At a time when the attention of the nation is almost exclusively
directed to the colossal struggle in which Great Britain has taken so
conspicuous a part—when the deepest anxiety is felt regarding the issue
of the conferences at Paris, which must have the effect either of
restoring peace to Europe, or of rendering the contest more desperate in
its character than before—we were surely entitled to expect that no
attempts would be made, at least by Her Majesty’s advisers, to alter or
innovate any acknowledged part of the fundamental constitution of the
realm. It is with great pain that we feel ourselves called upon to
denounce such an attempt, which appears to us not the less dangerous
because furtively made, and seemingly insignificant of its kind. All
permanent innovations, all great changes and revolutions, may be traced
to a very trifling source. The whole constitution of a country may be
overthrown in consequence of some narrow departure from its fundamental
rules—a departure which possibly may appear at the time too trivial to
demand remonstrance, but which, being drawn into a precedent, may, in
the course of years, be the means of producing the most serious and
disastrous effects. The tree that could have withstood the blast of the
wildest hurricane, will become rotten at the core, if the rain can
penetrate to its bole, even through a miserable crevice. The dykes of
Holland, which defy the winter storms, have, ere now, yielded to the
mining of that stealthy engineer, the rat, and provinces have been
inundated in consequence. And, therefore, it well becomes us to be
jealous of any attempt, however trivial, or however specious—for
plausible reasons can always be adduced on behalf of any kind of
innovation—to alter the recognised principles of our constitution, or to
introduce a totally new element into its framework.
We allude, of course, to the attempt which Her Majesty’s advisers have
thought proper to make, at altering the hereditary constitution of the
House of Lords, by the introduction of Life-Peers into that body. The
question is now being tried in the case of Mr Baron Parke, who has been
created Baron Wensleydale, without remainder to heirs; and it is
impossible, looking to the attendant circumstances, to avoid the
conclusion that this creation has been deliberately made, for the
purpose of establishing a precedent for opening the doors of the highest
deliberative assembly to a new order of nobles, who are not to have the
privilege of transmitting their rank and titles to posterity. For, if
the only object had been, as is alleged, to recruit the numbers of life
Lords upon whom the task of hearing and deciding appeals from the
inferior courts of the country must devolve, there was obviously no
necessity, nor even reason in this instance, for departing from the
usual conditions of the peerage. Lord Wensleydale (for so we are bound
to call him, in virtue of his patent of nobility from the Queen) is a
man of advanced years, and has no son. In all human probability,
therefore, the title, even though it had been destined to heirs-male, as
is the common form, would become extinct at his death. Want of fortune,
as the means of sustaining, in the future time, the social position
which a peer ought to occupy, has often been alleged, and with reason,
as a sufficient obstacle in the way of the elevation of commoners,
distinguished for their acquirements and genius, to the Peerage. It has
been said, and with great truth, that the present and fleeting gain is
more than counterbalanced by the future and permanent disadvantage. For
the acquirements and genius of the man so elevated are but personal, and
perish with him—the heirs remain as pauper peers, no ornament to their
order, and may, for a seemingly inadequate consideration, be willing to
surrender their independence, and use their legislative powers at the
bidding of an unscrupulous minister. But, in the present case, where the
chance of succession was so small, there could be little room for such
an objection; perhaps there was none, for the fortune of Lord
Wensleydale may be, for anything we know to the contrary, quite adequate
to the maintenance of a peerage; therefore we must hold that this case
was selected purposely to try the question. Indeed, supposing that Her
Majesty’s advisers were justified in making the attempt to alter the
constitution of the House of Lords by the introduction of Peers for
life, they could hardly have selected a better instance. For, if it
should be decided or declared that there is a limit to the prerogative
of the Crown, and that the creation of a peer for life, like Lord
Wensleydale, is simply a personal honour, but does not carry along with
it the privilege of a seat in the House of Lords, all unseemly questions
of precedency will be avoided. In that case it is not likely that the
experiment will be renewed; for we may safely conclude that the object
of Her Majesty’s advisers in issuing this singular patent was not to
gratify Lord Wensleydale by the gift of a barren honour, but to make him
a member of the House of Peers, entitled to speak and to vote; and
thereby to establish a precedent for the future creation of a
non-hereditary peerage.
