In the philosophical writings of Hume, the great element is scepticism.

He had many precursors in that sort of amusing speculation which tends

to throw doubt over received opinions; and which, as a natural effect of

human vanity, does so the more in regard to those notions which happen

to be retained most generally and with the greatest confidence. But

these limits did not satisfy the author of the Treatise of Human Nature.

The drift of his philosophy is to prove, not only that nothing _is_

known, but that nothing _can_ be known; that the human race are shut up

in the most entire ignorance, partly from the character of the objects

around them, but mainly from the very framework and nature of the human

understanding. Much ingenuity and acuteness was required to give any

plausible appearance to a theory so contrary to the natural impressions

of mankind, and Hume’s philosophical works afford evidence enough of the

sort of talent necessary to his object. But he well knew, that however

proper, and however felicitous it might be, to lay low the giant spirit

of dogmatism by such means, his own conclusions, in every instance of

importance, were hardly less dogmatic than those of his opponents, the

principal difference being, that the sources of _his_ assumptions were

somewhat more difficult to detect and expose. For what assumption can be

greater than that of a right to believe in all unbelief? In this case,

the very faculty that doubts must be a figment of vanity. The writer who

determines to assail everything, forces on mankind a suspicion of

caprice and insincerity, and is not likely to demolish anything. By

attempting less, Hume would have accomplished more; and he would not

then have called forth that array of philosophic power against himself,

which has done so much damage to his reputation in this department of

his labours. His miscellaneous Essays abound in valuable observations,

and are fine models of English composition. The manner in which he met

his death is the stock theme with the superficial, as illustrating the

power of philosophy. But the man of reflection may perhaps see as much

of the weakness of humanity in that event, as of the strength of

philosophy; and certainly he will not need to be told, that nothing can

be more delusive than the use generally made of such scenes.

It is not however as the philosopher, but as the historian, that Hume is

known to the majority of persons, both in this country and on the

continent. Those habits of close thought, and that careful use of

language, to which he had been so long accustomed in his philosophical

studies, qualified him, in a high degree, to treat the topics of history

with discrimination, simplicity, and clearness. The evil to be feared

was, that he would often allow the sprightliness of narrative to sink

into the dullness of disquisition; and that even his narrative would be

deficient in that selection of familiar anecdote, and in those

picturesque descriptions, which, while having little relation to the

great lessons of history, are certainly among its great attractions. But

it happens that the narrative of Xenophon himself is not more easy and

uninterrupted than that of Hume; nor has the former writer shown a

stronger disposition to dwell on domestic incidents, or to throw a

dramatic colouring over public occurrences, than the latter. Never did

any man bring so much of the power of abstruse thought to the writing of

history, and appear to be so much served and so little inconvenienced by

it. His station and intercourse in society added much of the feeling and

manners of the gentleman to the more grave attainments of the man of

learning, and tended to produce that combination of qualities, which

made his society at all times agreeable, and has thrown a nameless and

irresistible charm over his historical writing. His style was the result

of great elaboration, but has every appearance of being that which must

have been adopted without effort. It is open, indeed, in almost every

page, to much verbal criticism, no book perhaps of the same standing

being in this respect so vulnerable. But these lesser blemishes are

forgotten amid the many natural and delightful graces with which it is

adorned; graces which no one can help feeling, but which it would be as

difficult to describe as to imitate.

