exercise it in a careful inspection of the several State constitutions,
they would find little less room for disquietude and alarm, from the
latitude which most of them allow in respect to elections, than from
the latitude which is proposed to be allowed to the national government
in the same respect. A review of their situation, in this particular,
would tend greatly to remove any ill impressions which may remain in
regard to this matter. But as that view would lead into long and
tedious details, I shall content myself with the single example of the
State in which I write. The constitution of New York makes no other
provision for LOCALITY of elections, than that the members of the
Assembly shall be elected in the COUNTIES; those of the Senate, in the
great districts into which the State is or may be divided: these at
present are four in number, and comprehend each from two to six
counties. It may readily be perceived that it would not be more
difficult to the legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages of the
citizens of New York, by confining elections to particular places, than
for the legislature of the United States to defeat the suffrages of the
citizens of the Union, by the like expedient. Suppose, for instance,
the city of Albany was to be appointed the sole place of election for
the county and district of which it is a part, would not the
inhabitants of that city speedily become the only electors of the
members both of the Senate and Assembly for that county and district?
Can we imagine that the electors who reside in the remote subdivisions
of the counties of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge, etc., or in any part of
the county of Montgomery, would take the trouble to come to the city of
Albany, to give their votes for members of the Assembly or Senate,
sooner than they would repair to the city of New York, to participate
in the choice of the members of the federal House of Representatives?
The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable
a privilege under the existing laws, which afford every facility to it,
furnishes a ready answer to this question. And, abstracted from any
experience on the subject, we can be at no loss to determine, that when
the place of election is at an INCONVENIENT DISTANCE from the elector,
the effect upon his conduct will be the same whether that distance be
twenty miles or twenty thousand miles. Hence it must appear, that
objections to the particular modification of the federal power of
regulating elections will, in substance, apply with equal force to the
modification of the like power in the constitution of this State; and
for this reason it will be impossible to acquit the one, and to condemn
the other. A similar comparison would lead to the same conclusion in
respect to the constitutions of most of the other States.
If it should be said that defects in the State constitutions furnish no
apology for those which are to be found in the plan proposed, I answer,
that as the former have never been thought chargeable with inattention
to the security of liberty, where the imputations thrown on the latter
can be shown to be applicable to them also, the presumption is that
they are rather the cavilling refinements of a predetermined
opposition, than the well-founded inferences of a candid research after
truth. To those who are disposed to consider, as innocent omissions in
the State constitutions, what they regard as unpardonable blemishes in
the plan of the convention, nothing can be said; or at most, they can
only be asked to assign some substantial reason why the representatives
of the people in a single State should be more impregnable to the lust
of power, or other sinister motives, than the representatives of the
people of the United States? If they cannot do this, they ought at
least to prove to us that it is easier to subvert the liberties of
three millions of people, with the advantage of local governments to
head their opposition, than of two hundred thousand people who are
destitute of that advantage. And in relation to the point immediately
under consideration, they ought to convince us that it is less probable
that a predominant faction in a single State should, in order to
maintain its superiority, incline to a preference of a particular class
of electors, than that a similar spirit should take possession of the
representatives of thirteen States, spread over a vast region, and in
several respects distinguishable from each other by a diversity of
local circumstances, prejudices, and interests.
Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindication of the
provision in question, on the ground of theoretic propriety, on that of
the danger of placing the power elsewhere, and on that of the safety of
placing it in the manner proposed. But there remains to be mentioned a
positive advantage which will result from this disposition, and which
could not as well have been obtained from any other: I allude to the
circumstance of uniformity in the time of elections for the federal
House of Representatives. It is more than possible that this uniformity
may be found by experience to be of great importance to the public
welfare, both as a security against the perpetuation of the same spirit
in the body, and as a cure for the diseases of faction. If each State
may choose its own time of election, it is possible there may be at
least as many different periods as there are months in the year. The
times of election in the several States, as they are now established
for local purposes, vary between extremes as wide as March and
November. The consequence of this diversity would be that there could
never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time.
If an improper spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that
spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members, as they come
forward in succession. The mass would be likely to remain nearly the
same, assimilating constantly to itself its gradual accretions. There
is a contagion in example which few men have sufficient force of mind
to resist. I am inclined to think that treble the duration in office,
with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the same time,
might be less formidable to liberty than one third of that duration
subject to gradual and successive alterations.
Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less requisite for
executing the idea of a regular rotation in the Senate, and for
conveniently assembling the legislature at a stated period in each
year.
It may be asked, Why, then, could not a time have been fixed in the
Constitution? As the most zealous adversaries of the plan of the
convention in this State are, in general, not less zealous admirers of
the constitution of the State, the question may be retorted, and it may
be asked, Why was not a time for the like purpose fixed in the
constitution of this State? No better answer can be given than that it
was a matter which might safely be entrusted to legislative discretion;
and that if a time had been appointed, it might, upon experiment, have
been found less convenient than some other time. The same answer may be
given to the question put on the other side. And it may be added that
the supposed danger of a gradual change being merely speculative, it
would have been hardly advisable upon that speculation to establish, as
a fundamental point, what would deprive several States of the
convenience of having the elections for their own governments and for
the national government at the same epochs.
PUBLIUS.
THE FEDERALIST.
No. LXII.
The Senate
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON OR MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
Having examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and
answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I
enter next on the examination of the Senate.
The heads into which this member of the government may be considered
are: I. The qualification of senators; II. The appointment of them by
the State legislatures; III. The equality of representation in the
Senate; IV. The number of senators, and the term for which they are to
be elected; V. The powers vested in the Senate.
