SECTION I.

IAMBLICHUS

ON

=The Mysteries=

OF THE

EGYPTIANS, CHALDEANS, AND ASSYRIANS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK

BY

THOMAS TAYLOR.

Ο δε Αριστοτελης προς Αντιπατρον περι Αλεξανδρου γραφων, εφη μη μονον

εκεινῳ προσηκειν οτι πολλων κρατει μεγαφρονειν, αλλ’ ουδεν ηττον ει τις

ορθως γινωσκει περι θεων.

PLUTARCH.

=Second Edition.=

LONDON:

BERTRAM DOBELL,

77 CHARING CROSS ROAD, W.C.

AND

REEVES AND TURNER,

5 WELLINGTON STREET, STRAND.

MDCCCXCV.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The various translations and original works of Thomas Taylor, though

still in request by the more zealous students of ancient philosophy and

occult science, have now become so scarce and expensive that it is only

within the power of comparatively wealthy collectors to obtain them.

This is a matter for regret, inasmuch as it cannot be affirmed that his

writings have been, or are likely to be superseded, or that they are

without value. They can hardly be neglected without loss by those who

desire to understand the systems of philosophy which satisfied the

spiritual needs of the antique world. It is not possible, even for the

most fervent believer in modern “progress,” to dismiss the speculations

of the ancient philosophers as antiquated notions which have had their

day and no longer possess interest or value. The names of Socrates,

Plato, and Aristotle can never grow dim with age, nor is it possible to

conceive a time when men shall cease to study and reverence them. As the

disciple, the translator, and the expounder of these and of other sages

of antiquity, Thomas Taylor deserves to be held in honour and

remembrance, and it would be a misfortune if his labours remained

unknown because of the scarcity of his books. It is for this reason that

the present reprint has been undertaken; and it is hoped that it will

meet with such a measure of success as may encourage the republication

of various other works by the same author. It has been printed in

handsome style and published at a moderate price in order that it may be

regarded as a desirable addition to the scholar’s library, while yet it

will not tax severely the means of the not too wealthy student. For the

rest it is only necessary to say that this reprint is, in size, number

of pages, type, and general get-up, an almost exact facsimile of the

original edition, which was first printed in 1821. No alterations or

additions have been made in or to the original text, as it is thought

that those who care for Taylor’s writings will prefer to have them in

their integrity. Should it be found possible, however, to continue the

series it is intended to prefix to a future volume an essay on Taylor,

which will contain a biography of him, and a critical estimate of his

writings.

_May, 1895._

INTRODUCTION.

It appears to me that there are two descriptions of persons by whom the

present work must be considered to be of inestimable worth, the lovers

of antiquity and the lovers of ancient philosophy and religion. To the

former of these it must be invaluable, because it is replete with

information derived from the wise men of the Chaldeans, the prophets of

the Egyptians, the dogmas of the Assyrians, and the ancient pillars of

Hermes; and to the latter, because of the doctrines contained in it,

some of which originated from the Hermaic pillars, were known by

Pythagoras and Plato, and were the sources of their philosophy; and

others are profoundly theological, and unfold the mysteries of ancient

religion with an admirable conciseness of diction, and an inimitable

vigour and elegance of conception. To which also may be added, as the

colophon of excellence, that it is the most copious, the clearest, and

the most satisfactory defence extant of genuine ancient theology.

This theology, the sacred operations pertaining to which called

_theurgy_ are here developed, has for the most part, since the

destruction of it, been surveyed only in its corruptions among barbarous

nations, or during the decline and fall of the Roman empire, with which,

overwhelmed with pollution, it gradually fell, and at length totally

vanished from what is called the polished part of the globe. This will

be evident to the intelligent reader from the following remarks, which

are an epitome of what has been elsewhere more largely discussed by me

on this subject, and which also demonstrate the religion of the

Chaldeans, Egyptians, and Greeks to be no less scientific than sublime.

In the first place, this theology celebrates the immense principle of

things as something superior even to being itself; as exempt from the

whole of things, of which it is nevertheless ineffably the source; and

does not, therefore, think fit to enumerate it with any triad[1] or

order of beings. Indeed it even apologizes for giving the appellation of

the most simple of our conceptions to that which is beyond all knowledge

and all conception. It denominates this principle however, _the one_ and

_the good_; by the former of these names indicating its transcendent

simplicity, and by the latter its subsistence as the object of desire to

all beings. For all things desire good. At the same time, however, it

asserts that these appellations are in reality nothing more than the

parturitions of the soul, which, standing as it were in the vestibules

of the adytum of deity, announce nothing pertaining to the ineffable,

but only indicate her spontaneous tendencies towards it, and belong

rather to the immediate offspring of the first God than to the first

itself. Hence, as the result of this most venerable conception of the

supreme, when it ventures not only to denominate it, though ineffable,

but also to assert something of its relation to other things, it

considers this as preeminently its peculiarity, that it is _the

principle of principles_; it being necessary that the characteristic

property of principle, after the same manner as other things, should not

begin from multitude, but should be collected into one monad as a

summit, and which is the principle of all principles.

The scientific reasoning from which this dogma is deduced is the

following. As the principle of all things is _the one_, it is necessary

that the progression of beings should be continued, and that no vacuum

should intervene either in incorporeal or corporeal natures. It is also

necessary that every thing which has a natural progression should

proceed through similitude. In consequence of this, it is likewise

necessary that every producing principle should generate a number of the

same order with itself, viz. _nature_, a natural number; _soul_, one

that is psychical (_i. e._ belonging to soul); and _intellect_ an

intellectual number. For if whatever possesses a power of generating,

generates similars prior to dissimilars, every cause must deliver its

own form and characteristic peculiarity to its progeny; and before it

generates that which gives subsistence to progressions, far distant and

separate from its nature, it must constitute things proximate to itself

according to essence, and conjoined with it through similitude. It is,

therefore, necessary from these premises, since there is one unity, the

principle of the universe, that this unity should produce from itself,

prior to every thing else, a multitude of natures characterized by

unity, and a number the most of all things allied to its cause; and

these natures are no other than the Gods.

According to this theology, therefore, from the immense principle of

principles, in which all things causally subsist, absorbed in

superessential light, and involved in unfathomable depths, a beauteous

progeny of principles proceed, all largely partaking of the ineffable,

all stamped with the occult characters of deity, all possessing an

overflowing fulness of good. From these dazzling summits, these

ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations, _being, life, intellect,

soul, nature, and body_ depend; _monads_ suspended from _unities_,

deified natures proceeding from deities. Each of these monads, too, is

the leader of a series which extends from itself to the last of things,

and which, while it proceeds from, at the same time abides in, and

returns to, its leader. And all these principles, and all their progeny,

are finally centred and rooted by their summits in the first great

all-comprehending one. Thus all beings proceed from, and are

comprehended in, the first being: all intellects emanate from one first

intellect; all souls from one first soul; all natures blossom from one

first nature; and all bodies proceed from the vital and luminous body of

the world. And, lastly, all these great monads are comprehended in the

first one, from which both they and all their depending series are

unfolded into light. Hence this first one is truly the unity of unities,

the monad of monads, the principle of principles, the God of Gods, one

and all things, and yet one prior to all.

No objections of any weight, no arguments but such as are sophistical,

can be urged against this most sublime theory, which is so congenial to

the unperverted conceptions of the human mind, that it can only be

treated with ridicule and contempt in degraded, barren, and barbarous

ages. Ignorance and impious fraud, however, have hitherto conspired to

defame those inestimable works[2] in which this and many other grand and

important dogmas can alone be found; and the theology of the ancients

has been attacked with all the insane fury of ecclesiastical zeal, and

all the imbecile flashes of mistaken wit, by men whose conceptions on

the subject, like those of a man between sleeping and waking, have been

_turbid_ and _wild_, _phantastic_ and _confused_, _preposterous_ and

_vain_.

Indeed, that after the great incomprehensible cause of all, a divine

multitude subsists, cooperating with this cause in the production and

government of the universe, has always been, and is still, admitted by

all nations and all religions, however much they may differ in their

opinions respecting the nature of the subordinate deities, and the

veneration which is to be paid to them by man; and however barbarous the

conceptions of some nations on this subject may be, when compared with

those of others. Hence, says the elegant Maximus Tyrius, “You will see

one according law and assertion in all the earth, that there is one God,

the king and father of all things, and many Gods, sons of God, ruling

together with him. This the Greek says, and the Barbarian says, the

inhabitant of the continent, and he who dwells near the sea, the wise

and the unwise. And if you proceed as far as to the utmost shores of the

ocean, there also there are Gods, rising very near to some, and setting

very near to others.”[3]

The deification, however, of dead men, and the worshiping men as Gods,

formed no part of this theology, when it is considered according to its

genuine purity. Numerous instances of the truth of this might be

adduced, but I shall mention for this purpose, as unexceptionable

witnesses, the writings of Plato, the Golden Pythagoric Verses,[4] and

the Treatise of Plutarch on Isis and Osiris. All the works of Plato,

indeed, evince the truth of this position, but this is particularly

manifest from his Laws. The Golden verses order that the immortal Gods

be honoured first, as they are disposed by law; afterwards the

illustrious Heroes, under which appellation the author of the verses

comprehends also angels and dæmons, properly so called; and in the last

place, the terrestrial dæmons, _i. e._ such good men as transcend in

virtue the rest of mankind. But to honour the Gods as they are disposed

by law, is, as Hierocles observes, to reverence them as they are

arranged by their demiurgus and father; and this is to honour them as

beings not only superior to man, but also to dæmons and angels. Hence,

to honour men, however excellent they may be, as Gods, is not to honour

the Gods according to the rank in which they are placed by their

Creator; for it is confounding the divine with the human nature, and is

thus acting directly contrary to the Pythagoric precept. Plutarch too,

in his above mentioned treatise, most forcibly and clearly shows the

impiety of worshiping men as Gods.[5]

“So great an apprehension indeed,” says Dr. Stillingfleet,[6] “had the

Heathens of the necessity of _appropriate acts of divine worship_, that

some of them have chosen to die, rather than to give them to what they

did not believe to be God. We have a remarkable story to this purpose in

Arrian and Curtius[7] concerning Callisthenes. Alexander arriving at

that degree of vanity as to desire to have divine worship given him, and

the matter being started out of design among the courtiers, either by

Anaxarchus, as Arrian, or Cleo the Sicilian, as Curtius says; and the

way of doing it proposed, _viz._ by incense and prostration;

Callisthenes vehemently opposed it, _as that which would confound the

difference of human and divine worship, which had been preserved

inviolable among them_. The worship of the Gods had been kept up in

temples, with altars, and images, and sacrifices, and hymns, and

prostrations, and such like; _but it is by no means fitting_, says he,

_for us to confound these things, either by lifting up men to the

honours of the Gods, or depressing the Gods to the honours of men_. For

if Alexander would not suffer any man to usurp his royal dignity by the

votes of men; how much more justly may the Gods disdain for any man to

take their honours to himself. And it appears by Plutarch,[8] that the

Greeks thought it a mean and base thing for any of them, when sent on

any embassy to the kings of Persia, to prostrate themselves before them,

because this was only allowed among them in divine adoration. Therefore,

says he, when Pelopidas and Ismenias were sent to Artaxerxes, Pelopidas

did nothing unworthy, but Ismenias let fall his ring to the ground, and

stooping for that, was thought to make his adoration; which was

altogether as good a shift as the Jesuits advising the crucifix to be

held in the mandarin’s hands while they made their adorations in the

Heathen temples in China.

