Transcriber’s Notes:
A small number of obvious typos have been corrected. Except for
these corrections, the spelling and punctuation of the book have
not been changed.
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end this sentence _are in italics_.
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THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE
JAPANESE WAR
[Illustration: GENERAL KUROPATKIN REVIEWING HIS TROOPS.]
THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND
THE JAPANESE WAR,
BEING HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL COMMENTS ON
THE MILITARY POLICY AND POWER OF RUSSIA
AND ON THE CAMPAIGN IN THE FAR EAST,
BY GENERAL KUROPATKIN.
TRANSLATED BY
CAPTAIN A. B. LINDSAY,
2ND KING EDWARD’S OWN GURKHA RIFLES
TRANSLATOR OF “THE BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA”;
“THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR,” ETC.
EDITED BY
MAJOR E. D. SWINTON, D.S.O., R.E.,
AUTHOR OF “THE DEFENCE OF DUFFER’S DRIFT”;
AND EDITOR OF “THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR.”
WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
IN TWO VOLUMES: VOL. II.
NEW YORK
E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY
1909
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
CONTENTS TO VOL. II
CHAPTER IX
PAGES
Reasons for our reverses (_continued_): The insufficient
tactical preparation of our troops—Measures taken
to improve it 1–25
CHAPTER X
Reasons for our reverses (_conclusion_): Particular
difficulties of the strategic situation—Defects in
organization and _personnel_—Absence of a military
spirit in the army, and lack of determination in
carrying operations to a finish—Breakdown of our
organization under the strain of active service 26–97
CHAPTER XI
Suggested measures for the improvement of the senior
ranks; for the improvement of the regulars and
reservists; for the reorganization of the reserve
troops; for increasing the number of combatants
in infantry regiments—Machine-guns—Reserve
troops—Troops on the communications—Engineers
—Artillery—Cavalry—Infantry—Organization generally 98–176
CHAPTER XII
Summary of the war 177–204
CHAPTER XIII
Introduction and conclusion to Volume III. 205–305
APPENDIX I
The Royal Timber Company 306–313
APPENDIX II
Breakdown of the unit organization and distribution 314–335
INDEX 336–348
ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOL. II.
GENERAL KUROPATKIN REVIEWING HIS TROOPS _Frontispiece_
OPPOSITE PAGE
GENERAL LINIEVITCH 18
GENERAL BARON KITEN NOGI 40
GENERAL GRIPPENBERG 100
FIELD-MARSHAL MARQUIS IWAO OYAMA 206
MAPS
SKETCH-MAP OF MANCHURIA, SHOWING MAIN PLACES
ALONG RAILWAY SOUTH OF HARBIN 27
DIAGRAM SHOWING THE POSITION OF THE THEATRE OF
WAR RELATIVELY TO RUSSIA AND JAPAN 34
SKETCH-MAP OF AREA CONTAINING THE BATTLE-FIELDS
OF LIAO-YANG, THE SHA HO, HEI-KOU-TAI, AND
MUKDEN, SHOWING SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT
PLACES MENTIONED _At the end_
MAP OF THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS SOUTH OF
MUKDEN _At the end_
THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE JAPANESE WAR
CHAPTER IX
REASONS FOR OUR REVERSES (_continued_)
The insufficient tactical preparation of our troops—Measures
taken to improve it.
I have touched upon the fact of how our want of tactical training was
shown up in the Crimean and second Turkish Wars. Especially conspicuous
was the inability of our senior commanders—relying as they usually
did upon quite inadequate information as to the enemy’s strength and
dispositions—to co-ordinate the operations of the different arms
towards one end, and their ignorance of where to deliver the main
attack. The minor part played by our cavalry and our comparatively
great power of defence were also remarked. Finally, attention was drawn
to the fact that our lack of the power of manœuvre compelled us to
place superior numbers in the field against the Turks, a course which
had not formerly been necessary.
