CHAPTER III

THE REVOLT OF THE COMMON MAN

Practically all the farmers in the South, like those of the West, were

chronically in debt, and after 1870 the general tendency of the prices

of agricultural products was downward. In spite of largely increased

acreage--partly, to be sure, because of it--the total returns from the

larger crops were hardly so great as had been received from a much

smaller cultivated area. The Southern farmer began to feel helpless and

hopeless. Though usually suspicious of every movement coming from the

North, he turned readily to the organization of the Patrons of

Husbandry, better known as the Grange. In fact, the hopeless apathy of

the Southern farmer observed by Oliver Hudson Kelley, an agent of the

Bureau of Agriculture, is said to have determined him to found the

order. In spite of the turmoil of Reconstruction, the organization

appeared in South Carolina and Mississippi in 1871. Tennessee.

Missouri, and Kentucky had already been invaded. During 1872 and 1873,

the order spread rapidly in all the States which may be called Southern.

The highest number reached was in the latter part of 1875 when more than

6400 local granges were reported in the States which had seceded; and in

Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware, West Virginia, and Missouri there were

nearly 4000 more. The total membership in the seceding States was more

than 210,000 and including the border States, over 355,000. Since

negroes were not admitted, the proportion of the total white

agricultural population in the Grange was perhaps as high in the South

as in any other part of the Union. In the years that followed, the order

underwent the same disintegration in the South as elsewhere.

As a class the Southern Grangers did not take an active part in

politics. The overshadowing question of the position of their States in

the Union and the desire to preserve white supremacy prevented any great

independent movement. In a few instances, men ran for Congress as

Independents or as Greenbackers, and in some cases they were elected;

but the Southern farmers were not yet ready to break away from the

organization which had delivered them from negro rule. There was not at

that time in the South the same opposition to railroads that prevailed

in the West. The need of railroads was felt so keenly that the practice

of baiting them had not become popular. Some railroad legislation was

passed, largely through Granger influence, but it was not yet radical.

Nevertheless the Granger movement was by no means without permanent

influence. It helped to develop class consciousness; it demonstrated

that the Western and the Southern farmer had some interests in common;

and it also implanted in people's minds the idea that legislation of an

economic character was desirable. Heretofore the Southern farmer, so far

as he had thought at all about the relation of the State to industry,

had been a believer in _laissez faire_. Now he began to consider whether

legislation might not be the remedy for poverty. Out of this serious

attention to the needs of the farmer other organizations were to arise

and to build upon the foundations laid by the Grange.

About 1875 there appeared in Texas and other States local organizations

of farmers, known as Farmers' Alliances, and in 1879 a Grand State

Alliance was formed in Texas. The purposes were similar to those set

forth by the Grange. In Arkansas appeared the Agricultural Wheel and

the Brothers of Freedom, which were soon consolidated. The Farmers'

Union of Louisiana and the Alliance of Texas were also united under the

name of the National Farmers' Alliance and Coöperative Union of America.

This was soon united with the Arkansas Wheel, which had crossed state

lines.

A session of the National Alliance was held at St. Louis in 1889 with

delegates present from every Southern State, except West Virginia, and

from some of the Middle Western States. The National Assembly of the

Knights of Labor was also held in St. Louis at this time, and a joint

declaration of beliefs was put forth. This platform called for the issue

of more paper money, abolition of national banks, free coinage of

silver, legislation to prevent trusts and corners, tariff reform,

government ownership of railroads, and restriction of public lands to

actual settlers.

The next year, the annual convention of the Alliance was held at Ocala,

Florida, and the Ocala platform was published. This meeting recommended

the so-called sub-treasury plan by which the Federal Government was to

construct warehouses for agricultural products. In these the farmer

might deposit his non-perishable agricultural products, and receive 80

per cent of their market value in greenbacks. Surely the Southern farmer

had shaken off much of his traditional conservatism in approving such a

demand as this! The explanation is not far to seek.

The high price of cotton in the years immediately following the War was

the economic salvation of the South. Whatever may have been the

difficulties in its production, the returns repaid the outlay and more.

