it was found that during the night the whole of the
Turks who had occupied this portion of their defences had cleared out
and crossed the Tigris.
The next job the British forces had to take in hand was to reduce
the very extensive trench system that the enemy still held across
the Hai stream in the immediate vicinity of Kut. This was a slow and
somewhat tedious business, but by the 24th January, after steady and
persistent pushing, our troops got to within four hundred yards of the
enemy, and an assault was arranged for the following day. This slow
approach consisted of a series of small advances at various points
and subsequent consolidation of what was gained. Thus a new line
was occupied by the Buffs on the 12th, and the next day, while this
was made strong, 2nd Lieut. Hook made a reconnaissance to the front,
which resulted in establishing an advanced post, which was occupied
by a platoon under 2nd Lieut. Filmer. On the 15th two endeavours were
made by 2nd Lieut. Angus to reach another point, but without success.
Captain V. Arnold was killed on this date.
A still more important little action of the same nature took place on
the 16th: a party of about sixty of all ranks went out from the trench
in the morning and attempted the occupation of a point about 450 yards
in advance of the line. This enterprise was successfully accomplished
and, in the words of Sir Stanley Maude, “with great gallantry,” but
with severe loss considering the number engaged, and it was hard that,
after the sacrifice made, the party was by superior authority ordered
back again after dark. Lieut. Jeffreys and four men were killed, and
Lieut. MacFadyen, 2nd Lieut. Gibson and twenty-seven men wounded--more
than fifty per cent of the two platoons becoming casualties.
On the 18th another advanced point was reached by 2nd Lieut. Tustin
and his platoon, and this time the place was consolidated and a
communication trench dug. Later in the day the battalion was relieved
from the trenches, but it was back again in four days’ time, suffering
the loss of three men killed on the 22nd and Captain Usher, 2nd Lieut.
Western and nine men wounded on the 24th. On the next day an attack was
made in conjunction with the 3rd Indian and 13th British Divisions,
with a view to clearing up the corner of the east bank of the Hai.
This operation, however, was not successful and the Buffs lost some
casualties to no great purpose, one officer and eighty other ranks
being wounded in the business. The next day, however, the 36th Brigade
attacked with great success and the 35th was able to come into line:
Lieut. Sergeant and four men of the Buffs being wounded. The first
blow of a hammer will often not drive in a nail, but it prepares the
way for a successful second or third blow. The next two or three days
were spent in consolidating and improving the new line.
The 31st of the month brought a fresh attack, and the brigade was
progressing with its work when orders came that it was to move
no further till the 37th Brigade came up on its left. This move,
however, never materialized and, in consequence, the advance came to a
standstill. Two men were killed and eleven wounded on the 1st February,
but 2nd Lieut. Tustin and a party of bombers established themselves
in a forward position. A further attack was prepared and was to be
executed on the 2nd, but the dense fog, rendering all work impossible,
made postponement necessary on the part of the 35th Brigade. The Turk
was making fairly resolute counter-attacks, but they were broken by our
artillery or met resolutely by our advanced troops.
On the 3rd the Devons and Ghurkas carried the enemy’s first and second
lines, and in the evening there were signs that he contemplated
withdrawal. In fact, it seemed a little later as if this retreat had
actually taken place, for everything was very quiet, so much so that
things looked like a withdrawal, partial at any rate, from the other
bank as well; and the Buffs, Ghurkas and Dogras all sent forward strong
patrols, while the whole brigade stood ready to move forward at a
moment’s notice. On the 4th February the whole of the left bank of Hai
had passed into our hands and the enemy was found to have fallen back
to the Liquorice Factory and a line east and west across the Dahra
Bend. On this day the Buffs took up a line of picquets facing the enemy
in the bend, being relieved at nightfall.