After the war of 1877–78 we set to work to study our weak points, in
order to eliminate our faults. Much must have been accomplished since
then, for the tactical training of the army at the beginning of the
recent war was undoubtedly of a higher standard than it was twenty-five
years ago. Still, in some matters we had not progressed, while in
others we had actually gone back. The duty of training the troops rests
with commanding officers of all ranks, and the responsibility for this
extends right up to those in command of military districts. Although
the same drill-books and manuals are used by the whole army, there
is considerable variety in the way that the tactical instruction is
imparted, owing to the diverse views held by the district commanders.
I have taken part in many manœuvres, and was in command of the army
at the grand manœuvres at Kursk in 1902, and I noted down what I
considered to be our principal failings in this respect. In October,
1903, I submitted a report on the subject to the Tsar, in which my
conclusions on certain points were as follows:
“1. _Staff Work with the Main Army and with Detached Columns at
the Grand Manœuvres._
“Generally speaking, the staff work cannot be characterized
as entirely satisfactory. The principal reasons for this were
the somewhat unhappy selection of the officers appointed to
be chiefs of the different staffs, the poor organization of
the staffs themselves, due to a limited personnel and to an
insufficient supply of the means of communication [telegraph
and telephone equipment] for both the troops and staffs, and
the neglect to arrange proper intercommunication between units
by making use of mounted orderlies, automobiles, or cyclists.
Intelligence of the enemy as well as of the disposition
of other units was always received late by those whom it
concerned, because the cavalry was badly organized, and could
not carry out its orders properly.
“The amount of writing done by the various staff-officers was
colossal. They worked the whole evening and all night; their
effusions were lithographed or printed, and were sent off in
all directions; but the orders were rarely received by the
troops in proper time. At the manœuvres of the Warsaw Military
District in 1899, cases came under my notice of general
officers commanding divisions receiving the order to move in
the morning two hours after the time appointed for them to
start.
“In many instances staff-officers with troops seemed ignorant
of how a reconnaissance should be carried out, and consequently
did not gauge the dispositions of the enemy’s forces with
sufficient accuracy. This reacted in turn on the dispositions
made by the chief commanders, more particularly in their
employment of the reserves (Kursk manœuvres and those at Pskoff
and Vlodava). Similarly, they did not know how to arrange for
the maintenance of touch along the front and to the rear,
a defect which caused a delay in the receipt of orders and
information which was quite avoidable.
“2. _Work of the Cavalry at Manœuvres._
“The increased importance now attached to the strategic or
independent duties of cavalry has, in my opinion, acted
detrimentally upon the cavalry work with the troops. The
spirit of the strategic rôle was in most cases not properly
grasped, and the chief idea of the masses of mounted troops of
both sides appeared to be to meet each other. They therefore
neglected to furnish the commanders of their sides with the
information of the enemy, so necessary before an action, and
left the infantry without their co-operation during the actual
combat; this was the same whether they were acting in attack or
defence. Long-distance patrols often did useful work, but owing
to the lack of proper means for the quick transmission of the
information collected, it reached the troops to whom it might
be useful after the enemy’s dispositions had been changed.
The near patrols did not work in with the long-distance ones.
Our mounted troops were frequently allowed to lose touch with
the enemy at night under the pretext that the men and horses
required rest, and the employment of a dozen troopers was
grudged after dark, when by day whole divisions and corps were
futilely marched and countermarched, and sent upon duties which
were not always in accordance with the general idea of the
operations.
“The cavalry work should be more strictly in co-operation with
that of the other arms than it is at present, and all officers
in command of mounted units should remember that their rôle is
auxiliary, and largely consists in assisting the General in
command to come to a proper decision by the completeness and
accuracy of the information they send back; that the cavalry
should help the commanders, firstly, to frame a plan of action,
then to crush the enemy on the field of battle.