The quantity was less than the world demanded. Not until 1870-71 did the

production approach that of the crops before the War. Then, with the

increase in production and general financial stringency came a sharp

decrease in price. Between 1880 and 1890 the price was not much above

the cost of production, and after 1890 the price fell still lower. When

middling cotton brought less than seven cents a pound in New York, the

small producer got little more than five cents for his bale or two. The

price of wheat and corn was correspondingly low, if the farmer had a

surplus to sell at harvest time. If he bought Western corn or flour in

the spring on credit, the price he paid included shrinkage, storage,

freight, and the exorbitant profit of the merchant. The low price

received by the Western producer had been much increased before the

cereals reached the Southern consumer. The Southern farmer was

consequently becoming desperate and was threatening revolt against the

established order.

While Southern delegates joined the Western Alliance in the organization

of the People's party in 1891 and 1892, the majority of the members in

the South chose an easier way of attaining their object: they entered

the Democratic primaries and conventions and captured them. In State

after State, men in sympathy with the farmers were chosen to office,

often over old leaders who had been supposed to have life tenure of

their positions. In some cases these leaders retained their offices, if

not their influence, by subscribing to the demands of the Alliance.

Perhaps some could do this without reservation; others, Senators

particularly, justified themselves on the theory that a legislature had

the right to speak for the State and instruct those chosen to represent

it.

The feeling of the farmer that he was being oppressed threatened to

develop into an obsession. His hatred of "money-power," "trusts,"

"corners," and the "hirelings of Wall Street" found expression in his

opposition to the local lawyers and merchants, and, in fact, to the

residents of the towns in general. The idea began to grow up that any

one living in a town was necessarily an enemy to the farmer. The

prevalent agricultural point of view came to be that only the farmer was

a wealth producer, and that all others were parasites who sat in the

shade while he worked in the sun and who lived upon the products of his

labor. This bitterness the farmer extended to the old political leaders

whom he had regarded with veneration in the past. These old Confederate

soldiers, he believed, had allowed him to be robbed.

The state Democratic Convention of Georgia in 1890 pledged all

candidates for office to support the demands of the Farmers' Alliance,

including the sub-treasury "or some better system." Senator John B.

Gordon, however, refused to pledge himself and was reëlected

nevertheless. The leader of the Alliance was nominated and elected

governor. In Alabama, Reuben F. Kolb, the Commissioner of Agriculture,

almost obtained the Democratic nomination for governor. Two years later,

he again entered the primary and, declaring that he had been cheated out

of the nomination, ran independently as the candidate of the

Jeffersonian Democracy. On the face of the returns, the regular

candidate was elected, but Kolb pointed out the fact that the

Democratic majorities came from the black counties, while the white

counties had given a majority for him. Again in 1894 Kolb entered the

race for governor and again declared that he had been counted out, as he

had not only the Jeffersonian Democracy behind him but also the

endorsement of the Republicans and the Populists.

Undoubtedly the controlling influence in Democratic councils in some of

the Southern States had been exercised by a very small element in the

population. A few men, almost a "Family Compact" either held the

important offices themselves, or decided who should hold them, and fixed

the party policy so far as it had a policy other than the maintenance of

white supremacy. The governments were generally honest, economical, and

cheap. The leaders, partly because they themselves believed in limiting

the function of government and partly because they believed that the

voters would oppose any extension, had prevented any constructive

legislation. Events showed that they had misunderstood their people.

When the revolt came, the farmer legislators showed themselves willing

to vote money liberally for education and for other purposes which were

once considered outside the sphere of government.

South Carolina furnished the most striking example of this revolt. In

that State the families which had governed before the War continued the

direction of affairs. By a rather unusual compromise, the large western

population of the State had been balanced against the greater wealth of

the east. Consequently there was overrepresentation of the east after

the negro had been deprived of the ballot. It was charged--and with some

show of truth--that a small group of men clustering around Charleston

exercised an entirely disproportionate share of influence in party

management. The farmers, with a growing class consciousness, began to

resent this injustice and found a leader ready and anxious to direct

them.

