CHAPTER VI.

No resistance was after this offered until Vafé was reached. Here about

two hundred Greek volunteers and a thousand Cretans, under the command

of Hadji Mikhali, of Lakus, and Costa Veloudaki, of Sphakia, were

concentrated. The Cretan chiefs were opposed to any regular fighting,

and counselled a retreat into the ravines, where they could entangle

the troops and attack them without serious risk to themselves, while

a pitched fight was not only not in the way of the islanders, but, if

lost, as they considered it must be in view of the overpowering Turkish

forces, it would discourage the movement greatly. Zimbrakaki, the

commander of the volunteers, with the most of his men, wished not to

abandon so strong a position, at which they had, moreover, constructed

a strong redoubt, without fighting, and it was decided to make a stand.

The majority of the Cretans, however, recognizing no authority but that

of their captains, withdrew before the fight, which, had Mustapha been

a commander careful of the lives of his troops, might have been decided

by flanking movements without firing a shot, as his army was composed

of ten thousand regulars and fully three thousand irregulars, Albanian

and Cretan, while the Christians were hardly five hundred. No forces

the committee could have assembled would have made the stand a prudent

or justifiable one under the circumstances, and its result was what the

Cretan chiefs had foreseen. Mustapha, as usual, opened with a direct

assault of Egyptians, which was repulsed with heavy loss; but, in the

meantime, a body of Albanians were engaged in climbing the heights

which protected the flanks of the position, and so nearly succeeded in

surprising the Greeks that they only saved themselves by precipitate

flight. A few gallant fellows, indifferent to the odds or the certainty

of defeat, were killed, taken prisoners, or escaped by suicide. The

committee, with the Hellenes, retreated to Askyfó, and made the best

preparations to defend the ravine which their demoralized forces

permitted; and so formidable was the position that Mustapha decided not

to attack it, but to be content with the moral advantage of the victory

at Vafé, which was nearly fatal to the insurrection, in spite of the

triviality of the losses of the Christians, which did not surpass

thirty killed of both Hellenes and Cretans. The latter had attributed

invincibility to their allies, and to find them defeated so utterly at

the first encounter paralyzed the insurrection for the moment; and,

if the Turkish commander had moved energetically on Askyfó, it is not

probable that any serious defence would have been made, and, as there

was then no other centre of resistance, the taking of Askyfó would have

left the movement without any power of forming another nucleus of moral

force. The committee must have dispersed, and the thousands of families

assembled in Sphakia must have surrendered.

But Mustapha, remembering his former disaster in the defile of Krapi,

hesitated, waited at Prosnero and in the Apokorona, while the Sphakiote

chieftains craftily negotiated, and made their calculations on the

amount of assistance they could get from Greece, the measure of

concessions or personal advantages they could hope for as the price

of submission, and prolonged the practical truce until the reaction

from the effects of the late defeat began. Hadji Mikhali, with his

Lakiotes, went back to Lakus and Theriso, entirely abandoned by the

troops, and resumed his old policy of little and incessant raids to

harass the Turkish commander and keep his own men from the despondency

of inaction.

The immediate salvation of the insurrection was, however, the arrival

of Col. Coroneos, the ablest by far of the Greek chiefs, and the only

one, it would seem, who was capable of adapting his plans to the

kind of material he had to work with. He arrived too late either to

prevent or assist in the battle of Vafé, and, seeing the danger the

insurrection was in of dying of despondency and the dissidence of its

chiefs, moved at once into the central provinces, and, collecting

together such Cretans as he could find, surprised and cut off two small

Turkish detachments, and with unimportant advantages reawakened the

enthusiasm of the fickle and excitable islanders, gained for himself

the prestige of victory, and rapidly recruited a considerable force.

At the same time, slight advantages were won by Hadji Mikhali near

Canéa, and by other chiefs in the eastern provinces, where an Ottoman

detachment had been disastrously repulsed in an attempt to penetrate

into the Lasithri district. Coroneos, with a small body of volunteers,

established his headquarters at the old fortified convent of Arkadi,

a building of Venetian construction of such size and strength as to

be a fit depot of supplies and place of refuge as against anything

less than a regular siege. From here he harassed the detachments

which issued from Retimo, and kept alive the movement in the district

between Sphakia and Mount Ida, and on several occasions menaced the

city of Retimo, which is fortified by a low wall, almost unprovided

with artillery. Mustapha, after nearly a month of indecision and

negotiation, in which the Cretans showed a diplomatic ability and

duplicity quite worthy the antique reputation of the race, found

himself compelled to act against the new dangers which Coroneos had

conjured for him. He moved with great rapidity from Episkopi, where

he had made his headquarters in order that he might watch both the

great passes into Sphakia, Krapi and Kallikrati, to Retimo, and thence

to the attack of Arkadi, which had been left with a small detachment

of volunteers and about one hundred and fifty Cretan combatants,

including the priests. Besides these, there were about one thousand

women and children, whom Coroneos had made every attempt to dissuade

from remaining, but, on account of the opposition of the Hegumenos,

who would not consent to the expulsion of his own relatives, the rest

could not be induced to leave a place of traditional security, well

provisioned and adequately defended against any attack they could

conceive of. Coroneos only persuaded about four hundred to return to

their villages. The Greek commander, with the main body of his forces,

had been watching Mustapha after his taking position at Episkopi, and

followed his movements to prevent, if possible, his investment of

Arkadi. Taking the circuit of the hills, he only reached the convent

after Mustapha's vanguard, which he engaged until nightfall, when

his men mostly withdrew to the mountains, and Arkadi was necessarily

abandoned to its fate.

