CHAP. I.
It now remains, in the last place, that we should speak concerning
felicity, about which you make various inquiries, first of all proposing
objections, afterwards doubting, and then interrogating. Adducing,
therefore, all that is said by you, we shall answer it appropriately.
You inquire, then, “_whether there is not some other latent way to
felicity_.” But how, in that path which recedes from the Gods, is it
probable there can be an ascent to felicity? For if the essence and
perfection of all good are comprehended in the Gods, and the first and
ancient power of them is with us priests, and if by those who similarly
adhere to more excellent natures, and genuinely obtain a union with
them, the beginning and end of all good is earnestly pursued; if this be
the case, here the contemplation of truth, and the possession of
intellectual science are to be found.[148] And a knowledge of the Gods
is accompanied with a conversion to, and the knowledge of, ourselves.
CHAP. II.
Hence you in vain doubt, “_that it is not proper to look to human
opinions_.” For what leisure can he have whose intellect is directed to
the Gods to look downward to the praises of men? Nor do you rightly
doubt in what follows, viz. “_that the soul devises great things from
casual circumstances_.” For what principle of fictions can there be in
truly existing beings? Is it not the phantastic power in us which is the
maker of images? _But the phantasy is never excited when the
intellectual life energizes perfectly._ And is not truth essentially
coexistent with the Gods? Is it not, likewise, concordantly established
in intelligibles? It is in vain, therefore, that things of this kind are
disseminated by you and others. But neither do those things for which
certain futile and arrogant men calumniate the worshipers of the Gods,
the like to which have been asserted by you, at all pertain to true
theology and theurgy. And if certain things of this kind germinate in
the sciences of divine concerns, as in other arts evil arts blossom
forth; these are doubtless more contrary to such sciences than to any
thing else. For evil is more hostile to good than to that which is not
good.
CHAP. III.
I wish, in the next place, to reply to such assertions as calumniate
divine prediction. For you compare with it “_certain other methods which
are conversant with the prediction of future events_.” To me, however,
it does not appear to be any thing honourable if a certain natural
aptitude is ingenerated in us to the indication of the future, just as
in animals there is a foreknowledge of earthquakes, or winds, or
tempests. For an innate presage of this kind is the consequence of
acuteness of sensation, or sympathy, or some other conjoint motion of
the physical powers, and is not attended with any thing venerable and
supernatural. Nor if some one, by human reasoning, or artificial
observation, conjectures from signs those things of which the signs are
indicative (as physicians foreknow that a fever will take place from the
systole and torpor of the pulse), neither does he appear to me to
possess any thing honourable and good. For he conjectures after a human
manner, and concludes from our reasoning power about things which are
acknowledged to be effected naturally, and forms a judgment not very
remote from the corporeal-formed order. Hence, if there is in us a
certain natural presentiment of the future, in the same manner as in all
other animals, this power is clearly seen to energize; this presentiment
does not in reality possess any thing which is most blessed. For what is
there among the things which are implanted in us by nature in the realms
of generation that is a genuine, perfect, and eternal good?
CHAP. IV.
Divine divination, therefore, which is conjoined with the Gods, alone
truly imparts to us a divine life; since it participates of [divine]
foreknowledge, and divine intellections, and renders us in reality
divine. It likewise causes us to be genuine participants of _the good_,
because the most blessed intellectual perception of the Gods is filled
with all good. Hence those who possess this divination “_do not_,” as
you conjecture, “_foresee future events, and are nevertheless unhappy_.”
For all divine foreknowledge is boniform. Nor “_do they foresee, indeed,
what is future, but do not know how to use this knowledge properly_.”
For, together with the foreknowledge, they receive the beautiful itself,
and true and appropriate order: and utility is also present with it. For
the Gods, in conjunction with it, deliver a transcendent power of
defence against the inconveniences which accede from nature. And when it
is necessary to exercise virtue, and the ignorance of future events
contributes to this, then the Gods conceal what will be for the sake of
rendering the soul better. But when the ignorance of what is future does
not at all contribute to this, and foreknowledge is advantageous to
souls, for the sake of their salvation and reascent [to divinity], then
the Gods insert the foreknowledge which pertains to divination in the
penetralia of the essences of souls.
CHAP. V.
But why am I prolix about these particulars? For I have abundantly
shown, in what has been before said, the transcendency of divine above
human divination. It is better, therefore, in compliance with your
request, “_to point out to you the way to felicity, and show you in what
the essence of it is placed_.” For from this the truth will be
discovered, and at the same time all the doubts may be easily dissolved.
I say, therefore, that the more divine[149] intelligible man, who was
formerly united to the Gods by the vision of them, afterwards entered
into another soul, which is coadapted to the human form, and through
this became fettered with the bonds of necessity and fate. Hence it is
requisite to consider how he may be liberated from these bonds. _There
is, therefore, no other dissolution of them than the knowledge of the
Gods._ For to know scientifically _the good_ is the idea of felicity;
just as the oblivion of good, and deception about evil, happen to be the
idea of evil. The former, therefore, is present with divinity; but the
latter, which is an inferior destiny, is inseparable from the mortal
nature. And the former, indeed, measures the essences of
intelligibles[150] by sacred ways; but the latter, abandoning
principles, gives itself up to the measurement of the idea of body. The
former is a knowledge of the father; but the latter is a departure from
him, and an oblivion of the God who is a superessential father, and
sufficient to himself. The former, likewise, preserves the true life of
the soul, and leads it back to its father; but the latter draws down the
generation-ruling[151] man, as far as to that which is never permanent,
but is always flowing. You must understand, therefore, that this is the
first path to felicity, affording to souls an intellectual plenitude of
divine union. But the sacerdotal and theurgic gift of felicity is
called, indeed, the gate to the Demiurgus of wholes, or the seat, or
palace, of _the good_. In the first place, likewise, it possesses a
power of purifying the soul, much more perfect than the power which
purifies the body; afterwards it causes a coaptation of the reasoning
power to the participation and vision of _the good_, and a liberation
from every thing of a contrary nature; and, in the last place, produces
a union with the Gods, who are the givers of every good.
CHAP. VI.
Moreover, after it has conjoined the soul to the several parts of the
universe, and to the total divine powers which pass through it; then it
leads the soul to, and deposits it in, the whole Demiurgus, and causes
it to be independent of all matter, and to be counited with the eternal
reason alone. But my meaning is, that it peculiarly connects the soul
with the self begotten and self-moved God, and with the all-sustaining,
intellectual, and all-adorning powers of the God, and likewise with that
power of him which elevates to truth, and with his self-perfect,
effective, and other demiurgic powers; so that the theurgic soul becomes
perfectly established in the energies and demiurgic intellections of
these powers. Then, also, it inserts the soul in the whole demiurgic
God. And this is the end with the Egyptians of the sacerdotal elevation
of the soul to divinity.
CHAP. VII.
With respect to _the good_, likewise, they conceive that one kind is
divine, and this is the God who is prior to the intelligible; but that
the other is human, and is a union with the former. And these two kinds
of good Bitys has unfolded from the Hermaic books. This part, therefore,
is not, as you suspect, omitted by the Egyptians, but is divinely
delivered by them. Nor do “_theurgists disturb the divine intellect
about trifling concerns_;” but they consult it about things which
pertain to the purification, liberation, and salvation of the soul.
Neither do they studiously employ themselves in things which are indeed
difficult, yet useless to mankind; but, on the contrary, they direct
their attention to things which are of all others most beneficial to the
soul. Nor, in the last place, are “_they deceived by a certain
fraudulent dæmon_,” who, having vanquished a fallacious and dæmoniacal
nature, ascend to an intelligible and divine essence.
CHAP. VIII.
And thus we have answered, to the utmost of our ability, your inquiries
concerning divination and theurgy. It remains, therefore, at the end of
this discussion, that I should beseech the Gods to afford me an
immutable guard of true conceptions, to insert in me truth eternally,
and to supply me abundantly with the participation of more perfect
conceptions of the Gods, in which the most blessed end of our good is
posited, and the confirmation of our concordant friendship with each
other.
ADDITIONAL NOTES.
Page 9. _Anebo._ Porphyry in his Life of Plotinus, and also in the
second book of his Treatise on Abstinence from Animals, informs us that
he was familiar with a certain Egyptian priest, who, as Gale
conjectures, is probably the priest to whom Porphyry now writes. The
diction, indeed, as Gale observes, denotes that the person to whom this
Epistle is addressed was a very _great prophet_, who, nevertheless, is
afterwards said to be a _priest_. This, however, is not any thing novel
or incongruous. For by Apuleius in Metamorph. lib. xi. the Egyptian
Zaclas is said to be _propheta primarius et sacerdos, a chief prophet
and priest_.
Page 9. _Hermes the God who presides over language._ The Egyptians
celebrated two Hermes, the former of which is here signified by
Iamblichus. This deity is the source of _invention_, and hence he is
said to be the son of _Maia_; because _search_, which is implied by
_Maia_, leads _invention_ into light. He bestows too _mathesis_ on
souls, by unfolding the will of his father Jupiter; and this he
accomplishes as the angel or messenger of Jupiter. Proclus in MS.
Comment. in Alcibiad. observes, “that this deity is the inspective
guardian of _gymnastic exercises_; and hence _hermæ_, or carved statues
of Mercury, were placed in the Palæstræ; of _music_, and hence he is
honoured as _the lyrist_ λυραιος among the celestial constellations; and
of _disciplines_, because the invention of geometry, reasoning, and
discourse is referred to this God. He presides, therefore, over every
species of erudition, leading us to an intelligible essence from this
mortal abode, governing the different herds of souls, and dispersing the
sleep and oblivion with which they are oppressed. He is likewise the
supplier of recollection, the end of which is a genuine intellectual
apprehension of divine natures.”