In March, 1890, the delegates of the Farmers' Association decided to

secure the nomination for governor for Benjamin R. Tillman, who had

devoted much of his time for four years to arousing the farmers. The

contest for the nomination was begun in May and, after a bitter

struggle, Tillman won easily in the convention in September. The

"straight outs," dazed and humiliated, ran an independent candidate.

Tillman and his followers accepted the challenge and the conflict took

form as a struggle between mass and class. The farmers' leader, though

not himself illiterate, obscure, or poor, raged up and down the State

frankly and brutally preaching class war. He held up Charleston as a

sink of iniquity, and he promised legislation to cleanse it. Perhaps a

majority of the whites really believed his charges and put faith in his

doctrines. If not, the fetish of party regularity drew the votes

necessary to make up the deficiency. Tillman had been regularly

nominated in a Democratic convention, and South Carolinians had been

trained to vote the party ticket. He was elected by a large majority.

At the end of Tillman's first term two years later, he was again a

candidate, and the convention which nominated him approved the Ocala

platform. Since the party machinery was in control of the Tillmanites,

the opposition adopted the name "Cleveland Democracy" and sought to undo

the revolution. The result was never doubtful. Tillman was reëlected by

an overwhelming majority, and on the expiration of his term was sent to

the United States Senate, which he shocked by his passionate utterances

as he had so often shocked his own State. The attitude of the educated

and cultivated part of the population of South Carolina toward Tillman

affords a parallel to that of Tory England toward Lloyd George twenty

years later. The parallel may be extended further. Tillman, in time,

modified some of his extreme opinions, won over many of his opponents,

and gained the respect of his colleagues just as Lloyd George has done;

and South Carolina grew to have pride in her sturdy fighter whose life

ended just as his fourth term in the Senate was almost done.

The election of Tillman as Governor and then as Senator was a real

revolution, for South Carolina had been long represented in the United

States Senate by Wade Hampton and Matthew C. Butler, both distinguished

soldiers and representatives of the old régime. Hampton, under whose

leadership the carpetbag government had been overthrown, had been a

popular idol. Both he and Butler had won the respect of their colleagues

in the Senate and had reflected credit upon their State. But such

services now availed nothing. Both they and others like them were swept

out, to be replaced by the partisans of the new order.

Nothing was omitted by the reformers to humiliate what had been the

ruling portion of the population. The liquor traffic was made a state

monopoly by the dispensary system modeled on the Gothenburg plan: no

liquor was sold to be drunk on the premises, and the amount allowed a

purchaser was limited. It was hoped the revenue thus received would

permit a considerable reduction in the tax rate. These hopes, however,

were not realized, and scandals concerning the purchasing agency kept

the State in a turmoil for years. Other legislation was more successful.

An agricultural and mechanical college for men was founded at the old

home of John C. Calhoun at Clemson. A normal and industrial college for

girls has also proved very successful. The appropriations to the state

university were reduced on the ground that it was an aristocratic

institution, but on the other hand funds for public schools were

increased.

Not all the members of the Alliance remained in the Democratic party.

Populist electors were nominated in every Southern State in 1892, except

in Louisiana, where a combined Republican and Populist ticket was named.

In no State did the new party secure a majority, but in Alabama,

Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas, the Populist vote was

large. In North Carolina, always inclined to independence, the combined

Republican and Populist vote was larger than that cast for Democratic

electors. It was obvious that Democratic supremacy was imperiled, if

the new party continued its amazing growth.

The politicians, Republican and Democratic, set out to win the

insurgents. Some shrewd political manipulators, scenting future profit

for themselves, had joined the new movement and were willing to trade.

During 1893, 1894, and 1895 the Republicans were generally successful.