Before entering into the questions of privilege and prerogative, it may
be as well to consider the reasons founded on expediency which have been
advanced in behalf of the creation of peerages for life. Such of her
Majesty’s ministers as have spoken upon the subject have been
exceedingly cautious and guarded in their language. None of them have
ventured to assert an opinion that, for the future, it would be
advisable to multiply this kind of peerages. Their arguments go little
beyond this—that whereas the appellate jurisdiction of the House of
Peers renders it necessary that at all times there should be among that
body persons intimately acquainted with the law, and qualified to act as
judges, it is for the advantage of the country that such creations
should be not permanent but temporary, not hereditary but personal. In
this there is not only some, but much plausibility. It is of the utmost
importance to the country that the highest legal talent should be
engaged for the last Court of Appeal; and we are not of the number of
those who consider that a court of appeal might be dispensed with. We
believe that the consciousness that there exists a tribunal which has
the power of reversing or altering their judgments, has conduced more
than anything else to stimulate the zeal, activity, and attention of the
judges in the ordinary courts of law; and it would be a very hazardous
experiment to give an irresponsible character to their decisions. We
think also, and we make this admission freely, that some decided steps
should be taken for the better regulation of the ultimate Court of
Appeal. The House of Peers, as a body, has long since abdicated its
right of sitting in judgment, except in some cases peculiar to the
peerage. The judicial duties are now invariably devolved upon judicial
Peers, that is to say, upon those who have either occupied or occupy the
highest judicial offices; and although the form of putting the question
to the House, after the opinion of the legal Peers has been delivered,
is still observed, no instance of any attempt on the part of other peers
to vote, has taken place for a long series of years. Thus the appellate
jurisdiction of the House has been confided to a small and fluctuating
committee, on whom attendance at the hearing of causes is not
compulsory; and although hitherto, as we verily believe to be the case,
the judgments have been such as to give general satisfaction, there is
no security for the continuance of a sufficiently qualified number of
adequate Judges. We think that some other arrangement for establishing
and securing a permanent tribunal of appeals should be adopted; but we
demur greatly to the plan now proposed of creating life-peerages for the
purpose of keeping the jurisdiction within the House of Lords. Very
wisely, we think, has it been provided that Judges shall not be eligible
to sit in the House of Commons. Their functions being of the utmost
importance to the wellbeing and safety of the community, it is above all
things desirable that they should not be allowed to mingle actively in
that strife of parties, which must, to a certain extent, in very many
cases, warp the judgment, or at least give a strong political bias. The
judicial atmosphere ought to be not only pure but calm, for so
constituted are the human frame and mind, that excitement of any kind is
apt to disturb the equilibrium of the judgment, and often suggests hasty
views, which will not bear the test of severe and dispassionate
investigation. Neither should the attention of a Judge be too much
directed to objects alien to his function. Undoubtedly there are minds
so active and capacious that they rebel against any restriction of their
powers, and go beyond their proper sphere, led away by a craving for
intellectual exercise, or under the influence of overpowering ambition.
But these constitute the exception, not the rule; and we humbly venture
to think that the best judges are to be found among the men who deviate
least from the tenor of their way, and who do not devote themselves
ardently to other occupations or pursuits. Therefore we have great
doubts as to the propriety of the system which would necessarily, to
some extent, expose the judge to the influences of the politician, or,
at any rate, distract his attention from what is or ought to be the main
object and purpose of his life. Besides this, it is not convenient or
decorous that there should be anywhere an unpaid tribunal upon which
such serious responsibilities devolve. Judges receive salaries in order
that they may be compelled to do their work, and overcome that tendency
towards indolence from which very few of the human race are altogether
free. The salaried Judge must act: he must attend to every case which is
brought before him, unless he can allege occasional failure of health,
or unless he declines on account of interest or affinity. But a
voluntary and unpaid Judge may absent himself at pleasure, and without
responsibility—a very serious matter to suitors, and, as we think,
inconsistent with the proper administration of justice. For many
reasons, therefore, it appears to us that the time has arrived when the
supreme appeal court of the realm should be placed upon a footing
different from that which has hitherto existed, and that it should be so
remodelled as to give it a permanent and responsible character. We have
already observed that, as regards the great body of the Peers, their
appellate jurisdiction and power is merely a name; and surely it is not
worth retaining the shadow when the substance has passed away. There are
evidently many deficiencies in the present system. The bulk of appeals
are from the Scottish courts; and as the Scotch law differs materially
from that of England, being based altogether upon a separate foundation,
it is important that at least one Judge, intimately acquainted with the
system, and trained to its technicalities, should be a member of the