Conon[9] also _refused to make his adoration, as a disgrace to his

city_; and Isocrates[10] accuses the Persians for doing it, _because

herein they showed that they despised the Gods rather than men, by

prostituting their honours to their princes_. Herodotus mentions

Sperchies and Bulis, who could not with the greatest violence be brought

to give adoration to Xerxes, _became it was against the law of their

country to give divine honour to men_.[11] And Valerius Maximus[12]

says, “_the Athenians put Timagoras to death for doing it_; so strong an

apprehension had possessed them, that the manner of worship which they

used to their Gods, should be preserved sacred and inviolable.” The

philosopher Sallust also, in his Treatise on the Gods and the World,

says, “It is not unreasonable to suppose that impiety is a species of

punishment, and that those who have had a knowledge of the Gods, and yet

despised them, will in another life be deprived of this knowledge. And

it is requisite to make the punishment of those who have honoured their

kings as Gods to consist in being expelled from the Gods.”[13]

When the ineffable transcendency of the first God, which was considered

as the grand principle in the Heathen religion by the best theologists

of all nations, and particularly by its most illustrious promulgators,

Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, was forgotten, this oblivion was

doubtless the principal cause of dead men being deified by the Pagans.

Had they properly directed their attention to this transcendency they

would have perceived it to be so immense as to surpass eternity,

infinity, self-subsistence, and even essence itself, and that these in

reality belong to those venerable natures which are, as it were, first

unfolded into light from the unfathomable depths of that truly mystic

unknown, about which all knowledge is refunded into ignorance. For, as

Simplicius justly observes, “It is requisite that he who ascends to the

principle of things should investigate whether it is possible there can

be any thing better than the supposed principle; and if something more

excellent is found, the same inquiry should again be made respecting

that, till we arrive at the highest conceptions, than which we have no

longer any more venerable. Nor should we stop in our ascent till we find

this to be the case. For there is no occasion to fear that our

progression will be through an unsubstantial void, by conceiving

something about the first principles which is greater and more

transcendent than their nature. For it is not possible for our

conceptions to take such a mighty leap as to equal, and much less to

pass beyond, the dignity of the first principles of things.” He adds,

“This, therefore, is one and the best extension [of the soul] to [the

highest] God, and is, as much as possible, irreprehensible; _viz._ to

know firmly, that by ascribing to him the most venerable excellences we

can conceive, and the most holy and primary names and things, we ascribe

nothing to him which is suitable to his dignity. It is sufficient,

however, to procure our pardon [for the attempt], that we can attribute

to him nothing superior.”[14] If it is not possible, therefore, to form

any ideas equal to the dignity of the immediate progeny of the

ineffable, _i. e._ of the first principles of things, how much less can

our conceptions reach that thrice unknown darkness, in the reverential

language of the Egyptians,[15] which is even beyond these? Had the

Heathens, therefore, considered as they ought this transcendency of the

supreme God, they would never have presumed to equalize the human with

the divine nature, and consequently would never have worshiped men as

Gods. Their theology, however, is not to be accused as the cause of this

impiety, but their forgetfulness of the sublimest of its dogmas, and the

confusion with which this oblivion was necessarily attended.

But to return to the present work. To some who are conversant with the

writings of Porphyry, who know how high he ranks among the best of the

Platonists, and that he was denominated by them, on account of his

excellence, _the philosopher_, it may seem strange that he should have

been so unskilled in theological mysteries, and so ignorant of the

characteristics of the beings superior to man, as by his epistle to

Anebo he may appear to have been. That he was not, however, in reality

thus unskilful and ignorant, is evident from his admirable Treatise on

Abstinence from Animal Food, and his Αφορμαι προς τα νοητα, or

Auxiliaries to Intelligibles. His apparent ignorance, therefore, must

have been assumed for the purpose of obtaining a more perfect and

copious solution of the doubts proposed in his Epistle, than he would

otherwise have received. But at the same time that this is admitted, it

must also be observed, that he was inferior to Iamblichus in theological

science, who so greatly excelled in knowledge of this kind, that he was

not surpassed by any one, and was equaled by few. Hence he was

denominated by all succeeding Platonists _the divine_, in the same

manner as Plato, “to whom,” as the acute Emperor Julian remarks, “he was

posterior in time only, but not in genius.”[16]

The difficulties attending the translation of this work into English are

necessarily great, not only from its sublimity and novelty, but also

from the defects of the original. I have, however, endeavoured to make

the translation as faithful and complete as possible; and have

_occasionally_ availed myself of the annotations of Gale, not being able

to do so _continually_, because for the most part, where philosophy is

concerned, he shows himself to be an inaccurate, impertinent, and

garrulous smatterer.

THE

EPISTLE OF PORPHYRY

TO THE

EGYPTIAN ANEBO.

_Porphyry to the Prophet Anebo greeting._

I commence my friendship towards you from the Gods and good dæmons, and

from those philosophic disquisitions, which have an affinity to these

powers. And concerning these particulars indeed, much has been said by

the Grecian philosophers; but, for the most part, the principles of

their belief are derived from conjecture.

In the first place, therefore, it is granted that there are Gods. But I

inquire what the peculiarities are of each of the more excellent genera,

by which they are separated from each other; and whether we must say

that the cause of the distinction between them is from their energies,

or their passive motions, or from things that are consequent, or from

their different arrangement with respect to bodies; as, for instance,

from the arrangement of the Gods with reference to etherial, but of

dæmons to aerial, and of souls to terrestrial, bodies?

I also ask, why, since [all] the Gods dwell in the heavens, theurgists

only invoke the terrestrial and subterranean Gods? Likewise, how some of

the Gods are said to be aquatic and aerial? And how different Gods are

allotted different places, and the parts of bodies according to

circumscription, though they have an infinite, impartible, and

incomprehensible power? How there will be a union of them with each

other, if they are separated by the divisible circumscriptions of parts,

and by the difference of places and subject bodies?

How do theologists, or those who are wise in divine concerns, represent

the Gods as passive, to whom on this account, it is said, erect phalli

are exhibited, and obscene language is used? But if they are impassive,

the invocations of the Gods will be in vain, which announce that they

can appease the anger of the divinities, and procure a reconciliation

with them; and still more, what are called the necessities of the Gods,

will be vain. For that which is impassive cannot be allured, nor

compelled, nor necessitated. How, therefore, are many things, in sacred

operations, performed to them as passive? Invocations,—likewise, are

made to the Gods as passive; so that not dæmons only are passive, but

the Gods also, conformably to what Homer says,

“And flexible are e’en the Gods themselves.”[17]

But if we assert with certain persons, that the Gods are pure

intellects, but that dæmons, being psychical, participate of intellect;

in a still greater degree will pure intellects be incapable of being

allured, and will be unmingled with sensible natures. Supplications,

however, are foreign to the purity of intellect, and therefore are not

to be made to it. But the things which are offered [in sacred rites] are

offered as to sensitive and psychical essences.

Are, therefore, the Gods separated from dæmons, through the former being

incorporeal, but the latter corporeal? If, however, the Gods are

incorporeal alone, how will the sun and moon, and the visible

celestials, be Gods?

How, likewise, are some of the Gods beneficent, but others malefic?

What is it that connects the Gods in the heavens that have bodies, with

the incorporeal Gods?

What is it that distinguishes dæmons from the visible and invisible

Gods, since the visible are connected with the invisible Gods?

In what do a dæmon, hero, and soul, differ from each other? Is it in

essence, or in power, or in energy?

What is the indication of a God, or angel, or archangel, or dæmon, or a

certain archon, or soul being present? For to speak boastingly, and to

exhibit a phantasm of a certain quality, is common to Gods and dæmons,

and to all the more excellent genera. So that the genus of Gods will in

no respect be better than that of dæmons.

Since the ignorance of, and deception about, divine natures is impiety

and impurity, but a scientific knowledge of the Gods is holy and

beneficial, the ignorance of things honourable and beautiful will be

darkness, but the knowledge of them will be light. And the former,

indeed, will fill men with all evils, through the want of erudition, and

through audacity; but the latter will be the cause to them of every

good. [I wish you, therefore, to unfold to me the truth respecting these

particulars.[18]]

[And, in the first place, I wish you to explain to me distinctly[19]]

what that is which is effected in divination? For we frequently obtain a

knowledge of future events through dreams, when we are asleep; not

being, at that time, in a tumultuous ecstasy, for the body is then

quiescent; but we do not apprehend what then takes place, in the same

manner as when we are awake.

But many, through enthusiasm and divine inspiration, predict future

events, and are then in so wakeful a state, as even to energize

according to sense, and yet they are not conscious of the state they are

in, or at least, not so much as they were before.

Some also of those who suffer a mental alienation, energize

enthusiastically on hearing cymbals or drums, or a certain modulated

sound, such as those who are Corybantically inspired, those who are

possessed by Sabazius, and those who are inspired by the mother of the

Gods. But some energize enthusiastically by drinking water, as the

priest of Clarius, in Colophon; others, by being seated at the mouth of

a cavern, as those who prophesy at Delphi; and others by imbibing the

vapour from water, as the prophetesses in Branchidæ. Some also become

enthusiastic by standing on characters, as those that are filled from

the intromission of spirits. Others, who are conscious what they are

doing in other respects, are divinely inspired according to the

phantastic part; some, indeed, receiving darkness for a cooperator,

others certain potions, but others incantations and compositions: and

some energize, according to the imagination, through water; others in a

wall, others in the open air, and others in the sun, or in some other of

the celestial bodies. Some also establish the art of the investigation

of futurity through the viscera, through birds, and through the stars.

I likewise ask concerning the mode of divination, what it is, and what

the quality by which it is distinguished? All diviners, indeed, assert,

that they obtain a foreknowledge of future events through Gods or

dæmons, and that it is not possible for any others to know that which is

future, than those who are the lords of futurity. I doubt, therefore,

whether divinity is so far subservient to men, as not to be averse to

some becoming diviners from meal.

But, concerning the causes of divination, it is dubious whether a God,

an angel, or a dæmon, or some other power, is present in manifestations,

or divinations, or certain other sacred energies, as is the case with

those powers that are drawn down through you [priests] by the

necessities with which invocation is attended.

Or does the soul assert and imagine these things, and are they, as some

think, the passions of the soul, excited from small incentives?

Or is a certain mixed form of subsistence produced from our soul, and

divine inspiration externally derived?

Hence it must be said, that the soul generates the power which has an

imaginative perception of futurity, through motions of this kind, or

that the things which are adduced from matter constitute dæmons, through

the powers that are inherent in them, and especially things adduced from

the matter which is taken from animals.