“3. _Attack and the Defence._
“Here again information was wanting. When commanders made up
their minds either to attack or to stand on the defensive, they
were never able to feel, from their information of the enemy
and the locality, that they thoroughly knew what they were
doing, or that it really was in accordance with the spirit of
the general idea. We were strong in the defence, but we rarely
delivered a soundly conceived or executed attack. In the attack
column commanders did not always take pains to obtain enough
accurate information as to the dispositions and strength of the
enemy, so as to be able to appreciate the situation properly
and draw up a reasoned plan of battle, to select the direction
of the main attack, to allot the troops for it, and take steps
to deceive the enemy as to its precise direction. When they had
massed sufficient first-line troops for the main attack, they
did not also move up the reserves of all arms.
“In particular, we did not know how to conduct the advance, and
then deliver the assault with proper preparation by artillery
and rifle fire. Many commanders seem, unfortunately, to be
wedded to the idea of carrying out a continuous advance without
making any use of the rifle. If we ever encounter an enemy,
such as the Germans, who systematically train their troops to
advance under cover of their own heavy rifle-fire, we shall be
worsted, for in peace we often advance almost without firing a
rifle to a range of 1,000 or even 800 paces of the position.
“The guns also frequently ceased fire at the same critical
period—_i.e._, when their attacking infantry are nearing the
enemy. My inquiries as to the reason for this were usually
met with the reply that their ammunition was expended. If
the absolute necessity for keeping in hand a considerable
number of rounds for the assistance of the decisive infantry
attack is not realized now that we have quick-firing guns, our
artillery will in war become useless at the very moment when
its co-operation is most vital.
“In defence we are better than in the attack, and we know how
to make the most of the fire effect of both guns and rifles.
The ranges in front of a position are usually measured and
clearly marked. But proper use is not made of reserves. We do
not, as we should, throw them into the firing-line, so as to
increase the volume of fire after the enemy’s main attack has
developed, nor do we launch them in a fierce counter-attack
after he has come within decisive range. The reserves are
often kept in mass, and thrown against the attack without any
supporting rifle-fire. Many regiments and brigades told off as
reserves to a defensive position go through the whole manœuvres
without firing a single round.
“4. _The Revival of the Column Formation in the Attack._
“Other European armies are now doing everything possible to
minimize the murderous effect of modern rifle and artillery
fire on themselves, and are, at the same time, endeavouring
to develop their own fire to the utmost, both in the attack
and defence; indeed, the Germans, in their efforts to this
end, have gone the extreme length of deploying all their
troops—sometimes even to the sacrifice of their reserves—in
long thin lines. We, on the other hand, judging by the last
manœuvres, are going to the other extreme, for our decisive
attack is delivered almost without any fire preparation, and
with men massed in quarter column!
“If a stop is not put to the increasing density of our attack
formations, we shall suffer for it heavily. It is all the more
dangerous for us, as we do not assist our assaulting infantry
properly with supporting gun and rifle fire.
“5. _The Work of the Artillery._
“Artillery positions were in most cases skilfully chosen, but
the fire discipline was often bad. As batteries can only carry
a limited number of rounds in the field, it is vital that the
gunners should be taught to economize every round; this is, of
course, particularly important with quick-firing guns. But we
often fired more rounds than were necessary: fire was opened
too hurriedly, at quite unimportant targets, with the result
that, at the critical moment of the attack, batteries had to
signal that they were in action, for all their ammunition had
been expended.[1]
“6. _The Work of the Sappers._
“The bloody lessons of Plevna and Gora Dubniak put fresh life
into our military engineering, which lasted for a certain
time after the Turkish War. Our sappers became skilful at
constructing trenches and redoubts, and the other troops were
also trained in field-works, and began to like entrenching
themselves. But a reaction soon set in. This was largely due
to General Dragomiroff, who did much to bring about a return
to the old order of things, when it was held that everything
was decided by the bayonet. He was quite opposed to the use of
cover, and carried his orders on this subject to the height of
absurdity, even forbidding his men to lie down while advancing
to attack!
