16. We have shown elsewhere that something must follow the One,
and that the One is a power, and is inexhaustible; and this is so,
because even the last-rank entities possess the power of begetting.
For the present we may notice that the generation of things reveals
a descending procession, in which, the further we go, the more does
manifoldness increase; and that the principle is always simpler than
the things it produces.[111] Therefore, that which has produced the
sense world is not the sense-world itself, but Intelligence and the
intelligible world; and that which has begotten Intelligence and
the intelligible world is neither Intelligence nor the intelligible
world, but something simpler than them. Manifoldness is not born of
manifoldness, but of something that is not manifold. If That which
was superior to Intelligence were manifold, it would no longer be the
(supreme) Principle, and we would have to ascend further. Everything
must, therefore, be reduced to that which is essentially one, which
is outside of all manifoldness; and whose simplicity is the greatest
possible. But how can manifold and universal Reason be born of the One,
when very evidently the One is not a reason? As it is not a reason,
how can it beget Reason? How can the Good beget a hypostatic form of
existence, which would be good in form? What does this hypostatic form
of existence possess? Is it identity? But what is the relation between
identity and goodness? Because as soon as we possess the Good, we seek
identity and permanence; and because the Good is the principle from
which we must not separate; for if it were not the Good, it would be
better to give it up. We must, therefore, wish to remain united to the
Good. Since that is the most desirable for Intelligence, it need seek
nothing beyond, and its permanence indicates its satisfaction with
the entities it possesses. Enjoying, as it does, their presence in a
manner such that it fuses with them, it must then consider life as the
most precious entity of all. As Intelligence possesses life in its
universality and fulness, this life is the fulness and universality of
the Soul and Intelligence. Intelligence, therefore, is self-sufficient,
and desires nothing; it contains what it would have desired if it had
not already possessed such desirable object. It possesses the good that
consists in life and intelligence, as we have said, or in some one of
the connected entities. If Life and Intelligence were the absolute
Good, there would be nothing above them. But if the absolute Good be
above them, the good of Intelligence is this Life, which relates to
the absolute Good, which connects with it, which receives existence
from it, and rises towards it, because it is its principle. The Good,
therefore, must be superior to Life and Intelligence. On this condition
only does the life of Intelligence, the image of Him from whom all life
proceeds, turn towards Him; on this condition only does Intelligence,
the imitation of the contents of the One, whatever be His nature, turn
towards Him.