For in sleep, when we are not employed about any thing, we sometimes

obtain a knowledge of the future.

But that a passion of the soul is the cause of divination, is indicated

by this, that the senses are occupied, that fumigations are introduced,

and that invocations are employed; and likewise, that not all men, but

those that are more simple and young, are more adapted to prediction.

The ecstasy, also, of the reasoning power is the cause of divination, as

is likewise the mania which happens in diseases, or mental aberration,

or a sober and vigilant condition, or suffusions of the body, or the

imaginations excited by diseases, or an ambiguous state of mind, such as

that which takes place between a sober condition and ecstasy, or the

imaginations artificially procured by enchantment.

Nature, likewise, art, and the sympathy of things in the universe, as if

they were the parts of one animal, contain premanifestations of certain

things with reference to each other. And bodies are so prepared, that

there is a presignification of some by others, which is clearly

indicated by the works performed in predicting what is future. For those

who invoke the divinities for this purpose, have about them stones and

herbs, bind certain sacred bonds, which they also dissolve, open places

that are shut, and change the deliberate intentions of the recipients,

so as from being depraved to render them worthy, though they were before

depraved. Nor are the artificers of efficacious images to be despised.

For they observe the motion of the celestial bodies, and can tell from

the concurrence of what star with a certain star or stars, predictions

will be true or false; and also whether the things that are performed

will be inanities, or significant and efficacious, though no divinity or

dæmon is drawn down by these images.

But there are some who suppose that there is a certain obedient genus of

dæmons, which is naturally fraudulent, omniform, and various, and which

assumes the appearance of Gods and dæmons, and the souls of the

deceased; and that through these every thing which appears to be either

good or evil is effected; for they are not able to contribute any thing

to true goods, such as those of the soul, nor to have any knowledge of

them, but they abuse, deride, and frequently impede those who are

striving to be virtuous. They are likewise full of pride, and rejoice in

vapours and sacrifices.

Jugglers likewise fraudulently attack us in many ways, through the

ardour of the expectations which they raise.

It very much indeed perplexes me to understand how superior beings, when

invoked, are commanded by those that invoke them, as if they were their

inferiors; and they think it requisite that he who worships them should

be just, but when they are called upon to act unjustly, they do not

refuse so to act. Though the Gods, likewise, do not hear him who invokes

them, if he is impure from venereal connexions, yet, at the same time,

they do not refuse to lead any one to illegal venery.

[I am likewise dubious with respect to sacrifices, what utility or power

they possess in the universe, and with the Gods, and on what account

they are performed, appropriately indeed, to the powers who are honoured

by them, but usefully to those by whom the gifts are offered.[20]]

Why also do the interpreters of prophecies and oracles think it

requisite that they should abstain from animals, lest the Gods should be

polluted by the vapours arising from them; and yet the Gods are

especially allured by the vapours of animals?

Why is it requisite that the inspector [who presides over sacred rites]

ought not to touch a dead body, though most sacred operations are

performed through dead bodies? And why, which is much more absurd than

this, are threats employed and false terrors, by any casual person, not

to a dæmon, or some departed soul, but to the sovereign Sun himself, or

to the Moon, or some one of the celestial Gods, in order to compel these

divinities to speak the truth? For does not he who says that he will

burst the heavens, or unfold the secrets of Isis, or point out the

arcanum in the adytum, or stop Baris, or scatter the members of Osiris

to Typhon, [or that he will do something else of the like kind[21]],

does not he who says this, by thus threatening what he neither knows nor

is able to effect, prove himself to be stupid in the extreme? And what

abjectness does it not produce in those who, like very silly children,

are possessed with such vain fear, and are terrified at such fictions?

And yet Chæremon, who was a sacred scribe, writes these things, as

disseminated by the Egyptians. It is also said, that these, and things

of the like kind, are of a most compulsive nature.

What also is the meaning of those mystic narrations which say that a

certain divinity is unfolded into light from mire, that he is seated

above the lotus, that he sails in a ship, and that he changes his forms

every hour, according to the signs of the zodiac? For thus, they say, he

presents himself to the view, and thus ignorantly adapt the peculiar

passion of their own imagination to the God himself. But if these things

are asserted symbolically, being symbols of the powers of this divinity,

I request an interpretation of these symbols. For it is evident, that if

these are similar to passions of the Sun, when he is eclipsed, they

would be seen by all men who intently survey the God.

What also is the design of names that are without signification? and

why, of such, are those that are barbaric preferred to our own? For if

he who hears them looks to their signification, it is sufficient that

the conception remains the same, whatever the words may be that are

used. For he who is invoked is not of the Egyptian race; nor, if he was

an Egyptian, does he use the Egyptian, or, in short, any human language.

For either all these are the artificial contrivances of enchanters, and

veils originating from our passions, which rumour ascribes to a divine

nature; or we ignorantly frame conceptions of divinity, contrary to its

real mode of subsistence.

I likewise wish you to unfold to me, what the Egyptians conceive the

first cause to be; whether intellect, or above intellect? whether alone,

or subsisting with some other or others? whether incorporeal, or

corporeal; and whether it is the same with the Demiurgus, or prior to

the Demiurgus? Likewise, whether all things are from one principle, or

from many principles? whether the Egyptians have a knowledge of matter,

or of primary corporeal qualities; and whether they admit matter to be

unbegotten, or to be generated? For Chæremon, indeed, and others, do not

think there is any thing else prior to the visible worlds; but in the

beginning of their writings on this subject, admit the existence of the

Gods of the Egyptians, but of no others, except what are called the

planets, the Gods that give completion to the zodiac, and such as rise

together with these; and likewise, the sections into decans, and the

horoscopes. They also admit the existence of what are called the

powerful leaders, whose names are to be found in the calendars, together

with their ministrant offices, their risings and settings, and their

significations of future events. For Chæremon saw that what those who

say that the sun is the Demiurgus, and likewise what is asserted

concerning Osiris and Isis, and all the sacred fables, may be resolved

into the stars and the phases, occultations and risings of these, or

into the increments or decrements of the moon, or into the course of the

sun, or the nocturnal and diurnal hemisphere, or into the river [Nile].

And, in short, the Egyptians resolve all things into physical, and

nothing into incorporeal and living essences. Most of them likewise

suspend that which is in our power from the motion of the stars; and

bind all things, though I know not how, with the indissoluble bonds of

necessity, which they call fate. They also connect fate with the Gods;

whom, nevertheless, they worship in temples and statues, and other

things, as the only dissolvers of fate.

Concerning the peculiar dæmon, it must be inquired how he is imparted by

the lord of the geniture, and according to what kind of efflux, or life,

or power, he descends from him to us? And also, whether he exists, or

does not exist? And whether the invention of the lord of the geniture is

impossible, or possible? For if it is possible he is happy, who having

learned the scheme of his nativity, and knowing his proper dæmon,

becomes liberated from fate.

The canons, also, of genethlialogy [or prediction from the natal day]

are innumerable and incomprehensible. And the knowledge of this

mathematical science cannot be obtained; for there is much dissonance

concerning it, and Chæremon and many others have written against it. But

the discovery of the lord, or lords, of the geniture, if there are more

than one in a nativity, is nearly granted by astrologers themselves to

be unattainable, and yet they say that on this the knowledge of the

proper dæmon depends.

Farther still, I wish to know whether the peculiar dæmon rules over some

one of the parts in us? For it appears to certain persons, that dæmons

preside over the parts of our body, so that one is the guardian of

health, another of the form of the body, and another of the corporeal

habits, and that there is one dæmon who presides in common over all

these. And again, that one dæmon presides over the body, another over

the soul, and another over the intellect; and that some of them are

good, but others bad.

I am also dubious whether this dæmon is not a certain part of the soul,

[such, for instance, as the intellectual part;] and if so, he will be

happy who has a wise intellect.

I see likewise, that there is a twofold worship of the peculiar dæmon;

the one being the worship as of two, but the other as of three. By all

men, however, the dæmon is called upon by a common invocation.

I farther ask, whether there is a certain other latent way to felicity,

separate from the Gods? And I am dubious whether it is requisite to look

to human opinions in divine divination and theurgy? And whether the soul

does not devise great things from casual circumstances? Moreover, there

are certain other methods, which are conversant with the prediction of

future events. And, perhaps, those who possess divine divination,

foresee indeed what will happen, yet are not on this account happy; for

they foresee future events, but do not know how to use this knowledge

properly. I wish, therefore, that you would point out to me the path to

felicity, and show me in what the essence of it consists. For with us

[Greeks] there is much verbal contention about it, because we form a

conjecture of good from human reasonings. But by those who have devised

the means of associating with beings more excellent than man, if the

investigation of this subject is omitted, wisdom will be professed by

them in vain; as they will only disturb a divine intellect about the

discovery of a fugitive slave, or the purchase of land, or, if it should

so happen, about marriage, or merchandize. And if they do not omit this

subject, but assert what is most true about other things, yet say

nothing that is stable and worthy of belief about felicity, in

consequence of employing themselves about things that are difficult, but

useless to mankind; in this case, they will not be conversant either

with Gods or good dæmons, but with that dæmon who is called fraudulent;

or, if this is not admitted, the whole will be the invention of men, and

the fiction of a mortal nature.

=Iamblichus[22] on the Mysteries, &c.=

THE

ANSWER OF THE PRECEPTOR ABAMMON

TO THE

EPISTLE OF PORPHYRY TO ANEBO,

AND A

SOLUTION OF THE DOUBTS CONTAINED IN IT.

SECTION I.

CHAP. I.

Hermes, the God who presides over language, was formerly very properly

considered as common to all priests; and the power who presides over the

true science concerning the Gods is one and the same in the whole of

things. Hence our ancestors dedicated the inventions of their wisdom to

this deity, inscribing all their own writings with the name of Hermes.

If, therefore, we participate of a portion of this God, adapted and

commensurate to our powers, you do well to propose your theological

doubts to the priests, as friends, and to make these doubts known to

them. I also very properly conceiving that the epistle sent to my

disciple Anebo was written to me, shall give you a true answer to your

inquiries. For it would not be becoming, that Pythagoras and Plato,

Democritus and Eudoxus, and many other of the ancient Greeks, should

have obtained appropriate instruction from the sacred scribes of their

time, but that you who are our contemporary, and think conformably to

those ancients, should be frustrated of your wish by those who are now

living, and who are called common preceptors. I, therefore, thus betake

myself to the present discussion; and do you, if you please, conceive

that the same person to whom you sent the letter returns you an answer.

Or, if it should seem fit to you, admit it to be me who discourses with

you in writing, or some other prophet of the Egyptians, for this is of

no consequence. Or, which I think is still better, dismiss the

consideration whether the speaker is an inferior or a superior

character, but direct your attention to what is said, so as readily to

excite your mind to survey whether what is asserted is true or false.

