CHAP. I.
Let us then, in the next place, consider the opposing arguments, what
they are, and what reason they possess. And if we should discuss some
things a little more abundantly, in consequence of speaking freely and
at leisure, it is requisite that you should promptly attend to, and
endure what, we say. For it is necessary that great labour should be
bestowed on the greatest disciplines, and that they should be accurately
explored for a long time, if you intend to know them perfectly. Do you,
therefore, conformably to the present hypothesis, propose the arguments
which occasion the doubt, and I will answer you. Say then, “_it very
much perplexes me to understand how superior beings, when invoked, are
commanded by those that invoke them, as if they were their inferiors_.”
But I will unfold to you the whole division, which is worthy of regard,
concerning the powers that are invoked; from which you will be able
clearly to define what is possible and what is impossible, in the
subjects of your investigation. For the Gods, indeed, and the natures
that are more excellent than we, through the wish of what is beautiful,
and from an unenvying and exuberant fulness of good, benevolently impart
to those that are worthy, such things as are fit for them, commiserating
the labours of sacerdotal men, but being delighted with those that they
have begotten, nourished, and instructed. But the middle genera are the
inspective guardians of judgment. These inform us what ought to be done,
and from what it is fit to abstain. They also give assistance to just
works, but impede such as are unjust; and as many endeavour to take away
unjustly the property of others, or basely to injure or destroy some
one, they cause these to suffer the same things as they have done to
others. But there is, likewise, another most irrational genus of
dæmons,[85] which is without judgment, and is allotted only one power,
through an arrangement by which each of these dæmons presides over one
work alone. As therefore, it is the province of a sword to cut, and to
do nothing else than this, thus also of the spirits which are
distributed in the universe, according to the partible necessity of
nature, one kind divides, but another collects, things which are
generated. This, however, is known from the phænomena. For the
Charonean[86] spiracles, as they are called, emit from themselves a
certain spirit, which is able to corrupt promiscuously every thing that
falls into them. Thus, therefore, of certain invisible spirits, each is
allotted a different power, and is alone adapted to do that which it is
ordained to perform. He, therefore, who turns from their natural course
things which contribute to the universe in an orderly manner, and
illegitimately performs a certain thing, in this case receives the
injury arising from that which he uses badly. This, however, pertains to
another mode of discussion.
CHAP. II.
But we sometimes see that take place which is now proposed to be
considered. For it happens that spirits are commanded [to do this or
that] who do not use a reason of their own, and have not the principle
of judgment. Nor does this occur irrationally. For our dianoia naturally
possessing the power of reasoning about and judging of things as they
are, and comprehending in itself many powers of life, is accustomed to
command the most irrational spirits, and such as derive their perfection
from one energy alone. Hence, it invokes these as more excellent
natures, because it endeavours to attract to particulars from the whole
world, in which we are contained, things which contribute to wholes.[87]
And it commands them as inferior natures, because frequently certain
parts of things in the world [such as our reasoning power] are more pure
and perfect than things which extend themselves to the whole world.
Thus, for instance, if one thing is intellectual [as is the case with
our dianoia], but another is wholly inanimate or physical, then that
which proceeds to a less extent has a more principal power than that
which is more extended, though the former falls far short of the latter
in magnitude and multitude of domination. For these things, also,
another reason may be assigned, and which is as follows: in all
theurgical operations the priest sustains a twofold character; one,
indeed, as man, and which preserves the order possessed by our nature in
the universe; but the other, which is corroborated by divine signs, and
through these is conjoined to more excellent natures, and is elevated to
their order by an elegant circumduction, this is deservedly capable of
being surrounded with the external form of the Gods. Conformably,
therefore, to a difference of this kind, the priest very properly
invokes, as more excellent natures, the powers derived from the
universe, so far as he who invokes is a man; and again, he commands
these powers, because through arcane symbols, he, in a certain respect,
is invested with the sacred form of the Gods.
CHAP. III.
