THE SUPREME GOOD AS END OF ALL OTHER GOODS.

1. Could any one say that there was, for any being, any good but the

activity of "living according to nature?"[318] For a being composed

of several parts, however, the good will consist in the activity of

its best part, an action which is peculiar, natural, and unfailing.

Further: as the soul is an excellent being, and directs her activity

towards something excellent, this excellent aim is not merely excellent

relatively to the soul, but is the absolute Good. If then there be a

principle which does not direct its action towards any other thing,

because it is the best of beings, being above them all, it can be this

only because all other beings trend towards it. This then, evidently,

is the absolute Good by virtue of which all other beings participate

therein.

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 245 / 382 题