court of last resort. Looking to the present state of the Scottish bar
and bench, we must confess that we entertain grave doubts whether any
competent lawyer could be found to undertake such a duty for the
unsubstantial reward of a life peerage; and we apprehend that no
satisfactory or thoroughly efficient arrangement for the determination
of appeals from the courts of England, Scotland, and Ireland can be
effected, unless based upon the principle of delegating the appellate
jurisdiction of the House of Peers to a court, holding its sittings in
London, comprising the highest legal talent which can be drawn from the
three kingdoms, but not necessarily, in so far as its members are
concerned, directly connected with the peerage. Of course, the Judges in
such a court of appeal should be, like all other Judges, the paid
servants of the State; and we are confident that such a measure, the
details of which would be matter of grave consideration, could not fail
to be acceptable, and must prove highly beneficial to the country at
large. Indeed, it is manifest that some such alteration of the law is
now peremptorily required; as it is upon the inconvenience and
insecurity of the working of the present system of appellate
jurisdiction, as vested nominally in the whole body of the House of
Peers, that the main arguments in favour of what we must consider as a
dangerous attempt to destroy the hereditary constitution of the Upper
House have been founded.
These observations of ours have not been made at random. We know that
many of the highest and best legal authorities of our time have regarded
the uncertain state of the constitution of the last court of appeal with
considerable misgivings as to the future, and that they have entertained
a deep anxiety as to the possible result, if no definite arrangement
should be made. The establishment of a responsible tribunal, such as we
have hinted at, would, in any case, have deprived the inventors and
advocates of the creation of life-peerages of their only plausible plea;
because, as we have already remarked, none of them have ventured to
express their unqualified approval of the institution of life-peers, as
giving new blood to the Legislature—they merely take their stand upon
the judicial advantages which might result from the new method of
creation. But if the same advantages, or, as it appears to us,
advantages much more important and even precious to the public interest,
could be derived from the institution of a new court, framed in
accordance and consonance with the legal practice of the realm, and
calculated to give universal satisfaction and security, we apprehend
that the House of Lords would lose nothing if it renounced what, to the
great bulk of its members, is a pure fiction of authority. The
pretext—for it is nothing more—for the introduction of life-peerages,
has been rested upon a very narrow ground; namely, the necessity of
providing for the adequate discharge of the appellate jurisdiction of
the House. By consent of Queen, Lords, and Commons, to the erection of
an independent and responsible tribunal of appeal, of which the Law
Lords of Parliament might be members, the difficulty could be obviated
at once; and then—if it should still be proposed to make a radical
change in the constitution of the Upper House—the question may be argued
upon broad and general grounds. If in any quarter—we care not how high
it be—it is deemed advisable, or expedient, or creditable, or conducive
to the maintenance of the present constitution of the realm, that
life-peerages should hereafter be copiously introduced, let the subject
be ventilated and discussed with all imaginable freedom and latitude.
But this back-blow—this poor attempt, as we must needs think it to be,
of endeavouring to gain a precedent and an example by insidious means,
without the co-operation of Parliament—strikes us as peculiarly shabby;
and is anything but wise, inasmuch as it indicates a desire to push the
prerogative of the Crown beyond the point which has been held as
constitutional since the union of the three kingdoms. In a matter such
as this is, we need hardly repeat the words of Lord Lyndhurst, that we
do not speak of the Sovereign personally, but of the advisers of the
Sovereign.
All that we have hitherto said relates to the _expediency_ of creating
life-peerages for the purpose of supplying possible deficiencies in the
number of Law Lords who now exercise the whole appellate jurisdiction of
the House of Peers. But the greater question is behind; and although we
approach the subject with considerable diffidence, we are constrained to
express our opinion that, in the case of Lord Wensleydale, the
prerogative of the Crown has been stretched beyond its proper limit. We
do not mean as to the title. The Crown is the fountain of honour; and
there seems to be little doubt that the Crown may create titles at
pleasure, without any violation of the constitution. The old orders of
Thanes and Vavasors may be resuscitated, or new orders of knighthood,
with extraordinary rank of precedence, may be formed. All that, and even
more than that, lies within the power of the Sovereign. But the
institution of a new estate, or a new order, or a new tenure of
nobility, which shall have the effect of augmenting or decreasing the
power of either of the two other recognised and established estates of
the realm, the Lords or the Commons, is an assumption or exercise of
power beyond the prerogative of the Crown; and we, who certainly do not
lean to the side of democracy, must oppose any such innovation, as
strongly and strenuously as we would do were the true privileges of the
Crown assailed. We deny not the right of the Queen to bestow honours and
titles, and to give rank and precedence; but the case is very different
when we find the Queen—or, to speak more accurately and properly, the
Queen’s advisers—attempting to alter the recognised hereditary character
of one of the legislative chambers.