In the first place, therefore, we shall divide the genera of the

proposed problems, in order that we may know the quantity and quality of

them. And, in the next place, we shall show from what theologies the

doubts are assumed, and according to what sciences they are

investigated. For some things that are badly confused, require a certain

distinction; others are conversant with the cause through which they

subsist, and are apprehended; others, which we propose according to a

certain contrariety, draw our decision on both sides; and some things

require from us the whole development of mystic doctrines. Such,

therefore, being the nature of the subjects of discussion, they are

assumed from many places, and from different sciences. For some things

introduce animadversions from what the wise men of the Chaldeans have

delivered; others produce objections from what the prophets of the

Egyptians teach; and there are some that, adhering to the theory of

philosophers, make inquiries conformably to them. There are now likewise

some, that from other opinions, which do not deserve to be mentioned,

elicite a certain dubitation; and others originate from the common

conceptions of mankind. These things, therefore, are of themselves

variously disposed, and are multiformly connected with each other.

Hence, through all these causes, a certain discussion is requisite for

the management of them in a becoming manner.

CHAP. II.

We shall, therefore, deliver to you the peculiar dogmas of the

Assyrians; and also clearly develop to you our own opinions; collecting

some things from the infinite writings of the ancients, but others from

those particulars which were comprehended by the ancients in one

treatise, and pertain to the whole knowledge of divine natures. If also

you should propose any philosophic inquiry, we shall discuss it for you,

according to the ancient pillars of Hermes, which Plato and Pythagoras

knew before, and from thence constituted their philosophy. But such

things as exhibit foreign inquiries, or which are contradictory and

contentious, we shall assist mildly and aptly, or we shall demonstrate

their absurdity. Such, likewise, as proceed conformably[23] to common

conceptions, we shall endeavour to discuss in a way perfectly known and

clear. And things, indeed, which require the experience of divine

operations to an accurate knowledge of them, we shall explain, as far as

this is possible to be effected by words alone; but such as are full of

intellectual theory, we shall develop with a view to the purification of

the soul. But indications of this theory worthy of notice may be

mentioned, by which it is possible for you, and those who resemble you,

to be conducted by intellect to the essence of [real] beings. And with

respect to such things as become known by a reasoning process, we shall

leave no one of these without a perfect demonstration. But in all things

we shall give to each that which is appropriate. And such questions,

indeed, as are theological, we shall answer theologically; such as are

theurgic, theurgically; but such as are philosophical, we shall, in

conjunction with you, philosophically explore. Of these, also, such as

extend to first causes, we shall unfold into light, by following them

conformably to first principles. But such as pertain to morals, or to

ends, we shall fitly discuss, according to the ethical mode. And, in a

similar manner, we shall examine other things methodically and

appropriately. Let us, therefore, now betake ourselves to your

inquiries.

CHAP. III.

In the first place, therefore, you say, “_it must be granted that there

are Gods_.” Thus to speak, however, is not right on this subject. For an

innate knowledge of the Gods is coexistent with our very essence; and

this knowledge is superior to all judgment and deliberate choice, and

subsists prior to reason and demonstration. It is also counited from the

beginning with its proper cause, and is consubsistent with the essential

tendency of the soul to _the good_. If, indeed, it be requisite to speak

the truth, the contact with divinity is not knowledge. For knowledge is

in a certain respect separated [from its object] by _otherness_.[24] But

prior to the knowledge, which as one thing knows another, is the uniform

connexion with divinity, and which is suspended from the Gods, is

spontaneous and inseparable from them. Hence, it is not proper to grant

this, as if it might not be granted, nor to admit it as ambiguous (for

it is always unically established in energy); nor are we worthy thus to

explore it, as if we had sufficient authority to approve or reject it.

For we are comprehended in it, or rather we are filled by it, and we

possess that very thing which we are, [or by which our essence is

characterized] in knowing the Gods.

I shall likewise say the same thing to you, concerning the more

excellent genera that follow the Gods, I mean dæmons, heroes, and

undefiled souls.[25] For it is necessary to understand respecting these,

that there is always in them one definite reason of essence, and to

remove from them the indefiniteness and instability of the human

condition. It is likewise requisite to separate from them that

inclination to one side of an argument rather than another, arising from

the equilibrium of a reasoning process. For a thing of this kind is

foreign from the principles of reason and life, and rather tends to

secondary natures, and to such things as pertain to the power and

contrariety of generation. But it is necessary that the more excellent

genera should be apprehended uniformly.

The connascent perception, therefore, of the perpetual attendance of the

Gods, will be assimilated to them. Hence, as they have an existence

which is always invariably the same, thus also the human soul is

conjoined to them by knowledge, according to a sameness of subsistence;

by no means pursuing through conjecture, or opinion, or a syllogistic

process, all which originate in time, an essence which is above all

these, but through the pure and blameless intellections which the soul

received from eternity from the Gods, becoming united to them. You,

however, seem to think, that there is the same knowledge of divine

natures as of any thing else, and that one thing, rather than another,

may be granted from opposites, in the same manner as it is usual to do

in dialectic discussions. There is, however, no similitude whatever

between the two kinds of knowledge. For the knowledge of divine natures

is different from that of other things, and is separated from all

opposition. It likewise neither subsists in being now granted, or in

becoming to be, but was from eternity, uniformly consubsistent with the

soul. And thus much I say to you concerning the first principle in us,

from which it is necessary those should begin who speak or hear any

thing about the natures that are superior to us.

CHAP. IV.

With respect to your inquiry, “_what the peculiarities are in each of

the more excellent genera, by which they are separated from each

other?_” if you understand by peculiarities the specific differences

under the same genus, which are distinguished by opposite qualities, as

the rational and irrational under animal; we by no means admit

peculiarities of this kind, in things which neither have one common

essence, nor an equal contradistinction, nor receive a composition from

something common, which is indefinite, and defines the peculiarity. But

if you apprehend the peculiarity to be, as in prior and secondary

natures, differing in their whole essence and whole genus, a certain

simple condition of being, definite in itself; in this case, your

conception of peculiarities will be reasonable. For these peculiarities

of things, which have an eternal subsistence, are simple, and entirely

exempt. The inquiry, however, proceeds imperfectly. For it was

necessary, in the first place, to inquire what the peculiarities are of

the more excellent genera, according to essence; in the next place, what

they are according to power; and thus afterwards, what they are

according to energy. But, as your question now stands, with respect to

the peculiarities by which these genera are separated, you alone speak

of the peculiarities of energies. Hence you inquire concerning the

difference in the last things pertaining to them; but you leave

uninvestigated such things as are first, and most honourable in them,

and which are the elements of their difference. In the same place, also,

something is added concerning “_efficacious and passive motions_,” which

is a division by no means adapted to the difference of the more

excellent genera. For the contrariety of action and passion is not

inherent in any one of them; but their energies are unrestrained,

immutable, and without habitude to their opposites. Hence, neither must

we admit in them motions of such a kind as arise from action and

passion. For neither do we admit in the soul a self-motion, which

consists of the mover and that which is moved; but we conceive that it

is a certain simple essential motion, subsisting from itself,[26] and

not possessing a habitude to another thing, and exempt from acting on,

and suffering from, itself. Who, therefore, can endure that the

peculiarities of the genera superior to the soul, should be

distinguished according to active or passive motions?

That also which is added by you, “_or of accidents_,” is foreign from

these genera. For in composites, and things which exist together with,

or in others, or are comprehended by others, some things are conceived

to be precedaneous, but others consequent; and some as essences, but

others, as afterwards acceding to essences. For there is a certain

coarrangement of them, and incongruity and interval intervenes. But, in

the more excellent genera, all things must be conceived in τῳ ειναι,

i. e. _in merely existing_; and wholes have a precedaneous subsistence,

are separate by themselves, and have not their hypostasis from, or in

others; so that there is not any thing in them which is accidental.

Hence the peculiarity of them is not characterized from accidents.

At the end, likewise, of your inquiry, you introduce a distinction

according to nature. For your question asks, “_How essences are known by

energies, by physical motions, and by accidents?_” The very contrary,

however, to all this takes place. For if energies and motions were

constitutive of essences, they would be the lords of the difference

which is between them. But if essences generate energies, the former

being separate prior to the latter, will impart to motions, energies,

and accidents, that by which they differ from each other. This,

therefore, subsists contrarily to what you suppose, for the purpose of

discovering the peculiarity which you now investigate.

In short, whether you think that there is one genus of the Gods, one of

dæmons, and in a similar manner of heroes, and souls essentially

incorporeal; or whether you admit that these are severally many, you

inquire what the difference of them is according to peculiarities. For

if you apprehend that each of these is one [and the same genus] the

whole arrangement of scientific theology is confounded. But if, as truth

requires, you admit that they are genetically distinguished, and that

there is not in them one common essential definition, but that those of

them which are prior, are exempt from those that are inferior, it is not

possible to discover their common boundaries. And even if this were

possible, this very thing would destroy their peculiarities. In this

way, therefore, the object of investigation cannot be found. He,

however, he who directs his attention to the analogous sameness which

exists in superior natures, as, for instance, in the many genera of the

Gods, and again in dæmons and heroes, and, in the last place, in souls,

will be able to define their peculiarities. Hence through this, it is

demonstrated by us what the rectitude is of the present inquiry, and

what its [accurate] distinction, and also in what manner it is

impossible, and in what manner it is possible, for it to subsist.

CHAP. V.

In the next place, let us direct our attention to the solution of your

inquiries. There is, therefore, _the good itself_ which is beyond

essence, and there is that good which subsists according to essence; I

mean the essence which is most ancient and most honourable, and by

itself incorporeal. And this is the illustrious peculiarity of the Gods,

which exists in all the genera that subsist about them, preserving their

appropriate distribution and order, and not being divulsed from it, and

at the same time being inherent with invariable sameness in all the

Gods, and their perpetual attendants.

In souls, however, which rule over bodies, and precedaneously pay

attention to them, and which, prior to generation, have by themselves a

perpetual arrangement, essential good is not present, nor the cause of

good, which is prior to essence; but to these a certain

participation[27] and habit, proceeding from essential good, accedes;

just as we see that the participation of beauty and virtue is very

different [in these souls] from that which we behold in men. For the

latter is ambiguous, and accedes to composite natures as something

adventitious. But the former has an immutable and never failing

establishment in souls, and neither itself ever departs from itself, nor

can be taken away by any thing else. Such, therefore, being the

beginning and end in the divine genera, conceive two media between these

extreme boundaries, _viz._ the order of heroes, which has an arrangement

more elevated than that of souls, in power and virtue, in beauty and

magnitude, and in all the goods which subsist about souls, and which,

though it entirely transcends the psychical order, yet, at the same

time, is proximately conjoined to it, through the alliance of a similar

formed life. But the other medium, which is suspended from the Gods,

though it is far inferior to them, is that of dæmons, which is hot of a

primarily operative nature, but is subservient to, and follows the

beneficent will of the Gods. It likewise unfolds into energy the

invisible good of the Gods, being itself assimilated to it, and gives

completion to its fabrications conformably to it. For it renders that

which is ineffable in the good of the Gods effable, illuminates that

which is formless in forms, and produces into visible reasons [or

productive forms] that which in divine good is above all reason.