“To dig oneself into the ground means labour, and takes much
time. Moreover, instructions used to be issued that all
trenches dug had to be filled in again, and all redoubts
dismantled. This at once limited the scope of trench-work in
the army. The entrenching tool, which after the Turkish War had
been valued next to cartridges and biscuits, was relegated to
the mobilization store, and never brought out for use or even
for inspection. At many manœuvres the men were not practised at
all in the fortification of positions; at others the alignment
of trenches was traced only. While giving the sapper units full
credit for their excellent training, I cannot but express my
fear that they specialize far too much in a mass of detail, and
ignore the fact that their main duty in war is to co-operate in
every way with the infantry, both in strengthening defensive
positions and in the attack of them.
“7. _Criticism by Commanders._
“It is gradually becoming the custom to omit all criticisms[2]
at grand manœuvres. Mistakes, therefore, pass unnoticed, are
repeated, and tend to become chronic. I remember some very
instructive manœuvre criticisms made by General Gurko, and
I have listened with interest and advantage to others made
by General Roop. Discussions after the operations are always
held in the Kieff and St. Petersburg Military Districts,
but nowadays some officers in command of districts neither
make any remarks themselves when present at manœuvres, nor
expect them to be made by the officers commanding sides or
the other seniors. Orders issued after a long period—though
they may enumerate the various points noticed—and the reports
eventually printed of large concentrations and manœuvres, are
comparatively useless for instruction. To be of use, criticisms
must be made by the commanders, and made on the spot.
“It is, however, important to realize how rare the power of
good criticism is. The remarks usually made are either quite
colourless or too highly pitched. Some of our most capable
general officers also seem peculiarly ‘unlucky’ in the way
they manage unnecessarily to hurt the feelings of commanding
officers by their harsh way of putting things. They forget
that to lower the prestige of a senior in the presence of his
juniors always produces a bitter harvest, especially in war.
They forget the infinite variety of the conditions of different
tactical situations, and that at peace manœuvres there is
no need for one side to win or lose. Again, independent
action, though certainly not wrong in itself, is often put
down as a mistake and adjudged to be wrong because the senior
commander has his own opinion in the matter. Such narrow-minded
criticism deprives officers in command of units of the
spirit of independence, of initiative, and of the desire for
responsibility. Instead, they try to discover the fads of the
officer in command, in order to ‘play up’ to them.
“8. _Conclusion as to the Tactical Instruction of our Troops._
“Although the opinion of the generals in command of military
districts in all matters pertaining to military training
should, and do, carry great weight, yet there must be some
limit to individual action. It is impossible, for instance, to
permit each of them to train the troops in his command entirely
in accordance with his own views as to what is most important
in war; for the instruction of attack and defence should not
be carried out on entirely different lines in the different
districts. Yet this is more or less what has been done. We at
headquarters are partly to blame, owing to the delay in the
publication of the field-service manuals and the instructions
for the combined training of all arms. As an example of what I
refer to: General Dragomiroff has trained the troops under him
in the Kieff Military District to attack according to a system
of his own, of which the soundness is open to doubt. If some of
his theories are carried out in war, they will result in heavy
loss, and therefore their inculcation in peace seems entirely
wrong. His order that the skirmishers escorting artillery
should be on a line with the guns themselves would only cause
the premature silencing of the latter; and another, that the
lines of skirmishers advancing to attack should not lie down
when halted, is simply impossible of execution. When bullets
are flying, a line lies down of its own accord as soon as it
halts, and quite rightly so, as men get cover more easily when
lying than standing. And now, following General Dragomiroff’s
example, in the Vilna Military District General Grippenberg has
begun to act according to his own theories, and depart from
the textbook. In his District Orders this year,[3] in which
were published his criticisms on the work done at manœuvres, he
recommends that infantry in close order should receive cavalry
with independent fire[4] instead of with volleys. He insists,
also, that when a line is advancing by short rushes, these
rushes should begin from the flanks.