Let us then consider what is the constitution of the House of Lords.
Diligent search has been made for precedents to show that, at an early
period of English history, the Crown was in the use of granting peerages
for life only; and we are bound to allow that sufficient evidence has
been brought to establish the fact that, in the reign of Richard II., at
least one peerage of that nature was created. But those who will take
the trouble to peruse the elaborate reports upon the dignity of the
Peerage, issued in 1820, 1822, and 1825, will find that in those early
times the Crown assumed and exercised most arbitrary powers. Peers were
summoned or not summoned to Parliament according to the will of the
sovereign, and the right to exclude from Parliament a peer who had once
taken his seat, was exercised by the Crown in repeated instances. If
precedents drawn from the early history of England are to be accepted as
rules for interpreting the existing measure of the prerogative of the
Crown, we must necessarily conclude that the Crown has the power,
without trial or forfeiture, to suspend or take away the privileges of
any peer, and that this can be done simply by withholding a writ at the
time when Parliament is summoned. We doubt greatly whether even the
strongest stickler for prerogative would maintain that such a course
would be justifiable at the present day. But in truth we set very little
value upon such precedents, beyond what attaches to them as mere
antiquarian inquiries; and for this reason, that the ancient usage of
England in regard to peerages is of no value in determining the rights,
privileges, or position of members of the present House of Lords. It
seems to be forgotten that there is now no English House, nor are there
any Peers of England. The unions with Scotland and Ireland entirely
altered the character of the existing Peerage. To borrow the language of
the Third Report upon the Dignity;—
“When the union of England and Scotland was accomplished in the reign
of Queen Anne, all the adult peers of the realm of England were
entitled to writs of summons in the characters of temporal Lords of
the Parliament of England, as that Parliament was then constituted;
_but there are now no longer any peers of the realm of England_. By
the union with Scotland, England as well as Scotland ceased to be
distinct realms; and all the peers of the realm of England, and all
the peers of the realm of Scotland, became, by the terms of the Treaty
of Union, _peers of the new kingdom of Great Britain_.”
In like manner the union of Great Britain and Ireland produced a change
in the character of the Peerage:—
“All the peers of Ireland, and all the Peers of Great Britain, and all
the peers of the United Kingdom since created, form, in some degree,
the second estate of the realm of the United Kingdom, qualified by the
power given to the peers of Ireland to divest themselves of their
privileges as such, under certain circumstances; but twenty-eight only
of the peers of Ireland are Lords of Parliament, being elected to
represent the rest of the peers of Ireland in Parliament, and their
election being for life. A power is also reserved to the Crown to
create new peers of Ireland, under certain circumstances; and the
peers so created become also part of the whole body of peers of the
United Kingdom, though not by their creation Lords of Parliament, and
though, by the terms of their creation, made peers of Ireland only.
“It seems manifest, therefore, that not only the peers of the realm of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland at the present day,
but all the members of the legislative assemblies of the United
Kingdom, both as bodies, and as individual members of different
bodies, and in their several different and respective rights and
capacities, bear little resemblance to any of the members of the
legislative assemblies of the realm of England from the Conquest,
before and to the reign of John; and the peers of the realm of the
United Kingdom, both as a body and individually, are very different
from the peers of the realm of England, before the Union of England
and Scotland in the reign of Queen Anne, _and especially as many of
them are not Lords of Parliament_; and such of them as are elected to
represent the peers of Scotland, and such of them as are elected to
represent the peers of Ireland, are Lords of Parliament by election,
and not by virtue of their respective dignities, though the possession
of those dignities is a necessary qualification to warrant their
election.”—_Third Report on the Dignity of the Peerage_, pp. 34, 35.