Receiving also a connascent participation of things beautiful, it

imparts and transfers it, in unenvying abundance, to the genera

posterior to itself. These middle genera, therefore, give completion to

the common bond of the Gods and souls, and cause the connexion of them

to be indissoluble. They also bind together the one continuity of things

from on high as far as to the end; make the communion of wholes to be

inseparable; cause all things to have the best, and a commensurate

mixture; in a certain respect, equally transmit the progression from

more excellent to inferior natures, and the elevation from things

posterior to such as are prior; insert in more imperfect beings order

and measures of the communication which descends from more excellent

natures, and of that by which it is received; and make all things to be

familiar and coadapted to all, supernally receiving the causes of all

these from the Gods.

You must not, therefore, think that this division is the peculiarity of

powers or energies, or of essence; nor assuming it separately, must you

survey it in one of these. But by extending it in common through all the

genera, you will give perfection to the answer concerning the

peculiarities of Gods, dæmons, and heroes, and also of those in souls

which are now the subjects of your inquiry.

Again, however, according to another mode of considering the subject, it

is necessary to ascribe to the Gods the whole of that which is united,

of whatever kind it may be; that which is firmly established in itself,

and which is the cause of impartible essences; the immoveable, which

also is to be considered as the cause of all motion, and which

transcends the whole of things, and has nothing in common with them; and

the unmingled and the separate, understood in common in essence, power

and energy, and every thing else of this kind. But that which is now

separated into multitude, and is able to impart itself to other things,

and which receives from others bound in itself, and is sufficient in the

distributions of partible natures, so as to give completion to them;

which also participates of the primarily operative and vivific, having

communion with all real and generated beings; receives a commixture from

all things, imparts a contemperation to all things from itself, and

extends these peculiarities through all the powers, essences, and

energies, in itself; all this we shall truly ascribe to souls, by

asserting that it is naturally implanted in them.

CHAP. VI.

What, therefore, shall we say concerning the media? I think, indeed,

that from what has been before said, they will be manifest to every one;

for these give completion to the indivisible connexion of the extremes.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to be more explicit. I consider,

therefore, the dæmoniacal tribe to be multiplied, but, unitedly, to be

comingled, but in an unmingled manner, and to comprehend all other

things of a subordinate nature, according to the idea of that which is

more excellent. But again, the tribe of heroes supernally presides over

a more obvious division and multitude, and likewise over motion,

commixture, and things allied to these. It also receives gifts of a more

excellent nature, concealed as it were inwardly; I mean union, purity, a

firm establishment, impartible sameness, and a transcendency above other

things. For one of these middle genera is proximate to the first, but

the other to the last, of the extremes. But it reasonably follows,

according to continuity of alliance, that the medium which begins from

the most excellent natures, should proceed to such as are less

excellent; but that the medium which primarily produces a contact with

the last of things, should also in a certain respect communicate with

the natures that transcend it. From these media, also, the completion

may be seen of the first and last genera, and this entirely connascent,

in a similar manner, in existence, in power, and in energy. As we have,

therefore, in these two ways, perfectly completed the division of the

four genera, we shall deem it sufficient in the others, to exhibit the

extreme peculiarities alone, for the sake of conciseness, and because

what remains, _i. e._ the comprehension of the media, is in a certain

respect evident. But the media themselves, as being known from the

extremes, we shall omit; making a definition of the extremes in the

shortest way, as follows.

CHAP. VII.

Of the extremes, therefore, one is supreme, transcendent, and perfect;

but the other is last in dignity, deficient, and more imperfect. And the

former, indeed, is capable of accomplishing all things at once,

uniformly in an instant; but the latter is neither able to effect all

things, nor at once, nor suddenly, nor impartibly. The former also

generates and governs all things, without being inclined towards them;

but the latter is naturally disposed to verge, and be converted to the

things which it generates and governs. And the former, indeed, as

primordial and cause, precedes all things in power; but the latter,

being suspended from the will of the Gods, as from a cause, is from

eternity consubsistent with it. The former, likewise, according to one

vigorous acme, comprehends the ends of all energies and essences; but

the latter passes from some things to others, and proceeds from the

imperfect to the perfect. Farther still, to the former that which is

highest and that which is incomprehensible pertain, and also that which

is better than all measure, and is in such a manner formless, as not to

be circumscribed by any form; but the latter is vanquished by

inclination, habitude, and propensity; and is detained by appetites

directed to that which is less excellent, and by familiarity with

secondary natures. Hence, in the last place, it is formalized by

all-various measures derived from them. Intellect, therefore, which is

the leader and king of all beings, and which is the demiurgic art of the

universe, is always present with the Gods with invariable sameness,

perfectly, and without indigence, being purely established in itself,

according to one energy. But soul participates of a partible and

multiform intellect, having its attention directed to the government of

the whole. It also providentially attends to inanimate natures, becoming

at different times ingenerated in different forms.

From the same causes, therefore, order and beauty itself are

consubsistent with the more excellent genera; or, if some one had rather

admit it, the cause of these is consubsistent with them. But with soul,

the participation of intellectual order and divine beauty is always

present. And with the former, indeed, the measure of wholes, or the

cause of this, perpetually concurs. But soul is terminated by the divine

boundary, and participates of this in a partible manner. To the former,

also, empire over all beings, through the power and domination of cause,

may be reasonably ascribed. But soul has certain distinct boundaries, as

far as to which it is able to have dominion. Such, therefore, being the

different peculiarities in the extremes, it will not be difficult to

understand what we have now said, and to perceive the middle

peculiarities of dæmons and heroes, which are allied to each of the

extremes, possessing a similitude, to each, departing from both to the

medium, and embracing a concordant communion comingled from them, and

connected with it in appropriate measures. Such, therefore, must be

conceived to be the peculiarities of the first divine genera.

CHAP. VIII.

But neither must we admit that cause of the distinction of these genera

which you subjoin, viz. “_that it is an arrangement with reference to

different bodies; as, for instance, of Gods to etherial bodies, but of

dæmons to aerial bodies, and of souls to such as are terrene_.” For such

an arrangement as this, which resembles that of Socrates to a tribe,

when he is a senator, is unworthy of the divine genera, because all of

them are essentially unrestrained and free. To which may be added, that

it is dreadfully absurd to ascribe to bodies a principal power of giving

a specific distinction to the first causes of themselves. For bodies are

in servile subjection to these causes, and are ministrant to generation.

And farther still, the genera of the more excellent natures are not in

bodies, but the former externally rule over the latter. Hence they are

not changed in conjunction with bodies. Again, they impart from

themselves to bodies every such good as they are able to receive, but

they themselves receive nothing from bodies; so that neither will they

derive from them certain peculiarities. For if they were as the habits

of bodies, or as material forms, or were in some other way

corporeal-formed, it would, perhaps, be possible for them to be changed

together with the differences of bodies. But if they are separate from

bodies, and essentially preexist unmingled with them, what reasonable

distinction, produced from bodies, can be transferred to them? To which

also may be added, that this assertion of yours makes bodies to be more

excellent than the divine genera, since the former afford a seat to

superior causes, and insert in them peculiarities essentially. He,

therefore, who coarranges allotments, distributions, and consociations

of governors with the governed, will evidently assign a principal

authority to more excellent natures. For, because the presiding powers

are such [as we have shown them to be], on this account they have such

an allotment, and give to it an essential specific distinction, but they

are not assimilated to the nature of their receptacles.

It is necessary, therefore, to admit a thing of this kind in partial

souls. For such as is the life which the soul received, prior to its

insertion in a human body, and such as the form which it readily

exerted; such also is the organical body which it has suspended from

itself, and such the consequent corresponding nature, which receives the

more perfect life of the soul. But with respect to more excellent

natures, and which, as wholes, comprehend the principle [of parts] in

these, inferior are produced in superior natures; bodies, in incorporeal

essences; things fabricated, in the fabricators; and, being circularly

comprehended in, are directed and governed by, them. Hence, the

circulations of the celestial bodies, being primarily inserted in the

celestial circulations of the etherial soul, are perpetually inherent in

them; and the souls of the worlds [_i. e._ of the spheres], being

extended to their intellect, are perfectly comprehended by it, and are

primarily generated in it. Intellect, also, both that which is partial

and that which is universal, is in a similar manner comprehended in the

genera that are more excellent than intellect. Since, therefore, second

are always converted to first natures, and superior are the leaders of

inferior essences, as being the paradigms of them, hence essence and

form accede to subordinate from superior natures, and things posterior

are primarily produced in such as are more excellent; so that order and

measure are derived from primary to secondary beings, and the latter

possess that which they are from the former. But the contrary must not

be admitted, _viz._ that peculiarities emanate from things less

excellent to the natures which precede them.

Hence, through these things such a corporeal-formed division as you

introduce, is demonstrated to be false. It is, indeed, especially

necessary not to propose any thing of this kind; but if this should

appear to you to be requisite, yet you must not think, that what is

false deserves to be discussed. For such a discussion does not exhibit a

copiousness of arguments; but he wearies himself in vain, who, proposing

things that are false, endeavours afterwards to subvert them, as things

that are not true. For how is it possible that an essence, which is of

itself incorporeal, and which has nothing in common with the bodies that

participate of it, should be distinguished from other things by

corporeal qualities? How can that which is not locally present with

bodies, be separated by corporeal places? And how can that which is not

inclosed by the partible circumscriptions of subjects, be partibly

detained by the parts of the world? What, also, is that which can

prevent the Gods from being every where? And what can restrain their

power from extending as far as to the celestial arch? For to effect

this, must be the work of a more powerful cause, which is able to

inclose and circumscribe them in certain parts. But truly existing

being, and which is essentially incorporeal, is every where, wherever it

may wish to be. And that which is divine, and which transcends all

things, would [if what you say were admitted] be transcended by the

perfection of the whole world, and, as a certain part, would be

comprehended by it. Hence, it would be inferior to corporeal magnitude.

I do not, however, see after what manner these sensible natures could be

produced and specifically distinguished, if there was no divine

fabrication, and if no participation of divine forms, extended through

the whole world.

In short, this opinion wholly subverts sacred institutions, and the

theurgic communion of the Gods with men; since it exterminates from the

earth the presence of the more excellent genera. For it says nothing

else than that divine dwell remote from earthly natures, and that this

our place of abode is deserted by them. According to this assertion,

therefore, neither can we, that are priests, learn any thing from the

Gods, nor do you rightly inquire of us, as knowing more than others,

since we shall differ in no respect from other men.

No one, however, of these assertions is sane. For neither are the Gods

detained in certain parts of the world, nor are terrene natures

destitute of their providential attention. But the divinities are

characterized by this, that they are not comprehended by any thing, and

that they comprehend all things in themselves. But terrestrial natures

possess their existence in the _pleromas_[28] of the Gods; and when they

become adapted to divine participation, then prior to their own proper

essence, they immediately possess the Gods, which [latently] preexisted

in it.