“Unfortunately, much that I saw when inspecting the troops in
the different districts and on grand manœuvres led me to the
conclusion that the tactical training, especially in command,
of officers commanding units, from regiments upwards, is
neither sound nor uniform.”
My strictures on the peace tactical training of the army were,
unfortunately, only too well confirmed during the war.
The theatre of war in Manchuria presented many peculiarities of
climate, topography, and inhabitants. It was unlike any of the
“probable” theatres of operations we had studied, and was, therefore,
quite new to the troops who came from European Russia. The Japanese
were not only new and practically unknown foes, but the nature of the
information that we did possess about them tended to show our great
superiority, and therefore incited us to contempt. The existing edition
of our “Field Service Regulations” was obsolete, and the revised
edition was still in the Press. Special instructions, therefore, had to
be issued, in order to assist our troops to grapple with the entirely
strange conditions under which they were placed. These were compiled
and printed under my direction, and distributed to officers in command
of all units, from companies and squadrons upwards, and to all chief
staff-officers. In them I emphasized the necessity of getting to know
something about the enemy, enumerated their strong and weak points,
and drew attention to their patriotism and traditional indifference to
death. I stated that their strong points predominated, and that in the
Japanese we should find a very powerful opponent, even when reckoned by
European standards. I continued:
“It is most important that in the first engagements, in which
they will certainly be in superior strength, we should not give
the Japanese the satisfaction of victory, for that will only
still further elevate their spirit.
“No particular or new tactics need be adopted against our
present enemy, but we must not repeat the mistakes in
manœuvring which cost us so dear in the Turkish War of 1877–78.”
I then mentioned the causes of our reverses at Plevna, and commented
in detail on the most important. After capturing Nicopolis, our troops
moved on Plevna in ignorance of the strength and dispositions of the
enemy. As far as obtaining this information was concerned, our cavalry
was not well handled. In the first fight at Plevna (July 20, 1877)
we attacked with too few men and in detail. We did the same in the
fights of July 31 and September 12, but to an even greater extent,
and the attacks were carried out in too dense a formation, were not
sufficiently prepared by fire-effect, and our own numerous cavalry
and that of the Roumanians did practically nothing. The attacks on
September 10 and 11, 1877, failed because our troops were badly
distributed and untrained. I attached an appreciation of the work of
our troops in the Turkish War as follows:
“In this war the staff work was not always successful. The
troops often received orders too late, and time was wasted
waiting for their receipt before commencing a move. Units
arriving at night on the positions allotted to them did not
always find the officers who should have been waiting their
arrival to guide them. Officers in command of troops were
often not informed by the staff as to the enemy’s strength
and dispositions, or as to our own neighbouring columns. Lack
of information was the principal cause of our disasters; we
sometimes attacked in entire ignorance of the enemy’s strength
and dispositions, and even partially so of our own.
“As an example of what our troops can do in an attack may be
quoted the capture of Kars; it is a very instructive case.
Though the weak field-works of Plevna resisted our efforts for
five months, at Kars neither strong parapets nor deep ditches
could check our onslaught. Our gallant Caucasians advanced on
the fortress by night; they were well led, and always had a
body of scouts skilfully thrown out in front, and they captured
strongholds that had been termed ‘impregnable’ with great
bravery.
“In the defence our troops have always fought well. Let us
remember the defence of the Shipka Pass, and imitate it.”
After a short review of our errors in the Turkish War, I enumerated
those which were still noticeable in our peace manœuvres.
As operations developed the enemy’s peculiarities became as well known
as our own, so I was able in August, September, October, and December,
1904, to issue supplementary instructions.
