Let us now return to our most important problem. Intelligence needs
to contemplate itself, or rather, it continually possesses this
contemplation. It first sees that it is manifold, and then that it
implies a difference, and further, that it needs to contemplate,
to contemplate the intelligible, and that its very essence is to
contemplate. Indeed, every contemplation implies an object; otherwise,
it is empty. To make contemplation possible there must be more than
an unity; contemplation must be applied to an object, and this object
must be manifold; for what is simple has no object on which it could
apply its action, and silently remains withdrawn in its solitude.
Action implies some sort of difference. Otherwise, to what would
action apply itself? What would be its object? The active principle,
must, therefore, direct its action on something else than itself, or
must itself be manifold to direct its action on itself. If, indeed,
it direct its action on nothing, it will be at rest; and if at rest,
it will not be thinking. The thinking principle, therefore, when
thinking, implies duality. Whether the two terms be one exterior
to the other, or united, thought always implies both identity and
difference. In general, intelligible entities must simultaneously be
identical with Intelligence, and different from Intelligence. Besides,
each of them must also contain within itself identity and difference.
Otherwise, if the intelligible does not contain any diversity, what
would be the object of thought? If you insist that each intelligible
entity resembles a ("seminal) reason," it must be manifold. Every
intelligible entity, therefore, knows itself to be a compound, and
many-colored eye. If intelligence applied itself to something single
and absolutely simple, it could not think. What would it say? What
would it understand? If the indivisible asserted itself it ought first
to assert what it is not; and so, in order to be single it would have
to be manifold. If it said, "I am this," and if it did not assert that
"this" was different from itself, it would be uttering untruth. If
it asserted it as an accident of itself, it would assert of itself
a multitude. If it says, "I am; I am; myself; myself;" then neither
these two things will be simple, and each of them will be able to say,
"me;" or there will be manifoldness, and, consequently, a difference;
and, consequently, number and diversity. The thinking subject must,
therefore, contain a difference, just as the object thought must also
reveal a diversity, because it is divided by thought. Otherwise, there
will be no other thought of the intelligible, but a kind of touch, of
unspeakable and inconceivable contact, prior to intelligence, since
intelligence is not yet supposed to exist, and as the possessor of
this contact does not think. The thinking subject, therefore, must
not remain simple, especially, when it thinks itself; it must split
itself, even were the comprehension of itself silent. Last, that which
is simple (the One) has no need of occupying itself with itself. What
would it learn by thinking? Is it not what it is before thinking
itself? Besides, knowledge implies that some one desires, that some
one seeks, and that some one finds. That which does not within itself
contain any difference, when turned towards itself, rests without
seeking anything within itself; but that which develops, is manifold.