P. 10. _The ancient pillars of Hermes._ These pillars, according to Amm.
Marcellinus, lib. xxii. were concealed prior to the deluge in certain
caverns, which were called συριγγες, _syringes_, not far from the
Egyptian Thebes. The second Hermes interpreted these pillars, and his
interpretation formed many volumes, as Iamblichus informs us in Section
viii. of this work. These pillars are mentioned by Laertius in his Life
of Democritus; by Dio Chrysostom in Orat. 49; by Achilles Tatius on
Aratus; and by others of the ancients.
P. 15. _There is, therefore, the good itself which is beyond essence,
and there is that good which subsists according to essence._ There are
three orders of good; _viz._ that which is imparticipable and
superessential; that which is imparticipable and essential; and that
which is essential and participable. Of these, the last is such as our
nature contains; _the good_ which ranks among forms is essential; and
that which is beyond essence is superessential. Or we say that _the
good_ which subsists in us may be considered as a habit, in consequence
of subsisting in a subject; the next to this ranks as essence, and a
part of essence, I mean _the good_ which ranks among forms; and _the
good_ which is beyond essence, is neither a habit, nor a part. With
respect to _the good_, also, which subsists according to essence, it
must be observed, that since forms are twofold, some alone
distinguishing the _essences_ of the things fashioned by form, but
others their _perfections_, the genus of essence, same and different,
and the form of animal, horse, and man, and every thing of this kind,
give distinction to essence and subjects; but the form of _the good_,
the beautiful, and the just, and in like manner the form of virtue, of
health, strength, and every thing of a similar nature, are perfective of
the beings to which they belong: and of some, essence is the leader, but
of others _the good_. For, as Plato says, every thing except _the one_,
must necessarily participate of essence; and whatever preserves, gives
perfection to, or defends any being, must be good. Hence, since these
two are leaders, the one of forms which give subsistence to things, and
the other of such as are the sources of their perfection; it is
necessary that one of these should be subordinate to the other; I mean
that _the good_ which is allotted a coordination among forms that are
the sources of perfection, should be subordinate to _essence_, which
ranks among causes, whence subsistence originates, if _the good_ is
being, and a certain being. For it is either the same with, or different
from, essence, which the Elean guest or stranger in the Sophista of
Plato shows to be the genus of being. And if _the good_ is the same with
essence, an absurdity must ensue: for being and well-being are not the
same. But if _the good_ is something different from essence, it must
necessarily participate of essence, in consequence of essence being the
genus of all forms. But if genera are more ancient than forms, _the
good_ which ranks among forms, and is posterior to their genus, will not
be the superessential good which reigns over intelligibles; but this
must be asserted of that good, under which this and every form is
arranged, which possesses being, and which is the leader of the other
genera of being.
P. 15. _But the other medium, which is suspended from the Gods, though
it is far inferior to them, is that of dæmons._ In addition to what is
said in this work by Iamblichus concerning dæmons, the following
information about them from Olympiodorus, in his MS. Scholia on the
Phædo of Plato, is well worthy the attention of the philosophical
reader:
“Since there are in the universe things which subsist differently at
different times, and since there are also natures which are conjoined
with the superessential unities, it is necessary that there should be a
certain middle genus, which is neither immediately suspended from deity,
nor subsists differently at different times, according to better and
worse, but which is always perfect, and does not depart from its proper
virtue; and is immutable indeed, but is not conjoined with the
superessential [which is the characteristic of deity]. The whole of this
genus is dæmoniacal. There are, also, different genera of dæmons: for
they are placed under the mundane Gods. The highest of these subsists
according to _the one_ of the Gods, and is called an unific and divine
genus of dæmons. The next subsists according to the intellect which is
suspended from deity, and is called intellectual. The third subsists
according to soul, and is called rational. The fourth, according to
nature, and is denominated physical. The fifth according to body, which
is called corporeal-formed. And the sixth according to matter, and this
is denominated material.” Olympiodorus adds, “or after another manner it
may be said, that some of these are celestial, others etherial, others
aerial, others aquatic, others terrestrial, and others subterranean.
With respect to this division also, it is evident that it is derived
from the parts of the universe. But irrational dæmons originate from the
aerial governors, whence, also, the Chaldean Oracle says,
Ηεριων ελατηρα κυνων χθονιων τε και υγρων.
_i. e._ being the charioteer of the aerial, terrestrial, and aquatic
dogs.” Our guardian dæmons, however, belong to that order of dæmons
which is arranged under the Gods that preside over the ascent and
descent of souls. For a more copious account of dæmons see the notes on
the First Alcibiades in vol. i. of my translation of Plato.
P. 22. _One and the best solution will be obtained by surveying the mode
of divine allotment._
The manner in which divine allotments subsist is admirably unfolded by
Proclus in Tim. p. 43, as follows: “Since, according to a division of
the universe into two parts, we have distributed allotments into the
celestial and sublunary, there can be no doubt what the former are, and
whether they possess an invariable sameness of subsistence. But the
sublunary allotments are deservedly a subject of admiration, whether
they are said to be perpetual or not. For since all things in generation
are continually changing and flowing, how can the allotments of the
providential rulers of them be said to be perpetual? For things in
generation are not perpetual. But if their allotments are not perpetual,
how is it possible to suppose that divine government can subsist
differently at different times? For an allotment is neither a certain
separate energy of the Gods, so that sublunary natures changing, we
might say that it is exempt, and remains immutable, nor is it that which
is governed alone, so that no absurdity would follow from admitting that
an allotment is in a flowing condition, and is conversant with
all-various mutations; but it is a providential inspection, and
unrestrained government of divinity over sublunary concerns. Such being
the doubts with which this subject is attended, the following appears to
be a solution of the difficulty.
“We must say, then, that it is not proper to consider all the natures
that are in generation, and generation itself, as alone consisting of
things mutable and flowing, but that there is also something immutable
in these, and which is naturally adapted to remain perpetually the same.
For the interval which receives and comprehends in itself all the parts
of the world, and which has an arrangement through all bodies, is
immoveable, lest, being moved, it should require another place, and thus
should proceed from one receptacle to another, _ad infinitum_. The
etherial vehicles, also, of divine souls, with which they are circularly
invested, and which imitate the lives in the heavens, have a perpetual
essence, and are eternally suspended from these divine souls themselves,
being full of prolific powers, and performing a circular motion,
according to a certain secondary revolution of the celestial orbs. And,
in the third place, the wholeness (ολοτης) of the elements has a
permanent subsistence, though the parts are all-variously corrupted. For
it is necessary that every form in the universe should be never failing,
in order that the universe may be perfect, and that, being generated
from an immoveable cause, it may be immoveable in its essence. _But
every wholeness is a form, or rather it is that which it is said to be
through the participation of one all perfect form._
“And here we may see the orderly progression of the nature of bodies.
For the interval of the universe is immoveable according to every kind
of motion. But the vehicles of divine souls alone receive a mutation
according to place; for such a motion as this is most remote from
essential mutation. And the wholeness of the elements admits in its
parts the other motions of bodies, but the whole remains perfectly
immutable. The celestial allotments also, which proximately divide the
interval of the universe, codistribute likewise the heavens themselves.
But those in the sublunary region are primarily, indeed, allotted the
parts which are in the interval of the universe, but afterwards they
make a distribution according to the definite vehicles of souls. And, in
the third place, they remain perpetually the same, according to the
total parts of generation. The allotments of the Gods, therefore, do not
change, nor do they subsist differently at different times; for they
have not their subsistence proximately in that which may be changed.
“How, therefore, do the illuminations of the Gods accede to these? How
are the dissolutions of sacred rites effected? And how is the same place
at different times under the influence of different spirits? May it not
be said, that since the Gods have perpetual allotments, and divide the
earth according to divine numbers, similarly to the sections of the
heavens, the parts of the earth also are illuminated, so far as they
participate of aptitude. But the circulation of the heavenly bodies,
through the figures which they possess, produce this aptitude; divine
illumination at the same time imparting a power more excellent than the
nature which is present with these parts of the earth. This aptitude is
also effected by nature herself as a whole, inserting divine impressions
in each of the illuminated parts, through which they spontaneously
participate of the Gods. For as these parts depend on the Gods, nature
inserts in such of them as are different, different images of the
divinities. Times too cooperate in producing this aptitude, according to
which other things, also, are governed; the proper temperature of the
air likewise; and, in short, every thing by which we are surrounded
contributes to the increase and diminution of this aptitude. When,
therefore, conformably to a concurrence of these many causes, an
aptitude to the participation of the Gods is ingenerated in some one of
the natures which are disposed to be changed, then a certain divinity is
unfolded into light, which, prior to this, was concealed through the
inaptitude of the recipients; possessing, indeed, his appropriate
allotment eternally, and always extending the participation of himself,
similarly to illuminations from the sun, but not being always
participated by sublunary natures, in consequence of their inaptitude to
such participation. For as with respect to partial souls such as ours,
which at different times embrace different lives, some of them, indeed,
choose lives accommodated to their appropriate Gods, but others foreign
lives, through oblivion of the divinities to whom they belong; thus,
also, with respect to sacred places, some are adapted to the power which
there receives its allotment, but others are suspended from a different
order. And on this account, as the Athenian guest in Plato says, some
places are more fortunate, but others more unfortunate.
“The divine Iamblichus, however, doubts how the Gods are said to be
allotted certain places according to definite times, as, by Plato in the
Timæus, Minerva is said to have been first allotted the guardianship of
Athens, and afterwards of Saïs. For if their allotment commenced from a
certain time, it will also at a certain time cease. For every thing
which is measured by time is of this kind. And farther still, was the
place which at a certain time they are allotted, without a presiding
deity prior to this allotment, or was it under the government of other
Gods? For if it was without a presiding deity, how is it to be admitted
that a certain part of the universe was once entirely destitute of
divinity? How can any place remain without the guardianship of superior
beings? And if any place is sufficient to the preservation of itself,
how does it afterwards become the allotment of some one of the Gods? But
if it should be said, that it is afterwards under the government of
another God, of whom it becomes the allotment, this also is absurd. For
the second God does not divulse the government and allotment of the
former, nor do the Gods alternately occupy the places of each other, nor
dæmons change their allotments. Such being the doubts on this subject,
he solves them by saying, that the allotments of the Gods remain
perpetually unchanged, but that the participants of them at one time,
indeed, enjoy the beneficent influence of the presiding powers, but at
another are deprived of it. He adds, that _these are the mutations
measured by time, which sacred institutes frequently call the birthday
of the Gods_.