In many States there was more or less cooperation in state and county

tickets, in spite of the disfavor with which the Republican party had

been regarded in the South. In North Carolina J.C. Pritchard, a regular

Republican, was elected to the United States Senate, to fill the

unexpired term of Senator Vance, but the Populist state chairman, Marion

Butler, cool, calculating, and shrewd, took the full term to succeed

Senator Ransom. The Democratic party had maintained control for twenty

years, and it was held responsible for all the ills from which the

farmer suffered. Then, too, some of the leaders of the new party felt

that they would have greater opportunities for preferment by coöperating

with a party in which the number of white voters was small.

The doctrine of free silver had been making converts among the

Democrats, however, and early in 1896 it was clear that a majority of the

Southern delegates to the national convention would favor a silver plank.

The action of the convention in nominating Bryan and Sewall is told in

another volume.[1] Bryan was also endorsed by the Populist convention, but

that convention refused to endorse Sewall and nominated Thomas E. Watson

for Vice-President. A majority of the Populist convention favored a strict

party fight, but the managers were shrewd, and the occasion manifestly

offered great opportunities for trading. In twenty-six States the electoral

tickets were divided between Democrats and Populists. Among these States

were Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, and North Carolina. But coöperation

with Republicans on local legislative and state tickets often occurred. In

North Carolina, a fusion legislature was elected, and a Republican was

chosen governor by the aid of Populist votes, though one faction of the

Populists nominated a separate ticket. The judicial and congressional

nominations were divided. The apparent inconsistency of voting for Bryan

for President and at the same time supporting Republicans who might be

expected to oppose him in Congress was accepted without flinching.

According to the bargain made two years before, when a Republican was

sent to the United States Senate for an unexpired term by the aid of the

Populist votes, Senator Pritchard was reëlected.

[Footnote 1: _The Agrarian Crusade,_ by Solon J. Buck (in _The

Chronicles of America_).]

The experience of North Carolina with fusion government was a reminder

of the Reconstruction days. The Republicans had dilated upon "local

self-government" and the Populists had swallowed the bait. The

Legislature changed the form of county government, by which the board of

county commissioners had been named by the justices of the peace, and

made the board elective. This turned over to the blacks counties in

which several of the largest towns in the State were situated. Negro

politicians were chosen to office, and lawlessness and violence

followed. In Wilmington there was an uprising of the whites, who took

possession of the city government by force. The Legislature was again

Democratic in 1898 and began to prepare an amendment which should

disfranchise a large proportion of the 125,000 negro voters of the

State. There was coöperation between the Republican and Populist

organizations again in 1900, but too many Populists had returned to

their former allegiance. The restrictive amendment, of which more will

be aid presently, was carried by an overwhelming majority at the special

election in the summer, and at the regular election in November the

Democratic ticket was chosen by an overwhelming majority.

The fusion of 1896 and the rising prices of agricultural products killed

the Populist party in the South, but the influence of the movement

remains to this day. It has had some effect in lessening political

intolerance, for those of the Populists who returned to the Democratic

party came back without apology, while others have since classed

themselves as Republicans. The Populist attitude toward public education

was on the whole friendly, and more money has since been demanded and

expended for public schools.

Perhaps the greatest effect of the Populist movement was the overthrow

of the old political organizations. In some States a few men had ruled

almost by common consent. They had exerted a great influence upon

legislation--not by use of the vulgar arts of the lobbyists, but by the

plea of party advantage or by the prophecy of party loss. They had given

their States clean government and cheap government, but nothing more. A

morbid fear of taxation, or rather of the effects of taxation upon the

people, was their greatest sin. The agrarian movement took them unawares.

They were unable to realize that between the South of 1890 and another,

older South, there was a great gap. They could not interpret the

half-coherent speech of the small farmer, who had come to feel that he had

been wronged and struck out blindly at those whom he had previously

trusted. New and unknown men appeared in Washington to take the place of

men whose character, ability, and length of service had made them

national figures. The governorship of the States went to men whose chief

qualifications seemed to be prominence in the affairs of the Alliance or

else bitter tongues.

Though the Populists, for the most part, returned to the Democratic

party, and the suffrage amendments, which will be mentioned presently,

made the possibility of Republican success extremely remote, the "old

guard" has never regained its former position. In all the Southern

States party control has been for years in the hands of the common man.