It is manifest, therefore, that such a question as this, affecting the
status and privileges of the Peerage of the United Kingdom, cannot be
settled by reference to early English precedents. There is no longer an
English peerage, neither is there an English Sovereign. The Acts of
Union have quite altered the character of the Peerage, for they have
established a clear and intelligible distinction between Peers of the
United Kingdom and Lords of Parliament. The mere possession of the
dignity by no means implies the right to sit in the House of Lords. With
the exception of sixteen who are elected to serve in each Parliament,
the whole body of what were the peers of Scotland, but who now are peers
of the United Kingdom, are excluded from the House of Lords, unless
qualified to sit in virtue of a new patent; and that portion of the
Peerage of the United Kingdom whose ancestors were peers of Ireland, are
represented in Parliament by twenty-eight of their number. It is
important that this distinction should be borne in mind; the more
especially because, by a loose and inaccurate mode of expression, many
people are led to think that the descendants of the old Scottish and
Irish peers are not peers of the United Kingdom. Yet such unquestionably
is their character; but though peers of the United Kingdom, they are not
necessarily members of the House of Lords.
If, therefore, precedent is to be regarded as affording any rule for
ascertaining the extent of the Sovereign’s prerogative, it humbly
appears to us that no instance from the history of England previous to
the unions with Scotland and Ireland, can be accepted as satisfactory.
The laws of England, as a province or component part of the realm, may
have remained intact; but the character of the Peerage was entirely
altered. The question is not now, What were the powers or extent of the
prerogative of the monarchs of England? It is simply this, What are the
powers, and what is the prerogative of the Sovereign of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland? For otherwise, be it observed, the
search for precedents must be extended both to Scotland and Ireland, and
we apprehend that investigation so directed might lead to some curious
results. We know that King James, who succeeded to the throne of
England, had such an exalted notion of his prerogative, that in his
progress southward he actually tried in person, and condemned to death,
an unfortunate footpad, who in all probability would have received a
milder sentence from a less august tribunal. As to creations of the
peerage in Scotland, take the case of the Barony of Rutherford. That
peerage was created by Charles II., in 1661; a much more recent
authority than Richard II.; and the destination was to Andrew
Rutherford, and the heirs-male of his body, “quibus deficientibus,
quamcumque aliam personam seu personas quas sibi quoad vixerit,
quinetiam in articulo mortis, ad ei succedendum, ac fore ejus hæredes
talliæ et provisionis in eadem dignitate, nominare et designare
placuerit, secundum nominationem et designationem manu ejus
subscribendam, subque provisionibus restrictionibus et conditionibus a
dicto Andrea, pro ejus arbitrio, in dicta designatione experimendis.” In
short, if the first Lord Rutherford had no heirs-male, he was entitled
by this patent to assign the dignity, even on death-bed, to any person
whom he might choose to name; and there was nothing to prevent him, if
so disposed, from having nominated his footman to succeed him in the
peerage! Here is a precedent to which we respectfully request the
attention of those who are bent upon asserting the unlimited nature of
the royal prerogative; and we should like to know whether they are
prepared to maintain that such a patent, if granted now, would be
regarded as constitutional, and would be held sufficient to entitle _the
assignee_, not the heir, of the originally created peer to sit in the
House of Lords? Certainly we are entitled to demand, if this case of
Lord Wensleydale is to be decided upon precedents, a distinct answer to
the foregoing question. For, as we have already shown—we trust
distinctly, and we know incontrovertibly—the interest now at stake
concerns not the Peerage of England, which has long since ceased to
exist, but the interest of the Peerage of the United Kingdom; and
therefore precedents drawn from the history of England can have no more
weight than precedents drawn from the histories or records of Scotland
or of Ireland.
