CHAPTER II.

The real agitation began when the Assembly finally adjourned to

Boutzounaria, a tiny village at the edge of the plain of Canéa. Three

thousand men were assembled on a little plateau overlooking the plain,

and about three miles from the city. Here gushes out of the living rock

the stream which supplies the city with water, by an aqueduct which

dates from the Hellenic times. Metellus cut it when he laid siege to

Cydonia, and the Cretans in the war of Greek independence repeated the

offence, and though, in the latter case, the siege was raised by a

fleet and army coming to the assistance of the Turks, the sufferings

produced by cutting off the water were very great.

From here the people had a safe retreat into their fastnesses above,

and had nothing to fear from the Turkish forces. They came unarmed, but

kept patrols at night on all the roads leading from the city to guard

against surprise. By day they could observe the whole plain from Suda

to Platania; and here, looking down on the orange groves of Murnies and

Perivoglia, the wide expanse of olive orchards, and the fields where

thousands of sheep, the property of Mussulmans mainly, feed while the

herbage is green with the spring rains, they passed the time much after

the old Greek fashion, games of agility and strength occupying the

time of the young, while the old discussed the affairs of state; but

no disorder occurred during the session of the Assembly proper. Sheep

were roasted whole, the messengers came and went, deputations from

the further districts came in slowly, others whose affairs demanded

their presence at home went away, there being none of those professed

politicians who live by attending conventions, and making the public

harm their good, so that there could be no vicarious expression of

opinion.

Finally, all was done, the _ne plus ultra_ of democracy had said its

say, and signed its name for the indignant regards of the most despotic

of sovereigns. A solemn deputation of gray-headed captains of villages,

the executive committee, brought to each of the consuls a copy of the

petition, and consigned the original to the Governor for transmission

to Constantinople. This functionary had been growing uneasy about the

apparent unanimity and deliberateness of the Assembly, and, having cast

his lead occasionally and found the water deeper than he thought, began

to be anxious to see the Assembly dispersed. The moral force of the

recognition by the consular corps of the peaceful and legal character

of the meeting had dissuaded him from interrupting its labors; but,

the petition once delivered, he peremptorily ordered the Cretans to

go home and wait the answer, intending to repeat the trick he had so

successfully tried before, namely, arresting the chiefs and calling a

counter-assembly; and, further ordering the committee to disperse, it

refused.

This was the position into which the Pasha had desired to draw the

Cretans. Their Assembly was perfectly legal, they having a firman which

permitted them to meet unarmed, the Porte having long before seen the

impolicy of depriving them of a custom which was of so great antiquity

and reverence; but the Pasha hoped to give an illegal color to their

refusal to obey his order, and, according to his habit of making his

will the supreme law, determined to make use of their persistence in

their rights to precipitate the collision which he knew they were

unprepared for; and, having once excited armed resistance, even against

an illegal use of authority, he confidently counted on the support

not only of his own government, but of the consuls. To this end, he

called a conference of the consular corps, at which, having stated the

measures he had taken, he declared his intention to use the military

force at his disposal to disperse the Assembly. In this conference, a

division was shown as to the advisability of using force. The French

consul (a Levantine[C] of the lowest order, a bastard of one of the De

Lesseps family by a Jewish adventuress, and an intense hater of the

Greeks ever since the society of Syra, where he was once _Chancelier de

Consulat_, refused to recognize his mistress, a retired saltimbanque

from a café chantant of the Champs Elysées) supported the Pasha in

everything, and even urged him to greater arbitrariness. The English

consul, Mr. Dickson, a man of the most humane character and entire

honesty, had an unfortunate weakness before constituted authorities,

and the greatest possible respect for the Turks, coupled with an

Englishman's innate dislike for a Greek. He had his orders, moreover,

to co-operate with his French colleague, and, with his good faith and

unsuspecting nature, he was no match for his intriguing and mendacious

yoke-fellow, who led him wherever he wished. It was like coupling a

faithful mastiff to a dirty bazaar dog. These two supported the Pasha

from very different motives, but with the same result. All the others

opposed any violence as inexpedient and unjustifiable, being entirely

assured of the peaceful intentions of the committee. Ismael opened

the discussion by rehearsing his labors with the Assembly to induce

them to submit and disperse, and declared that, having exhausted

persuasion, he should employ force if the committee did not at once

dissolve. Mr. Dickson said that his Excellency deserved great credit

for his moderation, and hoped that he would continue to show the same

quality, adding that thus far the Assembly had behaved in a strictly

legal manner, being convoked in accordance with their privileges, but

admitted that, if they refused to disperse on order, they rendered

themselves amenable to force. M. Derché, the French consul, urged their

immediate violent dispersal, but the others all declared their opinion

that, the Assembly having met for a legal purpose, and having so far

comported themselves in an entirely unoffensive manner and showed no

intention of going beyond the object for which they had met, the Pasha

had no pretext for the employment of force. Mr. Colucci, the Italian

consul, then stated that he had received information that the committee

had expressed their willingness to disperse on receiving the assurance

that the signers of the petition should not be persecuted by the Pasha,

and that he considered that the Governor owed this assurance, since

he and all others admitted that the Assembly and committee had so far

committed no illegal act. His Excellency dodged the suggestion, and,

rising, was about to dismiss the conference, when, seeing that all

was on the point of being won to the arbitrary course of the Pasha, I

begged to offer my protest against any implied endorsement on my part

of the proposed violence, as, until the assurance of immunity had been

given the Cretans, the peaceful expedients for assuring tranquillity

had not been exhausted, or need for employment of force arisen. The

Italian, Russian, and other consuls followed me in protest. The Pasha,

disconcerted, sat down again, and the discussion was renewed. His

Excellency hesitated, but Derché came to his relief with reasons for

his not according the immunity asked, saying that the Pasha had no

right to compromise the intentions of his government. I replied that

there was no question of Constantinople in the matter. The Cretans had

confidence in the good-will of the Sultan, but not in his Excellency.