Notwithstanding the number of our cavalry, and what our scouts had
been able to do, we had not ascertained the general dispositions
and strength of the enemy. The information brought in by spies was
exaggerated and unreliable. The result was that, when we had carried
out any offensive operations, we had advanced without knowing anything
of the enemy. My instructions ran:
_Instructions issued in August._
“In our attacks we have started the advance too rapidly,
without strengthening positions already occupied, and without
full artillery co-operation, and we have stopped the action at
a period when we still had large numbers both in the general
and regimental reserves. In retirements we have withdrawn to
positions previously occupied by us without having taken steps
to hold our ground on any of them, which preparation would not
only have greatly assisted the retirement itself, but, what was
far more important, would have enabled us to renew the attack.
“Another point is, that many of our defensive positions have
not corresponded to the numbers, when extended, told off to
defend them. Nevertheless, the enemy’s frontal attacks, even if
we hold quite chance positions, usually fail, and we have been
obliged to abandon our ground owing to the turning movements
which their superior numbers have made possible.
“In attacking, especially among hills, the infantry must wait
so that the assault may be prepared by fire, in order to get
breath or to give time for the co-operation of a turning
movement. There is also another and involuntary reason for
halting—namely, the enemy’s fire. Owing to this, units halt,
or, what is worse, begin to retire without orders; what then
usually happens is this: A few men begin to trickle back from
some company that has come under a particularly hot fire; they
are followed by their own company, which is in turn followed
by the companies on either side, even though the latter may
perhaps be holding strong ground. Such a moment is, indeed,
critical, and unless some brilliant officer appears who
possesses the secret of rallying retreating men and succeeds
in making the company hold its ground, the action is lost. But
besides setting a personal example to the men, a commanding
officer must at once push forward some of his reserves to
stop the rot among those retreating. The most important thing
at such a crisis is the example set by the officers or the
steadiest men, particularly by Cavaliers of the Order of St.
George.[5] A company commander’s example is everything to his
company. Therefore, however deserving he may be in peace, a
company commander who does not display personal gallantry in
action should be instantly removed from his command.
“The most effective method of guarding against a sudden
emergency either in attack or defence—and this is particularly
true in hilly country—is to have in hand a strong reserve,
and not to make use of it too lightly. This we have not done
in recent actions; we have told off weak reserves, and used
them up too quickly. Whole regiments have sometimes been sent
in support where two companies or a battalion would have been
ample.[6]
“In all kinds of operations officers in command must keep the
forces on either flank, as well as their seniors, informed of
everything that happens. We are, unfortunately, not accustomed
to do this. Before an action the smallest details are reported,
but as soon as an action begins we become so preoccupied with
the fight that the most obvious duties are forgotten. Chief
staff-officers of all grades will in future be held responsible
for the frequent transmission of reports during an action.”
The special attention of commanding officers was also called to the
necessity for providing their men with hot food during action, and to
the excessive expenditure of ammunition in our fights.
_Instructions issued during September._
The following were the main instructions given by me while preparing
for an advance after the fighting in August:
“It is a regrettable fact that so far, whenever we have taken
the offensive, we have met with reverse. Owing to our lack
of information, to which I have already drawn attention,
instead of delivering a confident attack according to a
clearly-thought-out plan, we have acted in a half-hearted
manner. We often deliver our main attack too soon, and
regardless of the enemy’s intentions. Instances have occurred
where we have detailed attacking columns as small as a
battalion; in others we have operated without any definite
plan of action. Finally, there have been cases where not
enough determination has been shown in pressing forward to the
objective.”
The importance of gaining even slight successes over the enemy’s
advanced troops at the beginning of a forward movement, the fact that
in the attack of positions turning movements should always be made
in combination with frontal attacks, and the advantage of pushing on
energetically when once an advance had commenced, were all points
specially noted. The necessity of holding on determinedly to every
yard of ground gained was accentuated, and leading units in a frontal
attack were warned not to deliver the assault until the synchronous
turning movement had been fully developed. Every use was to be made of
fire-effect of every sort. I wrote:
“A glaring case of that lack of co-operation from which we
suffer so much was the fight of September 2,[7] when the left
column began the action far too soon, and therefore finished by
retiring in disorder. This had the worst results on the success
of the whole operation.