Through these things, therefore, we have shown that the whole of this

division is false; that the method [employed by you] of investigating

peculiarities is irrational; and that to suppose the government of the

Gods is fixed in a certain place, is by no means to apprehend the whole

essence and power which is in them. It would have been proper,

therefore, to have omitted the opposite inquiry made by you, about this

distribution of more excellent natures, as not contradicting in any

respect true conceptions. Because, however, it is necessary rather to

direct the attention to true science, but not to dispute with men, on

this account, we also shall adapt the present inquiry to a certain

rational and theological apprehension.

CHAP. IX.

I consider you, therefore, as asking, for it is your inquiry, “_Why,

since the Gods dwell in the heavens alone, there are invocations by

theurgists of terrestrial and subterranean Gods?_” For what you assert

in the beginning is not true, that the Gods circumvolve in the heavens

alone: since all things are full of them. You also inquire, “_How some

of the Gods are said to be aerial, and different Gods are allotted

different places, and circumscribed portions of bodies, though they

possess infinite, impartible, and incomprehensible power? And how,

likewise, there will be a union of them with each other, as they are

separated by divisible circumscriptions of parts, and by difference of

places and subject bodies?_” Of all these, therefore, and an infinite

number of other similar questions, one and the best solution will be

obtained by surveying the mode of divine allotment.

A divine nature, therefore, whether it is allotted certain parts of the

universe, such as heaven or earth, or sacred cities and regions, or

certain groves, or sacred statues, externally[29] illuminates all these,

in the same manner as the sun externally irradiates all things with his

rays. Hence, as light comprehends the things which are illuminated by

it, thus also the power of the Gods externally comprehends its

participants. As, likewise, the solar light is present with the air in

an unmingled manner; but this is manifest from no light being left in

the air, when once that which illuminated it has departed, though heat

is still present with it, when that which heated it is entirely

withdrawn; thus also the light of the Gods illuminates separately, and

being firmly established in itself, wholly proceeds through all beings.

Moreover, the light which is the object of sensible perception, is one,

continuous, and every where the same, whole; so that it is not possible

for any part of it to be separate and cut off from the whole, nor to be

inclosed in a circle, nor at any time to depart from its illuminating

source. After the same manner, therefore, the whole world being

partible, is divided about the one and impartible light of the Gods. But

this light is every where one and the same whole, and is impartibly

present with all things that are able to participate of it; through an

all perfect power fills all things, and by a certain causal

comprehension, incloses and terminates the whole of things in itself,

and is every where united to itself, and conjoins ends to beginnings.

This too, all heaven and the world imitating, revolve with a circular

motion, are united to themselves, and lead the elements which are

carried round in a circle. Hence the world causes all things to be in

each other, and to tend to each other, makes the end of one thing to

coalesce with the beginning of another, as, for instance, earth with

heaven, and produces one connexion and concord of wholes with wholes.

Will not, therefore, he who surveys this conspicuous statue of the Gods,

thus united to itself, be ashamed to have a different opinion of the

Gods, who are the causes of it, so as to introduce among them sections,

and separations, and corporeal-formed circumscriptions? I, indeed,

should think, that every one would be thus disposed. For if there is no

ratio, no habitude of symmetry, no communion of essence, nor a connexion

either in capacity or in energy, between that which is adorned and the

adorning cause; if this be the case, there will neither be found in the

world a certain extension according to interval, nor local

comprehension, nor partible interception, nor any other such like

connascent equalization in the presence of the Gods [with mundane

natures]. For in things which are of a kindred nature, according to

essence and power, or which are, in a certain respect, of the same

species, or homogeneous, a certain comprehension, or conservation, may

be discovered. But in such things as are entirely exempt from all

mundane wholes, what opposing circumstance, or transition through all

things, or partible circumscription, or local comprehension, or any

thing else of this kind can justly be perceived? I think, therefore,

that the several participants of the divinities are of such a nature,

that some partake of them etherially, others aerially, and others

aquatically; which also, the art of divine works perceiving, employs

adaptations and invocations, conformable to such a division. And thus

much concerning the distribution of the more excellent genera into the

world.

CHAP. X.

After these things, you again subjoin another division for yourself,

“_in which you separate the essences of the more excellent genera by the

difference of passive and impassive_.” But neither do I admit this

division. For no one of the more excellent genera is passive, nor yet

impassive in such a way as to be contradistinguished from that which is

passive; nor is naturally adapted to receive passions, but liberated

from them through virtue, or some other worthy condition of being. But

because they are entirely exempt from the contrariety of action and

passion; and because they are not at all adapted to suffer, and have

essentially an immutable firmness, on this account I place the impassive

and the immutable in all the divine genera.

For consider, if you are willing, the last of divine natures, _viz._ a

soul purely liberated from bodies. What does such a soul want with the

generation which is in pleasure, or the restitution which is in it to a

natural condition, since such a soul is above nature, and lives an

unbegotten life? Why, also, should it participate of the pain which

leads to corruption and dissolves the harmony of the body, since it is

beyond all body, and the nature which is divided about body, and is

entirely separate from the harmony which descends from the soul into the

body? But neither is it in want of the passions which precede sensation:

for neither is it detained in body, nor inclosed by it, so as to require

corporeal organs, in order to apprehend certain other bodies which are

external to these organs. And, in short, being impartible, and abiding

in one and the same form, and also being essentially incorporeal, and

having no communication with a generated and passive body, it cannot

suffer any thing either according to division, or according to a change

in quality, nor can have any thing which is allied to any kind of

mutation or passion.

But neither does the [rational] soul, when it accedes to body, either

itself suffer, or the reasons which it imparts to the body. For these

_reasons_ are _forms_, and being simple and uniform, they receive no

perturbation in themselves, and no departure from their proper mode of

subsistence. That which remains, therefore [or the participant of the

rational soul], becomes the cause of suffering to the composite. Cause,

however, is not the same with its effect. Hence, as soul is the first

origin of generable and corruptible composite animals, but is itself by

itself ingenerable and incorruptible; thus, also, though the

participants of the soul suffer, and do not wholly [_i. e._ truly]

possess life and existence, but are complicated with the indefiniteness

and diversity of matter, yet the soul is itself by itself immutable, as

being essentially more excellent than that which suffers, and not as

possessing impassivity, in a certain deliberate choice, which verges

both to the impassive and the passive, nor as receiving an adscitious

immutability in the participation of habit or power.

Since, therefore, we have demonstrated that it is impossible for even

the last genus of the more excellent order of beings, _viz._ the soul,

to participate of suffering, how can it be proper to adapt this

participation to dæmons and heroes, who are perpetual, and the

attendants of the Gods, and who always invariably preserve the same

divine order, and never desert it? For we know this indeed, that passion

is something disorderly, confused, and unstable, never having any proper

authority of its own, but being devoted to that by which it is detained,

and to which it is subservient for the purposes of generation. This,

therefore, rather pertains to some other genus, than to that which

always exists, and is suspended from the Gods, and which, in conjunction

with them, observes the same order, and accomplishes the same period.

Hence dæmons are impassive, and all the more excellent genera, which

follow them [and the Gods].

CHAP. XI.

“_How therefore_,” you ask, “_are many things performed to them in

sacred operations, as if they were passive?_” I reply, that this is

asserted through an ignorance of sacerdotal mysticism. For of the things

which are perpetually effected in sacred rites, some have a certain

arcane cause, and which is more excellent than reason; others are

consecrated from eternity to the superior genera, as symbols; others

preserve a certain other image, just as nature, which is effective of

invisible reasons, expresses certain visible formations; others are

adduced for the sake of honour, or have for their end some kind of

similitude, or familiarity and alliance; and some procure what is useful

to us, or in a certain respect purify and liberate our human passions,

or avert some other of those dire circumstances which happen to us. It

must not, however, be on this account granted, that a certain portion of

sacred institutions is employed in the service of Gods or dæmons, as if

they were passive. For an essence which is by itself perpetual and

incorporeal, is not naturally adapted to receive a certain mutation from

bodies.

Nor, even though we should admit that this essence is especially in want

of such things, will it require the aid of men to a sacred worship of

this kind; since it is itself filled from itself, and from the nature of

the world, and the perfection which is in generation; and, if it be

lawful so to speak, prior to being in want it receives the

self-sufficient, through the never failing wholeness of the world and

its own proper plenitude, and because all the more excellent genera are

full of appropriate good. Let this, therefore, be a lenitive for us in

common, concerning the worship of the undefiled genera, as being

appropriately coadapted to the beings that are more excellent than we,

and because pure things are introduced to pure, and impassive things to

impassive, natures.

But directing our attention to particulars, we say that the erection of

the _phalli_ is a certain sign of prolific power, which, through this,

is called forth to the generative energy of the world. On which account,

also, many phalli are consecrated in the spring, because then the whole

world receives from the Gods the power which is productive of all

generation. But I am of opinion, that the obscene language which then

takes place, affords an indication of the privation of good about

matter, and of the deformity which is in material subjects, prior to

their being adorned. For these being indigent of ornament, by so much

the more aspire after it, as they in a greater degree despise their own

deformity. Again therefore, they pursue the causes of forms, and of what

is beautiful and good, recognizing baseness from base language. And

thus, indeed, the thing itself, _viz._ turpitude, is averted, but the

knowledge of it is rendered manifest through words, and those that

employ them transfer their desire to that which is contrary to baseness.

Another reason, also, of these things may be assigned. The powers of the

human passions that are in us, when they are entirely restrained, become

more vehement; but when they are called forth into energy, gradually and

commensurately, they rejoice in being moderately[30] gratified, are

satisfied; and from hence, becoming purified, they are rendered

tractable, and are vanquished without violence. On this account, in

comedy and tragedy, by surveying the passions of others, we stop our own

passions, cause them to be more moderate, and are purified from them. In

sacred ceremonies, likewise, by certain spectacles and auditions of

things base, we become liberated from the injury which happens from the

works effected by them.[31] Things of this kind, therefore, are

introduced for the sake of our soul, and of the diminution of the evils

which adhere to it through generation, and of a solution and liberation

from its bonds. On this account, also, they are very properly called by

Heraclitus _remedies_, as healing things of a dreadful nature, and

saving souls from the calamities with which the realms of generation are

replete.

CHAP. XII.

You also say, “_that invocations are directed to the Gods as to beings

that are passive, so that not only dæmons are passive, but likewise the

Gods_.” This, however, is not the case. For the illumination which takes

place through invocations, is spontaneously visible and self-perfect; is

very remote from all downward attraction; proceeds into visibility

through divine energy and perfection, and as much surpasses our

voluntary motion as the divine will of _the good_ transcends a

deliberately chosen life. Through this will, therefore, the Gods, being

benevolent and propitious, impart their light to theurgists in unenvying

abundance, calling upwards their souls to themselves, procuring them a

union with themselves, and accustoming them, while they are yet in body,

to be separated from bodies, and to be led round to their eternal and

intelligible principle.

But it is evident, from the effects themselves, that what we now say is

the salvation of the soul. For the soul in contemplating blessed

spectacles, acquires another life, energizes according to another

energy, and is then rightly considered as no longer ranking in the order

of man. Frequently, likewise, abandoning her own life, she exchanges it

for the most blessed energy of the Gods. If, therefore, the ascent

through invocations imparts to the priests purification from passions, a

liberation from generation, and a union with a divine principle, how is

it possible to connect with it any thing of passion? For an invocation

of this kind does not draw down the impassive and pure Gods, to that

which is passive and impure; but, on the contrary, it renders us, who

have become passive through generation, pure and immutable.