It was not Maude’s intention to let any of the enemy remain on the
south side of the Tigris, in case such could resist his contemplated
march on Baghdad by saving the communications with that city, and so
enabling the Turkish army to keep the field. Obviously, therefore, the
next task was to clear the Dahra Bend and drive its occupants across
the main river. With this object in view, the King’s Own Regiment
effected a lodgment in the centre of the enemy’s line on the 9th
February, and the same day the Worcestershire, capturing some advanced
posts, established a line 2,500 yards or so south of the river at
the southern end of the Shumran Bend, and on the 10th our infantry,
lying west of the Liquorice Factory, after being attacked all night by
bombing parties, began early to assail the Turkish position. In this
connection the Buffs moved from their line against that of the enemy
with the 2/4th Ghurkas on their right. The move was successful because
the Turks would not abide the issue but vacated their trenches, and,
after occupying them, the Buffs pushed forward patrols and bombing
parties who, on the 11th, in pouring rain, took up a line well forward,
from whence a communication trench was started towards the north.
Four men were killed during these two days, and 2nd Lieuts. Tustin
and Sergeant and fourteen men were wounded. On the 12th there was
severe fighting over the job of driving in the enemy’s picquets and
covering troops, and the 102nd Grenadiers of the 35th Brigade greatly
distinguished themselves by gallantly capturing a redoubt and holding
it against all counter-attacks.
[Illustration: THE RECAPTURE OF KUT-EL-AMARA
On the right a company of the Buffs is seen advancing on the
Turkish position, which rests on the right bank of the river,
roughly indicated by the bursting shrapnel. Kut, with its tall
minaret, is seen in the dark palm-grove across the river. Beyond
are the Pushtikuh Hills and the snow-capped Persian mountains.
The tall yellow column (centre) is spray from lyddite bursting in
the river.
_From a sketch made from the parapet in foreground by Herbert
Alexander, A.R.W.S._]
But the principal day of battle in the Dahra Bend was the 15th
February, and it was the date of a complete and glorious success. Quite
early the Loyal North Lancashires carried a strong point opposite our
left; then the South Wales Borderers and Welch Fusiliers captured the
enemy’s right centre, taking many prisoners; and later, about 1.30
p.m., the Buffs and the Dogras, of their brigade, took up the work. On
the occasion of occupying the forward position referred to above,
A Company of the Buffs had been detached a little distance from the
rest of the battalion and on the morning of the 15th patrols, sent
out from this company, reported that the enemy’s line in front was
strongly held. Nevertheless when the hour came, the remaining three
companies, with the good and faithful Dogras, rushed forward and
nothing could stay their onslaught. It was most successful and together
they reached the river line, isolating the Turkish extreme left and
taking one thousand prisoners, of which six hundred, together with
five machine guns, surrendered to the Buffs. Tactically this success
was of the greatest importance, for the Dahra Bend was cleared and
nothing was left but to cross and try conclusions on the left bank of
the Tigris. Our casualties were twelve men killed and 2nd Lieut. Brooke
and sixty-seven men wounded. As Sir Stanley Maude pointed out in his
despatches: “To eject the enemy from his horse-shoe bend, bristling
with trenches, and commanded from across the river on three sides by
hostile batteries and machine guns, called for offensive qualities of a
high standard on the part of the troops.” To take the army across the
river it would be necessary to keep the Turk fully occupied at Sanna i
Yat and all along the bank from there to Kut, while preparations were
made to pass the great obstacle as far to the westward as possible; so
orders were issued to Lt.-General Cobbe to attack the lines at Sanna i
Yat on the 17th.
An abnormally heavy rain fell on the 16th which flooded everything.
The river rose--the trenches in the picquet line along the river
bank, which were the temporary home of the Buffs, were swamped--the
country was half under water and it was impossible to clean up the
battlefield. Our battalion being relieved from picquet on the 18th
returned to camp at a place called Kala Haji Fahan and remained there
till the 22nd, all this time being utilized by Marshall and his men in
methodical preparations for the great crossing which was to be about
the Shumran Bend whilst Cobbe, fifteen miles away, was assaulting the
lines, in front of which he had been so long, and inducing the enemy to
believe that there was the point of danger. On the 17th he gained some
trenches, but had to withdraw, only to attack again on the 22nd, on
which date the two first trenches were taken and made secure.
