CHAPTER XII

THE ETHICS OF DOCTRINAL CHRISTIANITY: AN IDEAL OF RIGHT BELIEF

[Sidenote: Ethical import of the

Christianization of Rome]

The establishment of Christianity, in its Greco-Judaic form, as the

favored religion of the Roman Empire by the edict of the Emperor

Constantine is rightly regarded as one of the most important events

not only in the history of the Empire but also in that of the Western

world. What made this act, or rather the religious revolution it

registered, of such transcendent importance was the fact that the

ascendancy of the new religion meant the ascendancy of a new moral

ideal; for Christianity, unlike Stoicism, did not merely act upon

the old classical ideal of excellence to modify and remold it, but

superseded it by another made up largely of a wholly different set of

virtues.

It was this new ethical element thus introduced into Greco-Roman

civilization which was the most dynamic of the forces active in the

transformation of the ancient into the medieval world. The new ideal

re-created ethically the Roman world and made Europe for a thousand

years and more--until the Renaissance of the fifteenth century called

forth again the ethical thought and feeling of classical antiquity--in

moral conviction and striving an extension of Asia.

A prerequisite to an intelligent study of the history of this new moral

ideal is a knowledge of the beliefs and theological doctrines out of

which it arose; for this ideal has through the centuries followed the

fortune of these beliefs and teachings. In the immediately following

pages we shall indicate what were some of the most influential of these

ideas and doctrines.

I. RELIGIOUS IDEAS AND THEOLOGICAL DOGMAS MOLDING THE IDEAL

[Sidenote: The doctrine of a moral

law supernaturally revealed]

Among the doctrines of Christian theology freighted heavily with

ethical consequences was that of a moral law supernaturally

promulgated. This was essentially an Oriental conception, a heritage

of Christianity from the Hebrew past, and a conception quite alien in

general to the manner of thinking of the Greeks and Romans, with whom

morality, as we have seen, was a civic and secular and human thing, an

expression of man’s essential nature, that is, an outcome of the human

reason and conscience.

This doctrine exercised an immense influence upon the moral

evolution in the Western world. First, it displaced naturalism with

supernaturalism in ethics. The whole history of morals records no

revolution more momentous than this. Second, it made rigid large

sections of the moral code and thus tended to impart for an historical

epoch a certain immobility to the religious-ethical side of European

civilization.

[Sidenote: The teaching of the

unity of God and of his universal

fatherhood]

Another idea found in this body of religious doctrines, an idea rich

in ethical consequences, was the conception of God as one and as the

Universal Father. We have seen that the great defect in primitive

morality was the limited range of the moral feelings. The circle of

moral obligation was bounded by the clan, the tribe, the city. This

resulted in large part from the notion that each kin group had an

origin and ancestry different from that of every other. One group

thought themselves to be the offspring of Zeus; another proclaimed

themselves to be the descendants of Heracles; and still another

believed themselves to be the children of Mars. So long as this view

of men’s origin and descent prevailed there could arise no conception

of their spiritual relationship and ethical oneness. Tacitus merely

expressed the common opinion of the ancient world when he declared

absurd the doctrine that all men are brothers.

But from the doctrine of the common fatherhood of God there arises

naturally the conception of the essential brotherhood of men. The

apostle’s declaration, “We are the offspring of God,”[624]--phrasing

the teachings of the Master in terms understood by the men to whom he

spoke,--announced the opening of a new era in the moral development of

the race. The proclamation of this practically new thought[625] meant,

at once in ethical theory and sooner or later in actual practice, the

widening of the narrow class and race circle of moral obligation to

include all tribes and peoples.

[Sidenote: The doctrine of a

future life of rewards and

punishments]

Greco-Roman morality was influenced but slightly by a belief in a

life after death. The vision of the other world was in general too

indistinct for it to exert any decided influence upon the conduct of

men.[626] The conception of Hades, though it did undergo with the lapse

of time a process of moralization, was never so far ethicalized as to

have a positive moral value.