The men he chooses to office are those who understand his psychology and

can speak his language. Real primary elections were common in the South

years before they were introduced elsewhere, and the man who is the

choice of the majority in the Democratic primary wins.

Some of the men chosen to high office in the State and nation are men of

ability and high character, who recall the best traditions of Southern

statesmanship; others are parochial and mediocre; and some are blatant

demagogues who bring discredit upon their State and their section and

who cannot be restrained from "talking for Buncombe."

The election of a Democratic President in 1884 had stirred the

smoldering distrust of the South on the part of the North. The

well-known fact that the negro vote in the South did not have the

influence its numbers warranted aroused the North to demand a Federal

elections law, which was voiced by bills introduced by Senator Hoar of

Massachusetts and by Henry Cabot Lodge, then a member of the House of

Representatives. Lodge's bill, which was passed by the House in 1890,

permitted Federal officials to supervise and control congressional

elections. This so-called "Force Bill" was bitterly opposed by the

Southerners and was finally defeated in the Senate by the aid of the

votes of the silver Senators from the West, but the escape was so narrow

that it set Southerners to finding another way of suppressing the negro

vote than by force or fraud. Later the division of the white vote by the

Populist party also endangered white supremacy in the South.

In this same year (1890) Mississippi framed a new constitution, which

required as a prerequisite for voting a residence of two years in the

State and one year in the district or town. A poll tax of two

dollars--to be increased to three at the discretion of the county

commissioners--was levied on all able-bodied men between twenty-one and

sixty. This tax, and all other taxes due for the two previous years,

must be paid before the 1st of February of the election year. All these

provisions, though applying equally to all the population, greatly

lessened the negro vote. Negroes are notoriously migratory, and a large

proportion never remain two years in the same place. The poll tax could

not be collected by legal process, and to pay the tax for two years,

four dollars or more, eight months in advance of an election, seemed to

the average negro to be rank extravagance. Moreover, few politicians are

reckless enough to arrange for the payment of poll taxes in exchange for

the promised delivery of votes eight months away, when half the would-be

voters might be in another county, or even in another State. To clinch

the matter, the constitution further provided that after 1892, in

addition to the qualifications mentioned above, a person desiring to

vote must be able to read any section of the constitution, "or he shall be

able to understand the same when read to him, or give a reasonable

interpretation thereof." Even when fairly administered, this section

operated to disfranchise more negroes than whites, for fewer can read and

fewer can understand a legal instrument. But it is obvious that the

opportunities for discrimination are great: a simple section can be read to

an illiterate white, while a more difficult section, filled with

technicalities, may be read to a negro applicant; and the phrase "a

reasonable interpretation" may mean one thing in the case of a negro and

quite another where a white man is concerned. It is perhaps not

surprising that only 5123 Republican votes were reported in 1896, and

hardly more, in 1912, were cast for Taft and Roosevelt together.

South Carolina followed the lead of Mississippi a little more frankly in

1895, by adopting suffrage amendments which provided for two years'

residence in the State, one year in the county, and the payment of a

poll tax six months before the election. Up to 1898 any person who could

read any section of the constitution, or could understand and explain it

when read by the registration officer, could have his name placed upon a

permanent roll and could vote thereafter, provided he satisfied the

other requirements already mentioned. After January 1, 1898, every one

presenting himself for registration had to be able to read and write any

section of the constitution, or else must have paid taxes the preceding

year on property assessed at three hundred dollars or over. The list of

disqualifying crimes is long, including those of which negroes are most

commonly found guilty, such as larceny, false pretence, bigamy, adultery,

wife-beating, and receiving stolen goods. To insure the complexion of the

permanent roll, the registration was conducted in each county by a board of

"three discreet persons" appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice

and consent of the Senate.