P. 23. _Which also the art of divine works perceiving, &c._ This art of
divine works is called _theurgy_, in which Pythagoras was initiated
among the Syrians, as we are informed by Iamblichus in his Life of that
philosopher. (See p. 9 of my translation of that work.) Proclus also was
skilled in this art, as may be seen in the Life of him by Marinus.
Psellus, in his MS. treatise on Dæmons, says, as we have before
observed, “that magic formed the last part of the sacerdotal science”;
in which place by magic he doubtless means that kind of it which is
denominated theurgy. And that theurgy was employed by the ancients in
their mysteries, I have fully proved in my treatise on the Eleusinian
and Bacchic Mysteries.[152] This theurgy, too, is doubtless the same as
the magic of Zoroaster, which Plato in the First Alcibiades says,
consisted in the worship of the Gods; on which passage the following
account of theurgy by Proclus was, I have no doubt, originally part of a
commentary. For the MS. Commentary of Proclus, which is extant on this
dialogue, does not extend to more than a third part of it; and this
Dissertation on Theurgy, which is only extant in Latin, was published by
Ficinus the translator, immediately after his Excerpta, from this
Commentary. So that it seems highly probable that the manuscript from
which Ficinus translated his Excerpta, was much more perfect than that
which has been preserved to us, in consequence of containing this
account of the theurgy of the ancients.
“In the same manner as lovers gradually advance from that beauty which
is apparent in sensible forms, to that which is divine; so the ancient
priests, when they considered that there is a certain alliance and
sympathy in natural things to each other, and of things manifest to
occult powers; and discovered that all things subsist in all, they
fabricated a sacred science from this mutual sympathy and similarity.
Thus they recognised things supreme in such as are subordinate, and the
subordinate in the supreme: in the celestial regions, terrene properties
subsisting in a causal and celestial manner; and in earth celestial
properties, but according to a terrene condition. For how shall we
account for those plants called heliotropes, that is, attendants on the
sun, moving in correspondence with the revolution of its orb, but
selenitropes, or attendants on the moon, turning in exact conformity to
her motion? It is because all things pray, and hymn the leaders of their
respective orders; but some intellectually, and others rationally; some
in a natural, and others after a sensible, manner. Hence the sunflower,
as far as it is able, moves in a circular dance towards the sun; so that
if any one could hear the pulsation made by its circuit in the air, he
would perceive something composed by a sound of this kind, in honour of
its king, such as a plant is capable of framing. Hence, too, we may
behold the sun and moon in the earth, but according to a terrene
quality; but in the celestial regions, all plants, and stones, and
animals, possessing an intellectual life according to a celestial
nature. Now the ancients, having contemplated this mutual sympathy of
things, applied for occult purposes, both celestial and terrene natures,
by means of which, through a certain similitude, they deduced divine
virtues into this inferior abode. For, indeed, similitude itself is a
sufficient cause of binding things together in union and consent. Thus,
if a piece of paper is heated, and afterwards placed near a lamp, though
it does not touch the fire, the paper will be suddenly inflamed, and the
flame will descend from the superior to the inferior parts. This heated
paper we may compare to a certain relation of inferiors to superiors;
and its approximation to the lamp, to the opportune use of things
according to time, place, and matter. But the procession of fire into
the paper, aptly represents the presence of divine light to that nature
which is capable of its reception. Lastly, the inflammation of the paper
may be compared to the deification of mortals, and to the illumination
of material natures, which are afterwards carried upwards, like the
enkindled paper, from a certain participation of divine seed.
“Again, the lotus, before the rising of the sun, folds its leaves into
itself, but gradually expands them on its rising: unfolding them in
proportion to the sun’s ascent to the zenith; but as gradually
contracting them as that luminary descends to the west. Hence this
plant, by the expansion and contraction of its leaves, appears no less
to honour the sun, than men by the gesture of their eyelids, and the
motion of their lips. But this imitation and certain participation of
supernal light is not only visible in plants, which possess nothing more
than a vestige of life, but likewise in particular stones. Thus the
sun-stone, by its golden rays, imitates those of the sun; but the stone
called the eye of heaven, or of the sun, has a figure similar to the
pupil of an eye, and a ray shines from the middle of the pupil. Thus,
too, the lunar stone, which has a figure similar to the moon when
horned, by a certain change of itself, follows the lunar motion. Lastly,
the stone called helioselenus, _i. e._ of the sun and moon, imitates,
after a manner, the congress of those luminaries, which it images by its
colour. So that all things are full of divine natures; terrestrial
natures receiving the plenitude of such as are celestial, but celestial
of supercelestial essences;[153] while every order of things proceeds
gradually, in a beautiful descent, from the highest to the lowest. For
whatever particulars are collected into one above the order of things,
are afterwards dilated in descending, various souls being distributed
under their various ruling divinities.
“In the next place, there are many solar animals, such as lions and
cocks, which participate, according to their nature, of a certain solar
divinity; whence it is wonderful how much inferiors yield to superiors
in the same order, though they do not yield in magnitude and power.
Hence it is said, that a cock is very much feared, and, as it were,
reverenced, by a lion; the reason of which we cannot assign from matter
or sense, but from the contemplation alone of a supernal order. For thus
we shall find that the presence of the solar virtue accords more with a
cock than with a lion. This will be evident from considering that the
cock, as it were, with certain hymns, applauds and calls to the rising
sun, when he bends his course to us from the antipodes; and that solar
angels sometimes appear in forms of this kind, who, though they are
without shape, yet present themselves to us, who are connected with
shape, in some sensible form. Sometimes, too, there are dæmons with a
leonine front, who when a cock is placed before them, unless they are of
a solar order, suddenly disappear; and this because those natures which
have an inferior rank in the same order always reverence their
superiors; just as many, on beholding the images of divine men, are
accustomed, from the very view, to be fearful of perpetrating any thing
base.
“In fine, some things turn round correspondent to the revolutions of the
sun, as the plants which we have mentioned, and others after a manner
imitate the solar rays, as the palm and the date; some the fiery nature
of the sun, as the laurel; and others a different property. For, indeed,
we may perceive that the properties which are collected in the sun, are
every where distributed to subsequent natures constituted in a solar
order, that is, to angels, dæmons, souls, animals, plants, and stones.
Hence the authors of the ancient priesthood discovered from things
apparent the worship of superior powers, while they mingled some things
and purified others. They mingled many things indeed together, because
they saw that some simple substances possessed a divine property (though
not taken singly) sufficient to call down that particular power, of
which they were participants. Hence, by the mingling of many things
together, they attracted upon us a supernal influx; and by the
composition of one thing from many, they produced an assimilation to
that one which is above many; and composed statues from the mixture of
various substances conspiring in sympathy and consent. Besides this,
they collected composite odours, by a divine art, into one,
comprehending a multitude of powers, and symbolizing with the unity of a
divine essence; considering that division debilitates each of these, but
that mingling them together restores them to the idea of their exemplar.
“But sometimes one herb, or one stone, is sufficient to a divine
operation. Thus a thistle is sufficient to procure the sudden appearance
of some superior power; but a laurel, raccinum (or a thorny kind of
sprig), the land and sea onion, the coral, the diamond, and the jasper,
operate as a safeguard. The heart of a mole is subservient to
divination, but sulphur and marine water to purification. Hence the
ancient priests, by the mutual relation and sympathy of things to each
other, collected their virtues into one, but expelled them by repugnancy
and antipathy; purifying when it was requisite with sulphur and bitumen,
and sprinkling with marine water. For sulphur purifies, from the
sharpness of its odour; but marine water on account of its fiery
portion. Besides this, in the worship of the Gods, they offered animals,
and other substances congruous to their nature; and received, in the
first place, the powers of dæmons, as proximate to natural substances
and operations; and by these natural substances they convoked into their
presence those powers to which they approached. Afterwards they
proceeded from dæmons to the powers and energies of the Gods; partly,
indeed, from dæmoniacal instruction, but partly by their own industry,
interpreting appropriate symbols, and ascending to a proper intelligence
of the Gods. And lastly, laying aside natural substances and their
operations, they received themselves into the communion and fellowship
of the Gods.”
The Emperor Julian alludes to this theurgical art, in the following
extract from his Arguments against the Christians, preserved by Cyril.
Το γαρ εκ θεων εις ανθρωπους αφικνουμενον πνευμα, σπανιακις μεν και εν
ολιγοις γινεται, και ουτε παντα ανδρα τουτου μετασχειν ρᾳδιον, ουτε εν
παντι καιρῳ. ταυτῃ το και το παρ’ Εβραιοις επελιπεν, ουκουν ουδε παρ’
Αιγυπτιοις εις τουτο σωζεται. Φαινεται δε και τα αυτοφυη χρηστηρια ταις
των χρονων εικοντα περιοδοις. ὃ δε φιλανθρωπος ημων δεσποτης και πατηρ
Ζευς εννοησας, ως αν μη πανταπασι της προς τους θεους αποστερηθωμεν
κοινωνιας δεδωκεν ημιν δια των ιερων τεχνων επισκεψιν, υφ’ ης προς τας
χρειας εξομεν την αποχρωσαν βοηθειαν. _i. e._ “For the inspiration which
arrives to men from the Gods is rare, and exists but in a few. Nor is it
easy for every man to partake of this, nor at every time. This has
ceased among the Hebrews, nor is it preserved to the present time among
the Egyptians. Spontaneous oracles, also, are seen to yield to temporal
periods. This, however, our philanthropic lord and father Jupiter
understanding, that we might not be entirely deprived of communion with
the Gods, has given us observation through _sacred arts_, by which we
have at hand sufficient assistance.” For the cause why, at stated times,
sacred arts, oracles, and inspiration fail, see the additional notes to
my translation of Iamblichus’s Life of Pythagoras.
