IN SPITE OF APPARENT MISFORTUNE TO THE GOOD NO HARM CAN HAPPEN TO THEM.

6. It is constantly objected that fortune maltreats the good, and

favors the evil in opposition to the agreement that ought to exist

between virtue and happiness. The true answer to this is that no

harm can happen to the righteous man, and no good to the vicious

man.[42] Other objectors ask why one man is exposed to what is contrary

to nature, while the other obtains what conforms thereto. How can

distributive justice be said to obtain in this world? If, however, the

obtaining of what conforms to nature do not increase the happiness of

the virtuous man, and if being exposed to what is contrary to nature

do not diminish the wickedness of the vicious man, of what importance

(as thought Plato[43]), are either of these conditions? Neither will it

matter if the vicious man be handsome, or the virtuous man ugly.

THE SLAVERY OF THE GOOD AND VICTORY OF THE EVIL SEEM TO ACCUSE

PROVIDENCE.

Further objections assert that propriety, order and justice demand the

contrary of the existing state of affairs in the world, and that we

could expect no less from a Providence that was wise. Even if it were

a matter of moment to virtue or vice, it is unsuitable that the wicked

should be the masters, and chiefs of state, and that the good should

be slaves; for a bad prince commits the worst crimes. Moreover, the

wicked conquer in battles, and force their prisoners to undergo the

extremities of torments. How could such facts occur if indeed a divine

Providence be in control? Although indeed in the production of some

work (of art), it be especially the totality that claims attention,

nevertheless, the parts must also obtain their due, especially when

they are animated, living and reasonable; it is just that divine

Providence should extend to everything, especially inasmuch as its

duty is precisely to neglect nothing. In view of these objections we

shall be forced to demonstrate that really everything here below is

good, if we continue to insist that the sense-world depends on supreme

Intelligence, and that its power penetrates everywhere.

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 37 / 382 题