announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for
discussion two points: “the analogy of the proposed government to your
own State constitution,” and “the additional security which its
adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, and to
property.” But these heads have been so fully anticipated and exhausted
in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to
do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated form, what has been
heretofore said, which the advanced stage of the question, and the time
already spent upon it, conspire to forbid.
It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the convention to
the act which organizes the government of this State holds, not less
with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to the real
excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects are the
re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of a council, the omission of
a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision respecting the
liberty of the press. These and several others which have been noted in
the course of our inquiries are as much chargeable on the existing
constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the Union; and a
man must have slender pretensions to consistency, who can rail at the
latter for imperfections which he finds no difficulty in excusing in
the former. Nor indeed can there be a better proof of the insincerity
and affectation of some of the zealous adversaries of the plan of the
convention among us, who profess to be the devoted admirers of the
government under which they live, than the fury with which they have
attacked that plan, for matters in regard to which our own constitution
is equally or perhaps more vulnerable.
The additional securities to republican government, to liberty and to
property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under
consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation
of the Union will impose on local factions and insurrections, and on
the ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who may acquire
credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the
despots of the people; in the diminution of the opportunities to
foreign intrigue, which the dissolution of the Confederacy would invite
and facilitate; in the prevention of extensive military establishments,
which could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a
disunited situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of
government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles
of nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition of those
practices on the part of the State governments which have undermined
the foundations of property and credit, have planted mutual distrust in
the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have occasioned an almost
universal prostration of morals.
Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned to
myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust at
least you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance I gave you
respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be conducted. I
have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and have studiously
avoided those asperities which are too apt to disgrace political
disputants of all parties, and which have been not a little provoked by
the language and conduct of the opponents of the Constitution. The
charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the people, which has
been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan, has
something in it too wanton and too malignant, not to excite the
indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of the
calumny. The perpetual changes which have been rung upon the wealthy,
the well-born, and the great, have been such as to inspire the disgust
of all sensible men. And the unwarrantable concealments and
misrepresentations which have been in various ways practiced to keep
the truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to demand the
reprobation of all honest men. It is not impossible that these
circumstances may have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of
expression which I did not intend; it is certain that I have frequently
felt a struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former
has in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been
neither often nor much.
Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of these
papers, the proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily
vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has not
been shown to be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary to the
public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer these
questions to himself, according to the best of his conscience and
understanding, and to act agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates
of his judgment. This is a duty from which nothing can give him a
dispensation. ’T is one that he is called upon, nay, constrained by all
the obligations that form the bands of society, to discharge sincerely
and honestly. No partial motive, no particular interest, no pride of
opinion, no temporary passion or prejudice, will justify to himself, to
his country, or to his posterity, an improper election of the part he
is to act. Let him beware of an obstinate adherence to party; let him
reflect that the object upon which he is to decide is not a particular
interest of the community, but the very existence of the nation; and
let him remember that a majority of America has already given its
sanction to the plan which he is to approve or reject.
I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the arguments
which recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and that I am
unable to discern any real force in those by which it has been opposed.
I am persuaded that it is the best which our political situation,
habits, and opinions will admit, and superior to any the revolution has
produced.
Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has not a
claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small triumph
to its enemies. “Why,” say they, “should we adopt an imperfect thing?
Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is irrevocably
established?” This may be plausible enough, but it is only plausible.
In the first place I remark, that the extent of these concessions has
been greatly exaggerated. They have been stated as amounting to an
admission that the plan is radically defective, and that without
material alterations the rights and the interests of the community
cannot be safely confided to it. This, as far as I have understood the
meaning of those who make the concessions, is an entire perversion of
their sense. No advocate of the measure can be found, who will not
declare as his sentiment, that the system, though it may not be perfect
in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the
present views and circumstances of the country will permit; and is such
an one as promises every species of security which a reasonable people
can desire.