But by Christianity the other world was lifted into such prominence as

it had had in the life and thought of no people of antiquity except

the Egyptians, and immortality was declared to be the destiny of every

human soul. With the classical peoples it was the city which had been

conceived as eternal. This transference of immortality from the city

to the individual had vast import for morality.[627] What contributed

to render it of such ethical importance was the fact that the after

life was conceived as a life of rewards and punishments. A heaven

of ineffable and everlasting bliss and a hell of unutterable and

everlasting torment were laid open to the eyes of men, and became the

tremendous sanctions of the new moral code promulgated by Christianity.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence of this teaching

upon the moral life of the European peoples, especially during the

medieval centuries of faith. To make this life transitory, vain, and

worthless, and life in another world the only real life, is to cause

the transvaluation of all moral values, and to change fundamentally

conceptions of what is rational and right in conduct.

[Sidenote: The teaching of the

sanctity of human life]

Springing naturally from the foregoing conceptions of man’s origin and

eternal destiny is the Christian doctrine of the sanctity of human

life. In no respect do Christian teachings contrast more sharply with

pagan conceptions than in this regard. In the Greco-Roman view value

did not attach to man as man. To the Greek way of thinking it was

the Greek freeman alone who possessed the full capacity for virtue

and the rights of manhood. In the common Roman view only the Roman

citizen was regarded as dowered with the full faculties and rights of a

human being. The slave was looked upon and treated as belonging to an

inferior order of existence.

The Christian doctrine of man’s divine sonship and of his eternal

destiny gave infinite worth to every human life, and, investing man as

man with an inviolable sanctity, worked effectively in widening the

range of the moral sympathies and in bringing within the scope of the

moral law all classes and conditions of men. It checked infanticide,

which in the pre-Christian world had been very generally practiced

without the least moral scruple; it suppressed the gladiatorial games

in which the lives of men were placed on a level with those of the wild

beasts with which they fought; it helped to make suicide, which the

Romans looked upon as a noble mode of departure from life, a crime; and

contributed to mitigate the lot of the slave and finally to help lift

him into freedom.

[Sidenote: The dogma of the fall

of man and hereditary guilt]

The view of man’s moral nature taught by the Founder of Christianity

was simple and natural. It is embodied in the parable of the prodigal

son. Man may go wrong, but he has ever the capacity, and, when he comes

to himself, the desire, to return to the right way.

In direct opposition to this view of man’s nature and deepest

preferences as being essentially good, we find elaborated in early

Christian theology the dogma that the first man, though created

upright, fell through disobedience and transmitted to all his

descendants a nature wholly evil and a total incapacity for doing good

or even desiring the good. And not only was man thus attainted by the

primal disobedience, but all nature became accursed.

This dogma of the fall of man is one of the most influential

conceptions in the moral domain ever entertained by the human mind.

It was the germ from which was developed the larger part of Christian

theological ethics.[628] For out of the dogma of ancestral sin and

total depravity sprang naturally and logically the doctrines of the

atonement, imputed righteousness, and salvation through faith. The

moral history of the Christian centuries we shall find to be largely

the history of the influence of this doctrine upon men’s conceptions

of their religious obligations and duties. As with the passage of

time and the incoming of evolutionary science the belief in this

teaching decays, we shall find men’s idea of what constitutes duty in

the religious sphere undergoing a great change, and shall see acts,

observances, and states of mind once regarded as supremely virtuous and

indispensable to salvation now looked upon as morally indifferent or

even positively wrong.

[Sidenote: The doctrine of the

sacredness of the Sabbath]

Christianity inherited from Judaism the belief in the sacred character

of the Sabbath day. This belief created one of the most important of

the religious duties of the Christian. It determined how one seventh

of all his time should be spent. The history of the observance of

this Sabbath as holy time, and the changed moral value attached to

such observance as times and beliefs have changed, forms a chapter

of the greatest suggestiveness to the student of the evolution of

morals, since this chapter epitomizes and repeats the entire history of

ceremonial or ritual morality.