P. 24. _The participant of the rational soul becomes the cause of
suffering to the composite._ See my translation of Plotinus on the
Impassivity of Incorporeal Natures, in which this is beautifully and
profoundly demonstrated. Proclus, also, in Tim. lib. v. p. 340,
admirably observes, that the motion of the nutritive power, and the
percussions of sense, are the causes of the perturbation of the soul;
but that we must not fancy that the soul suffers any thing through
these. “For as if,” says he, “some one standing on the margin of a river
should behold the image and form of himself in the floating stream, he
indeed will preserve his face unchanged; but the stream, being
all-variously moved, will change the image, so that at different times
it will appear to him different, oblique and erect, and perhaps divulsed
and continuous. Let us suppose too, that such a one, through being
unaccustomed to the spectacle, should think that it was himself that
suffered this distortion, in consequence of surveying his shadow in the
water, and thus thinking, should be afflicted and disturbed, astonished
and impeded. After the same manner, the soul beholding the image of
herself in body, borne along in the river of generation, and variously
disposed at different times, through inward passions and external
impulses, is indeed herself impassive, but thinks that she suffers; and
being ignorant of, and mistaking her image for, herself, is disturbed,
astonished, and perplexed.”
P. 35. _Since, however, the order of all the Gods is profoundly
united.——For the very existence in them, whatever it may be, is the one
of their nature._
The Gods are self-perfect superessential unities, so far as they are
Gods. For the principal subsistence of every thing is according to the
summit of its essence, and this in the Gods is _the one_, through which
they are profoundly united to each other and to _the one itself_, or the
ineffable principle of things, from which they are ineffably unfolded
into light. Concerning this union of them with each other, Proclus
admirably observes as follows, in his MS. Commentary on the Parmenides
of Plato. “All these unities are in, and are profoundly united to, each
other, and their union is far greater than the communion and sameness
which subsist in beings. For in the latter there is indeed mutual
mixture of forms, similitude, and friendship, and a participation of
each other; but the union of the Gods, as being a union of unities, is
much more uniform, ineffable, and transcendent: for here _all are in
all_, which does not take place in forms or ideas;[154] and their
unmingled purity, and the characteristic of each, in a manner far
surpassing the diversity in ideas, preserves their natures unconfused,
and distinguishes their peculiar powers. Hence, some of them are more
universal, and others more particular; some of them are characterised by
permanency, others by progression, and others by conversion, or
regression. Some, again, are generative, others anagogic, or of an
elevating nature, and others demiurgic; and universally, there are
different characteristics of different Gods, _viz._ the connective,
perfective, demiurgic, assimilative, and such others as are celebrated
posterior to these; so that all are in all, and yet each is at the same
time separate and distinct.
“Indeed we obtain this knowledge of their union and characteristics from
the natures by which they are participated. For, with respect to the
visible Gods, we say that there is one soul of the sun, and another of
the earth, directing our attention to the visible bodies of these
divinities, which possess much variety in their essence, powers, and
dignity among wholes. As, therefore, we apprehend the difference of
incorporeal essences from sensible inspection, in like manner from the
variety of incorporeal essences, we are enabled to know something of the
unmingled distinction of the first and superessential unities, and of
the characteristics of each. For each unity has a multitude suspended
from its nature, which is either intelligible alone; or intelligible,
and at the same time intellectual; or intellectual alone; and this last
is either participated, or not participated; and this again, is either
supermundane, or mundane. And thus far does the progression of the
unities extend.” Shortly after he adds, “As trees by their extremities
are rooted in the earth, and through this are earthly in every part, in
the same manner divine natures are rooted by their summits in _the one_,
and each is a _unity_ and _one_, through its unconfused union with _the
one itself_.” See more on this most important of all subjects in the
notes to my translation of the Parmenides.
P. 50. _For as in all other things, such as are principal, primarily
begin from themselves, &c._
Hence every God begins his own energy from himself, which Proclus thus
demonstrates in Prop. 131 of his Elements of Theology. “For every God
first exhibits the peculiarity of his presence with secondary natures in
himself; because he imparts himself to other things also according to
his own exuberant plenitude. For neither is deficiency adapted to the
Gods, nor fulness alone. For every thing deficient is imperfect, and not
being itself perfect, it is impossible it should make another thing to
be perfect. But that which is full is alone sufficient to itself, and is
not yet prepared to communicate. It is necessary, therefore, that the
nature which fills other things, and which extends to other things the
communications of itself, should be superplenary, or exuberantly full.
Hence, if a divine nature fills all things from itself with the good
which it contains in itself, it is exuberantly full. And if this be the
case, establishing first in itself the peculiarity which it imparts to
others, it will extend to them the communications of superplenary
goodness.
P. 59. _It is requisite also to know what enthusiasm is, and how it is
produced._
The following account of enthusiasm, and of the different kinds of mania
mentioned by Plato in the Phædrus, from the Scholia of Hermeas on that
dialogue, is extracted from the additional notes to my translation of
Proclus on the Timæus, and is given in this place for the sake of the
Platonic English reader, who may not have that translation in his
possession, as a valuable addition to what is here said by Iamblichus on
this subject.
“Since Plato here delivers four kinds of mania, by which I mean
enthusiasm, and possession or inspiration from the Gods, _viz._ the
musical, the telestic, the prophetic, and the amatory, previous to the
discussion of each, we must first speak about enthusiasm, and show to
what part of the soul the enthusiastic energy pertains; whether each
part of it possesses this energy; if all enthusiasm is from the Gods;
and in what part of the soul it is ingenerated; or whether it subsists
in something else more excellent than soul. Where, then, does that which
is properly and primarily called enthusiasm subsist, and what is it? Of
the rational soul there are two parts, one of which is _dianoia_, but
the other _opinion_. Again, however, of dianoia, one part is said to be
the lowest, and is properly dianoia, but another part of it is the
highest, which is said to be the intellect of it, according to which the
soul especially becomes intellectual, and which some call intellect in
capacity. There is also another thing above this, which is the summit of
the whole soul, and most allied to _the one_, which likewise wishes well
to all things, and always gives itself up to the Gods, and is readily
disposed to do whatever they please. This, too, is said to be _the one_
of the soul, bears the image of the superessential one, and unites the
whole soul. But that these things necessarily thus subsist, we may learn
as follows: The rational soul derives its existence from all the causes
prior to itself, _i. e._ from intellect and the Gods. But it subsists
also from itself: for it perfects itself. So far, therefore, as it
subsists from the Gods, it possesses _the one_, which unites all its
powers, and all the multitude of itself, and conjoins them to _the one
itself_, and is the first recipient of the goods imparted by the Gods.
It likewise makes all the essence of the soul to be boniform, according
to which it is connected with the Gods, and united to them. But so far
as it subsists from intellect it possesses an intellectual nature,
according to which it apprehends forms, by simple projections, or
intuitions, and not discursively; and is conjoined to the intellect
which is above itself. And so far as it constitutes itself, it possesses
the dianoetic power, according to which it generates sciences and
certain theorems, energizes discursively, and collects conclusions from
propositions. For that it constitutes or gives subsistence to itself, is
evident from its imparting perfection to itself; since that which leads
itself to perfection, and imparts to itself well-being, will much more
impart to itself existence. For well-being is a greater thing than
being. If, therefore, the soul imparts that which is greater to itself,
it will much more impart that which is less. Hence that which is
primarily, properly, and truly enthusiasm from the Gods, is effected
according to this one of the soul, which is above dianoia, and above the
intellect of the soul; which one is at another time in a relaxed and
dormant state. This one, likewise, becoming illuminated [by the Gods],
all the life of the soul is illuminated, and also intellect, dianoia,
and the irrational part, and the resemblance of enthusiasm is
transmitted as far as to the body itself.
“Other enthusiasms, therefore, are produced about other parts of the
soul,[155] certain dæmons exciting them,[156] or the Gods also, though
not without the intervention of dæmons. For dianoia is said to energize
enthusiastically, when it discovers sciences and theorems in a very
short space of time, and in a greater degree than other men. Opinion,
likewise, and the phantasy, are said thus to energize when they discover
arts, and accomplish admirable works, such, for instance, as Phidias
effected in the formation of statues, and another in another art, as
also Homer says[157] of him who made the belt of Hercules, ‘that he
neither did nor would artificially produce such another.’ Anger,
likewise, is said to energize enthusiastically, when in battle it
energizes supernaturally.
Like Mars, when brandishing his spear, he raged.[158]
But if some one, yielding to desire, should eat of that which reason
forbids, and through this should unexpectedly become well, you may say
that desire also, in this instance, energized enthusiastically, though
obscurely; so that enthusiasm is likewise produced about the other parts
of the soul. Enthusiasm, however, properly so called, is when this one
of the soul, which is above intellect, is excited to the Gods, and is
from thence inspired. But at different times it is possessed about the
aptitudes of itself, by different Gods; and is more or less possessed
when intellect or dianoia is that which is moved. As, therefore, when we
inquire what philosophy is, we do not always accurately define it, but
frequently, from an improper use of the word, call mathematics or
physics philosophy and science; we do the like also with respect to
enthusiasm. For though it should be the phantasy which is excited, we
are accustomed to call the excitation enthusiasm. Moreover, those who
ascribe enthusiasm to the temperatures of bodies, or the excellent
temperament of the air, or the ascendency of exhalations, or the
aptitudes of times and places, or the agency of the bodies that revolve
in the heavens, speak rather of the cooperating and material causes of
the thing than of the causes of it properly so called. You have,
therefore, for the producing cause of enthusiasm, the Gods; for the
material cause, the enthusiastically energizing soul itself, or the
external symbols; for the formal cause, the inspiration of the Gods
about _the one_ of the soul; and for the final cause, good.