I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme of
imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national affairs, and
to expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive experiments, in the
chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect
work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all
collective bodies must necessarily be a compound, as well of the errors
and prejudices, as of the good sense and wisdom, of the individuals of
whom they are composed. The compacts which are to embrace thirteen
distinct States in a common bond of amity and union, must as
necessarily be a compromise of as many dissimilar interests and
inclinations. How can perfection spring from such materials?
The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately published
in this city[1] are unanswerable to show the utter improbability of
assembling a new convention, under circumstances in any degree so
favorable to a happy issue, as those in which the late convention met,
deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the arguments there used,
as I presume the production itself has had an extensive circulation. It
is certainly well worthy the perusal of every friend to his country.
There is, however, one point of light in which the subject of
amendments still remains to be considered, and in which it has not yet
been exhibited to public view. I cannot resolve to conclude without
first taking a survey of it in this aspect.
It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it will be
far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments to the
Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the present plan, it
becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must undergo a new
decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout the
Union, it will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen States.
If, on the contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be ratified
by all the States as it stands, alterations in it may at any time be
effected by nine States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to
nine[2] in favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original
adoption of an entire system.
This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must
inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen
independent States are to be accommodated in their interests or
opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see, in any body of
men charged with its original formation, very different combinations of
the parts upon different points. Many of those who form a majority on
one question, may become the minority on a second, and an association
dissimilar to either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence the
necessity of moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to
compose the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to
the compact; and hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties
and casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The
degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the
number of particulars and the number of parties.
But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be
a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There would
then be no necessity for management or compromise, in relation to any
other point no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite number
would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently,
whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a
particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place. There
can, therefore, be no comparison between the facility of affecting an
amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a complete
Constitution.
In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been
urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the national
government will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the
authority of which they were once possessed. For my own part I
acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon
mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the
organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on
this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just
stated. I also think there is little weight in it on another account.
The intrinsic difficulty of governing thirteen States at any rate,
independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit
and integrity, will, in my opinion constantly impose on the national
rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable
expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a further
consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the
observation is futile. It is this that the national rulers, whenever
nine States concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth
article of the plan, the Congress will be obliged “on the application
of the legislatures of two thirds of the States, which at present
amount to nine, to call a convention for proposing amendments, which
shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the
Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the
States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof.” The words of this
article are peremptory. The Congress “shall call a convention.” Nothing
in this particular is left to the discretion of that body. And of
consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to a change
vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two
thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which
may affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such
difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative to the
general liberty or security of the people. We may safely rely on the
disposition of the State legislatures to erect barriers against the
encroachments of the national authority.
If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am myself
deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those rare
instances in which a political truth can be brought to the test of a
mathematical demonstration. Those who see the matter in the same light
with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in the
propriety of a previous adoption, as the most direct road to their own
object.
The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the
Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to the
truth of the following observations of a writer equally solid and
ingenious: “To balance a large state or society Usays hee, whether
monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great
difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by
the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of
many must unite in the work; experience must guide their labor; time
must bring it to perfection, and the feeling of inconveniences must
correct the mistakes which they INEVITABLY fall into in their first
trials and experiments.”[3] These judicious reflections contain a
lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers of the Union, and ought
to put them upon their guard against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a
perpetual alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps the
military despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of what
they are not likely to obtain, but from time and experience. It may be
in me a defect of political fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot
entertain an equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat the
dangers of a longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary.
A nation, without a national government, is, in my view, an awful
spectacle. The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound
peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a prodigy, to the
completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can
reconcile it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in
so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States, and
after having passed over so considerable a part of the ground, to
recommence the course. I dread the more the consequences of new
attempts, because I know that powerful individuals, in this and in
other States, are enemies to a general national government in every
possible shape.
PUBLIUS.
[1] Entitled “An Address to the People of the State of New York.”
[2] It may rather be said TEN, for though two thirds may set on foot
the measure, three fourths must ratify.
[3] Hume’s _Essays_, vol. i., page 128: “The Rise of Arts and
Sciences.”