[Sidenote: The personality of the

Prophet of Nazareth[629]]

But far more influential than all these inherited Jewish beliefs

and doctrines of speculative theology in molding the moral ideal of

Christianity, in all that renders it superior to the moral ideals of

the other great religions of the world, as well as in all that it

possesses of permanent ethical value for humanity, has been the simple

appealing story of the words and deeds of the Prophet of Nazareth.[630]

Those elements of the ideal which are based on speculative theological

doctrines have changed as these doctrines have changed with the

world’s advance in general intelligence and with the deepening and

clarifying of the moral consciousness of men; while those elements

derived from that wonderful personality, from that life of unbounded

tenderness and love and self-forgetting service, have been given an

ever higher and more dominant place in the world’s ideal of goodness.

In the eloquent words of the historian Lecky: “It was reserved for

Christianity to present to the world an ideal character, which through

all the changes of eighteen centuries has inspired the hearts of men

with an impassioned love; has shown itself capable of acting on all

ages, nations, temperaments, and conditions; has been not only the

highest pattern of virtue but the strongest incentive to its practice;

and has exercised so deep an influence that it may be truly said that

the simple record of three short years of active life has done more

to regenerate and to soften mankind than all the disquisitions of

philosophers and the exhortations of moralists. This has indeed been

the well-spring of whatever is best and purest in Christian life.”[631]

II. THE MORAL IDEAL

[Sidenote: Orthodoxy, or

correct religious opinion, the

indispensable saving virtue[632]]

Before the end of the third century, under the influence largely

of the speculative Greek spirit, what was to be essentially the

historical creed of the Church had been practically formulated and the

corresponding moral code brought into existence.[633] In the creation

of this standard of goodness which was to give guidance for an epoch to

the moral life of the European peoples, it was the theological doctrine

of the moral value of faith, which came practically to be defined as

“the acceptance of the dogma of the Trinity and the main articles

of the creed,” that determined the precedence and subordination of

virtues and duties.[634] Correct belief was made an indispensable

virtue. Without this there could be no salvation.[635] On the other

hand, unbelief, doubt, error, even honest error, in religious matters

was declared to be in the highest degree sinful. This conception that

belief is a virtue and doubt a sin was destined, since it imperils

freedom of thought, to have momentous and sinister consequences for the

intellectual and moral history of Europe.

[Sidenote: The virtue of charity

or love]

Just as the theological dogma of the ethical value of religious

opinions has made correct belief theoretically the saving virtue in

Church ethics, so has the personality of Jesus, his teachings and his

self-sacrificing life as mirrored in the gospel records, made love and

service of others, in multitudes of souls, practically the supreme and

controlling motive of life. It was the emphasis placed by primitive

Christianity on this virtue, and the persuasion to its practice

afforded by the example of the Master, that for the first two centuries

of the new era--until the emphasis became changed from right living

to right opinion--lent to the moral life in the Christian communities

of the Empire such sincerity, purity, and elevation as have marked no

other period in the history of the Church.

But orthodox theology has never allowed that charity, though combined

with perfect uprightness of life and expressed in noblest acts of

self-abnegating service of humanity, is a saving virtue unless

associated with correctness of religious belief and the outgrowth

of it. This opposition in the bosom of the Church itself between

theological and natural morality has created a great dualism in the

moral history of all the Christian centuries, like the dualism in

ancient Hebrew history caused by the opposition between the morality of

ritualism and the morality of prophetism.

[Sidenote: The body of secondary

virtues]

Alongside the primary Christian virtue, whether this be regarded as

correct belief or as charity, were grouped a cluster of secondary

virtues, such as humility, meekness, gentleness, compassion for

weakness, resignation, and renunciation of the world. What is

especially noteworthy respecting this body of moral qualities making up

the Christian ideal of excellence is that all these were virtues which

in general were undervalued or held in positive disesteem by the Greeks

and Romans.[636] Indeed it was made a matter of reproach to the early

Christians by the pagan opponents of Christianity, that its virtues

were all servile virtues--the virtues of the slave.

It was undoubtedly this character of the new ideal which caused it,

in the primal age of Christianity, to make such strong appeal to the

common people, to the despised and lowly, to the broken and humble in

spirit, in the aristocratically graded society of the ancient world.