Having however spoken thus of Mr. Hume’s style, and remarked the general

acuteness and frequent justice of his observations, we have fairly

exhausted our topics of praise. With regard to the two most valuable

qualities of a historian—research and integrity, the claims of Hume are

in the inverse position of his pretensions in other respects. Instead of

seeking, as the author of the Essay on Miracles might have been expected

to do, for the best possible testimonies, for these in the greatest

possible number, and then sifting them to the utmost, we find him

committing himself, with apparent unconsciousness, to the most

incompetent guides, often to a single authority where several were

accessible, and where several are adduced, attaching no more credit to

the depositions of an intelligent writer contemporary with what he

records, than to that of some worthless chronicler, who lived some

centuries later! This is particularly the case with regard to that

portion of our history which precedes the Reformation; and there cannot

be a greater mistake than to suppose that his references at the foot of

the page in these earlier volumes indicate the sources from which the

material of his text was derived. “Ingenious but superficial” is the

description of these volumes which Gibbon recorded in his diary, after

reading them. In the more modern period of our history, as the

authorities relating to it may be consulted by an indolent man with less

labour, and by a man of taste with less disgust, we find a little more

research and discrimination, but by no means sufficient to render his

accounts worthy of implicit confidence, even when not liable to be

affected by any of his known partialities. It is to this deficient

industry, and to the consequent want of a steady mastery of his subject

before beginning to write upon it, that we have mainly to attribute the

perpetual contradictions which occur in his description of the great

contest under the Stuart princes; contradictions which are so many and

so irreconcilable as to make his book one of the most inconsistent that

ever emanated from a man of ordinary powers. We have not, of course,

space in which to exhibit the proofs of this statement;—but we are

confident that inquiry will prove it to be correct.

But the want of industry, though a serious delinquency in a historian,

is almost venial when compared with a want of impartiality, and the

deficiency of Hume in this last quality has been often and largely

exposed. The extent in which the historian was conscious of his own

habit of unfairness, it is not in our power to determine; but there is

hardly a conceivable form of disingenuousness, of which his volumes

might not be shown to afford numerous and striking examples. The volume

embracing the reigns of James and Charles was first published, and we

have seen that the reception it met with only taught the author to

resolve, with a more fixed purpose, as to the complexion of those which

were to follow. In instances where his integrity is in the main

preserved, his eloquence is often so far misdirected that the truth

becomes discoloured, and makes the impression of falsehood. In his hands

the faults of his favourites lose much of their magnitude and grossness,

while their merits are raised much above their proper level, and with

regard to their opponents, the inverse process is adopted. Disagreeable

facts are passed over, or but partially and very artfully developed;

while others, of an opposite nature, have all prominence, and all

imaginable force assigned them. Incidents of very rare occurrence, and

existing only as exceptions, are culled with the greatest care, and

presented as the rule, and as no more than samples of the abundance that

might be adduced. And in describing the reasonings and the motives by

which the contending parties from time to time were influenced, it is

the fixed usage of this writer to consult his own prejudices or

imagination much more than the lights afforded by the documents of the

times. These summaries, as they are called, are inserted by Hume, in the

place of the speeches which the ancient historians were wont to put into

the mouth of their leading men; and, interesting as they are, deserve no

more credit, considered as the character of parties, or as accounts of

what was really said, than it is usual to bestow on those elaborate

harangues. There is much reason to believe that the historian began the

reigns of the two first Stuarts with a sincere conviction that

sufficient allowance had not been made for the peculiar situation of

those princes. But his delinquencies are such, that this excuse must be

of small avail in his defence. The majority of more than one generation

in this country have derived their notions of English history almost

exclusively from the pages of Hume; but so low has he fallen as a

historical authority, that the persons who have read scarcely anything

else, rarely show courage, or rather weakness, enough to make any appeal

to him.

[Illustration:

_Engraved by E. Scriven._

DE WITT.

_From a Picture by Netscher, in the possession of M^r. Lenoir, at

Paris._

Under the Superintendence of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful

Knowledge.

_London, Published by Charles Knight & C^o. Ludgate Street._

]

[Illustration]

DE WITT.

The father of this wise and honest statesman was burgomaster of the town

of Dort, or Dordrecht, and one of its representatives in the Assembly of

the States of Holland, a man of patriotism, courage, and integrity, who

apprehended danger to the liberties of the United Provinces from the

hereditary power of the House of Orange, and used his best exertions to

counteract it. His sons, Cornelius and John De Witt, born at Dort, the

former June 25, 1623, the latter September 25, 1625, inherited his

principles and his integrity; and rendered his name illustrious by

greater talents exerted in a higher sphere of action. Of these brothers,

united in their counsels, their lives, and their deaths, it is the

younger, John, the original of our portrait, who rendered the name of De

Witt most illustrious, by the ability and virtue with which, during

eighteen years, he directed the government of his country.