It would seem that either of these constitutions would serve to reduce

the negro vote sufficiently, while allowing practically all white men to

vote. Large discretion, however, is lodged in the officers of election,

and Democratic control in these matters is safe only so long as the

white men stick together. Louisiana went a step further in 1898 and

introduced the famous "grandfather clause" into her constitution. Other

requirements were similar to those already mentioned. Two years'

residence in the State, one year in the parish, and six months in the

precinct were preliminary conditions; in addition the applicant must be

able to read and write in English or his mother tongue, or he must be the

owner of property assessed for three hundred dollars or more.

This general requirement of literacy or ownership of property was

waived, however, in case of foreigners naturalized before January 1,

1898, who had lived in the State five years, and in the case of men who

had voted in any State before 1867, or of sons or grandsons of such

persons. These could be placed upon a permanent roll to be made up

before September 1, 1898, and should have the right to vote upon

complying with the residence and poll tax requirements. Practically all

white persons of native stock either voted in some State in 1867 or were

descended from some one who had so voted. Few negroes in any State, and

none in the South, were voters in that year. It is obvious that suffrage

was open to white but barred to negro illiterates. Apparently the only

whites debarred under this clause were the illiterate and indigent sons

of foreign-born fathers.

North Carolina adopted a new suffrage article in 1900 which is much

simpler than those just described. It requires two years' residence in

the State, one in the county, and the payment of poll tax before the 1st

of May in the election year. A uniform educational qualification is laid

down, but the "permanent roll" is also included. No "male person who was

on January 1, 1867, or at any other time prior thereto, entitled to vote

under the laws of any State in the United States, wherein he then resided,

and no lineal descendant of any such person shall be denied the right to

register and vote at any election in the State by reason of his failure to

possess the educational qualifications herein prescribed: _Provided_ he

shall have registered in accordance with the terms of this section prior to

December 1, 1908." In other words, any white illiterate thirteen years old

or over when the amendment was adopted would not be deprived of his vote

because of the lack of educational qualifications. No other State had given

so long a time as this.

The "grandfather clause" here was shrewdly drawn. Free negroes voted in

North Carolina until 1835, and under the terms of the clause any negro

who could prove descent from a negro voter could not be debarred because

of illiteracy. Negroes voted in a few States in 1867, and they or their

descendants were exempt from the educational test. Of course the number

of these was negligible, and the clause accomplished precisely what it was

intended to do--that is, it disfranchised a large proportion of the negroes

and yet allowed the whites to vote. The extension of the time of

registration until 1908, eight years after the amendment was adopted and

six after it went into effect, made the disfranchisement of any

considerable number of whites impossible.

Alabama followed in 1901, combining the South Carolina and the Louisiana

plans and including the usual residence and poll tax requirements, as

well as the permanent roll. This was to be made up before December 20,

1902, and included soldiers of the United States, or of the State of

Alabama in any war, soldiers of the Confederate States, their lawful

descendants, and "men of good character who understood the duties and

obligations of citizenship under a republican form of government." After

the permanent roll has been made up, the applicant for registration must

be able to read and write and must have worked the greater part of the

twelve months next preceding, or he or his wife must own forty acres of

land or real estate or personal property assessed at not less than three

hundred dollars. A long list of disqualifying crimes was added,

including wife-beating and conviction for vagrancy. As if this were not

enough, after 1903 an applicant for registration might be required to state

where he had lived during the preceding five years, the name or names by

which known, and the names of his employers. Refusal to answer was made a

bar to registration, and wilful misstatement was regarded as perjury.

Oklahoma adopted its disfranchising amendment in 1910, without valid

reason so far as any one outside the State could see, as the proportion

of negroes was very small. An attempt was made permanently to

disfranchise the illiterate negro by the "grandfather clause," while

allowing illiterate white voters to vote forever. Other States allowed a

limited time in which to register on a permanent roll, after which all

illiterates were to be disfranchised. Oklahoma sought to keep suffrage

permanently open to illiterate whites, while closing it to illiterate

negroes. This amendment was declared unconstitutional by the United

States Supreme Court in June, 1915, on the ground that a State cannot

reëstablish conditions existing before the ratification of the Fifteenth

Amendment, even though the disfranchising amendment contained no

"express words of exclusion" but "inherently brings that result into

existence."[1] What the Court will do with other similar constitutional

amendments when they are brought before it is not so certain. All differ

somewhat, and it is possible that the Court may let the whole or a part

of some of them stand. If not, it is probable that straight educational

and property qualifications will be substituted. In fact, if the Court

disapproves the permanent roll but allows the remainder to stand,

educational and property qualifications will prevail in several States.