“If, however, the Gods always wish the soul what is good, why does not
the soul always energize enthusiastically? May we not say, that the Gods
indeed always wish the soul what is good, but they are also willing that
the order of the universe should prevail, and that the soul, through
many causes, is not always adapted to enthusiasm, on which account it
does not always enthusiastically energize? But some say that the
telestic art extends as far as to the sublunary region. If, therefore,
they mean that no one of the superlunary and celestial natures energizes
in the sublunary region, they evidently assert what is absurd. But if
they mean that the Telestæ, or mystic operators, are not able to
energize above the lunar sphere, we say, that if all the allotments of
souls are sublunary, their assertion will be true; but if there are also
allotments of souls above the moon, as there are (for some are the
attendants of the sun, others of the moon, and others of Saturn, since
the Demiurgus disseminated some of them into the earth, others into the
moon, and others elsewhere), this being the case, it will be possible
for the soul to energize above the moon. For what the whole order of
things impacts to the soul for a very extended period of time, this the
soul is also able to impart to itself for a short space of time, when
assisted by the Gods through the telestic art. For the soul can never
energize above its own allotment, but can energize to the extent of it.
Thus, for instance, if the allotment of the soul was as far as to
philosophy, the soul would be able, though it should not choose a
philosophic but some other life, to energize in that life somewhat
philosophically. There are also said to be certain supermundane souls.
And thus we have shown how the soul energizes enthusiastically.
But how are statues said to have an enthusiastic energy? May we not say,
that a statue being inanimate, does not itself energize about divinity,
but the telestic art, purifying the matter of which the statue consists,
and placing round it certain characters and symbols, in the first place
renders it, through these means, animated, and causes it to receive a
certain life from the world; and, in the next place, after this, it
prepares the statue to be illuminated by a divine nature, through which
it always delivers oracles, as long as it is properly adapted. For the
statue, when it has been rendered perfect by the telestic art, remains
afterwards [endued with a prophetic power] till it becomes entirely
unadapted to divine illumination; but he who receives the inspiring
influence of the Gods receives it only at certain times, and not always.
But the cause of this is, that the soul, when filled with deity,
energizes about it. Hence, in consequence of energizing above its own
power, it becomes weary. For it would be a God, and similar to the souls
of the stars, if it did not become weary. But the statue, conformably to
its participations, remains illuminated. Hence the inaptitude of it
entirely proceeds into privation, unless it is again, _de novo_,
perfected and animated by the mystic operator. We have sufficiently
shown, therefore, that enthusiasm, properly so called, is effected about
_the one_ of the soul, and that it is an illumination of divinity.
“In the next place, let us discuss the order and the use of the four
manias, and show why the philosopher makes mention of these alone. Is it
because there are no other than these, or because these were sufficient
for his purpose? That there are, therefore, many other divine
inspirations and manias Plato himself indicates as he proceeds, and
prior to this, he makes mention of the inspiration from the Nymphs. But
there are also inspirations from Pan, from the mother of the Gods, and
from the Corybantes, which are elsewhere mentioned by Plato. Here,
however, he alone delivers these four manias; in the first place,
because these alone are sufficient to the soul, in the attainment of its
proper apocatastasis, as we shall afterwards show; and in the next
place, because he delivers the proximate steps of ascent to the soul.
For the gifts of the Gods to all beings are many and incomprehensible.
But now he delivers to us the energies of the Gods which are extended to
souls. He delivers, however, these four manias, not as if one of them
was not sufficient, and especially the amatory, to lead back the soul to
its pristine felicity; but at present the series and regular gradation
of them, and the orderly perfection of the soul, are unfolded. As,
therefore, it is possible for the tyrannic life, when suddenly changed,
to become aristocratic, through employing strenuous promptitude and a
divine allotment, but the gradual ascent is from a tyrannic to a
democratic, and from this to an oligarchic life, afterwards to a
timocratic, and at last to an aristocratic life, but the descent and
lapse are vice versa; thus also here, the soul being about to ascend,
and be restored to its former felicity, is in the first place possessed
with the musical mania, afterwards with the telestic, then with the
prophetic, and, in the last place, with the amatory mania. These
inspirations, however; conspire with, and are in want of, each other; so
abundant is their communion. For the telestic requires the
prophetic[159] mania; since the latter[160] interprets many things
pertaining to the former. And again, the prophetic requires the telestic
mania. For the telestic mania perfects and establishes oracular
predictions. Farther still, the prophetic uses the poetic and musical
mania. For prophets, as I may say, always speak in verse. And again, the
musical uses the prophetic mania spontaneously, as Plato says. But what
occasion is there to speak about the amatory and musical manias? For
nearly the same persons exercise both these, as, for instance, Sappho,
Anacreon, and the like, in consequence of these not being able to
subsist without each other. But it is very evident that the amatory
mania contributes to all these, since it is subservient to enthusiasm of
every kind: for no enthusiasm can be effected without amatory
inspiration. And you may see how Orpheus appears to have applied himself
to all these, as being in want of, and adhering to, each other. For we
learn that he was most telestic, and most prophetic, and was excited by
Apollo; and besides this, that he was most poetic, on which account he
is said to have been the son of Calliope. He was likewise most amatory,
as he himself acknowledges to Musæus, extending to him divine goods, and
rendering him perfect. Hence he appears to have been possessed with all
the manias, and this by a necessary consequence. For there is an
abundant union, conspiration, and alliance with each other, of the Gods
who preside over these manias, viz. of the Muses, Bacchus, Apollo, and
Love.
“It remains, therefore, that we should unfold the nature of each of the
manias, previously observing that those which are internal, and
originate from the soul itself, and give perfection to it, are of one
kind; but the external energies of them, and which preserve the outward
man, and our nature, are of another. The four external, however, are
analogous to the four internal manias. Let us consider, therefore, in
the first place, the internal, and which alone originate from the soul
itself, and let us see what they effect in the soul. In order, likewise,
that this may become manifest, and also their arrangement, let us survey
from on high, the descent, as Plato says, and defluxion of the wings of
the soul. From the beginning, therefore, and at first, the soul was
united to the Gods, and its unity to their one. But afterwards the soul
departing from this divine union descended into intellect, and no longer
possessed real beings unitedly, and in one, but apprehended and surveyed
them by simple projections, and, as it were, contacts of its intellect.
In the next place, departing from intellect, and descending into
reasoning and dianoia, it no longer apprehended real beings by simple
intuitions, but syllogistically and transitively, proceeding from one
thing to another, from propositions to conclusions. Afterwards,
abandoning true reasoning, and the dissolving peculiarity, it descended
into generation, and became filled with much irrationality and
perturbation. It is necessary, therefore, that it should recur to its
proper principles and again return to the place from whence it came. To
this ascent and apocatastasis, however, these four manias contribute.
And the musical mania, indeed, leads to symphony and harmony, the
agitated and disturbed nature of the parts of the soul, which were
hurried away to indefiniteness and inaptitude, and were filled with
abundant tumult. But the telestic mania causes the soul to be perfect
and entire, and prepares it to energize intellectually. For the musical
mania alone harmonizes and represses the parts of the soul; but the
telestic causes the whole of it to energize, and prepares it to become
entire, so that the intellectual part of it may energize. For the soul,
by descending into the realms of generation, resembles a thing broken
and relaxed. And the circle of _the same_, or the intellectual part of
it, is fettered; but the circle of _the different_, or the doxastic
part, sustains many fractures and turnings. Hence, the soul energizes
partially, and not according to the whole of itself. The Dionysiacal
inspiration, therefore, after the parts of the soul are coharmonized,
renders it perfect, and causes it to energize according to the whole of
itself, and to live intellectually. But the Apolloniacal mania converts
and coexcites all the multiplied powers, and the whole of the soul, to
_the one_ of it. Hence Apollo is denominated as elevating the soul from
multitude to _the one_. And the remaining mania, the amatory, receiving
the soul united, conjoins this one of the soul to the Gods, and to
intelligible beauty. As the givers, therefore, of these manias are
transcendently united, and are in each other, the gifts also on this
account participate of, and communicate with, each other, and the
recipient, which is the soul, possesses an adaptation to all the gifts.
This, therefore, is the order, and these are the energies and powers
within the soul itself, of these four manias.
“But let us also consider their external energies on man, and what they
outwardly effect about us. The musical mania, therefore, causes us to
speak in verse, and to act and be moved rythmically, and to sing in
metre, the splendid deeds of divine men, and their virtues and pursuits;
and, through these, to discipline our life, in the same manner as the
inward manias coharmonize our soul. But the telestic mania, expelling
every thing foreign, contaminating, and noxious, preserves our life
perfect and innoxious, and banishing an insane and diabolical phantasy,
causes us to be sane, entire, and perfect, just as the internal telestic
mania makes the soul to be perfect and entire. Again, the prophetic
mania contracts into one the extension and infinity of time, and sees,
as in one present now, all things, the past, the future, and the
existing time. Hence it predicts what will be, which it sees as present
to itself. It causes us, therefore, to pass through life in an
irreprehensible manner; just as the internal prophetic mania contracts
and elevates all the multiplied and many powers and lives of the soul to
_the one_, in order that it may in a greater degree be preserved and
connected. But the amatory mania converts young persons to us, and
causes them to become our friends, being instructive of youth, and
leading them from sensible beauty to our psychical beauty, and from this
sending them to intelligible beauty; in the same manner as the internal
amatory mania conjoins _the one_ of the soul to the Gods.
“All the above mentioned manias, therefore, are superior to the prudent
and temperate energies of the soul. Nevertheless, there is a mania which
is coordinate with temperance, and which we say has in a certain respect
a prerogative above[161] it. For certain inspirations are produced,
according to the middle and also according to the doxastic reasons of
the soul, conformably to which artists effect certain things, and
discover theorems beyond expectation, as Asclepius, for instance, in
medicine, and Hercules in the practic[162] life.”