Cornelius De Witt served in the navy during several years, and

distinguished himself in the bloody wars of England and Holland; he also

studied jurisprudence in his youth, and displayed talents for civil and

military business not unnoticed by his fellow-citizens, who bestowed

several municipal offices on him at an early age. The youth of John De

Witt appears to have been less occupied by active employments; though he

possessed great knowledge and practical skill in maritime affairs, and

was esteemed one of the best pilots of his time. The early development

of his political talents, aided probably by family connexion, and the

respect due to his father’s services, soon introduced him to high civil

employment. In 1650 he was appointed Pensionary of his native town, and

in 1652, Grand Pensionary of Holland, an office which gave him a

commanding influence over the deliberations of the whole Union. It was

granted nominally only for five years, but in effect was permanent,

since at the end of each period it was customary to re-appoint the

holder.

It was the leading object of De Witt’s policy to diminish the influence

which the princes of the House of Orange had acquired, as much by their

services and high personal qualities, as by their power and territorial

possessions, and to strengthen the republican institutions of his

country, which he saw to be endangered, as it was ultimately destroyed,

by their hereditary tenure of the office of Stadtholder. “The chief

direction of the affairs of Holland, for eighteen years, continued in

the hands of their Pensionary De Witt, a minister of the greatest

authority and sufficiency, the greatest application and industry, ever

known in their state. In the course of his ministry he and his party

reduced, not only all the civil charges of the government in this

province, but in a manner all the military commands of the army, out of

the hands of persons affectionate to the Prince of Orange, into those

esteemed more sure and fast to the interests of their more popular

state. And all this was attended for so long a course of years with the

perpetual success of their affairs, by the growth of their trade, power

and riches at home, and the consideration of their neighbours abroad.”

Such is the testimony of Sir William Temple, (Essay on the Origin and

Nature of Government,) to the policy, success, and merits of a friend

whom he loved and venerated. The position of affairs, when De Witt

attained to the direction of the state, favoured the development of his

republican views. William II., Prince of Orange, had died in 1650, and

his posthumous son and heir, afterwards William III. of England, was an

infant. Had the representative of that house been of mature age, we may

conclude that gratitude for the eminent services of his predecessors,

and the natural inclination of the people towards the form of government

to which they had been accustomed, would have led again to the

appointment of a Stadtholder in his person. But the office was of a

nature which could not be well exercised by a regent, or committed to an

infant, without acknowledging a species of hereditary right, scarcely

differing from the claims of royalty: and accordingly in some provinces

another prince of the Nassau family was appointed Stadtholder, in

others, of which Holland was one, the office continued in abeyance, and

De Witt, thwarted by no superior, was able to direct his best efforts to

counteract the workings of the Orange party, and to effect those changes

in the civil and military organization of the state, which are mentioned

in the above quotation from Sir W. Temple. The same leading principle

guided his foreign policy. When he was appointed Grand Pensionary, the

Provinces were engaged in war with England; an unequal contest while her

government was directed by Cromwell. But the true interest of both

parties lay in their amity, and peace was concluded in 1654. While

Cromwell lived, the republican party was upheld by his influence. He

endeavoured to obtain from the States General, in the treaty of 1654,

the perpetual exclusion of the Prince of Orange from the

Stadtholdership: but not being able to obtain their consent to this,

contented himself with the assent of the States of Holland, as far as

regarded their own province, which was accorded by a secret article.

After the Restoration it was to be expected that Charles II. would

support the interests of his nephew the Prince of Orange; and De Witt

thenceforward cultivated the alliance of France in preference to that of

England. This, and the jealousy of the English nation at the commercial

prosperity of the Dutch, led to the breaking out of a bloody war in

1665, in which the preponderance of success was on the side of England.