Mustapha, arriving the next day, summoned the convent to surrender,

but, having no faith in his observance of the conditions, the

Christians refused, and the attack was ordered. The small rifled pieces

(mountain-guns) were found to produce no effect on the walls or on the

new masonry with which the gateway had been filled up, and, the fire

from the convent being found to be unexpectedly hot and effective, the

investment was made complete, and reinforcements sent for from Retimo,

whence nearly the whole garrison and Mussulman population came to his

aid, making the total force employed about 23,000 men,[H] regulars and

irregulars, being, in fact, by much the greatest part of the Ottoman

force in the island. Heavy artillery was also ordered from Retimo, and

two or three old siege-guns were transported with great difficulty (a

distance of about twelve miles), and placed in battery; and, having

demolished the masonry in the gateway, an assault was made, but the

fire from the monastery was so vigorous that the attacking column was

unable to face it, and after two or three assaults had failed, neither

the Turkish regulars nor their officers being willing to renew it, a

body of Egyptians were placed in front and driven in at the breach by

the bayonets of the Turkish soldiers in their rear.

[H] This estimate, and some of the details I give, I received from the

secretary of Mustapha Pasha after the war was over.

The convent was a hollow square of buildings, with a large court, in

the centre of which stood the church. The inner and outer walls were

equally solid, and the cells and rooms opening into the court were

garrisoned with bodies of the insurgents, who poured a hail of bullets

into the mass of Ottomans entering, but, the entrance once made,

defence and submission were alike fruitless. The troops killed all

who fell into their hands, fighting their way from cell to cell, and

bringing even their artillery into the rooms to penetrate the partition

walls. And so the struggle of extermination was fought out, until one

of the priests, who had previously expressed to his companions the

determination to blow up the magazine if the convent were entered,

finding death inevitable, fulfilled his threat, and changed what was

before but a profitless butchery into a deed of heroism, which again

saved the insurrection from the jaws of failure. The result of the

explosion was very limited so far as the combatants were concerned, and

probably did not kill a hundred Turks.

But even this catastrophe did not stop the carnage. The troops

recoiled, but again returned, and the last of the combatants defending

themselves in the refectory, having exhausted their bullets,

surrendered on the faith of an oath that their lives should be spared,

and were at once put to death. At the end, thirty-three men and

sixty-one women and children were spared.[I] Of the pandemonium that

the walls of Arkadi enclosed, I have heard many and ghastly hints,

and have in vain asked eye-witnesses to tell me what they saw; they

all said it was too horrible to be recalled or spoken of. One of the

most violent of the Mussulman fanatics of Crete, who had performed all

the pilgrimages and holy works required by the Koran, and earnestly

desired as the last grace of this life to die in the holy war against

the infidels, and had fought recklessly in all the battles he had been

able to participate in, went home after Arkadi in despair, declaring

that destiny forbade his dying the holy death. Mustapha was a general

of the old type, and did not care to win bloodless victories or spare

the lives of his troops, and the result, apart from the moral effect,

was far more disastrous to the Porte than to the insurrection. The

losses in killed and wounded were certainly not less than 1,500,

and were estimated at a much higher figure. The army was occupied

thirty-six hours in bringing the wounded into Retimo, and nearly 500,

unable to find place there, were brought on to Canéa (480 was the

number given me by a European surgeon in the Ottoman service). The

Pasha himself saw that he had made a blunder, and everything which the

local administration could effect to disguise and conceal the nature of

the event was done. I had, however, fortunately sent a trusty man to

Retimo on the first intimation of the movement, with orders to get me

the most minute and exact information possible, and his report, with

the confirmation of certain Turkish employees and submitted Christians

residing at Retimo, was in the main accepted by most of my colleagues

of the consular corps as the nearest to the truth which had been

obtained; and, though in these lands of fable and myth no exact history

can well be written, I believe that this is substantially the truth as

to Arkadi.

[I] The few men who were spared from this massacre were those who

were able to appeal to Mustapha Pasha, or some of his suite, on the

ground of ancient personal relations, or who succeeded in obtaining

his clemency by some sufficient plea, after surrender. That all the

butchery was not due to the heat of assault is shown by this and by

several incidents reported to me. One of the latest parties of the

combatants who surrendered on a promise of their lives was passed in

review before the Pasha himself, and all who wore European clothing

passed under the sword at once, as volunteers, though amongst them

were several Cretans from the adjacent villages, whose relatives

attested their nativity. When the refectory surrendered, the Pasha

swore on the head of the Sultan to spare its inmates, who were

required to hand out all their arms, and were afterwards butchered,

even to the women. Mr. Skinner, in his "Roughing it in Crete," gives

an account of his visit to Arkadi some months later, when he found the

bodies still unburied, and describes the scene in the refectory with

ghastly verity. After the fighting was all over, a party of irregulars

went round with lighted candles, and, holding them to the noses of the

corpses, gave the _coup de grace_ to all who breathed. Two Cretans

had managed to hide on the roof of one of the buildings, where they

remained till the next day, when, as the Albanians were leaving, one

of them shot a pigeon which fell on the roof where the Cretans had

hid, and, going up to secure his game, discovered the unfortunates,

who were put to death in cold blood. On the march back to Retimo, all

who could not keep up were at once killed, and those who reached the

city were kept for months in prison and in extreme misery.

The Cretan Insurrection of 1866-7-8 · 第 6 / 14 章