Meanwhile Marshall made several feints as if to cross the stream,
particularly one opposite Kut, but the real point selected was the
south end of the Shumran Bend and there three ferries were arranged,
while the bridge was being made. The first ferry trip was a success,
but subsequent journeys were pretty strongly opposed; nevertheless by
3 p.m. on the 22nd February three battalions were established across
the river about a mile north of the site selected for the bridge, and
at 4.30 the work was ready for use. The enemy had tried more than one
counter-attack which failed, on account of the quickness and accuracy
of our artillery. The Buffs crossed about 7 p.m. on the 23rd and
bivouacked three hundred yards or so from the bank.
The enemy on the 24th made a very good fight to retain possession of,
at any rate, some portion of the Shumran peninsula, in the northern
corners of which exist quite a network of nullahs which, giving good
cover and excellent concealment for machine guns, were utilized to
their fullest extent. It took four or five hours to clear the peninsula
and push back the Turk, but it was done. The Buffs were in support
of the 67th Punjabis who were held up on the left. Together these
battalions at last made some progress, but were stopped some three
hundred yards in front of a nullah which was strongly held; the Gurkhas
attacked on the Buffs’ right, but were also stopped, and an attempted
flanking movement was of no avail. However, about 9 p.m. patrols which
had gone out as soon as it was dark reported that the enemy had
evacuated the place and the nullah was at once occupied. The Buffs’
casualties on this day were twelve men killed and Lieut. Howell and
thirty-four wounded. Meanwhile cavalry, artillery and another division
crossed the river, and Cobbe finished his task by capturing Sanna i Yat
and clearing the bank of the main stream as far as Kut.
III. PURSUIT TO BAGHDAD
On the evening of the 24th February there were clear indications that
the enemy was in full retreat and that Marshall had been fighting a
strong and well-posted rear guard. The next few days were strenuous
and energetic ones, but they were triumphant to an extraordinary
degree. Since March, 1915, the Turkish enemy in Mesopotamia had proved
a stubborn and a dogged foe. Till now he had never been badly beaten
and he had scored, to his credit, the capture of a British Field
Force at Kut. At last, however, he was on the run; and Baghdad, after
Constantinople, the principal city of his empire, as well as the main
centre of his Asiatic operations, had lost its defensive positions--so
patiently perfected and prepared, and now lay open to the advance of
the British army. But for hundreds of years there have been few better
fighting men than the Turkish soldier, and even now he proved ready to
see the thing out to a finish. He took up a strong position in some
nullahs eight miles from Shumran, and it took us severe fighting on
the 25th, in which, however, the Buffs did not take part, to gain a
footing in his line; but after that his retreat was rapid. On the 26th
one column followed the river while another, in which our battalion
was, made a forced march over the arid plain of from eighteen to twenty
miles to intercept him while the naval flotilla pushed up stream; the
Turkish vessels struggling to escape, by no means wholly with success.
All movements to intercept the retreat were too late, however: the
enemy had gone, leaving guns and all sorts of impedimenta behind him;
and he streamed through Aziziya in confusion, shelled by gunboats and
harassed by cavalry. Our pursuit was almost too rapid, the reason being
that there was at one time hope of huge captures of fugitives. These,
however, proved too quick for us, and about the 1st March it was found
necessary to halt at Aziziya because the Field Force had outstripped
their supplies. On that day the Buffs had no rations and had to obtain
leave to consume the emergency one which everybody carries, but which
is never opened except by high permission and in extreme cases.