I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from
those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a longer
period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least;
as a representative must be twenty-five. And the former must have been
a citizen nine years; as seven years are required for the latter. The
propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the
senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of information and
stability of character, requires at the same time that the senator
should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these
advantages; and which, participating immediately in transactions with
foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly
weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and
education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity
between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents
may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and
hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign
influence on the national councils.
II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators
by the State legislatures. Among the various modes which might have
been devised for constituting this branch of the government, that which
has been proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with
the public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of
favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments
such an agency in the formation of the federal government as must
secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link
between the two systems.
III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point,
which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite
pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much
discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly
incorporated into one nation, every district ought to have a
PROPORTIONAL share in the government, and that among independent and
sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties,
however unequal in size, ought to have an EQUAL share in the common
councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that in a
compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal
character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the
principles of proportional and equal representation. But it is
superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the
Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of
theory, but “of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and
concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered
indispensable.” A common government, with powers equal to its objects,
is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political
situation, of America. A government founded on principles more
consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to be
obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the
former, lies between the proposed government and a government still
more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence must
be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless
anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate
rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the sacrifice.
In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each
State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of
sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for
preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be
no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they
are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against
an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic.
Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of
the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper
acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the
concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a
majority of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated
check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as
beneficial; and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of
the smaller States, would be more rational, if any interests common to
them, and distinct from those of the other States, would otherwise be
exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be
able, by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable
exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty
and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our
governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the
Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many
in contemplation.
IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their appointment, come
next to be considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both of
these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are
to be answered by a senate; and in order to ascertain these, it will be
necessary to review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer
from the want of such an institution.
First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in
a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it
may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove
unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate,
as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and
dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check
on the government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring
the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or
perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be
sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and
now so well understood in the United States, that it would be more than
superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the
improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the
dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to
distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will
consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine
principles of republican government.
Secondly. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the
propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the
impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious
leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this
subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the
United States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a
position that will not be contradicted, need not be proved. All that
need be remarked is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity
ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less
numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and
consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable
duration.
Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of
due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is
not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from
pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short
time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public
occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive
interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves,
escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their
legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no
small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged
on the blunders of our governments; and that these have proceeded from
the heads rather than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What
indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill
and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient
wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against each
preceding session; so many admonitions to the people, of the value of
those aids which may be expected from a well-constituted senate?
A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of
government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge
of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some
governments are deficient in both these qualities; most governments are
deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert, that in American
governments too little attention has been paid to the last. The federal
Constitution avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it
provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the
first.
Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid
succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out,
in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in
the government. Every new election in the States is found to change one
half of the representatives. From this change of men must proceed a
change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of
measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent
with every rule of prudence and every prospect of success. The remark
is verified in private life, and becomes more just, as well as more
important, in national transactions.
To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a
volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a
source of innumerable others.
In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other
nations, and all the advantages connected with national character. An
individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to
carry on his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all
prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly.
His more friendly neighbors may pity him, but all will decline to
connect their fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the
opportunity of making their fortunes out of his. One nation is to
another what one individual is to another; with this melancholy
distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the benevolent
emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking
undue advantage from the indiscretions of each other. Every nation,
consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, may
calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic
policy of their wiser neighbors. But the best instruction on this
subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own
situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends;
that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to
every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating
councils and embarrassed affairs.
The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It
poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to
the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the
laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that
they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they
are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who
knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law
is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is
little known, and less fixed?
Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it
gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few over the
industrious and uniformed mass of the people. Every new regulation
concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way affecting the value of
the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who
watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not
by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their
fellow-citizens. This is a state of things in which it may be said with
some truth that laws are made for the FEW, not for the MANY.
In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable
government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps every
useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend on a
continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard
his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows not but that
his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What
farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given
to any particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no
assurance that his preparatory labors and advances will not render him
a victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement
or laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of a
steady system of national policy.
But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment
and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people, towards a
political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and
disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government, any more
than an individual, will long be respected without being truly
respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a certain
portion of order and stability.
PUBLIUS.
THE FEDERALIST.
No. LXIII.
The Senate Continued
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON OR MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
A fifth desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want
of a due sense of national character. Without a select and stable
member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be
forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the
causes already mentioned, but the national councils will not possess
that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less
necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain, its respect and
confidence.
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every
government for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the
merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various
accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a
wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful cases,
particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong
passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the
impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has
not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and how
many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and
propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried
by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part
of mankind?
Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is
evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and
changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small that a
sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the
portion of each individual; or in an assembly so durably invested with
public trust, that the pride and consequence of its members may be
sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the
community. The half-yearly representatives of Rhode Island would
probably have been little affected in their deliberations on the
iniquitous measures of that State, by arguments drawn from the light in
which such measures would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by the
sister States; whilst it can scarcely be doubted that if the
concurrence of a select and stable body had been necessary, a regard to
national character alone would have prevented the calamities under
which that misguided people is now laboring.
I add, as a SIXTH defect the want, in some important cases, of a due
responsibility in the government to the people, arising from that
frequency of elections which in other cases produces this
responsibility. This remark will, perhaps, appear not only new, but
paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained, to
be as undeniable as it is important.