The remaining auxiliaries, paralyzed by want of organization, the usual
dissensions of the chiefs, and their mutual jealousies, even more than
by their want of supplies, retreated before Mustapha, who, after some
weeks of indecision, resumed his campaign; but, instead of following up
his advantages by land, and getting possession of Omalos as a better
base of operations, and preventing the Cretans from reoccupying it, he
embarked his troops at Suia, and attempted to land at St. Rumséli, the
entrance of the ravine of Samariá, the stronghold and place of refuge
_par excellence_ of Sphakia, and where, at this time, were gathered
thousands of women and children. This movement menaced too closely
the mountaineers, who opposed the landing, and finally repelled the
attack, as well as a subsequent one at Tripiti, nearer to Suia, when
Mustapha returned to his camp in Selmos, and passed another period
of inaction, during which the insurrectionary committees in Greece,
admonished by the imminent danger the movement seemed to have evaded
for the moment, renewed their efforts to send relief, and threw over
other bodies of volunteers, mainly Mainotes, a hardy, courageous race,
regarded as better irregulars even than the Albanians, who, landing in
the eastern provinces, revived the insurrection where the government
was ill able to meet it. The best of the volunteers, under Coroneos
and Yennissarli, recovering from their demoralization by rest and the
removal of the more disorderly elements, moved eastward to join the
new bodies, leaving the Sphakiotes to guard their own country. If
Mustapha, after the affair of Krustogherako, had followed the attack up
with vigor, two weeks would have finished the insurrection. Even as it
was, Sphakia being strongly disposed to purchase freedom from conquest
by neutrality, and several of the captains having openly embraced the
Turkish cause, there seemed very little hope for the prolongation of
the insurrection, when another of those wanton acts of barbarity, which
had on more than one occasion strengthened the insurgents instead of
weakening their courage, gave it another jog.
The Russian minister at Constantinople had, as soon as the news reached
that place that an English ship had rescued a number of non-combatants
from Crete, obtained from the Grand Vizier a reluctant consent that
other ships might intervene, and despatched a steamer at once to Crete,
with orders to the Grand Admiral to commence deportation. A violent
storm favored the Turks by delaying the avviso for several days,
and, when finally the order came, we had the news that the English
Government had disapproved Pym's acts, and the Commissioner (who had
plenary powers in all matters connected with Crete) had withdrawn the
permission given to Dickson, and both Dendrino and Boutakoff hesitated
to execute the order, anticipating its revocation. The former, a timid,
irresolute man, master of the arts of intrigue, but lost as soon as he
had an open part to play in which he must bear the responsibility of
decision, was more concerned for his own security than for the fate of
the Christians, and hesitated to give a requisition to the captain to
move, while the latter, indifferent to the consequences to himself, as
weighed against the relief of the Christian sufferers, hesitated to
move before getting renewed orders after the long delay, lest he might
compromise his Government in the event of a change of its momentary
policy, which was to avoid all appearance of ultra-advocacy of the
insurgent cause. It lacked but two or three days of our regular weekly
courier when the avviso had arrived, and both the Russian officials had
decided to wait the courier before moving.
As for myself, since the affair of Arkadi I had thrown aside
all reserve, and, while never going beyond the limits of moral
intervention, I had used all my influence with my colleagues, and with
our minister at Constantinople as well as our Government, to provoke
acts of positive intervention. I made no secret of it, nor did the
Turkish Government of its hostility to me. A patrol of zapties watched
my front door, and another my back door, and no Cretan dared enter
my house. I was regarded as the postman of the insurgents, and so
complete was the delusion that the authorities entirely neglected to
watch my colleagues, two of whom daily received and sent letters to the
mountains. All the little persecutions which a petty local government
could inflict were laid on me, and I reciprocated, as I best could,
by disseminating news of the true condition of the insurrection, and
stimulating the activity of my colleagues. Mr. Morris, our minister at
Constantinople, at first strongly under the influence of the English
ambassador, the just and liberal Lord Lyons, became convinced that
nothing was to be expected in the way of humane intervention from
England, and passed entirely over to the Russian policy, and lent me
his whole prestige and influence, made himself my defender at the
Porte, and gave me instructions after my own drawing up. I made common
cause, therefore, with my Russian colleague, on whose irresolution
I managed, in most cases, to impose my resolutions, and, little by
little, gained all the control over him which I desired for critical
emergencies, while I flattered his _amour propre_ by giving him the
credit of making up his own mind. I had also organized a sort of news
agency, by which I was able to get the earliest and most reliable
news of all movements in the island, so that gradually not only the
consuls but the naval officers came to expect from me the most reliable
information.
During the few days of suspense between the arrival of Boutakoff's
orders and the arrival of the courier which should confirm or revoke
them, the act of brutality to which I have alluded came to quicken
decision. I had received news that a Turkish frigate, hoisting English
colors, had run in near the coast of Sphakia, and when the unfortunate
refugees, expecting aid, came down to the shore, the Turks opened on
them with shot and shell. A Turkish cannonade is generally a pretty
harmless affair, except for accidental casualties, but the affair gave
me all the justification I needed to put a pressure on Dendrino to
issue a requisition for the Grand Admiral to go at once to the south
coast of the island. That night the post steamer was due, and, from
the absence of any despatches to the Italian commander similar to
those to the Russian, I anticipated that the movement had failed, and
that counter-orders would come to Boutakoff by the post. I went at
once, therefore, to Dendrino, and, putting the most energetic pressure
on him, dictated a letter to Boutakoff, who was on board the frigate
at Suda, requesting him to get up steam and go to the Sphakian coast
without delay, and did not leave till I saw the messenger on the way
and beyond recall, knowing that if I left Dendrino it would stop
there. Boutakoff, nothing loth, fired up at once, and at nine P.M. was
on his way. At midnight the post arrived, as anticipated, with counter
orders, but too late. Except myself, no one was so glad that the
countermand failed as General Ignatieff, the Russian minister.
The Grand Admiral went to Tripiti, where were thousands of
non-combatants hiding in caves and living amongst the rocks, waiting
the relieving European ships, but when the Russian boats ran in they
were fired on by the Cretan guards, made suspicious by the Turkish
frauds. Once assured of their friends, however, the people swarmed out
of their holes like ants, and, as Boutakoff told me, in a few minutes
the whole coast was lined with them, more than he could possibly stow.
He took about 1,200, and sailed for Peiræus.
This deportation had a triple effect: first, in strengthening the
Russian party in the island by assuring the Cretans of the good faith
of the Russian Government, that party having been hitherto very
inconsiderable; second, in relieving a large body of men of the care
of their families; and, third, in deciding doubtful and uninvaded
districts to take up arms, and breaking off the negotiations between
the Commissioner and the Sphakiote chiefs, by which the former had
hoped to have Sphakia given up without combat. The most tempting offers
were refused, and the people of Eastern Sphakia, under the command of
old Costa Veloudaki, entered on the war-path again, and, surprising
a Turkish post at Episkopí, drove the garrison, with serious losses,
back to Retimo; and, near the same time, Coroneos and Korakas on one
slope of Ida, and Petropoulaki, the chief of the Mainote volunteers,
on the other, harassed and drove back all the outposts in the open
country, and shut up the Turks of the central district in the fortress
of Retimo; while some battles, better worth the name than the desultory
skirmishes which most of the combats had been, were fought in the open
country around Candia, where Reschid Effendi proved himself a shrewd
and capable strategist, and drove the insurgents back to the western
slopes of Ida after sharp fighting, in which the dissensions of the
Greek and Cretan chiefs were more conspicuous than their wisdom; but
everywhere the insurrection showed new vigor.