Neither do the invocations which implore the Gods to _incline_ to us,

conjoin the priests to them through passion; but procure for them the

communion of an indissoluble connexion, through the friendship which

binds all things together. Hence, it does not, as the name seems to

imply, incline the intellect of the Gods to men; but, according to the

decision of truth, renders the will of man adapted to the participation

of the Gods, elevates it to them, and coharmonizes the former with the

latter, through the most appropriate persuasion. On this account also,

such names of the Gods as are adapted to sacred concerns, and other

divine symbols, are able, as they are of an anagogic or elevating

nature, to connect invocations with the Gods themselves.

CHAP. XIII.

Moreover, “_the pacifications of anger_” will become manifest, if we

understand what the anger of the Gods is.[32] This, therefore, is not,

as it appears to be to some, a certain ancient and inveterate rage, but

an abandonment of the beneficent care of the Gods, from which we turn

ourselves away, withdrawing, as it were, from meridian light, hiding

ourselves in darkness, and depriving ourselves of the beneficent gift of

the Gods. Hence _pacification_ is able to convert us to the

participation of divinity and the providential care of the Gods, from

which we were divulsed, and to bind together, commensurately,

participants and the participated natures. So far, therefore, is

pacification from accomplishing its work through passion, that it

separates us from the passive and tumultuous abandonment of the Gods.

But “_the oblation of victims_,” when some evil is present in places

about the earth, procures a remedy for the evil, and secures us from the

incursion of any mutation or passion. Hence, whether a thing of this

kind is effected through Gods or dæmons, it invokes these as the

expellers of evil, and [our true] saviours, and through them

exterminates all the injury which may accede from the calamities. Those

powers, also, who avert genesiurgic[33] and physical punishments, do not

expel them through passions. And if some one should think that the

suppression of the guardian care of the Gods, introduces a certain

spontaneous injury, in this case the persuasion arising from

pacification recalls the benevolence of the more excellent genera, to a

providential attention to our affairs, and takes away our privation of

good, being itself perfectly pure and immutable.

CHAP. XIV.

Farther still, with respect to “_what are called the necessities of the

Gods_,” the whole truth of this is, that necessities are peculiar to,

and subsist in such a way as accords with the nature of, the Gods.[34]

Hence they do not subsist as if they were externally derived, or were

the effect of violence, but after such a manner as _the good_ ought to

be from necessity, so the Gods entirely exist, and are by no means

otherwise disposed. This necessity, therefore, is mingled with

beneficent will, and is the friend of love; through an order adapted to

the Gods, possesses identity and immutability; and because it is

contained in one boundary, abides in this, and never departs from it.

Hence, through all these particulars, the contrary to what you infer

takes place. For it happens that a divine nature is incapable of being

allured, is impassive and uncompelled, if there are in reality such

powers in theurgy, as we have demonstrated there are.

CHAP. XV.

After this, you pass on to another division into contraries, _viz._ the

division of Gods with reference to dæmons. For you say, “_that the Gods

are pure intellects_;” but you propose this opinion as an hypothesis, or

you narrate it as a dogma adopted by certain persons. And you infer,

“_that dæmons are psychical essences participating of intellect_.”

Neither, therefore, am I ignorant that this is the opinion of many

philosophers; but to you, I do not think it is proper to conceal what

appears to me to be the truth. For all such opinions are full of

confusion; since they wander from dæmons to souls, which also

participate of intellect; and from the Gods to an immaterial intellect

in energy, which the Gods entirely excel by a priority of nature. Why,

therefore, is it requisite to attribute to them these peculiarities,

which are by no means appropriate? And thus much concerning this

division, for it would be superfluous to make any further mention of it.

But it is requisite that your doubts respecting this distinction should

be properly considered, as the discussion of them pertains to the

sacerdotal province.

Farther still, having said “_that pure intellects are inflexible_,

[i. e. _not to be changed or altered_] _and unmingled with sensibles_,”

you doubt, “_whether it is requisite to pray to them_.” But I think it

is necessary to pray to no others than these. For that in us which is

divine, intellectual,[35] and one, or intelligible, if you are willing

so to call it, is most clearly excited in prayer; and, when excited,

vehemently seeks that which is similar to itself, and becomes copulated

to perfection itself. But if it should appear to you to be incredible,

that an incorporeal nature can be capable of hearing sounds, and it

should be urged by you, that for this purpose the sense of hearing is

requisite, that it may apprehend what is said by us in prayer; you

willingly forget the excellency of primary causes, which consists in

both knowing and comprehending in themselves at once the whole of

things. The Gods, therefore, do not receive prayers in themselves,

through any corporeal powers or organs, but rather contain in themselves

the energies of pious invocations; and especially of such as, through

sacred ceremonies, are established in, and united to, the Gods. For

then, in reality, a divine nature is present with itself, and does not

communicate with the intellectual conceptions in prayer, as different

from its own.

“_Supplications, however_,” you say, “_are too foreign to the purity of

intellect to be offered to the Gods_.” But this is by no means the case.

For on this very account, because we fall short of the Gods in power,

purity, and every thing else, we shall act in the most opportune manner,

by invoking them with the most vehement supplications. For the

consciousness of our own nothingness, when we compare ourselves, with

the Gods, causes us to betake ourselves spontaneously to suppliant

prayer. But from supplication, we are in a short time led to the object

of supplication, acquire its similitude from intimate converse, and

gradually obtain divine perfection, instead of our own imbecility and

imperfection.

If, indeed, it is considered that sacred prayers are sent to men from

the Gods themselves, that they are certain symbols of the divinities,

and that they are only known to the Gods, with whom, in a certain

respect, they possess the same power,—how can it any longer be justly

apprehended, that a supplication of this kind is sensible, and not

divine and intellectual? Or what passion can accede to a thing of this

kind, the purity of which the most worthy human manners cannot easily

equal?

You say, however, “_that the things which are offered in supplications

are offered as to sensitive and psychical natures_.” And, indeed, if the

offerings consisted of corporeal and composite powers alone, or of such

things as are merely subservient to corporeal organs, your assertion

would be true. But as the offerings participate of incorporeal forms, of

certain reasons, and more simple measures, the aptitude of them is to be

surveyed according to this alone. And if a certain alliance, or

similitude, is present, which is either proximate or remote, it is

sufficient to effect the contact of which we are now speaking. _For

there is not any thing which in the smallest degree is adapted to the

Gods, to which the Gods are not immediately present, and with which they

are not conjoined._ The connexion, therefore, of supplications with the

Gods, is not as with sensitive or psychical natures, but as with divine

forms, and with the Gods themselves [as Gods, _i. e._ as superessential

hyparxes]. So that we have sufficiently spoken in opposition to this

division.

CHAP. XVI.

The difference which separates “_Gods from dæmons by the corporeal and

incorporeal_,” is the next thing that follows in what you have written;

this being much more common than the former difference, and yet it is so

far from expressing the peculiarities of their essence, that it does not

afford a conjectural knowledge of them, nor of any accidents which

pertain to them. For neither is it possible from these things to

apprehend whether they are animals or not, and whether they are deprived

of life, or are not at all in want of it. Farther still, neither is it

easy to conjecture how these names are predicated, whether in common, or

of many different things. For if in common, it is absurd that a line and

time, God and dæmons, fire and water, should be under the same

incorporeal genus. But if of many things, what reason is there when you

speak of the incorporeal, that you should rather manifest by it Gods

than points; or when you speak of the corporeal, that you should not be

thought to speak of the earth rather than of dæmons? For neither is this

very thing defined, whether Gods and dæmons have bodies, or are carried

in bodies, as in a vehicle, or use them, or comprehend them, or are

alone the same[36] with body. But, perhaps, it is not proper to examine

this distinction very minutely. For you do not propose it as your own

decision, but you exhibit it as the opinion of others.

CHAP. XVII.

We will exchange, therefore, this division for the doubt which may be

adduced by you against the present opinion. “_For_,” it may be said by

you, “_how, conformably to what we assert, can the sun and moon, and the

visible natures in the heavens, be Gods, if the Gods are alone

incorporeal?_” To this we reply, that the celestial divinities are not

comprehended by bodies, but contain bodies in their divine lives and

energies; that they are not themselves converted to body, but they have

a body which is converted to its divine cause; and that body does not

impede their intellectual and incorporeal perfection, nor occasion them

any molestation by its intervention. Hence it does not require an

abundant attention, but follows the divinities spontaneously, and after

a certain manner, self-motively, not being in want of manual direction;

but, through an anagogic tendency, being itself uniformly coelevated by

itself, to _the one_ of the Gods.

It may also, if requisite, be said that a celestial body is most allied

to the incorporeal essence of the Gods. For as the latter is one, so the

former is simple; as the latter is impartible, so the former is

indivisible;[37] and as that is immutable, so this is unchanged in

quality. If, likewise, it is admitted that the energies of the Gods are

uniform, a celestial body also, has one circulation. To which may be

added, that it imitates the sameness of the Gods, by a perpetual motion,

which is invariably the same, and which subsists according to one reason

and one order. It also imitates a divine life, by the life which is

connascent with etherial bodies. Hence, this celestial body does not

consist of things contrary and different, as is the case with our body;

nor does the soul of the celestial Gods coalesce with the body into one

animal from two things; but the celestial animals of the Gods are

entirely similar and counited, and are throughout wholes, uniform, and

incomposite. For things of a more excellent nature are always

transcendent in them, after the same manner; and things of an inferior

nature are suspended from the dominion of such as are prior, yet so as

never to draw down this dominion to themselves. But all these are

congregated into one coarrangement and perfection; and, after a certain

manner, all things in the celestial Gods are incorporeal, and wholly

Gods; because the divine form which is in them predominates, and inserts

every where throughout one total essence. Thus, therefore, the visible

celestials are all of them Gods, and after a certain manner incorporeal.

CHAP. XVIII.

Your next inquiry doubts, “_how some of the Gods are beneficent, but

others malefic_.” This opinion, therefore, is assumed from the

predictors of nativities. It is, however, entirely remote from the

truth. For all the Gods are good, and invariably the causes of good; and

all of them are uniformly convolved to one good, according to the

beautiful and good alone. The bodies, likewise, which are subject to

them possess immense powers; some of which are firmly established in the

divine bodies themselves, but others proceed from them into the nature

of the world, and into the world itself, descending in an orderly manner

through the whole of generation, and extending without impediment as far

as to things which have a partial subsistence.