On the 2nd March the regiment obtained some Turkish flour and a few
sheep, late in the evening, but the first supply ship arrived late that
night. Cobbe and his force had been following in Marshall’s footsteps
and found on their way immense quantities of rifles, vehicles, stores,
equipment and so on, which the enemy had abandoned in his flight.
On the 5th March, things being now a little more in order, Marshall
marched to Zeur and the Buffs marched with him, in a terrible dust
storm and over a network of nullahs. On the 6th, the dust still
continuing, a position was found to have been carefully prepared by
the enemy at Ctesiphon, but it was unoccupied and the men pushed on
to Bustan: a terrible day’s march, particularly when the weather was
taken into consideration; but fatigue and exhaustion were treated with
the light-hearted contempt of triumphant conquerors, who knew that the
object striven for so long was now within their grasp.
[Illustration:
_Imperial War Museum_ _Crown Copyright_
ARCH AT CTESIPHON]
On the 8th March our advance guard came in contact with the enemy on
Dialah river, eight miles below Baghdad, where the country was as
flat and afforded as little cover as a billiard table. At first it
was thought that the river bank had been abandoned, but the first
pontoon that was launched was riddled with bullets from rifle and
machine guns, and it was found that the crossing must be made with
skill and care. A small party ferried across the Tigris to bring the
Turks under enfilade fire, and a lodgment was made on the far bank
of the Dialah by about seventy men of the Loyal North Lancashires,
who formed a post there and held it alone for twenty-two hours, when
they were followed up, after the river had been bridged. It was now
ascertained that on the other bank of the Tigris the enemy had taken up
a position at a place called Shawa Khan to cover Baghdad from the south
and south-west; so, on the 8th March, a bridge was made near Bawi and a
portion of Cobbe’s force (the 7th Indian Division) crossed to drive him
away from it. Prior to the building of the bridge, however, and on the
night of the 7th/8th March, the 35th Brigade, which had marched to Bawi
and reached that place about noon, crossed the river by river-boat and
barges. This proved a very difficult job as a landing-place could only
be found a mile down-stream; the barges were very difficult to load,
and the first-line transport carts had to be left behind to follow on
the first opportunity. After getting across in two trips the brigade
marched for the remainder of the night, with frequent and tiresome
halts, for it was necessary to ramp the banks of the various nullahs
which crossed the path. At length, on the 8th, however, more open
ground was reached and the troops deployed and proceeded in two lines
of platoons, the Dogras with their right on the Tigris directing the
movement; then came the Buffs, with the Ghurkas in reserve. The march
was kept up till 2 p.m., when a high-walled and extensive garden was
reached and utilized for bivouacs.
At 11 a.m. next day the journey was continued in company with the 7th
Division, which had also crossed the Tigris, and at noon our brigade
was directed to fit in between this division and the river and advance
with it and under the command of its general, the Buffs, nearest the
stream, to act as directing unit; and the battalion commander directed
A Company to hug the river and direct the whole movement. The enemy
was found and he was strongly enough entrenched, but his resistance
was somewhat feeble. His left was driven back and an attempted
counter-attack defeated by A Company. The Turks vacated their position
after dark and it was occupied by our patrols. Lieuts. Johnson and
Holyman and four men were killed and thirty-nine men wounded on this
day.
On the 10th March patrols, pushing forward, gained touch with the Turks
once more, about a mile and a half further back than their original
position. They were apparently in force, and so heavily shelled the
28th Brigade on the left of the 35th that it had to withdraw. The
patrols of the latter brigade also met with strong opposition. Orders
were issued for the Buffs to attack in the middle of the night, but
these were cancelled, as the enemy was found to have vacated his
position.
There was a good deal of jealous anxiety in the Mesopotamian Army at
this time as to which unit was to first enter the city of Baghdad, and
it seemed now that the honour must fall to some portion of Cobbe’s
force on the right bank of the Tigris. It will be remembered that the
35th Brigade, of which the Buffs was the British or white unit, was
only temporarily attached to the 7th Division of Cobbe’s Force. The
divisional general on the morning of the 10th sent round a circular
note to his units directing that the 7th Division should make sure that
they should be first into the city. By some error on the part of the
messenger (presumably) this note was also taken round to the Buffs, and
Colonel Body promptly reminded his men that they, by their position
closest to the river, were actually the nearest soldiers to Baghdad.