“I must again remind all ranks of the great necessity for
economizing ammunition, especially gun ammunition. At Liao-yang
we used up in two days our special artillery reserve of more
than 100,000 rounds. The conveyance of gun ammunition to the
front is very difficult, and batteries which have expended
theirs become mere dead-weight to the army.”
[Illustration: GENERAL LINIEVITCH.]
The peculiarities attendant on operations in a country covered with
such crops as _kao-liang_ were also reviewed in detail:
“Any men leaving the ranks in action under pretext of
accompanying or carrying away wounded men will be severely
punished.
“Companies and squadrons must be as strong as possible for
an attack. To this end the most strict precautions must be
taken to limit the number of men employed on extraneous duties
and for transport work. The Cossacks are not to be employed
as orderlies and escorts by the officers under whom they may
be temporarily serving. Sound horses in possession of sick
Cossacks should be taken from them, and made over to those who
are horseless, but fit for duty.
“It is to be regretted—and I have more than once commented on
it—that commanding officers do not pay proper attention to the
order that the soldier’s emergency biscuit ration, carried on
the person, should remain untouched. This reserve ration is
constantly being eaten, and no steps are taken immediately to
replace it. Many commanding officers calmly allow the whole of
the men’s portable reserve to be consumed under the pleasing
conviction that it is the duty of someone else to bring up
fresh supplies to the regimental commissariat.
“The above instructions only touch on a few details of
field-work. The main guide for action is the ‘Field Service
Regulations,’ but these cannot, of course, meet every case
which may arise in the entirely new circumstances under which
we are now operating. I expect commanding officers of all
ranks, therefore, to show greater initiative in the performance
of their duties.”
My instructions issued in October included remarks on our offensive
operations during the end of September. Amongst other things, I said:
“I still notice faults in the method of conducting attacks.
Thick lines of skirmishers are too closely followed by the
supports and reserves. The formations have generally been
ill adapted to the ground, and have been such as to form an
excellent target. If this close-order formation had been
assumed in these cases just before a bayonet charge, then,
despite the heavy sacrifices entailed, there would have been
some point in it, because of the additional force and impetus
given to the assault; but it was adopted when the attack was
still at long range, and so caused useless and heavy loss.
We should in such cases imitate the Japanese, and do what we
used to in the Caucasus—make every use of cover. Every effort
must be made to reconnoitre well, in order that advantage may
be taken of every fold of the ground, and of every stick and
stone, and the attack may be enabled to advance as close as
possible to the enemy with the least possible loss. The way to
do this is for individual men, or groups of men, to advance
by short rushes till the attacking units are able to collect.
On open ground, if the attacking infantry has to wait for the
artillery preparation, it should entrench itself as rapidly as
possible.
“In retreating, the movement to the rear of large masses
together afforded the enemy a splendid target, for which we
suffered. Again, to avoid unnecessary loss in retirement,
portions of a position have often been stubbornly held until a
withdrawal could be effected under cover of darkness. If the
portion of ground on either side happens to have been already
abandoned, and the Japanese are sufficiently mobile to make use
of it, such isolated defence of any one section of a position
might cost very dear. We must learn how to retire by day—by the
same methods as laid down above for the attack (by rushes), and
avoid close formations in doing it.
“I and other senior officers have noticed during an action
hundreds and thousands of unwounded men leaving the ranks,
carrying wounded to the rear. In the fights of October 12
to 15[8] I personally saw wounded men being carried to the
rear by as many as nine others. This abuse must be put down
with the utmost rigour, and until an action is over only the
stretcher-bearers should take wounded to the rear.
“The Japanese are fortifying the positions along our front,
converting villages, knolls, and hill-tops into strong,
defensible points, and strengthening their positions with
obstacles. These positions should be carefully studied, their
strong points noted, and in every section of our line a plan of
possible operations against the corresponding portions of the
enemy’s position should be made. The early organization of the
artillery preparation of any attack on these selected points is
important.
