THE TURKISH ENEMY
I. ADEN
Since the 29th October, 1914, England had been at war with Turkey. Now
both our own country and the Ottoman Empire were much interested in
the East, and both had, of course, very extended Eastern possessions;
consequently, we were always knocking up against the Turk, and in many
parts of the world, such as the Gallipoli Peninsula, Egypt, Palestine,
Mesopotamia and Arabia.
It was on the 2nd July, 1915, that, as it was discovered that the
Turks had had the audacity to enter the Aden Protectorate, permission
was obtained from the Indian Government (Aden being officially a part
of India) to send out from the town a mobile column, with the result
that a very small one, but the best the little garrison could do,
proceeded on the 3rd to Shekh Othman, which is a point from which the
isthmus which connects the town with the mainland, and which is only
about a mile across, can best be defended against aggression from the
land side. The sea power of our country was, of course, sufficient to
prevent any hostile attempt from the water.
A Turkish advance into the Protectorate by about 900 men, nearly half
of them Arabs, with 8 guns, was confirmed; but it was found that our
own force, consisting as it did of only a little over 1,000 men, 10
guns and 10 maxims, was far too small to attempt operations in the
hilly country, and it was compelled to remain on the defensive and
hope for a chance of catching the enemy in the act of debouching from
the mountains. Another and very excellent reason for remaining quiet
was that our native transport men were deserting in crowds. It was
all very well for the canny Aden native to draw English pay in peace
time as a transport servant, but he was not going to be shot at. On
the 8th July, in fact, the mobile force had to withdraw into Aden and
ask for reinforcements. The heat was tremendous; the roads mere sand
tracks--quite unfit for mechanical transport, and along which it was
reckoned that eight camels would be required to drag one gun.
There are a few brackish wells at Shekh Othman and good water for one
brigade, but this supply was cut off by the enemy on the 10th July, and
condensed water was all that was obtainable. On this day it was found
that the Turks were being reinforced, and General Younghusband with his
brigade was ordered to Aden from Egypt, with directions to take Lahej.
It was, however, later taken into consideration that Aden itself was
safe enough, because, as we had the mastery of the sea, the enemy
could only attack it along a narrow isthmus commanded on both sides
by the fire of the ships; and therefore it came to pass that in this
region active service for a long period degenerated into two forces
remaining more or less passively facing each other: the English at
Aden, and their enemies at Lahej. But Shekh Osman was reoccupied on the
21st July. The English infantry consisted only of the Brecknockshire
Battalion of the South Wales Borderers.
Aden is not a white man’s garrison, and in normal times a British
battalion only remains there one year on its completion of an Indian
tour and on its way home to England. The summer proved extremely trying
to the Brecknockshires, and they suffered so much from sickness that
they eventually had to be relieved from India by the 4th Battalion of
The Buffs, which sailed on the _Varsova_ on the 26th.
The battalion disembarked at Aden on the 4th August, 1915. By the 18th
the Turkish force at Lahej was reckoned at 2,500 Turks, 1,500 Arabs and
20 guns, and it was supposed that only the absence of water between
them and Shekh Othman prevented their advance.
On the 28th a reconnoitring force of ours reported that 2,000 Turks
with 14 guns were at Waht. They assumed the offensive when approached
and our party fell back on Shekh Othman with 20 wounded, and after
this a passive defence of that place, covering Aden, was resolved on;
General Younghusband and his men, therefore, returned to Egypt and the
command devolved on Br.-General Price.
On the 25th September a column went out on a reconnoitring expedition
and entered Waht after slight opposition. There was one Buff casualty,
No. 2073 Pte. L. H. Fuller, being the first of the battalion to be
slain in the great cause of England. The roads by this time were
improved, but the heat was indescribable and proved a more serious
enemy than the Turk. No less than fourteen men died of sunstroke,
including Sgt. Brazier and Ptes. Bromley, Brown, De la Mare, Dyer,
Martin and Steadman of the Buffs.
On the 26th November 80 men of the regiment were reported unfit for
further service at Aden, and reference to sick reports shows that on
the 1st of that month there were no less than 93 of the battalion in
hospital and 121 attending daily. The determination not to attack the
enemy and his disinclination to come on resulted in comparative peace
till the end of the year.
On the 8th January, 1916, however, the Turks appeared to be
contemplating a movement against the Fadli country, and it was
considered that British prestige seemed likely to suffer from our
inaction. It was reckoned that about 700 of the enemy with 4 guns
were at Subar, 1,000 with 8 guns at Waht and a small body at Lahej;
so another reconnoitring column was arranged and sent out from Shekh
Othman to threaten the enemy’s line Waht-Subar. The men carried two
days’ supplies of all sorts, and were afterwards to be rationed from
Shekh Othman. Our force took up a position at 5.30 a.m. and a covering
line advanced, but hostile artillery opened upon it from the Subar
direction, and at 10.30 compelled a rearward movement, and the party
was finally withdrawn at 2.30 a.m. Later, the Turks themselves advanced
about 1,000 strong with 2 machine guns, but this advance on their
part was checked at about 500 yards from our position. Attempts were
made by our small body of cavalry to take this hostile movement in
flank and rear, but the close country impeded movement and the enemy’s
artillery soon checked the horsemen. At 4.30 the Turks withdrew towards
Subar. Their artillery had been well handled and had kept up a very
persistent fire. The officer in command determined to return to Shekh
Othman, being unable to carry out the programme and recognizing the
impossibility of getting the upper hand of his enemy’s artillery. The
retirement was faultlessly carried out.
A telegram from India arrived early in February ordering the battalion
to proceed to Bareilly on relief by the 4th Duke of Cornwall’s Light
Infantry from that place. The movement was duly carried out a few days
later, and only some few men, who had been trained as gunners, remained
behind until their places could be taken by newly made acting gunners
from the new regiment. The 4th Battalion remained at Bareilly till
July, 1918, and though as a complete unit it saw no more fighting, most
of its men did so, for while at Bareilly it sent up detachments to the
North-West Frontier, and several large drafts, about five hundred men
in all, to the 5th Battalion in Mesopotamia.
[Illustration: ADEN]
II. MESOPOTAMIA
The war in Mesopotamia was quite a different one to any of the
others, and perhaps resembled the operations of Lord Wolseley on the
Nile in the early eighties more than any other in which England has
been engaged. In fact, it was a river war and, until the siege of
Kut-el-Amarah began, early in December, 1915, it had been a successful
one.
A very brief sketch of the campaign, which ended in the surrounding
of General Townsend’s force in Kut, is perhaps necessary in order
properly to understand what followed: Sir John Nixon commanded an
Anglo-Indian army in the land of Mesopotamia, which was, of course, a
Turkish province. His headquarters were at the port of Basrah on the
River Tigris, about sixty miles from the real mouth of the river. In
the spring of 1915 the forces were much scattered: one brigade being at
Ahwaz, eighty miles away on the right (to the eastward), and another
brigade was at Qurnah (or Kurna), forty miles further up the river
than Basrah. The enemy, which had been driven from Basrah because the
English wanted the place, had collected mostly about Nasiriyah, one
hundred miles away to the westward. This was a most important place
from the Turkish point of view. It is on the Euphrates river, and from
it runs a watercourse into the Tigris. It was from there that any
attempt the enemy might make to recover what he had lost must start.
About one hundred miles, as the crow flies, above Basrah and on the
same river, stands Amarah, a place which, in 1915, was in Turkish
hands; from the garrison of this town, early in 1915, had been detached
a party of six battalions and ten guns down-stream as far as Qurnah,
and this force was, of course, in contact with our brigade there.
Early in May General Gorringe, with the 12th Indian Division and a
cavalry brigade, operated about Arwaz and, crossing the Kharkeh river
with some difficulty, drove all the enemy in the eastern regions
of the province in upon the garrison of Amarah. Meanwhile General
Townsend with the 6th Indian Division advanced up the Tigris supported
by the Naval flotilla, and, pursuing the Turkish detachment before
him, entered Amarah practically unopposed, because General Gorringe’s
operations had prevented the enemy from reinforcing his garrison.
Amarah was entered on the 4th June, 1915. Immediately after the taking
of this place arrangements were made for the capture of Nasiriyah,
which was after serious opposition effected by General Gorringe on the
25th July. The defeat of Nur-ed-Din and the occupation of Kut-el-Amarah
became the next objective as soon as Nasiriyah was secured, and the
transfer of troops towards Amarah was begun the following day.
Kut is another one hundred miles higher up the Tigris than Amarah,
without counting the bends, and in the summer the river is the only
approach to it.
The British force referred to, reached Sanna-i-Yat, about eight miles
below the enemy’s Kut position, by the 15th September, and halted there
for ten days, being reinforced during that period. General Townsend
then advanced and, with the aid of the Naval forces on the stream,
drove the Turk back, who by the 5th October was at Ctesiphon, covering
Baghdad; but here the enemy received very important reinforcements and,
moreover, his position was daily being strengthened. Townsend, too, was
concentrating at Aziziyah, but he found he could not proceed till the
21st November, and on the next day his force attacked the enemy and won
the battle of Ctesiphon, though his heavy losses in killed and wounded
rendered it impossible for him to renew his progress to Baghdad. As a
matter of fact, the British Army was neither strong enough in numbers
nor equipment for the task on which it had been sent.
General Townsend at last found it absolutely necessary to withdraw, and
this was done very gradually and with much fighting; on the morning of
the 3rd December his force reached Kut-el-Amarah where it was decided
his retirement should end. The force, considerably reduced in numbers,
was now regularly besieged by the Turks, and a resolute attempt to
relieve him by an army under Lt.-General Aylmer was organized and
arranged.
This relieving force got under way in December. It consisted of the
7th Lahore Division from France, 3rd Meerut Division and the 35th
Indian Brigade, lately brought to Mesopotamia; this brigade included
the 5th Battalion of the Buffs. The job was immense, because of the
difficulties of transport. The only possible way of carrying the
impedimenta of an army and of feeding and supplying it was by means
of the River Tigris, and this stream was a most unsatisfactory one
in every way: it winds about like a cork-screw, and is provided with
endless shifting shallows; when the rains come it is a raging torrent;
and after that the whole country, which is quite flat, is covered
with impassable marshes, which connect with the river by treacherous
channels. All this, of course, meant that the rations were bad and
more or less precarious. In fact, at this period of the war, the
feeding of the troops in Mesopotamia could not be compared with the
system obtaining in France. The sick, too, suffered extremely from the
difficulties of transport as well as a reprehensible paucity of medical
officers and medical equipment. In fact, the conditions of soldiering
on the Western Front and in this cradle of the human race were as
different as they well could be. In France nothing that could alleviate
the sufferings of the sick and wounded was left undone, whereas under
the Indian Government the contrary was the case, and it was only after
many lives had been needlessly sacrificed that adequate arrangements
were made.
Townsend’s cavalry had left him on the 6th December, and retired
down the Tigris till it reached Ali-el-Gharbi, at which spot it was
reinforced by infantry and guns from Basrah.
The siege of Kut was full of incident and the defence was a very fine
one, starvation being the only enemy that could not be defied, but it
is only with the attempted relief of the place that the Buffs were
concerned.
General Aylmer’s leading troops, under Major-General Younghusband, who
had moved up from Basrah by river steamers with open barges lashed on
either side, started from the Ali-el-Gharbi on the 4th January, 1916,
and moved up the river, using both banks and marching on Sheikh Saad.
The Buffs were on the left bank and furthest from the stream. All
surplus stores were carried by water. The length of the first day’s
march was about eight miles, the weather being very wet and the nights
cold.
The second day took the force another journey up the course of the
Tigris in the same formation. There was a considerable amount of
sniping when night fell. Indeed, it was obvious from this and other
signs that there was a strong force in front.
On the next day (6th January) the march was resumed and the outposts of
the enemy were reached. The firing commenced about noon and lasted till
4.30 p.m., but our casualties were inconsiderable; 2nd Lieut. Holyman
and three men being wounded. There was very heavy sniping that night.
The next day was fought the action of Sheikh Saad. Our force began to
advance and came under fire almost at once, and the artillery opened
at 8 o’clock. The firing increased hourly in intensity as the day
wore on, from rifles and shrapnel and later on from machine guns, too,
and casualties began to grow to an unpleasant extent. The adjutant,
Lieut. H. S. Marchant, was killed, and Lt.-Colonel J. Munn-Mace,
Major E. Clarke and many others were wounded. The advance was over
open country and the available cover was so meagre as to be almost
non-existent. There was a mirage, too, which interfered considerably
with observation, but by the middle of the afternoon a much thinned-out
firing line of Buffs, Black Watch and Seaforth Highlanders had got
within about four hundred yards of the position. There were not enough
men to keep up the pressure, however, and as there was every appearance
of a counter-attack being contemplated, these British troops prepared a
line about two hundred yards behind the place they had advanced to, and
digging themselves in for the night prepared to resist any offensive
on the part of the enemy. Beyond very heavy firing, which rendered
the bringing in of the wounded a matter of great difficulty, however,
nothing of that nature occurred, though the situation was anything but
a pleasant one, for the firing was kept up all night, the weather was
bitterly cold and showery, and the food consisted of a few biscuits
with some bully beef for breakfast.
Saturday the 8th January was a day of rifle fire. The Turks attempted
an advance, but were repulsed and all our men could do was to
strengthen and improve their defences, which work was carried out at
dusk. On the following morning the enemy had disappeared and nothing
was found to be in front but a few snipers. The reason of this proved
to be that, though our advance was checked, as has been seen, on the
left bank of the river, our troops on the other side had captured the
trenches in front of them. So, after burying the dead and clearing up
the battlefield, Aylmer’s force marched another six miles or so over
what had been the Turkish position, which was found to be a very
elaborate one, and camped at Sheikh Saad.
The part taken by the Buffs in this fight earned the very warmest
praise from those in authority. The casualty list was heavy, 3 officers
and 38 men were killed outright and 14 officers and 196 other ranks
were wounded, some of whom succumbed to their injuries.
The list of officer casualties was as follows:--
_Killed_: Lieuts. H. S. Marchant and G. T. Baker, and 2nd
Lieut. E. Rothwell.
_Wounded_: Lt.-Colonel J. Munn-Mace, Major E. Clarke;
Captains B. Buss (afterwards died of wounds), F. O. Marchant, T.
H. O. Collings; Lieuts. A. E. L. Hardcastle, G. Jessel, the Hon.
G. J. Goschen (died of wounds), W. H. Winch (died of wounds), F.
S. Fleuret, S. W. Weldon, L. E. Holyman, A. Goode (attached) and
T. Bridgens (attached).
On the 11th January in the evening came sudden orders to get on the
move again, and at 7 o’clock the force marched off in a north-easterly
direction, but after proceeding three miles halted again and dug in.
This procedure was repeated on the 12th, but the march (in the same
direction) was this time about eight miles, and every preparation
was made for an attack at dawn. The enemy had, however, gone when
morning arrived, and our people moved after him and marched steadily
from 7 o’clock in the morning till 2 p.m., when the foe was located
and promptly attacked. His position was known as the Wadi, which is
a stream running into the Tigris river on its left bank. The 35th
Brigade, in which the Buffs were serving, being on the right flank of
the relieving force, carried out a flanking movement and only really
came into action about 4 p.m. Then it advanced under fire and closed
with the bayonet, but the Turk thought it unwise to measure himself at
close quarters with the men of Kent, though he is a brave and hardy
fighter, so he made off and another battle was lost and won.
The Buffs’ own principal loss was the new commanding officer of the
battalion, Major J. S. Fraser, who was killed. Captain J. Body assumed
command.
The weather was now very bad indeed, the rains were terrible and the
wind very high. This state of things interfered sadly with military
operations, and delay was the only thing that really disheartened the
men. British comrades were being besieged in Kut, only some twenty-five
miles away, and discomforts and inferior feeding could be easily borne
if only progress could be made.
It is necessary to understand something of the nature of the country
and of the Turkish lines of defence between Kut and the relieving
forces and to remember that the only practical avenue of approach
was by the river, because sustained operations in the desert which
bordered the stream were impossible without adequate land transport,
which did not exist. Within a mile or two of the stream on both sides
were extensive and impassable marshes, and the enemy had constructed
several lines of entrenchments, one behind the other, and each
stretching across the water from the marshes on the left bank to those
on the right. The first of these, and nearest to Aylmer’s forces,
were the lines of Umm-el-Hanna. Then came those of Falahiyeh and then
Sanna-i-Yat. Behind all these, only about seven miles east of Kut
itself, was the long entrenchment of Es Sinn. The main line of this, as
it did not rest on marshes on the right side of the river, was thrown
back at an angle till it rested on the Shatt-el-Hai, the watercourse
which joined the Tigris at Kut to the great River Euphrates. At the
salient angle of this long line of works stood the Dujailah Redoubt.
On the 21st January Aylmer attacked the Umm-el-Hanna lines, but alas!
the attack proved a failure and the English army had to entrench
itself and await reinforcements, it being that day fairly conclusively
proved that our people were not in sufficient force for the work
undertaken. The Buffs had, amongst others, Captain A. G. A. Adam and
Lieut. J. Thorp Waite killed and Lieut. Goodland wounded. The weather
of the 21st was terribly wet: by evening the trenches were full of
water; it became difficult to carry away the wounded, and many of the
stretcher-bearers fell with their burdens.
About this time several pairs of battalions, who had been depleted
of men, were coupled up into one. This was of more or less frequent
occurrence. Thus two companies of the Hampshires, whose other half
battalion was in Kut, were sent to the Buffs, and together, until the
following June, the Buffs and these two companies formed the “composite
Territorial battalion,” better known as the “Huffs,” which was
commanded by Major F. N. Thorne, of the 1st Royal Sussex Regiment.
Notwithstanding everybody’s anxiety to get on, February proved
a comparatively idle month. As has been stated, Aylmer had an
insufficient force for his task. Reinforcements, however, were coming
up and every effort to reorganize for a fresh attempt was being made.
Soldiers, like sailors, will never leave a stone unturned to rescue
comrades in distress, and a relief column may always be depended on to
strive to the very end. The last day of the month brought a draft from
the 3/5th Battalion of 6 officers and 302 men, and sadly was the draft
needed. Very few indeed of the 627 men who left Basrah were now able to
perform a day’s duty.
On the 7th March a very resolute attempt to relieve the beleaguered
garrison commenced. It being impossible to force the several lines in
front, it was determined to try and turn them. This meant that our
people must leave the river and their water supply and march out
across the desert. The only possible chance of success was rapidity
and a decisive victory. The desert column could not be fed, watered,
relieved of its sick or reinforced until its work was ended and touch
again obtained with the Tigris in rear of the formidable Turkish lines.
A night march on the Dujailah Redoubt, in three columns, over the
desert, started on the evening of the 7th March and marched in pitch
darkness and in strict silence all night. At dawn the redoubt was
reached and Kut was in sight. Intense eagerness and excitement reigned
in every breast, but the result was the most bitter disappointment it
is hoped that will ever fall to the lot of gallant rescuers. The attack
was too late and failed to surprise, and the enthusiastic columns had
to fall back again upon their old camp at Hanna. During the march the
brigade in which the Buffs were acted as escort to the second-line
transport, but moved up into the fight at Dujailah, which lasted all
day. The enemy’s guns followed up the British retreat and our men were
under their fire during the greater part of the 9th. At 11.30 p.m. on
that date a dispirited and terribly fatigued column reached the old
camping ground again. They had suffered severely from want of water.
It was sad to have to remain inactive so near to Kut, but it was
essential that more troops should arrive. These came at last in the
shape of the 13th Division from Gallipoli, which had been evacuated
early in January. General Aylmer, V.C., was replaced by General Sir G.
P. Gorringe, and on the 5th April this commander attacked, frontally
and with the utmost vigour, the Hanna trenches, before which the
relief force had been held up so long. The attack took place early in
the morning and was chiefly entrusted to the newly arrived division,
which gloriously carried the obstacle in a couple of hours, though it
consisted of no less than five lines of trenches. It was soon noticed
by our aircraft that the Falahiyeh and Sanna-i-Yat lines were being
strongly reinforced. Absence of cover militated greatly against a
successful further advance, but this was made as soon as night fell,
and the Falahiyeh fortifications were soon also in our possession on
both banks of the river.
Hopes rose again after this victory that Kut would, after all, be
saved, and every man was prepared for any necessary effort, but
unhappily the floods now rose with great rapidity. The river became a
roaring torrent and the marshes more formidable than ever, not only in
impassability but, what was worse, in extent as well. Nevertheless,
attempts were made to pass the lines still intervening between
Gorringe’s men and their goal, but it was not to be. The last attempt
was made on the 23rd April: on the evening of the 21st the Buffs, with
the remainder of the brigade, crossed the river from the right to the
left bank, marched three or four miles up stream and took up a position
in reserve preparatory to an attack. Here the night was passed in
the open air in artillery formation, and a move up into the reserve
trenches was made the following morning. The attack was more or less
successful at first, but the Turks were reinforced and drove those of
our men who had penetrated their defences out again. Nothing but a
frontal attack could possibly be attempted owing to the presence of and
utter impassability of the marshes. The Buffs were sent back into the
trenches from whence they had emerged so full of anticipation, and on
the 29th April the garrison of Kut surrendered to the enemy.
During the end of April the Buffs had had to fight another enemy
besides the Turk. There were a few cases of cholera reported on the
27th. On the 28th there were four deaths and for a few days things
looked serious, but a bad epidemic was avoided.
[Illustration: TURKISH LINES NEAR KUT]
The following is the list of casualties suffered by the 5th Battalion
during these operations:--
Officers killed, 8: Major J. S. Fraser; Captain A. G. A. Adam; Lieuts.
G. T. Baker, Hon. G. J. Goschen, H. S. Marchant, E. Rothwell, J. T.
Waite and W. H. Winch.
Twelve were wounded: Colonel J. Munn-Mace; Major E. Clarke; Captains
B. Buss (afterwards died of wounds), T. H. O. Collings, F. O. Marchant
and D. S. Wilkinson; Lieuts. F. S. Fleuret, A. E. L. Hardcastle, L. E.
Holyman, G. Jessel, J. H. J. Peters and S. W. Weldon.
Eighty-four other ranks were killed up to the 29th April, and 259
wounded.
III. GALLIPOLI
Although no battalion of the Buffs served in Gallipoli, the regiment
was not unrepresented on that sanguinary Peninsula, and John Turk was
given a chance there also of confronting the Dragon badge. The story
of how Buffs came to be in this region is a somewhat curious one and
is briefly as follows: early in 1915 the Monmouthshire Brigade, which
was a portion of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, was suddenly sent off to
France, leaving the division one brigade short. In the month of April,
therefore, a new brigade was made up from the home counties to swell
the Welshmen’s ranks and make their division complete. It consisted
of the 2/4th Battalion of the Queens, the 1/4th Sussex, the 2/10th
Middlesex and a composite Kentish battalion which contained one company
from the 2/4th Buffs, one from the 2/5th Buffs and one company each
from the 4th and 5th Royal West Kent Regiment. The Buffs were A and
B Companies and the West Kents were C and D, but the latter regiment
found the Battalion Headquarter staff.
For this reason the unit was generally known as the 2/4th Royal West
Kent, though its proper designation was the Kent Composite Battalion.
At first it was suggested that a new badge should be found or invented
for this composite battalion, but this was vetoed, as Kent is not a
sufficiently populous county to maintain a new infantry regiment. The
War Office therefore gave authority for the wearing of the Buffs’ badge
by A and B Companies, and the West Kent badge by the others. The two
halves of the battalion had also different record offices at Hounslow,
different regimental numbers and so on. It was trained with the rest of
the division at Cambridge and afterwards at Bedford under the command
of Colonel Simpson. The officers of A Company were Captains Jude and
Taunton, Lieuts. Dixon and Filmer, and 2nd Lieuts. Morgan and Larkin. B
Company was commanded by Captain Greatorex, with Captain Lamarque and
Lieuts. Keble, Wood, Willows and Griffin, all of whom belonged to the
4th or 5th Battalion of the Buffs.
The division was ordered to the East instead of to France, so the
Kentish men and men of Kent entrained together on the 17th July at
Devonport and next day embarked on the s.s. _Northland_. They
landed at Suvla Bay, Gallipoli Peninsula, on the 9th August, three days
after the great surprise landing there and the attack on Achi Baba.
During their stay in this theatre of war the men were mostly employed
in making trenches and on fatigue work, and the movements from one part
to another were unimportant. First they were at “C” Beach, where the
commanding officer got wounded, then at West Beach and later on at Lala
Baba, but fatigue work was still the occupation of the unit. December,
1915, brought the skilful and successful evacuation of Gallipoli and
Suvla. Our battalion withdrew to Mudros, on the island of Lemnos, where
it embarked for Egypt on board the _Haverford_ and landed at
Alexandria on the 19th December.
The Egyptian history of the Kent Composite Battalion is not of very
great interest, although, after changing its name and organization,
it took its full share in the Palestine campaign which came later
on. Under its old constitution it proceeded to Wardan and afterwards
to Fayoum in Central Egypt, but, towards the middle of 1916, Colonel
Money, who was then in command, represented the great inconvenience
of having his men administered by two record offices and a double lot
of paymasters, with the result that an order came transferring all
N.C.O.’s and men of the Buffs compulsorily to the 2/4th Royal West
Kent Regiment, under which honourable title the men saw much service
on their new front, but as they were no longer Buffs their doings must
remain unchronicled in this regimental history.