34. (2, 3, 4) Everything, if it be somewhere, is there in some manner
that conforms to its nature. For a body that is composed of matter,
and possesses volume, to be somewhere, means that it is located in
some place. On the contrary, the intelligible world, and in general
the existence that is immaterial, and incorporeal in itself, does not
occupy any place, so that the ubiquity of the incorporeal is not a
local presence. "It does not have one part here, and another there;"
for, if so, it would not be outside of all place, nor be without
extension; "wherever it is, it is entire; it is not present here
and absent there;" for in this way it would be contained in some one
place, and excluded from some other. "Nor is it nearer one place, and
further from some other," for only things that occupy place stand
in relations of distance. Consequently, the sense-world is present
to the intelligible in space; but the intelligible is present to
the sense-world in space; but the intelligible is present to the
sense-world without having any parts, nor being in space. When the
indivisible is present in the divisible, "it is entire in each part,"
identically and numerically one. "If simple and indivisible existence
become extended and manifold, it is not in respect to the extended
and manifold existence which possesses it, not such as it really is,
but in the manner in which (simple existence) can possess (manifold
existence)." Extended and manifold existence has to become unextended
and simple in its relation with naturally extended and simple
existence, to enjoy its presence. In other terms, it is conformable to
its nature, without dividing, nor multiplying, nor occupying space,
that intelligible existence is present to existence that is naturally
divisible, manifold, and contained within a locality; but it is in
a manifold, divisible and local manner that a located existence is
present to "the existence that has no relation to space." In our
speculations on corporeal and incorporeal existence, therefore, we must
not confuse their characteristics, preserving the respective nature of
each, taking good care not to let our imagination or opinion attribute
to the incorporeal certain corporeal qualities. Nobody attributes to
bodies incorporeal characteristics, because everybody lives in daily
touch with bodies; but as it is so difficult to cognize incorporeal
natures ("beings"), only vague conceptions are formed of it, and they
cannot be grasped so long as one lets oneself be guided by imagination.
One has to say to oneself, a being known by the senses is located
in space, and is outside of itself because it has a volume; "the
intelligible being is not located in space, but in itself," because
it has no volume. The one is a copy, the other is an archetype; the
one derives its existence from the intelligible, the other finds it in
itself; for every image is an image of intelligence. The properties of
the corporeal and the incorporeal must be clearly kept in mind so as to
avoid surprise at their difference, in spite of their union, if indeed
it be permissible to apply the term "union" to their mutual relation;
for we must not think of the union of corporeal substances, but of
the union of substances whose properties are completely incompatible,
according to the individuality of their hypostatic form of existence.
Such union differs entirely from that of "homoousian" substances of
the same nature; consequently, it is neither a blend, nor a mixture,
nor a real union, nor a mere collocation. The relation between the
corporeal and the incorporeal is established in a different manner,
which manifests in the communication of "homoousian" substances of the
sense nature, of which, however, no corporeal operation can give any
idea. The incorporeal being is wholly without extension in all the
parts of the extended being, even though the number of these parts were
infinite. "It is present in an indivisible manner, without establishing
a correspondence between each of its parts with the parts of the
extended being;" it does not become manifold merely because, in a
manifold manner, it is present to a multitude of parts. The whole of it
is entire in all the parts of the extended being, in each of them, and
in the whole mass, without dividing or becoming manifold to enter into
relations with the manifold, preserving its numerical identity.[339] It
is only to beings whose power is dispersed that it belongs to possess
the intelligible by parts and by fractions. Often these beings, on
changing from their nature, imitate intelligible beings by a deceptive
appearance, and we are in doubt about their nature ("being"), for they
seem to have exchanged it for that of incorporeal "being," or essence.