[Footnote 1: Guinn _vs._ United States, 238 U.S., 347.]

All these plans for disfranchisement have accomplished the desired

results up to the present time. The negro vote has been greatly reduced

and elections are decided by the votes of white men. In some States,

negroes who could easily pass the tests no longer take the trouble to go

to the polls. The number of white voters also grows smaller. Some fail

to pay the poll tax, and others stay away from the polls because, as a

rule, the result has been decided in the primary elections. Since a

Democratic nomination is practically equivalent to election, many voters

who have taken part in the primaries neglect to vote on election day.

Only in North Carolina is there evidence of the growth of a strong

Republican opposition. In 1908, Taft received over 114,000 votes, and

the Republican candidate for governor 107,000. In 1916 Hughes received

120,000 votes as against 168,000 for Wilson.

What was done with the negro when he was thus rendered politically

helpless? Was there an attempt to take from him other things than the

ballot? The answer must be in the affirmative. Men advocated segregation

in common carriers, in public places, and even in places of residences.

An attempt to confine appropriations for negro schools to the amount of

taxes directly paid by the negroes has been made; men have sought office

on a platform of practical serfdom for the negro. But although some few

have achieved temporary successes--at least they have been

elected--their programs have not been carried out. The "Jim Crow" car is

common and the negro schools do not get appropriations equal to those of

the whites, but little else has been done. In fact, evidences of a

reaction in favor of the negro soon became apparent. The late Governor

Charles B. Aycock of North Carolina at the beginning of this century won

his triumphs on a platform of justice for the negro.

The question of the liquor traffic began to engage the attention of the

Southern people very soon after the end of Reconstruction. The great

problem was the sale of liquor in the unpoliced country districts, and

especially to negroes. By special legislative acts forbidding the sale

of liquor within a given number of miles of a church or a school a large

part of the South was made dry. Local option acts continued the

restrictive work until the sale of liquor outside of the larger

incorporated towns became rare. In some States, acts applying to the

whole State forbade the sale outside of towns. By concentrating their

efforts upon the towns, the anti-saloon forces made a large number of

them dry also, but there was so much illicit sale that employers often

found that Monday was a wasted day.

State wide prohibition began in 1907 with Oklahoma and Georgia, and

State after State followed until, in 1914, ten States were wholly dry,

and in large areas of the other Southern States the sale of intoxicants

was forbidden through local option. Southern members of Congress urged

the submission of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution,

forbidding manufacture or sale of intoxicants in the nation. Every

Southern State promptly ratified the Amendment when it was submitted by

Congress.

Unfortunately many negroes when deprived of alcohol began to use drugs,

such as cocaine, and the effect morally and physically was worse than that

of liquor. The "coke fiend" became a familiar sight in the police courts of

Southern cities, and the underground traffic in the drug is still a

serious problem. The new Federal law has helped to control the evil, but

both cocaine and alcohol are still sold to negroes, sometimes by pedlars of

their own race, sometimes by unscrupulous white men. The consumption of

both is less, however, than before the restrictive legislation. The South

has traveled far from its old opposition to sumptuary laws. Like State

Rights, this principle is only invoked when convenient. Starting largely as

a movement to keep whiskey from the negro and, to a somewhat less extent,

from the white laborer, prohibition has become popular. On the whole it

has worked well in the South though "moonshining" is undoubtedly

increasing. The enormous price eagerly paid for whiskey in the

"bone-dry" States has led to a revival of the illicit distillery, which

had been almost stamped out.

The New South: A Chronicle of Social and Industrial Evolution · 第 3 / 9 章