With respect to the powers, therefore, which remain in the heavens in

the divine bodies themselves, there can be no doubt that all of them are

similar. Hence, it remains that we should discuss those powers which are

thence transmitted to us, and are mingled with generation. These,

therefore, descend with invariable sameness for the salvation of the

universe, and connectedly contain the whole of generation after the same

manner. They are likewise impassive and immutable, though they proceed

into that which is mutable and passive. For generation being multiform,

and consisting of different things, receives _the one_ of the Gods, and

that in them which is without difference, with hostility and

partibility, conformably to its own contrariety and division. It also

receives that which is impassive, passively; and, in short, participates

of them according to its own proper nature, and not according to their

power. As, therefore, that which is generated [or has a subsistence in

becoming to be,] participates of being generatively, and body

participates of the incorporeal, corporeally; thus, also, the physical

and material substances which are in generation, participate of the

immaterial and etherial bodies, which are above nature and generation,

in a confused and disorderly manner. Hence they are absurd who attribute

colour, figure, and contact to intelligible forms, because the

participants of them are things of this kind; as likewise are those who

ascribe depravity to the celestial bodies, because their participants

sometimes produce evils. For the participation from the first could not

be a thing of this kind, unless the recipient had some mutation. But if

that which is participated is received as in another and different

thing, this other thing in terrene natures is evil and disorderly. The

participation, therefore, becomes the cause of the abundant difference

in secondary natures, and also the commixture of material substances

with immaterial effluxions; and besides these, another cause is this,

that what is imparted in one way, is received in another by terrestrial

substances. Thus, for instance, the efflux of Saturn is constipative,

but that of Mars is motive; but the passive genesiurgic receptacle in

material substances receives the former according to congelation and

refrigeration, but the latter according to an inflammation which

transcends mediocrity. Do not, therefore, the corruption and privation

of symmetry arise from an aberration which is effective of difference,

and which is material and passive? Hence the imbecility of material and

terrene places, not being able to receive the genuine power and most

pure life of the etherial natures, transfers its own passion to first

causes. Just as if some one having a diseased body, and not being able

to bear the vivific heat of the sun, should falsely dare to say, in

consequence of looking to his own maladies, that the sun is not useful

to health or life.

A certain thing of this kind also may take place in the harmony and

crasis of the universe: for the same things may be the salvation of the

whole, through the perfection of the things inherent and the recipients;

but may be noxious to the parts, through their partible privation of

symmetry. In the motion, therefore, of the universe, all the

circulations preserve the whole world invariably the same; but some one

of the parts is frequently injured by another part, which we see is

sometimes the case in a dance.

Again, therefore, corruptibility and mutability are passions connascent

with partial natures. But it is not proper to ascribe these to wholes

and first causes, either as if they existed in them, or as if they

proceeded to terrestrial substances from them. Hence, through these

things it is demonstrated, that neither the celestial Gods, nor their

gifts, are effective of evil.

CHAP. XIX.

In the next place, therefore, we shall answer your question, “_What it

is which conjoins the Gods that have a body in the heavens with the

incorporeal Gods._” What this is, therefore, is evident from what has

been before said. For if these Gods, as incorporeal, intelligible, and

united, ride in the celestial spheres, they have their principles in the

intelligible world, and intellectually perceiving the divine forms of

themselves, they govern all heaven according to one infinite energy. And

if they are present with the heavens in a separate manner, and lead the

perpetual circulations of them by their will alone, they are themselves

unmingled with a sensible nature, and exist together with the

intelligible Gods.

It will be better, however, to answer you more particularly, as follows:

I say, therefore, that the visible statues of the Gods originate from

divine intelligible paradigms, and are generated about them. But being

thus generated, they are entirely established in them, and being also

extended to,[38] they possess an image which derives its completion from

them. These images likewise fabricate another order; sublunary natures

are in continuity with them, according to one union; and the divine

intellectual forms, which are present with the visible bodies of the

Gods, exist prior to them in a separate manner. But the unmingled and

supercelestial intelligible paradigms of them, abide by themselves in

unity, and are at once all things, according to the eternal

transcendency of themselves.

There is, therefore, one common indivisible bond of them according to

intellectual energies; and there is also this bond according to the

common participations of forms, since there is nothing which intercepts

these, nor any thing which comes between them. For indeed, an immaterial

and incorporeal essence itself, being neither separated by places, nor

by subjects, nor defined by the divisible circumscriptions of parts,

immediately concurs, and is connascent with sameness. The progression

also, from, and the regression of all things to, _the one_, and the

entire domination of _the one_, congregates the communion of the mundane

Gods with the Gods that preexist in the intelligible world.

Farther still, the intellectual conversion of secondary to primary

natures, and the gift of the same essence and power imparted by the

primary to the secondary Gods, connects the synod of them in

indissoluble union. For in things of different essences, such as soul

and body, and also in those of a dissimilar species, such as material

forms, and those which are in any other way separated from each other,

the connascent adventitious union is derived from supernal causes, and

is lost in certain definite periods of time. But by how much the higher

we ascend, and elevate ourselves to the sameness both in form and

essence, of first natures, and proceed from parts to wholes, by so much

the more shall we discover the union which has an eternal existence, and

survey the essence, which has a precedaneous and more principal

subsistence, and possesses about, and in itself, difference and

multitude.[39]

Since, however, the order of all the Gods is profoundly united, and the

first and second genera of them, and all the multitude which is

spontaneously produced about them, are consubsistent in unity, and also

every thing which is in them is one,—hence the beginning, middles, and

ends in them are consubsistent according to _the one itself_; so that in

these, it is not proper to inquire, whence _the one_ accedes to all of

them. For the very existence in them, whatever it may be, is _this

one_[40] of their nature. And secondary genera, indeed, remain with

invariable sameness in _the one_ of such as are primary; but the primary

impart from themselves union to the secondary genera, and all of them

possess in each other the communion of an indissoluble connexion.

From this cause, therefore, the perfectly incorporeal Gods are united to

the sensible Gods that have bodies. For the visible Gods also are

external to bodies, and on this account are in the intelligible world;

and the intelligible Gods, through their infinite union, comprehend in

themselves the visible Gods; and both are established according to a

common union and one energy. In a similar manner, also, this is the

illustrious prerogative of the cause and orderly distribution of the

Gods, on which account the same union of all the divinities extends from

on high, as far as to the end of the divine order. But if this deserves

to be doubted, the contrary would be wonderful, _viz._ that there should

not be this union of the visible and intelligible Gods. And thus much

concerning the contact with, and establishment of, the sensible in the

intelligible Gods.

CHAP. XX.

After this, you again resume the same inquiries, of which what has been

already said may be considered as a sufficient solution. Since, however,

it is necessary, according to the proverb, frequently to speak of and

consider things that are beautiful, neither shall we pass over these

particulars, as if they had been now sufficiently answered, but by

repeatedly discussing them we may, perhaps, obtain from all of them a

certain perfect and great scientific good. For you doubt “_what it is

which distinguishes dæmons from the visible and invisible Gods, since

the visible are conjoined with the invisible divinities_.” But I,

beginning from this as the first thing, shall demonstrate what it is in

which they differ. For, because the visible are united to the

intelligible Gods, and have the same idea with them, but dæmons are far

distant from them, according to essence, and scarcely adumbrate them

through similitude, on this account they are separated from the visible

Gods; and they differ from the invisible Gods, according to the

difference itself of the invisible.[41] For dæmons, indeed, are

invisible, and by no means to be apprehended by sense; but the Gods

transcend rational knowledge and material intelligence. And, because

they are unknown and unapparent to these, they are thus denominated; but

are said to be invisible in a way very different from that in which this

is asserted of dæmons. What, therefore, have the invisible Gods, so far

as they are invisible, more excellent than the visible Gods? Nothing.

For that which is divine, wherever it may be, and whatever allotment it

may possess, has the same power and dominion over all the natures that

are arranged under it. Moreover, though the invisible Gods should become

visible, yet they rule over invisible dæmons. For neither the place,

which is the recipient of divinity, nor a certain part of the world,

produces any mutation in the dominion of the Gods. But the whole essence

of the Gods remains everywhere the same, indivisible and immutable,

which all subordinate beings similarly venerate, in the order assigned

them by nature.

By the assistance also of this reasoning, we may discover another

difference between Gods and dæmons. For both the visible and invisible

Gods, indeed, comprehend in themselves the whole government of whatever

is contained in all heaven and the world, and in the total invisible

powers in the universe. But those powers that are allotted a dæmoniacal

prefecture, distributing certain divisible portions of the world, govern

these, and have themselves a partible form of essence and power. They

are, likewise, in a certain respect, connascent with, and inseparable

from, the subjects of their government. But the Gods, though they may

ride in bodies, are entirely separated from them. The providential

attention, therefore, to bodies, produces no diminution in those to whom

body is subservient: for it is connectedly contained by a more excellent

nature, is converted to it, and is not the cause of any impediment to

it. But the adhering to a genesiurgic nature, and the being divided

about it, necessarily give to dæmons a more subordinate condition. In

short, that which is divine is of a ruling nature, and presides over the

different orders of beings; but that which is dæmoniacal is of a

ministrant nature, and receives whatever the Gods may announce, promptly

employing manual operation, as it were, in things which the Gods

intellectually perceive, wish, and command. The Gods, therefore, are

liberated from the powers which verge to generation; but dæmons are not

entirely purified from these. And thus much concerning this distinction;

and we trust, that from the former and the present exposition, the

difference between Gods and dæmons will become more known.

CHAP. XXI.

The division, however, of _the passive from the impassive_, which you

adopt, may perhaps be rejected by some one, as not adapted to either of

the more excellent genera, through the causes which we have before

enumerated; and it also deserves to be subverted, because it is inferred

that these genera are passive, from what is performed in religious

ceremonies. For what sacred institution, what religious cultivation,

which is conformable to sacerdotal laws, is effected through passion, or

produces a certain completion of passions? Is not each of these

legislatively ordained from the first, conformably to the sacred laws of

the Gods, and intellectually? Each also imitates both the intelligible

and celestial order of the Gods; and contains the eternal measures of

beings, and those admirable signatures which are sent hither from the

Demiurgus and father of wholes, by which things of an ineffable nature

are unfolded into light through arcane symbols, things formless are

vanquished by forms, things more excellent than every image are

expressed through images, and all things are accomplished through a

divine cause alone, which is in so great a degree separated from

passions, that reason is not able to come into contact with it.

This, therefore, is nearly the cause of our aberration to a multitude of

conceptions. For men being in reality unable to apprehend the reasons of

sacred institutions, but conceiving that they are able, are wholly

hurried away by their own human passions, and form a conjecture of

divine concerns from things pertaining to themselves. In so doing,

however, they err in a twofold respect; because they fall from divine

natures; and because, being frustrated of these, they draw them down to

human passions. But it is requisite not to apprehend after the same

manner, things which are performed both to Gods and men, such as

genuflexions, adorations, gifts, and first fruits, but to establish the

one apart from the other, conformably to the difference between things

more and things less honourable; and to reverence the former, indeed, as

divine, but to despise the latter as human, and as performed to men. It

is proper, likewise, to consider, that the latter produce passions, both

in the performer and those to whom they are performed; for they are

human and corporeal-formed; but to honour the energy of the former in a

very high degree, as being performed through immutable admiration, and a

venerable condition of mind, because they are referred to the Gods.