We think that no weight whatever is to be given to such precedents. No
sovereign of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland has, till
now, attempted to alter the hereditary character of the Peerage. This is
the very first instance of a peerage for life granted in the monarchy
under which we live, and it cannot be considered otherwise than as an
innovation. We use that term in its most innocuous sense; not meaning
thereby to challenge the right of the Crown to confer a new description
of dignity, but simply marking the fact that the dignity, as granted, is
new. But the creation of such a dignity by no means carries with it the
right to a seat in the House of Lords. As we have already shown, many of
the Peers of the United Kingdom, all of whom are hereditary, are
expressly excluded from that House, not by will of the Sovereign alone,
but by express statute, bearing the authority of the Three Estates of
the realm. If there be any meaning whatever in the phrase that this is a
“limited monarchy,” it must be held to signify that the Crown cannot,
_ex proprio motu_, interfere with the constitution of the other two
Estates. It cannot, we know well, interfere arbitrarily with the
constitution of the House of Commons; but is it not an interference with
the constitution of the House of Lords, when we find a new kind of
peerage created, for the purpose of giving the party so created a voice
in the Legislature? Is that not directly contrary to constitutional
usage—to the “lex et consuetudo Parliamenti,” which has been justly held
as the great bulwark of our national freedom? On this point we invite
consideration; and the more deeply it is considered, the stronger, we
are assured, will be the conviction that the present attempt, if
successful, would be highly dangerous to the liberties of the country.
All must agree with us that it is of the most vital importance that the
independence of the two national chambers should be maintained. The
House of Commons cannot be otherwise than independent, because it is
strictly electoral. All proposals which have hitherto been made to place
a certain number of seats at the disposal of ministers, or rather to
allow ministers to sit and vote without representing a constituency,
have been scouted; and although very plausible arguments have from time
to time been advanced to prove the expediency of such an arrangement,
these have failed to convince the people of this country that it would
be safe to depart, in any case, from the electoral system of return. The
House of Peers hitherto has been independent, because, though the Crown
has the right of creating new peers, that right has only been exercised
according to the existing and understood conditions; and the hereditary
constitution of the House renders it impossible to suppose that any
undue or exorbitant exercise of the power of the Crown, in creating new
peers, can permanently affect its independence. It by no means follows
that the successor of the original peer is to be swayed by the same
motives which affected his father, or that he will tread implicitly in
his footsteps; and therefore, even in times of great excitement, the
power of creation has been exercised within limits by the advisers of
the Crown. Lord Brougham, who, in the days of the Reform Bill, was not
very scrupulous, intended, as he tells us himself, to advise his
sovereign, William IV., to exercise his prerogative to an extent which
never had been attempted before, and which, we devoutly trust, will
never be attempted again. He says, “When I went to Windsor with Lord
Grey, I had a list of EIGHTY creations, framed upon the principle of
making the least possible permanent addition to our House, and to the
aristocracy, by calling up peers’ eldest sons—by choosing men without
families—by taking Scotch and Irish peers.” It is of no avail now to
revert to the past, or to enter into any discussion whether or not the
proposed measure was justifiable; more especially as Lord Brougham adds,
“But such was my deep sense of the dreadful consequences of the act,
that I much question whether I should not have preferred running the
risk of confusion that attended the loss of the bill as it then stood.”
Under the present hereditary system, there is little danger that the
House of Peers will lose its independent character; nor could it be so
affected, even for a short period, save by some such exorbitant exercise
of the power of the Crown, by creating simultaneously an undue and
unconstitutional number of peers. But the case would be widely different
if life-peerages were to be allowed, and recognised as conferring a
right to sit in the House of Lords. Peerages in the ordinary course of
succession become rapidly extinct. In 1707, when the Union Roll of
Scotland was made up, the number of the Peerage amounted to 154; and
since then six, having proved their claims, have been added, thus
swelling the number to 160. At present there are only 82 members of that
Peerage, showing a diminution of nearly _one-half_ in the course of 150
years. If, then, the lapse of hereditary peerages is to be supplied—as
no doubt it will be supplied, should the claim of Lord Wensleydale to
take his seat in the House of Peers be allowed—by peers created for life
only, who can fail to see that, in the course of time, the independence
of the Upper House must be entirely extinguished? In the natural course
of events, that Chamber must become an appanage of the Crown, very much
indeed in the condition of the old English Chamber of Peers, when the
Crown exercised its discretion in issuing or withholding writs of
summons to Parliament. Therein, we conclude, lies the real danger. We
speak of “the constitution of the country,” and men regard the term as
vague because so much is implied. But it is different when we consider
separately the constitution of each branch of the Legislature. Then we
are dealing, not with generalities, but with facts; and we appeal, not
only to the antiquarian and the genealogist, but to the understanding of
all educated men, whether, until now, they ever conceived the
possibility of a non-hereditary House of Lords? Surely, in 1832, when a
design for swamping that House was seriously entertained, the legality
of creating peerages for life must have occurred to some of the men of
acute and daring intellect who were willing to peril so much for the
success of their favourite measure, and yet no proposal of the kind was
put forward. It is in the “ennoblement of the blood” which, once
bestowed, the sovereign cannot recall, that the essential privilege and
pre-eminence of the Peerage lies. Take that away, and the whole
character of the dignity is altered.