Afterwards, in commenting on what Plato says of the mania from the
Muses, viz. “that it adorns the infinite deeds of the ancients,” Hermeas
observes, “that the inward energy in the soul of the poetic mania, by
applying itself to superior and intelligible natures, imparts to
subordinate natures harmony and order; but that the external
divinely-inspired poetry celebrates the deeds of the ancients, and
instructs both its contemporaries and posterity, extending its energies
every where.” But Plato says, “that he who without the divinely-inspired
mania of the Muses expects to become a divine poet, will, by thus
fancying, become himself imperfect, and his poetry will be vanquished
and concealed by the poetry which is the progeny of mania.” Hermeas
adds, “For what similitude is there between the poetry of Chærilus and
Callimachus, and that of Homer and Pindar? For the divinely-inspired
poets, as being filled from the Muses, always invoke them, and extend to
them all that they say.” For a fuller and most admirable account of the
poetic mania, and of the different species of poetry by Proclus, see the
notes on the tenth book of the Republic, in my translation of Plato, and
also the Introduction to my translation of the Rhetoric, Poetic, and
Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle.
From what is here said by Hermeas about enthusiasm, the intelligent
reader will easily see that none of the Roman poets, whose works have
been transmitted to us, possessed that which is primarily, properly, and
truly enthusiasm, or that highest species of it in which _the one_ of
the soul is illuminated by a divine nature, and through transcendent
similitude is united to it. As to Virgil, indeed, the prince of these
poets, though he invokes the Muse in the beginning of the Æneid, yet his
invocation of her is but a partial and secondary thing. For he only
calls on her to unfold to him the causes that involved a man of such
remarkable piety as Æneas in so many misfortunes:
Musa, mihi causa memora, &c.
And, confiding in his own genius, he begins his poem without soliciting
supernal inspiration,
Arma, virumque cano, &c.
To which may be added, that this placing himself before the Muse,
resembles the _ego et meus rex_ of Wolsey. On the contrary,
divinely-inspired poets, as Hermeas well observes, knock, as it were, at
the gates of the Muses, and thus being filled from thence exclaim,
Εσπετε νυν μοι Μουσαι
And,
Μηνιν αειδε θεα—
And,
Ανδρα μοι εννεπε Μουσα.
For being always extended to them, they dispose the whole of what they
afterwards say as derived from their inspiring influence. With an
arrogance too, peculiar to the Romans, who, as a certain Greek poet[163]
says, were a people
Beyond measure proud.
He associates himself, in his fourth Eclogue, with the Muses, as their
equal:
Sicelides Musæ, paulo majora canamus.
Which reminds me of what Suetonius relates of Caligula, that he would
place himself between the statues of Castor and Pollux, and confer
privately with Jupiter Capitolinus, fancying that he was intimate with,
and of equal dignity with, these divinities. And as to the poets that
have lived since the fall of the Roman empire, it would be ridiculous to
suppose that they possessed this highest enthusiasm, as they did not
believe in the existence of the sources from whence it is alone
genuinely derived.
P. 67. _The attentive power of the soul._ This is that part or power of
the rational soul which primarily apprehends the operations of the
senses. For the rational soul not only has intellect in capacity, the
dianoetic power, will, and choice, but another power, which is called by
the best of the Greek interpreters of Aristotle, as well as by
Iamblichus, το προσεκτικον, _the attentive_. This power investigates and
perceives whatever is transacted in man; and says, I understand, I
think, I opine, I am angry, I desire. And, in short, this attentive part
of the rational soul passes through all the rational, irrational,
vegetable, or physical powers. If, therefore, it is requisite it should
pass through all these powers, it will also proceed through the senses,
and say, I see, I hear; for it is the peculiarity of that which
apprehends energies thus to speak. Hence if it is the attentive power
which says these things, it is this power which apprehends the energy of
sensibles; for it is necessary that the nature which apprehends all
things should be one, since man also is one. For if one part of it
should apprehend _these_, and another _those_ things, it is just, as
Aristotle says, as if you should perceive _this_ thing, and _I_ that. It
is necessary, therefore, that the attentive power should be one
indivisible thing.
P. 74. _For the human soul is on all sides darkened by body, which he
who denominates the river of Negligence, or the water of Oblivion_,
&c.——_will not by such appellations sufficiently express its turpitude_.
“The whole of generation, as well as the human body,” says Proclus in
Tim. lib. v. p. 339, “may be called a river, through its rapid,
impetuous, and unstable flux. Thus also in the Republic, Plato calls the
whole genesiurgic nature the river of Lethe; in which are contained, as
Empedocles says, Oblivion, and the meadow of Ate; the voracity of
matter, and the light-hating world, as the Gods say; and the winding
streams under which many are drawn down, as the Chaldean oracles
assert.”
P. 105. _But there are a certain few who by employing a certain
supernatural power of intellect, are removed from nature_, &c. The class
to which these few belong is beautifully unfolded, as follows, by
Plotinus, in the beginning of his Treatise on Intellect, Ideas, and real
Being. “Since all men from their birth employ sense prior to intellect,
and are necessarily first conversant with sensibles, some proceeding no
farther, pass through life, considering these as the first and last of
things, and apprehending that whatever is painful among these is evil,
and whatever is pleasant is good; thus thinking it sufficient to pursue
the one and avoid the other. Those, too, among them who pretend to a
greater share of reason than others, esteem this to be wisdom, being
affected in a manner similar to more heavy birds, who collecting many
things from the earth, and being oppressed with the weight, are unable
to fly on high, though they have received wings for this purpose from
nature. But others are in a small degree elevated from things
subordinate, the more excellent part of the soul recalling them from
pleasure to a more worthy pursuit. As they are, however, unable to look
on high, and as not possessing any thing else which can afford them
rest, they betake themselves, together with the name of virtue, to
actions and the election of things inferior, from which they at first
endeavoured to raise themselves, though in vain. _In the third class is
the race of divine men_, who, through a more excellent power, and with
piercing eyes, acutely perceive supernal light, to the vision of which
they raise themselves above the clouds and darkness, as it were, of this
lower world, and there abiding despise every thing in these regions of
sense; being no otherwise delighted with the place which is truly and
properly their own, than he who after many wanderings is at length
restored to his lawful country.” See my translation of the whole of this
treatise.
P. 117. _By mire, therefore, understand every thing corporeal-formed and
material._ “Matter,” says Simplicius in his Commentary on the first book
of Aristotle’s Physics, “is nothing else than the mutation of sensibles,
with respect to intelligibles, deviating from thence, and carried
downwards to nonbeing. Those things, indeed, which are the properties of
sensibles are irrational, corporeal, distributed into parts, and passing
into bulk and divulsion, through an ultimate progression into
generation, _viz._ into matter; for matter is always truly the last
sediment. Hence, also, the Egyptians call the dregs of the first life,
which they symbolically denominate water, matter, being as it were a
certain mire. And matter is, as it were, the receptacle of generated and
sensible natures, not subsisting as any definite form, but as the state
or condition of subsistence; just as the impartible, the immaterial,
true being, and things of this kind, are the constitution of an
intelligible nature; all forms, indeed, subsisting both in sensibles and
intelligibles, but in the former materially, and in the latter
immaterially; viz. in the one impartibly and truly, but in the other
partibly and shadowy. Hence every form is in sensibles distributed
according to material interval.”
P. 120. _Through the innovation and illegality of the Greeks._
Iamblichus says, that through this innovation and illegality, both names
and prayers have at present lost their efficacy. For during his time,
and forborne centuries prior to it, the genuine religion of the Greeks
was rapidly declining, through their novelty and volatility, of which he
here complains. Hence the Emperor Julian, in the fragments of his
treatise against the Christians, preserved by Ciryl, says, speaking of
the Christians, “If any one wishes to consider the truth respecting you,
he will find that your impiety consists of the Judaic audacity, and the
_indolence_ and _confusion of the heathens_. For deriving from both, not
that which is most beautiful, but the worst, you have fabricated a web
of evils.——Hence, from the innovation of the Hebrews, you have seized
blasphemy towards the venerable Gods; but from our religion you have
cast aside reverence to every nature more excellent than man, and the
love of paternal institutes.” Το γαρ αληθες ει τις υπερ υμων εθελοι
σκοπειν, ευρησει την υμετεραν ασεβειαν, εκ τε της Ιουδαϊκης τολμης και
της παρα τοις εθνεσιν αδιαφοριας και χυδαιοτητος συγκειμενην. εξ αμφοιν
γαρ ουτι το καλλιστον αλλα το χειρον ελκυσαντες, παρυφην κακων
ειργασασθε.——Απο μεν ουν της Εβραιων καινοτομιας το βλασφημειν
τιμωμενους θεους ηρπασατε· απο δε της παρ’ ημιν θρησκειας το μεν ευλαβες
τε ομου προς απασαν την κρειττονα φυσιν, και των πατριων αγαπητικον,
απολελοιπατε.
P. 122. _Prior to truly existing beings, and total principles_, &c. Of
the two most ancient principles of all things mentioned in this chapter,
as celebrated by Hermes, the first corresponds to _the one itself_ of
Plato, and the second to _being itself_, or superessential being, the
summit of the intelligible triad; which two principles are beautifully
unfolded by Proclus in the second and third books of his treatise on the
Theology of Plato.
P. 122. _He arranges the God Eneph prior to, and as the leader of, the
celestial Gods.—But prior to this he arranges the impartible one, which
he says is the first paradigm, and which he denominates Eicton._ It
appears to me that the former of these two divinities is the same with
Saturn, who is the summit of the intellectual order of Gods; and that
the latter is _the animal itself_ of Plato, or the Phanes of Orpheus,
who subsists at the extremity of the intelligible triad. For the God
Eneph is said by Iamblichus to be an intellect intellectually perceiving
itself, and converting intellections to itself; and these are the
characteristics of Saturn. And the God Eicton is said to be the first
paradigm, and this is also asserted of Phanes.
P. 123. _For the books which are circulated under the name of Hermes,
contain Hermaic opinions, though they frequently employ the language of
the philosophers: for they were translated from the Egyptian tongue by
men who were not unskilled in philosophy._ A few only of these books are
now extant, but what is here said by Iamblichus sufficiently proves
their authenticity, and that they contain the genuine doctrines of
Hermes. They have doubtless, however, been occasionally interpolated by
some of the early Christians, though not to that extent which modern
critics, and that mitred sophist Warburton, suppose.