During the coming night the brigadier, being really much fatigued after
a strenuous day or two, was urged to take his rest, and the Buffs,
with their Indian comrades, pushing out patrols and following them
up, somehow by daylight found themselves a couple of miles further up
stream at the bend of the river opposite Garabah Island and only three
miles from the city.
That day, the 11th March, the brigade advanced to the Iron Bridge in
two lines of platoons in fours, the Buffs on the right, the 102nd
Grenadiers on the left, with the 2/4th Ghurkas and 37th Dogras in rear.
They met with no opposition, but just as the bridge was approached the
21st Brigade of the 7th Division appeared, coming up rapidly from the
westward with a view to entering the place. Now “Let all things be done
decently and in order,” as St. Paul says, and the whole party or whole
of the parties were halted at the site of the Iron Bridge at 8.35 a.m.
Then the welcome order came that the 35th Brigade was to enter the city
first, the Buffs to lead the column. The crossing was no easy matter
and was carried out by means of _goofahs_, which each contained
about twenty men. The Turkish flag was hauled down from the citadel and
the Union Jack[17] hoisted in its place by Captain G. K. Harrison of
the Buffs at 9.40 a.m.
The city of Baghdad was found to be in a most extraordinary state, and
fires were bursting out everywhere. There are no more determined and
persistent looters in the world than Arabs, and these and the Kurds
had seized the opportunity of their lives with avidity. The Turk for
the moment was too busy to protect his property, and until the English
entered the city anarchy prevailed and the thieves were in paradise,
and so it came about that our reception approached the cordial by the
regular inhabitants. Guards, prepared beforehand, were quickly mounted
and a few looters shot. The flotilla anchored opposite the British
residency. The Buffs marched through the city and bivouacked in the
compound opposite the American consulate and things soon began to quiet
down generally.
An immense amount of booty was found in Baghdad, though the enemy had
been removing stores and so on for over a fortnight; still many guns,
machine guns, rifles, ammunition, machinery and other things were left
behind, and in the arsenal were found Townsend’s guns which had been
taken at Kut, after having been rendered useless before the surrender.
The hoisting of the flag on the citadel would seem a natural point at
which to leave for a while the history of the 5th Battalion and turn
our attention to the doings of others, but Sir Stanley Maude ends his
despatch on the campaign, which included the fall of the great Turkish
city, three weeks later, on the 31st March, and, though the Buffs had
no very stirring adventures during this period, it may be as well to
finish the record for the present at the end of the month.
A junction with our Russian allies, who appeared to be advancing
from the direction of Persia, caused Maude to stretch out a hand, so
to speak, in that direction: that is, up the River Dialah. Another
matter that required arranging was that the Tigris is protected from
overflowing by means of banks (or “bunds,” as they are called), and
if the enemy cut these up stream of the city disastrous floods would
result. Another river, the Shatt el Adhaim, flows into the Tigris above
Baghdad and runs roughly parallel to the Dialah, which enters the
Tigris below the city, and on this river the enemy made attempts at a
stand. Altogether during March there was fighting on these rivers and
some gallant work was done, notably by the Manchesters on the 25th.
Taking it all round, however, further opposition on the enemy’s part
was but feeble. The most notable event of this period was perhaps
the occupation of Feluja on the Euphrates river on the 19th March,
giving the English, as it did, the control of both the great rivers of
Mesopotamia. The Buffs spent most of the latter end of March in camp
at Hinaidi, just south of Baghdad, and in the careful preparation and
excavations for a permanent camp to be occupied during the rapidly
approaching hot season.
[Illustration: VICINITY OF KUT]