Mr. Dickson was of opinion that the assurance was already implied in

the Pasha's promise to support the petition with the Porte, and that,

as the Assembly had committed no act to deserve persecution, it could

not be supposed that they would be subjected to it. He therefore

regarded the assurance as uncalled for. Six consuls were against the

Pasha, and two with him, but he took M. Derché's clue, and stood firm

on the ground which that led him to, and so the conference ended.

[C] Levantine is a term applied to people of foreign ancestry born in

Turkey and brought up there. With few exceptions, they are the most

corrupt, venal, and morally degraded class of the population of the

Turkish empire. They furnish all the legation and consular dragomans,

a class whose corruptibility has passed into a maxim.

The Pasha had, however, failed in getting the moral support of the

consular corps to the blow which he had intended to strike, and dared

not send the troops out. He made a great blunder in calling the

conference, as the consuls had no right of intervention in the affair,

but, like all over-cunning people, he caught himself in the trap he

set for us. Having invited us not really to get our opinion, though he

asked it, but to get our endorsement to his policy, he not only failed

in this, but got a rebuff which made the experiment more hazardous than

if he had said nothing. It had another bad effect for him in making

public the difference between his Excellency and the consular corps,

and, as the latter is believed in Turkish countries to be omnipotent,

the popular feeling was immensely strengthened.[D] The irritation of

the Pasha against the consular corps was unbounded, especially against

Colucci and myself; indeed, I may say, peculiarly against myself as an

old enemy and the spokesman of the opposition.

[D] The real reason for the insistence of the committee on the promise

of immunity was this: A daughter of one of the Pasha's council, his

_âme damnée_, a Cretan, by the name of Petrides, finding one day a

list of persons designated for exile and the bagnio, in which was

the name of her lover, a young Cretan, stole the document and gave

it to him. It contained the names of all the prominent chiefs of the

petition movement, and many in the city who were only known for their

liberal opinions.

Popular rumor magnified the difference, and myths as wild as those

of the day of Minos made the tour of the island; one which I saw in

a Greek newspaper represented me as rising in the conference and

declaring that, if the Pasha sent troops against the committee, I would

go and put myself in front of them, and then we should see if the

troops dared fire!

Meanwhile, all the friendly consuls united in urging the dissolution

of the committee, and leaving the protection of individuals to the

governments of the protecting powers, as the only means of averting

what was seen to be a disastrous affair for the Cretans. That this

was the true policy events have shown. The Cretans were not prepared

to fight at that time, their friends on the Continent were no more

prepared to assist them, and there was no supply of powder or arms in

the island, nothing but old tufeks, trophies of the war of 1821-30;

the whole Turkish empire was at peace, and its available force ready

to be poured on the island. The committee wavered and half-decided to

disperse, they offered to put themselves as a committee into the hands

of the Pasha, and await in his palace, or other quarters assigned

them, the reply to the petition. This was refused, and the critical

question hung by a hair. The influence of two persons prevailed

over the committee against that of the consuls--one a priest called

Parthenius Kelaïdes, there being two Parthenii in the committee; the

other a Greek physician, temporarily in the island, known by the

two names of Joannides and Pappadakis, long resident in England, an

ultra-radical, and one of those who, ultra-demagogical in all their

tendencies, are really honest in their intentions, and, wishing to do

good, only succeed in doing the greater evil. In Crete, Dr. Joannides

is generally considered as the immediate cause of the disastrous turn

events took, and, as soon as the insurrection took active form, he

abandoned it to its manifest destiny, and has never been heard of since

in the island. It has always been a question if the Russian consul was

sincere in his union with his colleagues of the majority, it being

thought by some that in his hostility, mainly personal, to the French

consul, he secretly took ground against the unconditional submission,

that the Pasha and M. Derché might not carry the day. Be this as it

may, I am confident that with regard to fighting he was in accord

with his colleagues, and considered that actual insurrection should

be avoided, and that the instructions of the government were to this

effect. But he was a man of very unsound judgment, and so passionate

and personal in his way of seeing men and matters that I have always

been of the opinion that, from mere personal feeling against Derché, he

secretly strengthened Parthenius, over whom his influence was supreme,

in his obstinacy, and so prevented the dispersal of the committee,

which finally withdrew to the mountains to be secure from a _coup de

main_. Before doing so, however, they offered to allow two or more

battalions of troops to guard them at Boutzounaria, a proposition which

the Pasha refused peremptorily, knowing that, so long as the committee

remained a constituted body, the Cretans would respect its authority,

but that, if they dissolved and dispersed, they would lose all right to

act, or control over the people. So ingrained is the Cretan's regard

for the law of his ancient tradition that, while the whole population

would have risen at once at the call of the committee as long as it was

constituted, not one of the districts would have regarded an appeal

made by the individual members when they had ceased to represent in

due form the original Assembly. The question at issue was not, then, a

trivial one, and in the reply to it lay the decision of peace or war.

The Cretan Insurrection of 1866-7-8 · 第 2 / 14 章