P. 123. _And such as have written concerning the decans._ The twelve
parts, mentioned in the preceding chapter, into which the Egyptians
divide the heavens, are the twelve signs of the zodiac. But the
thirty-six parts are the twelve houses of the planets, divided into
three other portions, which they call decans. Ptolemy, however, in his
Quadripartite, subverts this doctrine of the Egyptians. Concerning these
decans, see Scaliger ad Manilium, Kircher II. parte Oedipi, and
Salmasius de Annis climactericis. Gale also gives the following extract
from Hermes relative to the decans, which had not been before published,
and which he derived from a MS. copy of Stobæus in the possession of
Vossius. Φαμεν ω τεκνον, περιεκτικον των απαντων ειναι το σωμα. εννοησον
ουν αυτο ωσπερ κυκλοειδες σχημα——υπο δε τον κυκλον του σωματος τουτου
τεταχθαι τους λϛ δεκανους, μεσους του παντος κυκλου του
ζωδιακου.——νοησωμεν ωσπερει φυλακας αυτους προϊστασθαι των εν κοσμῳ
απαντων παντα συνεχοντας——και τηρουντας την των παντων ευταξιαν.——ετι δε
νοησον ω Τατ, οτι απαθεις εισιν ων οι αλλοι αστερες πασχουσιν. ουτε γαρ
επεχομενοι τον δρομον στηριζουσιν, ουτε κωλυομενοι αναποδιζουσιν, αλλ’
ουδε μην απο του φωτος του ηλιου σκεπονται, απερ πασχουσιν οι αλλοι
αστερες. ελευθεροι δε οντες υπερανω παντων, ωσπερ φυλακες και επισκοποι
ακριβεις του παντος, περιεχονται τῳ νυχθημερῳ το παν.——εχουσι προς ημας
την μεγιστην δυναμιν. _i. e._ “We say, O son, that the body [of the
universe] is comprehensive of all things. Conceive, therefore, this to
be as it were of a circular form.——But under the circle of this body the
thirty-six decans are arranged, as the media of the whole circle of the
zodiac.——These, likewise, must be understood to preside as guardians
over every thing in the world, connecting and containing all things——and
preserving the established order of all things.——Farther still,
understand, O Tat, that these decans are impassive to the things which
the other stars suffer. For neither being detained, do they stop their
course, nor being impeded do they recede, nor are they, like the other
stars, concealed as with a veil by the light of the sun. But being
liberated above all things, they comprehend the universe as the
guardians and accurate inspectors of it, in the Nycthemeron [or the
space of night and day].——They also possess, with respect to us, the
greatest power.”
P. 125. _So that what you add from Homer, “that the Gods are flexible,”
it is not holy to assert._ The words of Homer are στρεπτοι δε τε και
θεοι αυτοι, and are to be found in Iliad ix. v. 493. But when Iamblichus
says, it is not holy to assert the Gods are flexible, he means that it
is not holy according to the literal signification of the words; divine
flexibility indicating nothing more than this, that those who through
depravity were before unadapted to receive the illuminations of the
Gods, and in consequence of this were subject to the power of avenging
dæmons; when afterwards they obtain pardon of their guilt through
prayers and sacrifices, and through methods of this kind apply a remedy
to their vices, again become partakers of the goodness of the Gods. So
that divine flexibility is a resumption of the participation of divine
light and goodness by those who through inaptitude were before deprived
of it.
P. 130. _Dæmons preside over the parts of our body._ Proclus in the
fragments of his Ten Doubts concerning Providence, preserved by
Fabricius in the eighth vol. of his Bibliotheca Græca, observes, “That
the Gods, with an exempt transcendency, extend their providence to all
things, but that dæmons, dividing their superessential subsistence,
receive the guardianship of different herds of animals, distributing the
providence of the Gods, as Plato says, as far as to the most ultimate
division. Hence some of them preside over men, others over lions or
other animals, and others over plants; and still more partially, some
are the inspective guardians of the eye, others of the heart, and others
of the liver.” He adds, “all things, however, are full of Gods, some of
whom exert their providential energies immediately, but others through
dæmons as media: not that the Gods are incapable of being present to all
things, but that ultimate are themselves unable to participate primary
natures.” Hence it must be said that there is one principal dæmon, who
is the guardian and governor of every thing that is in us, and many
dæmons subordinate to him, who preside over our parts.
P. 134. _Hence it is requisite to consider how he may be liberated from
these bonds._ “The one salvation of the soul herself,” says Proclus in
Tim. lib. v. p. 330, “which is extended by the Demiurgus, and which
liberates her from the circle of generation, from abundant wanderings,
and an inefficacious life, is her return to the intellectual form, and a
flight from every thing which naturally adheres to us from generation.
For it is necessary that the soul, which is hurled like seed into the
realms of generation, should lay aside the stubble and bark, as it were,
which she obtained from being disseminated into these fluctuating
realms; and that purifying herself from every thing circumjacent, she
should become an intellectual flower and fruit, delighting in an
intellectual life, instead of doxastic nutriment, and pursuing the
uniform and simple energy of the period of sameness, instead of the
abundantly wandering motion of the period which is characterized by
difference. For she contains each of these circles, and twofold powers.
And of her horses one is good, but the other the contrary [as is said in
the Phædrus]. And one of these leads her to generation, but the other
from generation to true being. The one also leads her round the
genesiurgic, but the other round the intellectual circle. For the period
of the same and the similar elevates to intellect, and an intelligible
nature, and to the first and most excellent habit. But this habit is
that according to which the soul being winged governs the whole world,
becoming assimilated to the Gods themselves. And this is the universal
form of life in the soul, just as that is the partial form, when she
falls into the last body, and becomes something belonging to an
individual, instead of belonging to the universe. The middle of these,
also, is the partial universal, when she lives in conjunction with her
middle vehicle, as a citizen of generation. Dismissing, therefore, her
first habit, which subsists according to an alliance to the whole of
generation, and laying aside the irrational nature which connects her
with generation, likewise governing her irrational part by reason, and
extending opinion to intellect, she will be circularly led to a happy
life from the wanderings about the regions of sense; which life those
that are initiated by Orpheus in the mysteries of Bacchus and
Proserpine, pray that they may obtain, together with the allotments of
the [celestial] sphere, and a cessation of evil. But if our soul
necessarily lives well, when living according to the circle of sameness,
much more must this be the case with divine souls. It is, however,
possible for our soul to live according to the circle of sameness, when
purified, as Plato says. Cathartic virtue, therefore, alone must be
called the salvation of souls; since this cuts off, and vehemently
obliterates, material natures, and the passions which adhere to us from
generation; separates the soul and leads it to intellect; and causes it
to leave on earth the vehicles with which it is invested. For souls in
descending receive from the elements different vehicles, aerial,
aquatic, and terrestrial; and thus at last enter into this gross bulk.
For how, without a medium, could they proceed into this body from
immaterial spirits?”
THE END.
_Printed by_ BALLANTYNE, HANSON & CO.
_Edinburgh and London_
-----
Footnote 1:
According to this theology, as I have elsewhere shown, in every order
of things, a triad is the immediate progeny of a monad. Hence the
intelligible triad proceeds immediately from the ineffable principle
of things. Phanes, or intelligible intellect, who is the last of the
intelligible order, is the monad, leader, and producing cause of a
triad, which is denominated νοητος και νοερος, i. e. _intelligible,
and at the same time intellectual_. In like manner the extremity of
this order produces immediately from itself the intellectual triad,
Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter. Again, Jupiter, who is also the Demiurgus,
is the monad of the supermundane triad. Apollo, who subsists at the
extremity of the supermundane order, produces a triad of liberated
Gods. (Θεοι απολυτοι.) And the extremity of the liberated order
becomes the monad of a triad of mundane Gods. This theory, too, which
is the progeny of the most consummate science, is in perfect
conformity with the Chaldean theology. And hence it is said in one of
the Chaldean oracles, “_In every world a triad shines forth, of which
a monad is the ruling principle_.” (Παντι γαρ εν κοσμῳ λαμπει τριας ης
μονας αρχει). I refer the reader, who is desirous of being fully
convinced of all this, to my translation of Proclus on the Theology of
Plato.
Footnote 2:
_Viz._ The Philosophical Works of Proclus, together with those of
Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, Ammonius, Damascius,
Olympiodorus, and Simplicius.
Footnote 3:
Ενα ιδοις αν εν πασα γῃ ομοφωνον νομον και λογον, οτι θεος εις παντων
βασιλευς και πατηρ, και θεοι πολλοι, θεου παιδες, συναρχοντες θεῳ.
ταυτα και ο ελλην λεγει, και ο βαρβαρος λεγει, και ο ηπειρωτης και ο
θαλαττιος, και ο σοφος και ο ασοφος. κᾳν επι του ωκεανου ελθῃς τας
ηϊονας, κᾳκει θεοι, τοις μεν ανισχοντες αγχου μαλα, τοις δε
καταδυομενοι. Dissert. i. Edit. Princ.
Footnote 4:
“Diogenes Laertius says of Pythagoras, that he _charged his disciples
not to give equal degrees of honour to the Gods and heroes_. Herodotus
(in Euterpe) says of the Greeks, _That they worshiped Hercules two
ways, one as an immortal deity, and so they sacrificed to him; and
another as a Hero, and so they celebrated his memory_. Isocrates
(Encom. Helen.) distinguishes between the honours of heroes and Gods,
when he speaks of Menelaus and Helena. But the distinction is no where
more fully expressed than in the Greek inscription upon the statue of
Regilla, wife to Herodes Atticus, as Salmasius thinks, which was set
up in his temple at Triopium, and taken from the statue itself by
Sirmondus; where it is said, _That she had neither the honour of a
mortal nor yet that which was proper to the Gods_. Ουδε ιερα θνητοις,
αταρ ουδε θεοισιν ομοια. It seems by the inscription of Herodes, and
by the testament of Epicteta, extant in Greek in the _Collection of
Inscriptions_, that it was in the power of particular families to keep
festival days in honour of some of their own family, and to give
_heroical honours_ to them. In that noble inscription at Venice, we
find three days appointed every year to be kept, and a _confraternity_
established for that purpose with the laws of it. The first day to be
observed in honour of the Muses, and sacrifices to be offered to them
as _deities_. The second and third days in honour of the _heroes_ of
the family; between which honour and that of deities, they showed the
difference by the distance of time between them, and the preference
given to the other. But whereinsoever the _difference_ lay, that there
was a _distinction_ acknowledged among them appears by this passage of
Valerius, in his excellent oration, extant in Dionysius Halicarnass.