“Detachments of sappers and scouts should be sent ahead of the
assault to destroy the obstacles round fortified villages,
which should be well shelled. Till the assault is made the
advance should be under cover, and if the leading troops find
they are not strong enough to capture the point on which they
have been directed, they must hold on to a point as near to
the enemy as possible, in order to press forward again when
reinforced.”
Finally, in my instructions issued in December, 1904, I recapitulated
the most important points brought out by our recent experiences, such
as—
“1. The necessity, in order to avoid loss, for our attack
formations to be better adapted to the ground.
“2. Economy in artillery ammunition.
“3. The more intelligent employment of rifle-fire, and the
necessity for volley-firing at night.
“4. The great value of night operations.
“5. Proper communication between all senior commanders.
“6. The necessity for the mutual co-operation of all arms, and
the maintenance of touch in battle.
“The surest road to success is the determination to continue
fighting, even when the last reserve has been exhausted, for
the enemy may be in the same, if not in worse plight, and what
is not possible in daylight may be accomplished at night.
Unfortunately, in recent fights, some commanders even of large
forces have confessed themselves unable to carry out the
operation entrusted to them, at a moment when they still had in
hand big reserves which had not fired a shot.”
Of course, as soon as our disasters began, the papers started to accuse
our troops of insufficient training, and they were not far wrong. In
the first place, most of the men were reservists who had forgotten
a great deal. In the second, this war was our first experience of
smokeless powder, of quick-firing artillery, of machine-guns, and of
all the recent developments in means of destruction, and much was
strange and unexpected. Our preconceived notions were upset, and we
were baffled by the deadly nature of indirect artillery-fire, by the
new attack formations—when advancing infantry is rarely visible, and
one man at a time crawls up almost unseen, taking advantage of every
inch of cover. Our troops had been instructed, but what they had
learned varied according to the personal idiosyncrasies of this or that
district commander. The stronger the officer commanding a district, the
less did he feel bound to abide by the authorized method of instruction
and training laid down in the existing drill-books. General Grippenberg
was no exception to this. In spite of the regulation as to the use of
volleys for repulsing night attacks; in spite of war experience which
in every way confirmed the necessity and value of volley-firing; in
spite of the Commander-in-Chief’s instructions on this point, he made
up his mind some days before a battle to re-teach the force under his
command. He ordered the employment of independent fire at night. His
“Instructions for the Operations of Infantry in Battle” [signed by
him on January 4, 1905], printed and issued to the troops, aroused
consternation and amusement throughout the army. In this book it
was actually laid down that volleys were only to be resorted to if
the enemy suddenly appeared at close quarters, and that immediately
after a volley a bayonet attack should be made. While condemning the
method in which our troops operated at the Ya-lu, he, in the above
“Instructions,” gives a recipe for action whereby two of our battalions
might destroy a Japanese division. After a summary of the amount of
small-arm ammunition expended, he said:
“If our two battalions had been deployed and had opened rapid
independent fire, the Japanese division would have been
destroyed, and we should have won the day.”
Such a simple matter did General Grippenberg consider the annihilation
of a Japanese division! But a few days later, when he moved against
the Hei-kou-tai position with a strong force of 120 battalions, his
own prescription proved to be valueless. In the first few days, when
he was opposed by not more than two divisions, he was unable to take
San-de-pu, got his troops into confusion, gave the enemy time to bring
up strong reinforcements, and retired—to St. Petersburg.
As to the attack formation adopted by the troops arriving from Russia,
the 41st Division had in particular been taught to work in very close
formation, and not taught to make use of the ground. It came from
the Vilna district, which was commanded before the war by General
Grippenberg. Our gunners also arrived at the front with only one idea
of artillery tactics—to place their batteries in the open and make use
of direct fire. For this we paid dearly in our very first fight.