Dissolving, however, the doubts in a way still more true, we think it
requisite, in invoking superior natures, to take away the evocations
which appear to be directed to them as to men, and also the mandates in
the performance of works, which are given with great earnestness. For if
the communion of concordant friendship, and a certain indissoluble
connexion of union, are the bonds of sacerdotal operations, in order
that these operations may be truly divine, and may transcend every
common action known to men, no human work will be adapted to them; nor
will the invocations of the priest resemble the manner in which we draw
to ourselves things that are distant; nor are his mandates directed as
to things separated from him, in the way in which we transfer one thing
from others. But the energy of divine fire shines forth voluntarily, and
in common, and being self-invoked and self-energetic, energizes through
all things with invariable sameness, both through the natures which
impart, and those that are able to receive, its light. This mode of
solution, therefore, is far superior, which does not suppose that divine
works are effected through contrariety, or discrepance, in the way in
which generated natures are usually produced; but asserts that every
such work is rightly accomplished through sameness, union, and consent.
Hence, if we separate from each other that which invokes and that which
is invoked, that which commands and that which is commanded, that which
is more and that which is less excellent, we shall, in a certain
respect, transfer the contrariety of generations to the unbegotten goods
of the Gods. But if we despise all such things, as it is just we should,
as of an earth-born nature, and ascribe that which is common and simple,
as being more honourable, to the powers who transcend the variety which
is in the realms of generation, the first hypothesis of these questions
will be immediately subverted, so that no reasonable doubt concerning
them will be left.
CHAP. IV.
What then shall we say concerning the next inquiry to this, viz. “_why
the powers who are invoked think it requisite that he who worships them
should be just, but they when called upon to act unjustly do not refuse
so to act_?” To this I reply, that I am dubious with respect to what you
call acting justly, and am of opinion that what appears to us to be an
accurate definition of justice does not also appear to be so to the
Gods. For we, looking to that which is most brief, direct our attention
to things present, and to this momentary life, and the manner in which
it subsists. But the powers that are superior to us know the whole life
of the soul, and all its former lives; and, in consequence of this, if
they inflict a certain punishment from the prayer of those that invoke
them, they do not inflict it without justice, but looking to the
offences committed by souls in former lives;[88] which men not
perceiving think that they unjustly fall into the calamities which they
suffer.
CHAP. V.
The multitude, also, are accustomed to doubt in common the very same
thing concerning providence, _viz._ why certain persons are afflicted
undeservedly, as they have not done any thing unjustly prior to their
being thus afflicted. For neither here is it possible to understand
[perfectly] what the soul is, and its whole life, how many offences it
has committed in former lives, and whether it now suffers from its
former guilt. In this life, also, many unjust actions are concealed from
human knowledge, but are known to the Gods, since neither is the same
scope of justice proposed to them as to men. For men, indeed, define
justice to be the soul’s performance of its own proper business,[89] and
the distribution of desert, conformably to the established laws, and the
prevailing polity. But the Gods, looking to the whole orderly
arrangement of the world, and to the subserviency of souls to the Gods,
form a judgment of what is just. Hence the judgment of just actions with
the Gods is different from what it is with us. Nor is it wonderful, if
we are unable, in most things, to arrive at the supreme and most perfect
judgment of more excellent natures. What also hinders, but that to each
thing by itself, and in conjunction with the whole alliance of souls,
justice may in a very transcendent manner be decreed by the Gods? For if
a communion of the same nature in souls, both when they are in and when
they are out of bodies, produces a certain identical connexion and
common order with the life of the world, it is likewise necessary that,
a fulfilment of justice should be required by wholes, and especially
when the magnitude of the unjust deeds antecedently committed by one
soul transcends the infliction of one punishment due to the offences.
But if any one should add other definitions, through which he can show
that what is just subsists with the Gods in a way different from that in
which it is known by us, from these also our design will be facilitated.
For me, however, the beforementioned canons are alone sufficient for the
purpose of manifesting the universal genus, and which comprehends every
thing pertaining to the medicinal punishments inflicted by divine
justice.
CHAP. VI.
In order, therefore, that from an abundance of arguments we may contend
against the objection which is now adduced, we will grant, if you
please, the contrary to what we have asserted, _viz._ that certain
unjust things are performed in this business of invocations. That the
Gods, however, are not to be accused as the causes of these is
immediately manifest. For those that are good are the causes of good;
and the Gods possess good essentially. They do nothing, therefore, that
is unjust. Hence other causes of guilty deeds must be investigated. And
if we are not able to discover these causes, it is not proper to throw
away the true conception respecting the Gods, nor on account of the
doubts whether these unjust deeds are performed, and how they are
effected, to depart from notions concerning the Gods which are truly
clear. For it is much better to acknowledge the insufficiency of our
power to explain how unjust actions are perpetrated, than to admit any
thing impossible and false respecting the Gods; since all the Greeks and
Barbarians truly opine the contrary to be the case with divine natures.
After this manner, therefore, the truth respecting these particulars
subsists.
CHAP. VII.
Moreover, it is necessary to add the causes whence evils[90] sometimes
arise, and to show how many and of what kind they are. For the form of
them is not simple; but, being various, is the leader of the generation
of various evils. For if what we a little before said, concerning images
and evil dæmons, who assume the appearance of Gods and good dæmons, is
true, an abundant evil-producing tribe, about which a contrariety of
this kind usually happens, will from hence appear to flow. _For an evil
dæmon requires that his worshipper should be just, because he assumes
the appearance of one belonging to the divine genus; but he is
subservient to what is unjust, because he is depraved._ The same thing,
likewise, that is said of good and evil may be asserted of the true and
the false. As, therefore, in divinations we attribute true predictions
to the Gods alone, but when we detect any falsehood in predictions we
refer this to another genus of cause, _viz._ that of dæmons; thus, also,
in things just and unjust, the beautiful and the just are to be alone
ascribed to Gods and good dæmons; but such dæmons as are naturally
depraved, perpetrate what is unjust and base. And that, indeed, which
consents and accords with itself, and always subsists with invariable
sameness, pertains to more excellent natures; but that which is hostile
to itself, which is discordant, and never the same, is the peculiarity
in the most eminent degree of dæmoniacal dissension, about which it is
not at all wonderful that things of an opposing nature should subsist;
but perhaps the very contrary, that this should not be the case, would
be more wonderful.
CHAP. VIII.
We may, however, beginning from another hypothesis, demonstrate the same
thing. We must admit that the corporeal parts of the universe are
neither sluggish nor destitute of power, but as much as they excel our
concerns in perfection, beauty, and magnitude, by so much also is the
power which is present with them greater. Each, likewise, by itself is
capable of effecting different things, and produces certain different
energies. They are also capable of effecting things much more numerous
on each other. And besides this, a certain multiform production extends
to parts from wholes; partly from sympathy, through similitude of
powers, and partly from the aptitude of the agent to the patient. If,
therefore, certain evils and destructions happen to parts, they are
salutary and good as with reference to wholes and the harmony of the
universe, but to parts they introduce a necessary corruption, either
from not being able to bear the energies of wholes, or from a certain
other commixture and temperament of their own imbecility, or, in the
third place, from the privation of symmetry in the parts to each other.
CHAP. IX.
After the body of the universe, also, many things are generated by the
nature of it. For the concord of similars, and the contrariety of
dissimilars, effect not a few things. Farther still, the assemblage of
many things into the one animal of the universe, and the powers in the
world, whatever the number and quality of them may be, effect, in short,
one thing in wholes and another in parts, on account of the divided
imbecility of parts. Thus, for instance, the friendship, love, and
contention which subsist in energy in the universe, become passions in
the partial natures by which they are participated. Those things,
likewise, that are preestablished in forms and pure reasons in the
nature of wholes, participate of a certain material indigence, and
privation of _morphe_, in things which subsist according to a part. And
things which are conjoined to each other in wholes are separated in
parts. Hence partible natures, which participate of wholes in
conjunction with matter, degenerate from them in all things, and also
from what is beautiful and perfect. But some parts are corrupted, in
order that wholes may be preserved in a condition conformable to nature.
Sometimes, likewise, parts are compressed and weighed down, though at
the same time wholes remain impassive to a molestation of this kind.
CHAP. X.
We shall collect, therefore, what happens from these conclusions. For if
certain invocators employ the physical or corporeal powers[91] of the
universe, an involuntary gift of energy [from these powers], and which
is without vice, takes place. He, likewise, who uses this gift
[sometimes] perverts it to things of a contrary nature, and to base
purposes. And the gift, indeed, is moved contrarily together with the
passions, and sympathetically through similitude; but he who uses the
thing which is imparted, deliberately draws it, contrary to justice, to
what is evil and base. And the gift, indeed, causes things which are
most remote to cooperate through the one harmony of the world. But if
some one understanding this to be the case should iniquitously endeavour
to draw certain portions of the universe to other parts, these parts are
not the cause of the evil that ensues; but the audacity of men, and the
transgression of the order in the world, pervert things that are
beautiful and legal. Hence neither do the Gods effect what appears to be
base, but this is accomplished by the natures and bodies that proceed
from them; nor do these very natures and bodies impart improbity from
themselves, as it is thought they do; but they send their proper
effluxions to places about the earth, for the salvation of wholes, and
those who receive them transmute them by their commixture and
perversion, and transfer what is given to a purpose different from that
for which it was imparted. From all these particulars, therefore, it is
demonstrated that a divine nature is not the cause of evils and unjust
deeds.
CHAP. XI.
Moreover, you inquire, and at the same time doubt, “_how it comes to
pass that the Gods do not hear him who invokes them, if he is impure
from venereal connexions; but, at the same time, they do not refuse to
lead any one to illegal venery_.” You have, indeed, a clear solution of
these things from what has been before said; if they are done contrary
to [human] laws, but are effected according to another order and cause
more excellent than laws. Or if it happens that things of this kind are
conformable to the mundane harmony and friendship, yet produce a
conflict in parts through a certain sympathy. Or if the communication of
good, which is beautifully imparted, is perverted by those that receive
it to the contrary.
CHAP. XII.
It is, necessary, however, to discuss these things particularly, and to
show how they subsist, and what reason they possess. It is requisite,
therefore, to understand that the universe is one animal; and that the
parts in it are, indeed, separated by places, but through the possession
of one nature hasten to each other.[92] The whole collective power,
however, and the cause of mixture, spontaneously draws the parts to a
mingling with each other. But it is also possible for this spontaneous
attraction to be excited and extended by art more than is fit. The cause
itself, therefore, of this mixture extending from itself to the whole
world, is good, and the source of plenitude; has the power of
harmonically procuring communion, consent, and symmetry; and inserts, by
union, the indissoluble principle of love, which principle retains and
preserves both things that are in existence, and such as are becoming to
be. But in the parts, through their separation from each other and from
wholes, and because, from their own proper nature, they are imperfect,
indigent, and imbecile, their mutual connection is accompanied with
passion; by which, in most of them, desire and a connascent appetite are
inherent. Art[93] therefore, perceiving this innate desire thus
implanted by nature, and distributed about it (art itself also being
multiformly distributed about nature), variously attracts and derives it
as through a channel. Hence it transfers that which in itself is orderly
and arranged into the privation of order, and fills that which is
beautiful and commensurate with deformity. But the venerable end in each
particular thing, which is connascent with union, it transfers to
another indecorous plenitude, which is an assemblage of different things
according to a common passion. It likewise imparts a matter from itself,
which is unadapted to the whole generation of what is beautiful, either
because it does not entirely receive it, or because it transfers it to
other things. It also mingles many different physical powers, which it
manages as it pleases for the purposes of generation. Hence we have
universally shown, that the apparatus of a venereal connexion of this
kind proceeds from a certain human art, and not from a certain
dæmoniacal or divine necessity.
CHAP. XIII.
Consider, therefore, also another genus of causes; how a stone or a herb
frequently possess from themselves a nature corruptive, or again
collective of generated natures. For this is not only the case with
these, but this physical power is also in greater natures and greater
things, which those who are not able to infer by a reasoning process,
will perhaps transfer the works and energies of nature to more excellent
beings [_i. e._ to Gods, angels, and dæmons]. Now, therefore, it is
acknowledged that the tribe of evil dæmons has a very extended power in
generation, in human affairs, and in such things as subsist about the
earth. Hence, why is it wonderful that a tribe of this kind should
effect such works as these? For every man is not able to distinguish a
good from an evil dæmon, or by what peculiarities the one is separated
from the other. Hence those, who are not able to perceive the difference
between the two, absurdly reason concerning the cause of them, and refer
this cause to genera superior to nature and the dæmoniacal order. If,
also, certain powers of a partial soul are assumed in order to effect
these things, whether such a soul is detained in body, or has left the
testaceous and terrestrial body, but wanders about the places of
generation in a turbid and humid spirit; this, indeed, will be a true
opinion, but separates the cause of these things at the greatest
distance from more excellent natures. By no means, therefore, is that
which is divine, or any good dæmon, subservient to the illegal desires
of men in venereal concerns. For of these things there are many other
causes.