Antiq. Rom. lib. ii. p. 696. _I call_, says he, _the Gods to witness,
whose temples and altars our family has worshiped with common
sacrifices; and next after them, I call the Genii of our ancestors, to
whom we give δευτερας τιμας, the second honours next to the Gods_, (as
Celsus calls those, τας προσηκουσας τιμας, _the due honours that
belong to the lower dæmons_.) From which we take notice, that the
Heathens did not confound all _degrees of divine worship_, giving to
the lowest object the same which they supposed to be due to the
_celestial deities_, or the _supreme_ God. So that if the distinction
of divine worship will excuse from idolatry, the Heathens were not to
blame for it.” See Stillingfleet’s Answer to a book entitled Catholics
no Idolaters, p. 510, 513, &c.
Footnote 5:
See the extracts from Plutarch, in which this is shown, in the
Introduction to my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.
Footnote 6:
Answer to Catholics no Idolaters. Lond. 1676. p. 211.
Footnote 7:
Arrian. de Exped. Alex. l. iv. et Curt. lib. viii.
Footnote 8:
Vit. Artaxerx. Ælian. Var. Hist. lib. i. c. 21.
Footnote 9:
Justin. lib. vi.
Footnote 10:
Panegyr.
Footnote 11:
Lib. vii.
Footnote 12:
Lib. vi. cap. iii.
Footnote 13:
Και κολασεως δε ειδος ειναι αθειαν ουκ απεικος. τους γαρ γνοντας
θεους, και καταφρονησαντας, ευλογον εν ετερῳ βιῳ και της γνωσεως
στερεσθαι, και τους εαυτων βασιλεας ως θεους τιμησαντας, εδει την
δικην αυτων ποιησαι των θεων εκπεσειν. Cap. xviii.
Footnote 14:
και χρη τον επι τας αρχας αναβαινοντα ζητειν, ει δυνατον ειναι τι
κρειττον της υποτεθεισης αρχης κᾳν ευρεθῃ, παλιν επ’ εκεινου ζητειν,
εως αν εις τας ακροτατας εννοιας ελθωμεν, ων ουκετι σεμνοτερας εχομεν·
και μη στησαι την αναβασιν. ουδε γαρ ευλαβητεον μη κενεμβατωμεν,
μειζονα τινα και υπερβαινοντα τας πρωτας αρχας περι αυτων εννοουντες.
ου γαρ δυνατον τηλικουτον πηδημα πηδησαι τας ημετερας εννοιας, ως
παρισωθηναι τῃ αξιᾳ των πρωτων αρχων, ου λεγω και υπερπτηναι. μια γαρ
αυτη προς θεον ανατασις αριστη, και ως δυνατον απταιστος. και ων
εννοουμεν αγαθων τα σεμνοτατα, και αγιωτατα, και πρωτουργα, και
ονοματα και πραγματα αυτῳ ανατιθεντας ειδεναι βεβαιως, οτι μηδεν
ανατεθεικαμεν αξιον. αρκει δε ημιν εις συγγνωμην, το μηδεν εχειν
εκεινων υπερτερον. Simplic. in Epict. Enchir. p. 207. Lond. 1670. 8vo.
Footnote 15:
Of the first principles, says Damascius in MS. περι αρχων, the
Egyptians said nothing, but celebrated it as a darkness beyond all
intellectual conception, a thrice unknown darkness. Πρωτην αρχην
ανυμνηκασιν, σκοτος υπερ πασαν νοησιν, σκοτος αγνωστον τρις τουτο
επιφημιζοντες.
Footnote 16:
For farther particulars respecting this most extraordinary man, see
the introduction to my translation of his Life of Pythagoras, and my
History of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology.
Footnote 17:
Iliad, lib. x. v. 493.
Footnote 18:
Gale has omitted to give the original of the sentence contained in the
brackets; the translation of which I have added from the answer of
Iamblichus to this epistle.
Footnote 19:
Here also the original is omitted by Gale, and the translation of it
is given by me from the text of Iamblichus.
Footnote 20:
The paragraph within the brackets is omitted in the original; but I
have supplied it from the following answer of Iamblichus to this
Epistle. This omission is not noticed by Gale.
Footnote 21:
Here likewise the words within the brackets, which are omitted in the
original, are added from Iamblichus; but the omission is not noticed
by Gale.
Footnote 22:
The following testimony of an anonymous Greek writer, prefixed to the
manuscript of this treatise, which Gale published, proves that this
work was written by Iamblichus: Ιστεον οτι ο φιλοσοφος Προκλος
υπομνηματιζων τας του μεγαλου Πλωτινου εννεαδας, λεγει οτι ο
αντιγραφων εις την προκειμενην του Πορφυριου επιστολην, ο θεσπεσιος
εστιν Ιαμβλιχος· και δια το της υποθεσεως οικειον και ακολουθον,
υποκρινεται προσωπον Αιγυπτιου τινος Αβαμωνος· αλλα και το της λεξεως
κομματικον και αφοριστικον, και το των εννοιων πραγματικον, και
γλαφυρον, και ενθουν, μαρτυρει τον Προκλον καλως και κριναντα, και
ιστορησαντα. _i. e._ “It is requisite to know that the philosopher
Proclus, in his Commentary on the Enneads of the great Plotinus, says
that it is the divine Iamblichus who answers the prefixed Epistle of
Porphyry, and who assumes the person of a certain Egyptian of the name
of Abammon, through the affinity and congruity of the hypothesis. And,
indeed, the conciseness and definiteness of the diction, and the
efficacious, elegant, and divine nature of the conceptions, testify
that the decision of Proclus is just.” That this, indeed, was the
opinion of Proclus, is evident from a passage in his Commentaries on
the Timæus of Plato, which has escaped the notice of Gale, and which
the reader will find in a note on the fourth chapter of the eighth
section of the following translation.
Footnote 23:
In the original κατα τας κοινας εννοιας, which Gale erroneously
translates _contra communes opiniones_.
Footnote 24:
Damascius περι αρχων says, “that _difference_ not existing, there will
not be knowledge.” And, “that the contact as of one with one is above
knowledge.” Likewise, “that the intellectual perception of the first
intelligible is without any difference or distinction. ετεροτητος μη
ουσης, μηδε γνωσις εσται. Et συναφη ως ενος προς εν, υπερ γνωσιν.
Alibi, διακριτος η του πρωτου νοητου νοησις.
Footnote 25:
Between souls that always abide on high with purity, such as the souls
of _essential_ heroes, and those that descend into the regions of
mortality, and are defiled with vice, such as the souls of the greater
part of mankind, the class of _undefiled_ souls subsists. These
descend into the realms of generation, partly from that necessity by
which all human souls are, at times, drawn down to the earth, and
partly for the benevolent purpose of benefiting those of an inferior
class. But they descend without being defiled with vice. They are also
called heroes, κατα σχεσιν, _i. e._ according to _habitude_, in order
to distinguish them from _essential_ heroes. And, in the Pythagoric
Golden Verses, they are denominated the _terrestrial_ heroes.
Footnote 26:
For αυτην εαυτοις ουσαν in this place, it is necessary to read αυτην
εαυτης ουσαν.
Footnote 27:
For εποχη here, I read μετοχη.
Footnote 28:
_Viz._ In the plenitudes, or _total_ perfections, of the Gods.
Footnote 29:
_i. e._ Without habitude, proximity, or alliance to the things which
it illuminates.
Footnote 30:
What is here asserted by Iamblichus is perfectly true, and confirmed
by experience, _viz._ that the passions, when _moderately_ gratified,
are vanquished without violence. But Gale, not understanding this,
says, “Hoc adeo verum est, ac si dixisset, ignem extingues, oleum
addendo camino.” For a moderate gratification of the passions does not
resemble the pouring of oil on fire; since this similitude is only
applicable to them when they are _immoderately_ indulged.
Footnote 31:
See my Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries.
Footnote 32:
In the original, Και δη, και “αι της μηνιδος εξιλασεις” εσονται
σαφεις, εαν την μηνιν των δεων καταμαθωμεν, which Gale most
erroneously translates as follows: “Sed et ratio possit reddi
_supplicationum, quibus divinam iram procuramus_, si recte
intelligamus, qualis sit deorum ira.”
Footnote 33:
_Viz._ Punishments produced by the realms of generation, or the
sublunary region.
Footnote 34:
It is well observed by Proclus, “that divine necessity concurs with
the divine will.” Θεια αναγκη συντρεχει τῃ θειᾳ βουλησει. Procl. in
Tim. lib. i.
Footnote 35:
For νοητον here, it is obviously necessary to read νοερον.
Footnote 36:
For τουτο here, it is necessary to read ταυτο.
Footnote 37:
For as a celestial body consists of light so pure and simple, that,
compared with a terrestrial body, it may be said to be immaterial;
hence, like the light of the sun, it cannot be divided, or in other
words, one part of it cannot be separated from another.
Footnote 38:
For προς αυτην in this place, I read προς αυτα.
Footnote 39:
The nature of _the one_, as it is _all-receptive_, and
_all-productive_ (πανδεχης και παντοφυης) exhibits in itself a certain
representation and indication of multitude; for it is all things prior
to all.
Footnote 40:
For the Gods are essentialized in _the one_; or, as Damascius
observes, speaking Chaldaically, in the paternal peculiarity. For in
every God there is father, power, and intellect; _father_ being the
same as hyparxis and _the one_.
Footnote 41:
_Viz._ According to the difference which there is between the
invisibility of Gods and the invisibility of dæmons.
Footnote 42: