THE 2ND BATTALION TAKES ITS SHARE
I. RETURNS TO ENGLAND
The opening of hostilities found the headquarters of the 2nd Battalion
at Wellington in India. It was, like most units which have been some
time abroad, a very fine body of men, in spite of the fact that
Wellington is not exactly a training centre and that three detachments
were provided by the battalion. Very early in the war it was called
upon to send home, to the assistance of the new armies in course of
formation, some of the most useful members of the battalion staff and
many of the very best sergeants. Training was, however, continued, and
in November orders arrived to sail for England on being relieved by
Territorial troops, who had quite forgotten apparently that they were
home service soldiers only, directly England wanted them abroad.
On leaving the East the Buffs had to leave behind a depot which
consisted of a few men passed unfit, all the women and children, and
the property of the messes, regimental institutes, Army Temperance
Association and rifle ranges; this was under the command of Captain
Howard Smith. The only things that went home with the fighting men were
the Colours and the mess silver.
The battalion embarked at Bombay on the 16th November on the Cunard
ship _Ultonia_, which was old, slow and dirty, and fearfully
overcrowded owing to the 2nd Battalion East Yorkshire regiment being
also on board. The ship was under convoy together with thirty-three
others, and the whole made Plymouth instead of Southampton on the
23rd December, after making a wide detour in the Atlantic to avoid
submarines. The Buffs were bundled off their ship in great haste and
without their kits; they got off somehow to Winchester, where they
found themselves on a cold, bleak down, in pouring rain and with but
very meagre equipment--cooking-pots being one of the very many items
that were deficient. An Army Service wagon or two ultimately came along
and threw some blankets upon the wet ground, and some bread and meat
on top of them, and went away; but of course their drivers were not
responsible for cooking-pots. Christmas, 1914, may have been a merry
one in many places, even in the trenches to a certain extent, but it is
doubtful if the 2nd Battalion of the Buffs ever spent a more miserable
one. Certainly Captain Tomlinson’s company got plum puddings, but that
was the one bright spot.
The battalion, together with the 3rd Royal Fusiliers, 2nd East Surrey
and the 3rd Middlesex, all from India, found itself in the 85th
Infantry Brigade under Br.-General A. J. Chapman, C.B., who had Captain
C. J. Deverell for brigade major. The brigade was part of the 28th
Division--Major-General Bulfin, C.V.O., C.B. Captain L. Fort, and
afterwards Lieut. the Hon. P. G. Scarlett, was appointed staff captain
to the 85th Brigade.
Military exercises of an intensive kind were, of course, the daily lot
of the men while at Winchester, particularly so because the latest
pattern rifle (not used in India) had just been issued to them. A
furlough of three clear days to 25 per cent of the soldiers at a time
was, however, granted, so that those just returned from India, after a
foreign tour of nearly ten years, might get a glimpse of their friends
before starting for a new and sterner foreign service. A few drafts of
new men arrived, but it must be understood that these reinforcements
for each and all of the battalions during the four years under
consideration were of such frequent occurrence as to render constant
reference to them both tiresome and superfluous. It may easily be
understood that the strength of a unit must constantly be varying. A
hard-fought action would reduce the numbers enormously, as well as did
the regular drain by death, wounds and disease during the weary trench
work.
The only events worthy of record during the stay at Winchester were
a violent squall which did great damage to the tents on the 28th
December, and a grand inspection of the division by His Majesty the
King accompanied by Lord Kitchener on the 12th January, 1915. The
battalion moved into billets in the city on the 6th January, the
officers being accommodated in Winchester College.[7]
It is only fair to note here that the newly issued boots were not of
proper quality: the heels came off and the nails went through. Later
on, in France, the men experienced a good deal of quite unnecessary
hardship on account of their boots, which to an infantry soldier are
only of second importance to his weapons. Some one was to blame, of
course, presumably the contractor, and it seems that in every war these
men must make their fortunes at the expense of the soldier.
Most judges agree that English soldiers are seldom seen to such
perfection of training and physique as in India, and the infantry of
the 28th Division was entirely composed of units from that country, so
that all who saw these troops prior to embarkation for France agreed
that no finer body of infantry had ever taken the field.
The start was made on the 16th January, on which day the division
marched to Southampton, and a trying march it was; though well timed
and arranged by the staff, sufficient consideration was not given to
the length of the journey by foot, the state of the weather nor the
weight each soldier had to carry.
II. ARRIVES ON WESTERN FRONT
Next day the Buffs embarked for Havre, for the Channel ports were safe
enough by this time. On the 21st they detrained at Hazebrouck and
marched to Rouge Croix (4½ miles N.E.), after one of those terrible
French railway journeys, during which sanitary arrangements are
non-existent. The battalion now became a fighting unit in the great
struggle that was raging round Ypres.
It is good in winter time to have plenty of warm clothing and
protection from the weather, but the kits at this period were terribly
heavy to carry. Later on regular parties were told off to take what was
required from the billets to the trenches and so on, but at first the
soldier, in addition to his regular sixty-two pounds’ weight of kit,
was burdened with a fur coat, gum boots and spare sandbags, all very
excellent things to have with one, but a bit of a job to get over the
ground with.
On the 28th January the brigade was inspected by the
Commander-in-Chief, accompanied by the Prince of Wales. During the
month of February the Germans made several more or less determined
attempts to pierce the British line near Ypres, and sometimes with
partial success. On the 4th of the month the 85th Brigade, being at
Ouderdom, received news that their comrades of the 83rd were being
attacked south-west of the city, so two battalions started at once
to the rescue, and these were followed two hours later by the Buffs
and Middlesex, who entered the place and remained in readiness in the
cavalry barracks.
The 5th February brought some counter-marching. At 4.30 a.m. the
battalion started to march back again to Ouderdom as being not wanted
and was then told to stand by in readiness to move again, as the 84th
Brigade was now in trouble to the south of Ypres. This march, however,
was not performed till the following day, by the evening of which both
the Buffs and East Surreys were back in the cavalry barracks, and from
there they went into the trenches, the Buffs’ Headquarters being at
Ferme Chapelle.
The experience of the next few days was a terrible one; the trenches,
which had just been taken over from the French, were in very bad
condition indeed: they were knee-deep in water, and with parapets so
rotten as not to be bullet proof. Very soon this state of things had
its effect and numbers of the men were suffering from swollen feet and
frost-bite.
III. “O” TRENCH
The brigade front at this time was intersected at right angles by the
Ypres-Comines Canal, which divided it into what were known as the Right
and Left Sections of Defence. Immediately north of the canal the Left
Section of Defence was entrusted to the Buffs and 3rd Royal Fusiliers,
these battalions relieving each other as ordered; and the south or the
Right Section of Defence to the 2nd East Surrey and the 3rd Middlesex.
Each section had its own battalion headquarters. A small part of the
southern section was also held by one company of the Buffs (Captain
Worthington). The other battalions of the brigade were in somewhat
similar conditions to the Buffs, and were daily and rapidly being
reduced in fighting strength and efficiency, chiefly through frost-bite
and sickness. So serious had things become owing to this reduction in
fighting strength that, by the 13th February, it was decided to relieve
the brigade, and to withdraw it to recoup and refit as soon as other
troops were available to replace it in the line.
It had already been decided by the higher command that a part of the
line then being held by the 3rd Middlesex and the 2nd East Surrey,
south of the canal, was to be shortened by the construction of new
trenches a little in rear of trenches “O” and “P.” This work had
already been started, and was, on the night of the 14th February,
being continued by the 3rd Middlesex, which temporarily withdrew the
garrisons from “O” and “P” trenches for the purpose of digging, leaving
those trenches in charge of small covering parties only.
The Germans, who up till then had been showing very little local
activity, unexpectedly raided and captured “O” trench and prevented its
reoccupation by the Middlesex; without delay they reversed the parapet,
wired the front on our side and took all necessary steps for resisting
any attempts at recapture.
During the night 14th/15th February the Buffs were relieved by the
3rd Royal Fusiliers from their unenviable position in the trenches
as recorded above, and were withdrawn a short distance to Chateau
Rosenthal (Bedford House), on the Ypres-St. Eloi road, to rest. By the
time the reliefs had been completed and the battalion had settled down
to rest the night was far spent.
Shortly before dawn alarming rumours reached Battalion H.Q. that the
enemy had broken through the Middlesex and were advancing on Ypres.
Colonel Geddes reported accordingly to Brigade H.Q., and the battalion
was at once turned out in readiness for any eventuality. Soon after
daybreak orders were received to move out and hold the canal bank
south-east of Langhof. Although fairly heavily shelled _en route_,
the battalion crossed the canal without loss and assembled on the north
side, under cover of the canal embankment. Here it was subsequently
joined by the brigadier and some of the brigade staff and remained
awaiting developments throughout the rest of the morning.
About 2.30 p.m. the 2nd East Surrey, assisted by as many of the
Middlesex as it had been possible to collect, were ordered to recapture
“O” trench. No arrangements had apparently been made for artillery
support, and moreover this attack had to be made over ground deep
in mud, devoid of any cover and without any previous reconnaissance
or guides. From the Buffs’ rendezvous nothing could be seen of what
was taking place on the far side of the embankment, where the attack
had been launched. About 4.30 p.m. the Buffs (less one company which
remained with the brigadier in reserve) were ordered to reinforce the
East Surrey, who, owing to extremely heavy losses, were reported to be
held up and unable to make further progress. As the leading company
of the Buffs broke cover it came under artillery fire which caused
many casualties, including its commander, Major F. S. Reeves, wounded,
and Lieut. R. M. Heywood, killed. Neither the whereabouts of the East
Surreys nor the direction of the objective were known, and by this time
darkness was fast approaching. However, the three companies continued
the advance in the dusk and by good fortune came up with some of the
East Surreys, who, having reached a point some five hundred yards from
the objective, were unable to advance any further. The Buffs passed
through them and continued to advance until they reached a point about
three hundred yards from the objective, which by this time, however,
was completely hidden in the darkness which had by now intervened.
At this point a subaltern of the East Surrey Regiment, who had lost
his platoon, was met, and he volunteered to act as guide. The leading
company again pushed on, but, owing to the difficulty of keeping touch
and maintaining direction in the dark, a part of the battalion found
itself held up by wire and suffering heavy losses from fire from more
than one direction. At this juncture Colonel Geddes wisely determined
to withdraw the battalion, which was only done with the greatest
difficulty.
Whilst the above operations were in progress, half a battalion of the
2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, sent from the 84th Brigade, had arrived
in the dark at the rendezvous on the canal bank, where the brigadier
and the reserve company of the Buffs (Major R. E. Power) were waiting.
As nothing was known of the military situation, nor of the whereabouts
of the Buffs nor of the East Surrey Regiment, from whom no reports had
been received since dark, the brigadier ordered the reserve company
of the Buffs to go out and find the rest of the battalion. He himself
started with them. After going a short distance they came across a
building full of wounded which was found to be the Battalion H.Q. of
the Right Section of Defence, then occupied by the headquarters of the
3rd Middlesex Regiment. Here a guide was procured, and the company
proceeded in the direction in which the remainder of the battalion
and the 2nd East Surrey had gone. Before it had gone far, however, it
luckily met Colonel Geddes returning. The battalion (less half Major
Power’s company, detached to occupy a front-line trench) reached
the canal about 10.30 p.m., and was sent back at 1 a.m. to Chateau
Rosenthal to get a meal and rest.
During the morning of the 15th February, 1915, a conference was held
at Brigade H.Q., and it was decided to renew the attack on the lost
trench “O” on that night. The brigadier at first decided to carry out
this operation with the Buffs and East Surrey Regiment only, but these
two battalions had together only about three hundred men available,
owing to the casualties of the previous day and the losses sustained
during the recent tour in the trenches. Two companies of the 2nd
Northumberland Fusiliers (84th Brigade) were, therefore, added to this
small force, which was placed under command of Colonel Geddes. In the
written orders issued to units it was stated that “O” trench was to
be retaken at all costs and held until reliefs arrived. The G.O.C.
28th Division stated that the 85th Brigade, which, owing to the severe
losses from fire and sickness already incurred, was to have been at
once withdrawn from the line and sent back to recoup and refit, would
not be relieved until the lost trench “O” had been recaptured.
At 7 p.m. the Buffs (less half D Company)[8] and 2nd East Surrey
Regiment (less one and a half companies) assembled at the place
ordered, that is, on the road junction on the Ypres-St. Eloi road,
620 yards south of the canal. From this point the column, led by the
Buffs, marched via the road leading east towards Oosthoek, as far as
the Battalion H.Q. of the Right Sections of Defence, where the 2nd
Northumberland Fusiliers (less two companies) joined and followed in
reserve. Leaving here at 7.40 p.m. and moving in file, closed up, the
column was skilfully guided some two thousand yards across country by
Lieut. J. A. H. Wood, 2nd East Surrey, to the position of deployment
(the north-east end of a spinney about 150 yards north of “O” trench),
which was reached without opposition or casualties at about 8.40 p.m.
On reaching the position of deployment the Buffs, under Major L. I. B.
Hulke, having previously fixed bayonets, silently deployed into line
to the left, in single rank, without extending, and lay down in the
deep mud. The East Surreys, acting in a similar manner, formed a second
line twenty yards in rear with the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers some
fifty yards behind them. Selected scouts of the Buffs were sent out to
reconnoitre and cut the enemy’s wire and to report on the intervening
ground, which was quite unknown to all those about to take part in this
attack. Such complete silence had been maintained during the advance
and deployment that the presence of the column was unknown to the enemy
until a prearranged artillery bombardment of his trenches commenced
at 8.55 p.m. The shells all appeared to take effect against the main
German position, and consequently well beyond the immediate objective.
They unfortunately had the undesired effect of putting the defenders on
the _qui vive_, for they at once manned the trench “O,” sent up
flares, which revealed the position of the attacking force, and opened
on it a withering fire from rifles, machine guns and trench mortars.
The time ordered for the assault was 9 p.m., and the right of the
Buffs was detailed to direct. Immediately the enemy opened fire it
was apparent from the shells which, following one another in quick
succession, burst immediately behind and close to the Buffs, that the
enemy had the exact range. Realizing this, Major Hulke at once gave the
order to advance. Just in front of the Buffs the ground sloped somewhat
steeply downwards towards the objective for about fifty yards. Nothing
could have been finer than the dash and the steady determination with
which the whole line, like one man, arose and went forward down this
slope. The configuration of the ground, and the unhesitating manner
in which the order to advance was carried out, undoubtedly saved the
battalion from serious losses at this stage, as the more quickly the
advance down the slope was made the higher above the men’s heads rained
the storm of shells and bullets on to, and beyond, the position which
the battalion had just vacated.
From the bottom of the slope the advance had to be made across heavy
ground, ankle deep in mud and devoid of cover, for a distance of about
120 yards, the last part of which was up a steep incline. Except for
the enemy’s flares it was pitch dark. Against the heavy frontal fire
from the trench, and enfilade machine-gun fire from the left flank, the
battalion forged ahead with magnificent determination, and in spite of
serious casualties, most of which were sustained when the level ground
at the foot of the first slope was reached, fought its way through
the wire and finally assaulted and gained a footing in the trench.
The enemy, who had kept up a heavy fire until the Buffs were within
ten yards of the trench, disappeared in the dark, apparently down a
communication trench and also towards the western end of “O” trench.
Major C. L. Porter was wounded and many other ranks killed and wounded
during the attack, but ten officers and about sixty other ranks
succeeded in entering the trench. Major Hulke immediately reorganized
and distributed these along the trench, starting from the extreme left,
and arranged for the protection of the right flank by the construction
of a sandbag traverse, which was built, under fire from rifle and
bombs, under Captain Morgan’s supervision, assisted by Lieut. Laing.
A considerable number had already been wounded; parties had to be
employed in repairing and strengthening the parapet, whilst others had
to be told off to assist those detailed to man the parapet, in clearing
the jammed rifles and supplying them with cleaned ammunition. When
all these deductions from the sixty odd other ranks who had succeeded
in gaining a footing in the trench had been made, it was found that
only sufficient men remained to hold about fifty out of a probable
two hundred yards of trench. Whilst the above arrangements were in
progress the enemy started sniping and throwing bombs, apparently from
a communication trench and from the western end of “O” trench, which
was still in their hands. Bombs at that time were weapons of warfare
of which the 28th Division had had no previous experience whatever,
and owing to the darkness, the non-provision of maps and lack of
previous information about, or knowledge of, the trench, it was very
difficult to locate the places from which the enemy were throwing them
and sniping. However, Captain F. W. Tomlinson, Captain L. Fort and 2nd
Lieut. E. F. D. Strettell discovered the whereabouts of a party of the
enemy’s bombers and rushed it; demolished the sandbag wall, from under
cover of which bombs were being thrown, and cleared the enemy out of
the trench. Captain Tomlinson seized the bayonet of one of the enemy,
who turned tail. Captain L. Fort, who a few days previously had shown
the greatest courage and resource whilst in charge of an officers’
reconnoitring patrol, was killed, and 2nd Lieut. E. F. D. Strettell
was severely wounded in this gallant enterprise, which undoubtedly
saved many lives and further casualties in the battalion, as the enemy
afterwards ceased bombing and apparently withdrew.
Owing to the mud, with which everybody and everything was smothered,
a large number of the rifles became jammed and unserviceable. After
holding on for three hours, as the promised support had not arrived
the position of the Buffs was by now (midnight) somewhat critical.
Major Hulke therefore sent 2nd Lieut. J. A. Wood (2nd East Surrey),
accompanied by No. 9522 Pte. W. J. White, to report the situation
to Colonel Geddes, and eventually the former returned, guiding a
company of the 2nd Suffolk Regiment. He reported that both the 2nd
Northumberland Fusiliers and 2nd East Surrey had lost their way in
the dark, and that the former had been now ordered to follow the 2nd
Suffolk Regiment. They did not, however, arrive at “O” trench before
the Buffs were relieved.
As soon as the company of the Suffolks had taken over the portion
of the trench the Buffs were holding, they had to work their surplus
men along the trench beyond the sandbag traverse which the battalion
had built, and extend them further to the right. In trying to do this
they met with considerable opposition from parties of the enemy, who
were in the western part of the trench. As the officer in command of
this company appeared to meet with some difficulty in overcoming this
opposition, Major Hulke offered to remain with his handful of men
until it got sufficiently light to see what the real situation was.
This offer, however, was refused, and, in accordance with the orders
issued, Major Hulke therefore withdrew the Buffs, leaving in charge
of the Suffolks any wounded who were unable to be removed without
stretchers--of which there were none available. Great difficulty
was experienced in carrying out the withdrawal over the fire-swept
morass which had to be crossed, lit up, as it was, by almost incessant
star-shell and flares. By crawling through the mud between the
flares, a few yards at a time, and by lying down as flat as possible
whilst any light remained, was the only way of proceeding, but many
lives, including Sgt. Rosam, were lost during the first part of the
withdrawal: although the distance was not more than 150 yards, it took
half an hour to reach the original place of deployment.
After a few hours’ rest in the cavalry barracks in Ypres the battalion
marched into scattered billets in and around Reninghelst. On the same
afternoon the services of 2nd Lieut. C. W. Laing were asked for to act
as guide to another brigade detailed on that night to recapture “O”
trench, which the enemy had again taken possession of very shortly
after the Buffs had been relieved. In spite of his arduous experiences
of the previous night’s fighting and want of rest, 2nd Lieut. C.
W. Laing undertook this hazardous enterprise, and carried it out
successfully.
IV. TRENCH WARFARE NEAR YPRES
On the 19th February the battalion was attached to the 3rd Division
and went into billets at Locre, marching to Westoutre for baths and
clean clothes. There was a regular system in working this necessary
ablution arrangement. Men cast off their filthy underclothing, which
was taken from them, and after a bath, clean underclothes, which had
once belonged to other people, were provided and the old ones were
never seen again by the original owners. At first this caused a certain
amount of grumbling amongst careful men, who were liable to become
possessed of somewhat more ragged articles than they handed in, but it
was soon found that things generally came right in the long run.
A new line of trenches were occupied on the 22nd, and these were found
to be much preferable and more desirable in every way than those last
occupied. There is no doubt that the French were more careless as
regards the cleanliness as well as the general efficiency of their
trenches than were our own people, and it seems that the 2nd Buffs were
rather unfortunate in very frequently relieving our Allies instead of
other British troops. These new and better works were at Kemmel, and
the battalion alternated between this place and Locre till the 23rd
March, when it was billeted at Dickebusch. Captain A. S. Cresswell was
killed by a sniper on the 12th March.
On the 10th April, after a trying turn at St. Eloi, the battalion
marched to Zonnebeke and relieved the 153rd French Regiment, the 85th
Brigade having three battalions in the front line, with the Buffs in
the centre, three companies in the fire trenches and one in support.
About the middle of the line was the Broodseinde cross-roads, where
the enemy’s trenches approached very close to our own, at one point
to within five feet. This portion of the field is upon a plateau which
commands the Ypres road, and was of great tactical importance. Forward
of a trench which lay to the south-west of the cross-roads, the enemy
had that morning rushed a parallel in which the French had laid a mine
that was to have been fired before they handed over. After blocking
this mine up, the enemy had retained possession of that part of the
work in which it had been laid. Of this fact the French were either
ignorant or, at any rate, they made no report of it. Two attempts were
made to dislodge them, in which Captain Hood, Lieut. Whitaker (both of
whom were wounded) and 2nd Lieut. Chapman did good work.
In the meantime the Germans had established a heavy trench mortar
in a position, secure from our artillery, from which they brought a
merciless fire to bear on our lines, especially on B Company which
was on the cross-roads. This was the 2nd Battalion’s first experience
of this weapon. Serious damage was done to the parapets and many
casualties resulted. During this four days’ tour 1 officer and 22
other ranks were killed and 4 officers and 62 other ranks wounded. The
battalion was relieved by the 3rd Royal Fusiliers on the morning of the
14th and marched back to billets at St. Jean, about one mile east of
Ypres. A and D Companies were sent into the reserve dug-outs west of
Zonnebeke, but rejoined at St. Jean the next day. After another short
turn in the trenches the battalion on the 21st found itself bivouacked
in open fields near St. Jean, where shelters and dug-outs were arranged
for, because the town of Ypres was now being too heavily shelled for
troops to make use of billeting accommodation there, or, in fact, to
pass through the town at all.
V. SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES
The second battle of Ypres has brought more obloquy and ill-fame on the
German nation than even Marathon brought glory to the Athenians. It
appears to have been well understood by scientific men that a noisome
and poisonous gas could be so carried down wind that no man could
breathe its suffocating fumes and live for long, and further that he
must die in agony. At the ineffectual conference at the Hague it had
been arranged between the representatives of the several nations,
including Germany, that the use of such a disgusting and brutal weapon
should be barred between civilized enemies, and nobody thought any
more about it, but the German beast is not a gentleman and he ruled
that the brave old days when foeman fought with a chivalrous regard
for his opponent were to cease, at any rate as far as the much-vaunted
Fatherland was concerned, and so this battle which we are now to
consider goes down in history as the first great combat in which unfair
and blackguardly methods were adopted.
[Illustration:
_Imperial War Museum_ _Crown Copyright_
YPRES FROM NEAR MENIN GATE]
The commencement of this tremendous battle is best described in Sir
John French’s own words, which are here quoted from his despatches: “It
was at the commencement of the Second Battle of Ypres on the evening of
the 22nd April that the enemy first made use of asphyxiating gas.
“Some days previously I had complied with General Joffre’s request to
take over the trenches occupied by the French, and on the evening of
the 22nd the troops holding the lines east of Ypres were posted as
follows:--
“From Steenstraate to the east of Langemarck, as far as the
Poelcappelle road, a French division.
“Thence, in a south-easterly direction towards the
Passchendaele-Becelaere road, the Canadian division.
“Thence, a division took up the line in a southerly direction east
of Zonnebeke to a point west of Becelaere, whence another division
continued the line south-east to the northern limit of the corps on its
right.
“Of the 5th Corps there were four battalions in Divisional Reserve
about Ypres; the Canadian Division had one battalion in Divisional
Reserve and the 1st Canadian Brigade in Army Reserve. An infantry
brigade, which had just been withdrawn after suffering heavy losses on
Hill 60, was resting about Vlamertinghe.
“Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French division
at about 5 p.m., using asphyxiating gases for the first time. Aircraft
reported that at about 5 p.m. thick yellow smoke had been seen issuing
from the German trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote. The
French reported that two simultaneous attacks had been made east of
the Ypres-Staden railway, in which these asphyxiating gases had been
employed.
“What follows almost defies description. The effect of these poisonous
gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the
French division mentioned above practically incapable of any action at
all. It was at first impossible for anyone to realize what had actually
happened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds
of men were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an
hour the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about 50
guns.
“I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least blame
to the French division for this unfortunate incident.
“After all the examples our gallant Allies have shown of dogged and
tenacious courage in the many trying situations in which they have
been placed throughout the course of this campaign, it is quite
superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the incident, and I would
only express my firm conviction that, if any troops in the world had
been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous and
altogether unexpected onslaught, the French division would have stood
firm.
“The left flank of the Canadian division was thus left dangerously
exposed to serious attack in flank, and there appeared to be a prospect
of their being overwhelmed and of a successful attempt by the Germans
to cut off the British troops occupying the salient to the east.
“In spite of the danger to which they were exposed the Canadians held
their ground with a magnificent display of tenacity and courage, and it
is not too much to say that the bearing and conduct of these splendid
troops averted a disaster which might have been attended with the most
serious consequences.
“They were supported with great promptitude by the reserves of the
divisions holding the salient and by a brigade which had been resting
in billets.”
* * * * *
Now, of course, the commander-in-chief of a large army cannot possibly
in his reports home go into details concerning brigades and battalions,
but as the reader will see later this “brigade resting in billets”
comprised amongst others the 2nd Battalion of the Buffs. The story
as far as the Buffs are concerned is as follows:--The 1st Battalion
was still twelve miles or so south of Ypres, but the 2nd was, as has
been seen, on the afternoon of the 22nd of April, bivouacked in fields
at St. Jean, which village was about four miles back from the front
British line of trenches. The Middlesex and Buffs were that night
to relieve the rest of the brigade in the trenches about Zonnebeke.
Considerable Canadian forces were in the immediate vicinity of the
Buffs.
About 5 o’clock on the evening of the 22nd April there was a sudden
very sharp outburst of the enemy’s artillery, and a cloud of greenish
vapour was noticed away on the left of the line. Heavy machine-gun
firing was heard, evidently coming from the enemy, a very long way
inside what was the British line, and bullets came spattering into
St. Jean, which place ought to have been safe enough from this kind
of fire. Half an hour after the commencement of the bombardment many
French soldiers were observed retiring rapidly and in a disordered
manner. These men were mostly Turcos and Zouaves and, poor fellows, had
been taken entirely by surprise by the new and horrible methods of the
enemy. They had, of course, no protection against gas at that time, and
they simply fled as if the Devil were after them. It was thought by the
English at first that the gas attack was nothing, and preparations were
at first continued for carrying out the relief alluded to above, but
it soon became evident that something very serious indeed had occurred
and, at 8.30 p.m., Colonel Geddes was placed in command of all troops
in St. Jean, Major Power taking over the Buff battalion.
Geddes soon received another battalion from Ypres, and at first he
had his old adjutant, Lieut. Hon. P. G. Scarlett, with him as staff
officer, but the latter was relieved the same night and rejoined the
details of the 85th Brigade, of which he was staff captain, and which
were soon fighting hard at Zonnebeke. Geddes was later joined by
detachments of two other battalions, and his force during the next few
days was destined to play an extraordinarily fine rôle. These troops
were all there was between the Canadians left near Wieltje and the
Canal, and it became theirs to guard an otherwise open road to Ypres.
The Canadians with whom Geddes’ Detachment, as it was officially
nominated, was soon ordered to act, immediately stood to, as did the
Buffs and Middlesex, as well as the 4th King’s Own Royal Lancasters,
the battalion which had come from Ypres.
Meanwhile, the French troops were streaming down the road towards
Ypres, while the Englishmen were standing nonchalantly in the streets
of St. Jean, and the Canadians calmly marching north and north-east in
the direction from which the foreign troops were retiring. The Buffs
took up a position covering St. Jean, facing north and north-east, with
the Middlesex on their left and the King’s Own in reserve.
At night it was found that the Canadian left flank was turned and the
3rd Canadian Brigade requesting that a company should be sent up to
St. Julien to help and support them, Captain Tomlinson with B Company
was sent, though the Englishmen were themselves hardly pressed. At
2 a.m. on the 23rd, Geddes received instructions that he was to act
under orders of the Canadian Division, and was told by that unit to
co-operate on the Canadian left. At 3.30 the Buffs, less B Company, was
ordered to Wieltje and thence in a northerly direction to get touch
with the 3rd Canadian Brigade. The men took some time to collect for
the counter-attack, and it was after 4 o’clock and broad daylight when
the battalion moved off, preceded by an advance guard under Captain
Barnard.
[Illustration:
_Imperial War Museum_ _Crown Copyright_
BATTLEFIELD NEAR ST. JULIEN]
About eight hundred yards north of Wieltje some dug-outs and trenches
were reached, which were occupied by Canadians. These trenches were
screened by a hedge, under cover of which the Buffs closed up. Beyond
was open country, so the battalion at once deployed and was immediately
subjected to furious machine-gun and rifle fire from the enemy, who
were entrenched in two parallel lines about 1,200 and 900 yards
distant on rising ground sloping to the north. Moving at the double,
platoon followed platoon in quick succession in the open, many
casualties occurring. Two companies soon reached a farm four hundred
yards on, while the remaining company took advantage of the frail cover
afforded by a fence, 150 yards behind the farm, around which were a
few Canadians, from whom Major Power ascertained that there was a
space of about a quarter of a mile to the east, only lightly held by
the French. On it were three parallel lines of trenches facing north
with their right resting on the G.H.Q. wire. Major Power, seeing the
danger of this, ordered the battalion to advance half-right and occupy
the forward of the three trenches. In it were found a few men of the
1st Zouaves. The Buffs therefore advanced by rushes across the open
and lost heavily: Captain J. McB. Ronald being killed, Lieut. D. A.
Wilkins severely wounded and some eighty casualties of other ranks
occurring. Two companies occupied the front line, while the third (D)
was in a trench facing east along the G.H.Q. wire, which is the last
fortified line back from the enemy, and the fact that our troops were
now practically defending that meant, of course, that the enemy had
penetrated all defences but one on this northern flank of the Ypres
salient. The rest of the day the battalion was subjected to heavy
shelling and rifle fire. The remainder of the Zouaves withdrew, and the
Buffs then completely occupied the gap between the Canadian companies.
The 24th April proved an unfortunate day. D Company was moved at the
urgent request of the 3rd Canadian Brigade to a position across the
Wieltje-St. Julien road, but at 7 a.m. Captain Tomlinson’s B Company,
which had been detached late on the 22nd to the succour of the
Canadians, was completely surrounded by the enemy, and after losing
very heavily, practically all the survivors were made prisoners.
Among the killed were Lieut. W. G. Jackson and 2nd Lieut. C. W. Laing.
The Canadians and others who saw this company attack stated that this
little force was entirely responsible for the saving of the Canadian
left, and also that practically the whole company was killed, wounded
or taken prisoner, including Tomlinson, who had again shown great
gallantry. On this 24th of April, as well as the two following days,
the shelling was most severe, and the men suffered much from the
poisonous fumes given off on the bursting of the shells. D Company was
relieved by the Canadians on the morning of the 25th and resumed its
old place, thrown back at an angle from A’s right flank.
The battalion being relieved by the 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade,
got back to dug-outs at St. Jean on the 27th, but the constant and
persistent shelling continued there all day and, on the 28th, the Buffs
received orders to rejoin the 85th Brigade at Verlorenhoek, Geddes’
detachment having been broken up.
Colonel Geddes had thus again shown his worth; he combined experience
and valour with a strong understanding and much intellectual power, and
had, it would seem, a fine future before him. His brilliant handling of
the critical situation so suddenly forced on him undoubtedly prevented
the Germans from pressing home the attack so successfully begun on
the 22nd. To the great loss of his regiment and his country, a shell
entered the room in which he was sitting on the morning of the 28th and
killed him instantly.[9]
Although the 29th and 30th of April proved quiet days for the regiment
at Verlorenhoek this was but a lull in the awful and pitiless storm.
The most marked feature of the next few days was the failure of the
artillery to support the overdriven foot soldiers. This, of course,
was in no possible way the fault of the glorious gunners, but gun fire
cannot be kept up without an adequate supply of material. Throughout
the whole period since the first break in the line on the night of the
22nd April all the troops in this area had been constantly subjected
to violent artillery bombardment from a large mass of guns with an
unlimited supply of ammunition. It proved impossible, whilst under such
a vastly superior fire of artillery and gas, to dig efficient trenches
or properly reorganize the line after the confusion and demoralization
caused by the first great gas surprise; consequently a withdrawal to a
new line some little way further back became imperative, and this was
carried out successfully during the first four days of May.
Meantime, they were doing their duty in England; drafts were coming
out to replace those who had fallen, and the hard-tried battalion was
pulling itself together for the further upholding of the great cause
and for the honour of the corps.
On the 1st May a fresh draft of men had arrived from England. There
was no time to allot them to companies, so, for the time being, they
were kept together and put entire into a new support trench in front of
a wood, and the very next day they came under really extraordinarily
heavy shell fire, to which our gunners were unable to reply. It was
the most trying initiation into warfare that young soldiers ever had
to undergo, and the shelling was renewed at dawn on the 3rd of the
month, so that Captain Archer Houblon, who commanded, reported many
casualties, his parapet blown in and the situation critical. During
the whole of this day the shelling was quite abnormal in intensity
and our gunners could make hardly any reply. In the afternoon the
bombardment is described as sounding like machine-gun fire, being, as
it was, so rapid and incessant. The enemy meanwhile rushed a trench
called D.5, there being few, if any, Buffs to resist them. It had been
occupied by Captain Howard Smith, Lieut. G. R. Howe and some eighty
men of C Company. The whole party was reported missing, and it was
believed nearly all were killed or wounded. There were during these
days no communication trenches and the firing was too hot to permit of
men moving from one work to another, so that parties were completely
isolated.
The following is an extract from the official diary, a document which
deals only with the plainest facts, related in the simplest language.
There is never any exaggeration in the official diaries: “The Germans
now occupied the woods behind D.5, a movement which made D.4 quite
untenable; they were held up, however, by a small party of Buffs under
2nd Lieut. Backhouse and a company of Royal Fusiliers under Captain
Ford, who gallantly held on to the new support trench despite fearsome
enfilade fire from heavy howitzers and other artillery. Captain Houblon
and Lieut. Sharp and remainder of D Company who were still holding D.4,
were now being enfiladed by Germans from D.5 and taken in reverse from
the wood. Captain Houblon, therefore, was compelled to retire along the
trench line, a movement which was carried out steadily. The Germans
were still pressing forward and soon occupied a portion of the new
support trench where it joined D.4. Our men and the enemy were now only
a few yards apart, unfortunately the enemy were in greater numbers and
a far stronger situation. Many of the enemy were shot, especially when
they filed out of the wood in front of D.5. In the retirement we also
lost heavily.
“The two last men in D.4 were Company Sergt.-Major Port and No. 7852
Pte. F. Campbell, both of C Company. These two bravely kept the enemy
off while the others got away, and were able eventually both to follow
under very heavy fire.
“Lieut. Sharp was wounded, but was able, with the survivors of Captain
Houblon’s party, to reach D.3 and later D.1, held by Captain Barnard
with A Company. When the musketry and machine-gun fire opened in the
wood, Major Power instantly decided to send up the support company
to the ridge south-west of the wood with the object of checking the
enemy’s advance and of reinforcing Captain Ford’s company of Fusiliers
in the new support trench. The exact situation at the time was unknown.
On the way up Major Power was wounded in the chest.”
* * * * *
From about 3.45 p.m. to 6 p.m. the enemy plastered, bombarded and
searched the ridge with a storm of artillery fire, but the Royal
Fusiliers and a few of the 2nd East Yorkshire stood their ground and
the enemy showed no inclination to advance from the wood. Any moment
our people hoped to hear our artillery open, but hoped in vain. If only
our guns could have got on to the wood, the enemy must have suffered
heavily. As it was the contest was an unequal one. It was our infantry
alone against the enemy’s infantry in force and a most powerful
combination of the enemy’s artillery. Fortunately for us the attack of
the enemy’s infantry lacked push and determination. Things quieted down
towards dusk, the enemy contenting himself with remaining where he was,
enabling our retirement, which was ordered for the night 3rd/4th May,
to be carried out quite steadily with a minimum of loss, all wounded
men, spare ammunition and tools being brought away. The remnants of
the battalion moved back to bivouacs in a wood near Poperinghe on the
4th of the month, where it was congratulated by General Plumer on the
excellent work it had done and where it remained till the 8th. There is
no doubt that the Buffs had been fortunate in having in Major Power a
worthy successor to their late colonel. That officer was, however, now
on the sick list from a severe wound in the chest, and the command had
fallen to Captain Jackson, who held it for a few days until the arrival
of a very senior captain, Worthington, who was given the temporary rank
of lieut-colonel.
The total casualties from 22nd April to 4th May were:--
_Officers killed_ 6:
Colonel A. D. Geddes, Captain J. McB. Ronald,
Lieuts. E. H. U. Buttanshaw and W. G. Jackson, 2nd
Lieuts. C. W. Laing and P. T. Featherstonhaugh-Frampton.
_Officers wounded_ 9:
Major R. E. Power, Lieuts. A. D. Wilkins, J. B.
Sharp and D. V. Thomas, 2nd Lieuts. L. M. S. Essell,
E. B. Backhouse, R. M. Watson, G. Seath and S.
Rivers.
_Wounded and Missing_ 2:
Captain F. W. Tomlinson and Lieut. G. R. Howe.
_Missing_ 2:
Captain L. Howard Smith and Lieut. A. L. D.
Ryder.
The other rank casualties are most difficult to account for,
particularly in respect of the 150 men of the two drafts that arrived
on the 30th April and the 1st May respectively. These men’s names
were not known. Also many men were buried in the trenches and it
was impossible to obtain identity discs. The following figures are
approximate; it is certain, however, that many others were killed,
including the majority of the above-mentioned drafts:--
Killed 67
Wounded 259
Wounded and missing 13
Missing 363
A total of 17 officers and 702 other ranks.
* * * * *
It may be conceived and understood from this list of losses that
the old “Contemptible” army had by now disappeared. A few officers,
including promoted N.C.O.’s, and some veteran soldiers, still existed;
many of them, having partially recovered from wounds and sickness,
were now in military employment in England, but, roughly speaking, the
soldiers fighting in France were new men, who, a year before, never
thought it possible that they would be fighting the battles of their
Country; but still the drafts arrived and still the men composing them
were called upon to die or be maimed. It was a sad thing in the case
above recorded for the poor lads of the drafts who had just left Kent
full of life, zeal and enthusiasm to be obliterated immediately on
reaching their long-desired goal, their regiment, and even before they
had been allotted to companies.
At daylight on the 8th May very heavy bombardment was heard, and at
8.30 a.m. the Buffs, still under the command of Captain Jackson, were
ordered to a camp west of Ypres on the Zonnebeke road. Here were found
very poor and dilapidated trenches with demolished parapets, but
these were ordered to be held at all costs, and here the battalion
was shelled all day. B Company set to work to dig itself into a new
support trench about two hundred yards behind the main fire one.
Towards midnight on the 12th, after almost continuous shelling during
the preceding days, the battalion was relieved by the Life Guards and
moved back to Poperinghe.
The next night the Buffs, with the Northumberland Fusiliers, Cheshire
Regiment and 1st Battalion York and Lancasters were formed into a
temporary composite brigade under Br.-General Bols, and told to be
in readiness to move at a moment’s notice, but on the 19th the 85th
Brigade took over this duty from Bols’ men, the Buffs having in the
interval received a large draft of 5 officers and 350 men.
On the 20th the Commander-in-Chief, Sir John French, made a speech to
the 85th Brigade, as well as to others, of which the following is an
extract:--
“I came over to say a few words to you and to tell you how much I, as
Commander-in-Chief of this Army, appreciate the splendid work that
you have all done during the recent fighting. You have fought the
Second Battle of Ypres, which will rank amongst the most desperate
and hardest fights of the war. You may have thought because you were
not attacking the enemy that you were not helping to shorten the war.
On the contrary, by your splendid endurance and bravery, you have
done a great deal to shorten it. In this, the Second Battle of Ypres,
the Germans tried by every means in their power to get possession of
that unfortunate town. They concentrated large forces of troops and
artillery, and further than that they had recourse to that mean and
dastardly practice, hitherto unheard of in civilized warfare, namely,
the use of asphyxiating gases. You have performed the most difficult,
arduous and terrific task of withstanding a stupendous bombardment by
heavy artillery, probably the fiercest artillery fire ever directed
against troops, and warded off the enemy’s attacks with magnificent
bravery. By your steadiness and devotion, both the German plans were
frustrated. He was unable to get possession of Ypres--if he had done
this he would probably have succeeded in preventing neutral Powers from
intervening--and he was also unable to distract us from delivering
our attack in conjunction with the French in the Arras-Armentieres
district. Had you failed to repulse his attacks, and made it necessary
for more troops to be sent to your assistance, our operations in the
south might not have been able to take place, and would certainly not
have been so successful as they have been. Your Colours have many
famous names emblazoned on them, but none will be more famous or more
well-deserved than that of the Second Battle of Ypres. I want you one
and all to understand how thoroughly I realize and appreciate what you
have done. I wish to thank you, each officer, non-commissioned officer
and man, for the services you have rendered by doing your duty so
magnificently, and I am sure that your Country will thank you too.”
* * * * *
At 2.45 a.m. on the 24th May the Germans attacked as a final effort the
whole front from Wieltje to the Menin road. This began with gas for
four and a half hours and a very heavy bombardment with gas shells,
combined with “Flammenwerfen,” a terrible implement for ejecting liquid
fire, new at this time. Then the enemy advanced in very heavy masses
and gained the snipers’ line, but was repulsed in each attempt to get
further. Two companies of the 8th Middlesex and one company East Surrey
immediately north of the railway gave way in consequence of the gas.
There was cavalry on the right of the 85th Brigade and these were at
the same time heavily attacked, so that the O.C. Buffs, which was the
right battalion of the G.H.Q. line, was asked for help. The message
came at 4.30 a.m. and was from Captain Court, 9th Lancers, who said
that his men were “on their knees,” but holding out. Captain Barnard
with A Company followed by half of C, under Lieut. Swayne, at once
started for the rescue to reinforce the trenches north and south of
the Menin road, and thus on this day the Buffs fought in two separate
parties. At 6.30 orders came to reinforce the 3rd Royal Fusiliers, who
meant to retake their lost trench, and B Company, with the remaining
half of C, went up, leaving for the present D Company in the G.H.Q.
line. Directly it left the reserve line this party came under very
heavy shell fire and lost badly. Major Johnstone of the Fusiliers,
however, organized his counter-stroke, but it was beaten off, he
himself being wounded, Lieut. D. W. Hammond of the Buffs killed and
many men of both regiments lost.
The enemy appeared to be in great strength, so the remainder of the
Buffs was ordered up to assist the Royal Fusiliers at a level crossing
on the railway, but all this time the enemy’s shell fire was terrific
and the crossing became merely a death-trap. However, about 1 p.m. D
Company issued from the G.H.Q. lines and tried to come on, though it
was almost an impossibility. It was a terrible undertaking and only
about thirty men, under 2nd Lieut. Mantle, managed the journey. The
situation was most critical as the enemy were working round the right.
About 5 p.m. a counter-attack by the 84th Brigade, though held up,
relieved matters somewhat. At nightfall the attack was continued by
84th and 80th Brigades, but was not successful owing to the terrific
rifle and machine-gun fire directed upon it by the enemy. There were
many casualties. Numbers of Cheshire, Welsh, K.S.L.I. and other
regiments retired into the road cutting held by the Buffs and 3rd Royal
Fusiliers.
Referring to the other party of the battalion which, under Captain
Barnard, had been sent to assist the cavalry who were holding their own
so well, the following extract from the official diary describes its
adventures:--
“Captain Barnard having received orders to reinforce the 9th
Lancers, moved east along the Menin road under shrapnel fire,
meeting on the way scores of gassed and wounded men retiring
from trenches north of the Menin-Ypres road. Eventually about
150 men of A Company filed into the Hooge trenches, the
occupants of which were suffering badly from the gas--especially
the officers. Besides the 9th Lancers, there were portions of
the 18th Hussars, 4th Yorkshires, York and Lancasters and 5th
D.L.I. Captain Grenfell, V.C., 9th Lancers, was in command. A
Company spread all along the five hundred yards of trenches.
The enemy were found to be enveloping our left or north flank
and had pushed on one thousand yards west of it. A Company then
swung round and formed a new firing line facing north to meet
the new menace.”
For three days, until the night of the 26th to 27th, the company
maintained its position and accounted for several of the enemy. The men
were subjected to continuous fire from the enemy’s artillery, snipers
and large trench mortars. It was a case of digging in all day and
night. Some of the trenches were knee deep in water. No rations were
received for two days and the company was in great difficulties, and
a trying situation for the whole period up to the night of 26th/27th,
when it was relieved and moved back to G.H.Q. line. The 25th of the
month was devoted to the collection and reorganization of what was left
of B, C and D Companies under difficulties owing to the many stragglers
from other corps. The enemy fortunately slackened his fierce attacks
and at nightfall many wounded were collected, and after a couple of
comparatively quiet days in the trenches the battalion marched back to
billets east of Poperinghe.
After the narration of such terrible scenes as have been described it
is pleasant to record a happy social event which, though a civilian
reader may possibly regard it as of trivial importance, bears a very
different aspect in the eyes of the English soldier. In all or nearly
all foreign armies the battalions of a regiment are parts of the same
tactical unit, but this does not obtain in our Army. The nature of our
military duties causes the necessity of one battalion being abroad
while the other remains at home, and it is almost unheard of that two
battalions should serve together. There are old and retired Buffs who
remember the meeting of the 1st and 2nd Battalions at Singapore about
the year 1885. The occasion was celebrated then in what might now be
considered almost too jovial a manner, but its rare occurrence made
it very memorable. Again, after the Boer War when the 2nd Battalion,
recently home from South Africa, was quartered in Dover, the 1st, back
from Aden, was sent there also. These meetings are still remembered by
the survivors of those who served in 1885 and 1904. On the 2nd June,
then, in the midst of a tremendous war, it so happening that both the
old units were resting at the same time and near the same place, the
2nd Battalion made a route march to Wittenhoek to visit its sister
battalion which was in bivouac there. It was an historical event as
far as the old regiment was concerned, though, alas, the two portions
of it were not the same men that wore the Dragon on their collars a
year before. Still, there were certain old friendships to renew and the
Buffs were still the Buffs after all.
[Illustration: YPRES]