[Sidenote: Creation of specific

types through modifications of the

general ideal]

The Christian ideal of excellence has fulfilled itself in many ways;

that is, different types have arisen through the shifting in rank of

the virtues constituting the ideal, through the incorporation of pagan

elements, through racial influence, and through the reaction upon the

ideal of the changing intellectual, political, and economic environment.

Generally these specific forms of the ideal have been created by an

exaggerated enthusiasm for one or another particular virtue of the

standard, which has caused this special virtue so to overshadow all the

others, save the indispensable one of correct belief, as to bring into

existence a distinctive Christian type. Thus through the exaltation

of the virtue of chastity there arose in the early Church the ascetic

type of excellence, which for several centuries inspired unbounded

moral enthusiasm and drew away into the desert and into the seclusion

of the cloister great multitudes of both men and women; later, through

the reaction upon the Church of the pagan and barbarian world it had

nominally converted, and through the incorporation into the ideal of a

number of heathen virtues, there came into existence a composite type

of character--a combination of the virtues of the saint and the virtues

of the hero--known as the chivalric ideal, which colored the events of

European history from the ninth to the fourteenth century; and still

later, through the suppression of some of the distinctive virtues of

the Roman Catholic type of excellence and a fresh emphasis laid upon

others, there was created the Protestant type of moral character, which

has given a special cast to the theological morality of a large section

of modern Christendom.

[Sidenote: Limitations and defects

of the ideal]

That we may better be prepared to follow intelligently the various

phases of the moral history of the Christian centuries, to the tracing

of which the remaining chapters of this volume will be devoted, there

is need that to the brief description we have now given of the chief

virtues making up the ideal which was to give guidance to the moral

life of the European peoples, we add a word concerning its limitations

and defects, since these negative qualities of the ideal have exercised

an influence scarcely less decisive than its positive qualities in

making the history of the Christian world what it has been--a history,

on the whole, of inspiring moral progress, yet a history of moral

losses as well as of moral gains.

The first limitation of the ideal which we notice is its practical

exclusion of those civic, patriotic duties and virtues which had

been so highly esteemed by both the Greeks and the Romans. Man was

henceforth to be the citizen of no earthly city, but of a heavenly

city whose builder and maker is God. We can easily understand how this

new conception of life, which transferred all its chief interests to

another world, which substituted the Church--symbolized in accordance

with the modes of thought of the time as “the city of God”--for the

ancient city state as the object of moral enthusiasm and self-devotion,

should leave no place for those civic, military, and heroic virtues

that had constituted the very soul of the morality of classical

antiquity.

A second limitation of the ideal is its neglect of the intellectual

virtues, which by the Greeks had been assigned such a high place in

their ethical standard.[637] The slighting of this important domain of

ethics by Christian theology arose naturally from its exaltation of

faith above reason, and from its assumption that in the revealed word

the Church was already in possession of all knowledge really essential

to man’s welfare and salvation.[638]

But the chief defect of the ideal, the lamentable historical

consequences of which we shall witness later, is, as we have already

pointed out, in its making the acceptance of all the articles of a

given creed an indispensable virtue. In assigning orthodox belief

this place in the ideal of moral goodness, theological ethics has

marred Christian morality by fostering the faults of intolerance and

intellectual insincerity. This dogma inspired in the Church, as soon

as it became powerful, a persecuting spirit, and made Christianity for

centuries something altogether alien to its real genius and spirit--one

of the most intolerant of the world’s religions. At the same time

this dogma, by making religious unbelief and nonconformity a sin so

heinous as to be worthy of death by the most exquisite torture, and

of everlasting punishment in the hereafter, discouraged intellectual

veracity and open-mindedness, and fostered the vice of insincere

conformity, which, more than any other fault, has marred Church

morality from the end of the early age of the martyrs to the present

day.

[Sidenote: Conclusion]

In the following pages we shall follow the fortunes of this ethical

ideal through medieval and modern times. We shall trace the modifying

influence upon it of the different and changing elements of the

civilization of which it has formed a part, and shall note the reaction

of the ideal, in its successive types, upon the history of the passing

centuries.

History as past ethics; an introduction to the history of morals · 第 7 / 14 章