The spirit, energy, and ability of De Witt was the main stay of his

countrymen under the reverses which they sustained in this contest:

their disasters were promptly repaired, their defeated armaments

refitted, their credit sustained; and Charles II. becoming weary of a

war which brought no advantages to compensate for the drain which it

occasioned on the treasury, condescended to open negotiations for peace

in 1667. These, however, proceeded but slowly: and while they were yet

pending, De Witt planned that memorable expedition which surprised our

ill-guarded shores, burnt our ships in the Thames, and threw the

metropolis into the utmost alarm. The course of diplomacy being

quickened by this event, the treaty of Breda was soon after concluded,

on terms not disadvantageous to Holland.

In the following year a closer union, called the Triple League, was

formed, chiefly by the agency of De Witt and Sir William Temple, between

these two powers, in conjunction with Sweden. It was intended to

restrain the ambition of Louis XIV., which had manifested itself in such

encroachments upon the Spanish Netherlands as gave just cause of anxiety

to the United Provinces. De Witt saw that a new danger threatened the

independence of his country from abroad, and sacrificed to the emergency

his own political prepossessions and his jealousy of everything which

could restore the House of Orange to power. So great was his

earnestness, that he violated a fundamental principle of the Union, by

inducing the States General to ratify the treaty at once, instead of

referring it, as was prescribed by the constitution, to the acceptance

of the several provinces: an act by which, had it proved unpalatable to

the nation, the lives of all who were concerned in it were endangered,

and which is only to be excused on the plea of necessity, and by the

certainty that the measure, which its framers regarded as essential to

the welfare of the whole confederacy, would have been frustrated by the

influence of France over some or other of its least important members.

In 1670 De Witt concluded another treaty with the emperor of Germany and

the King of Spain, with the same object of maintaining the power of

Spain in the Netherlands, as a barrier against the encroachments of

France.

All these precautions were rendered vain by the weak and corrupt conduct

of the English Court. The ministers were bribed, and the King cajoled by

a French mistress, sent over in the train of his sister the Duchess of

Orleans, to renounce the Triple League and to declare war against the

United Provinces, in 1672, on the most frivolous pretences. At the same

time the king of France in person led against them a numerous, well

appointed, and well officered army. It is probable that De Witt had

relied with confidence on the sincerity of England in promoting the

objects of the Triple League, and that though well aware of the

disposition of Louis, he had not thought the danger so near at hand. At

all events he had made no sufficient preparation to meet it; and the

consequences of this omission were most disastrous. The troops of the

Provinces, composed in a great measure of new levies, could make no

head; the frontier fortresses yielded almost without resistance; the

Rhine was passed, an event remarkable only by the flatteries for which

it gave a subject to the French poets; and Louis held his court at

Utrecht, while his troops advanced within a few miles of Amsterdam. A

loud clamour was now raised against De Witt, who was roundly accused of

having disbanded the veteran troops of the Republic, dismantled the

fortresses, and exhausted the treasury, that his country might fall an

easier prey to the French connexion. This calumny, even at the time,

probably, was hardly believed: but too great neglect of the military

establishment seems justly chargeable as a fault on his administration.

For this, however, some excuse may be found in the necessity of economy,

the inconsistency of a mercenary army of foreigners with republican

principles, and the readiness of the Orange party to misrepresent this

policy of the Pensionary, as tending to concentrate in himself the

powers of Stadtholder, a name and office which he had been so eager to

abolish. By the machinations of that party the embarrassments of the

government were increased, and discontent was fomented; and their

sufferings and danger led the people to think more and more favourably

of the claims of William of Orange. The natural high qualities of that

prince had received most careful cultivation under the superintendence

of De Witt, who was resolved, he said, to render him capable of serving

his country, if any change should throw the administration into his

hands. Already, February 25, he had been declared captain-general and

admiral of the Provinces. Shortly after, De Witt’s life was attempted by

four assassins, who left him for dead, as he was returning home at

night, unattended, with his usual simplicity of demeanour. While he lay

ill of his wounds, the repeal of the Perpetual Edict passed in 1667, by

which the office of Stadtholder was abolished for ever in the province

of Holland, was demanded by the populace, with much violence and

sedition. That State yielded to the clamour, and the Prince was thus

reinstated in the full power enjoyed by his predecessors.

Cornelius De Witt was induced, with great difficulty, to sign the

revocation of the Edict. Soon after, he was accused of being concerned

in a plot to murder the Prince of Orange. The informer and only witness,

one Tichelaer, was a person of infamous character: yet on his evidence

this brave and well-deserving citizen was thrown into prison at the

Hague, and cruelly tortured to extort confession of a plot, the very

existence of which, without that confession, could not be proved. He

bore the trial with unshaken constancy, protesting that if they cut him

to pieces, they should not make him confess a thing which he had never

thought of. Without it, he could not be convicted: but he was stripped

of his employments and banished from Holland; and such was the madness

of the time, that even this iniquitous decree gave great offence, by its

leniency, to the people, who were fully persuaded of Cornelius De Witt’s

guilt. John De Witt meanwhile had recovered from his wounds; and finding

that in the existing state of public feeling his continuance at the head

of affairs was both undesirable for himself and unpleasing to the

country, he resigned his office. After the promulgation of his brother’s

sentence, he went to receive him upon his delivery from prison; and

probably to do him more honour, and testify his own sense of the malice

of the charge, and the unworthiness of the treatment which he had

received, repaired to the Hague in his coach and four, a sort of display

which he was not wont to affect. This bravado proved still more

unfortunate than ill-judged. The people, collected by the unusual

spectacle, began to murmur at the presumption of one suspected traitor

coming in state to insult the laws, and triumph in the escape of a

traitor-brother from a deserved death. De Witt went to the prison, to

convey his brother to his own house; but Cornelius replied, that having

suffered so much, being innocent, he would not leave the prison as a

culprit, but remain, and appeal against the sentence; a resolution which

John De Witt strove in vain to shake. Meanwhile Tichelaer, the informer,

was busily engaged in stirring up the populace to riot. Apprehending

some disturbance, the States of Holland, which were then sitting at the

Hague, requested the Prince of Orange to repair thither with a military

force. Meanwhile the tumult spread from the lowest people to the

burghers, and a furious mob collected round the gates of the prison

where the brothers still remained. The military force which had been

sent for did not arrive, and that which was in the city was drawn off,

by written order from one or more of the magistrates, upon a false

report, that a body of peasants was advancing to pillage the Hague.

Actuated by fear, or some worse motive, the gaoler opened the gates, the

leaders of the mob rushed in, the brothers were violently dragged from

their chamber, and massacred as soon as they reached the street, with

circumstances of brutality too revolting to be narrated in detail. Their

corpses were dragged to the gibbet, and publicly suspended with the

heads downwards; and the mangled limbs of these upright magistrates and

patriotic citizens were offered for sale, and bought at prices of

fifteen, twenty, and thirty sols.

There is another account, different in some particulars, which intimates

that this atrocious murder was preconcerted, and that a train was laid

for it, if not by the Prince of Orange himself, at least by the leaders

of his party. Such charges are often lightly made; and we are not aware

that there is any direct evidence to fix this guilt on any one,

certainly not personally on that distinguished monarch. But that there

was culpable neglect, even acquitting those in power of wilful

connivance, seems certain; and the proceedings of the court which

sentenced Cornelius, show that the government was not delicate in

finding means to remove those whom it disliked. And William’s subsequent

conduct may almost be said to have merited the imputation which he

incurred; for though the States of Holland voted the murder detestable

in their eyes and the eyes of all the world, and requested the

Stadtholder to take proper measures to avenge it, none of the murderers

were ever brought to justice. The flimsy pretext for this neglect was,

that it would be dangerous to inquire into a deed in which the principal

burghers of the Hague were concerned.

The Gallery of Portraits: with Memoirs. Volume 7 (of 7) · 第 13 / 20 段