Some kind of argument has been attempted to be drawn in favour of
life-peerages, from the patent fact that bishops have seats in the House
of Lords. To that we answer that the “Spiritual Lords,” as they are
termed, sit there partly by consuetude, and partly by statute; and
Blackstone thus explains the reason of their sitting: “These” (_i.e._
the Spiritual Lords) “hold, or are supposed to hold, certain ancient
baronies under the Queen; for William the Conqueror thought proper to
change the spiritual tenure of frankalmoign, or free alms, under which
the bishops held their lands during the Saxon government, into the
feodal or Norman tenure by barony, which subjected their estates to all
civil charges and assessments, from which they were before exempt; and
in right of succession to those baronies which were unalienable from
their respective dignities, the bishops and abbots were allowed their
seats in the House of Lords.” And let it be specially remarked, that the
Crown has no power to call a newly-created bishop, in virtue of his
bishopric, to sit in the House of Lords. This is distinctly asserted by
the statute 10 and 11 Vict. cap. 108, which provides that the number of
English Lords Spiritual shall not be increased by the creation of any
new bishopric. So here is a precedent, if precedents are to be sought
for, limiting the power of the Crown as to new dignities, and debarring
it from interfering with the constituted rights of another estate of the
realm.
In the course of this discussion upon a subject not only interesting,
but of the highest importance, we have studiously avoided mixing up the
question of the right of the Crown to confer titles of honour at
pleasure, with that of the exercise of the prerogative to create,
contrary to consuetude, a new kind of nobility to sit in the House of
Lords. They are indeed totally separate questions, and must so be
considered in order to arrive at a proper understanding of the point at
issue. We submit that this much is clear and evident—1st, That the right
of sitting in the House of Lords is not the necessary consequence of the
possession of a British peerage; 2d, That, with the exception of the
Bishops or Lords Spiritual, who sit in the character of holders of
ancient baronies under the Queen, all the members of the House of Lords
are hereditary peers; 3d, That since the union of England and Scotland,
which merged the two ancient kingdoms into one monarchy under the name
of Great Britain, and made all the existing peers, without any
exception, peers of Great Britain, there has been no instance of any
attempt on the part of the Crown to create peerages without remainder;
4th, That the same observation applies to the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, which was established by the Act of Union with
Ireland, and which made all existing peers, peers of the United Kingdom.
The present is the first instance in which a title of nobility, without
remainder, has been conferred by patent, and the mere title, as a
personal honour, may be unimpeachable. But it is a very different thing
when it is attempted to give the holder of that title a seat in the
House of Lords, which, we humbly venture to think, is beyond the power
of the Crown, because it is contrary to the acknowledged constitution
and hereditary character of the House of Lords. That there must be some
limit to the exercise of the prerogative is certain; and we shall put a
case for the solution of those who take the opposite view. It is this:
Would the Crown be entitled to issue a writ of summons to any peer of
the United Kingdom, who is such in virtue of his representing an old
Scottish or Irish peerage; and would such peer be entitled, in respect
of that writ, to take his seat in the House of Lords? We apprehend that
there can be but one answer to that. Such an attempt would be directly
contrary to and in violation of the terms of the Acts of Union. No man
surely will maintain that Queen Anne could have evaded the express
conditions of the Treaty of Union, by creating all the former peers of
Scotland who became peers of Great Britain (with the exception of the
sixteen representatives), peers for life, without remainder, and so have
effected an absolute revolution in the character of the then existing
House of Lords. It was not until the year 1782, seventy years after the
Union, that a writ of summons was allowed to be issued to Douglas Duke
of Hamilton, in the character of Duke of Brandon, a dignity which had
been given to his ancestor in 1711. Previous to that decision, it seems
to have been maintained that no subsequent patent to a peer, who
originally was a peer of Scotland, could entitle him to a writ of
summons to sit in the House of Lords; and the point was twice
adjudicated upon in the House of Lords: first in the case of the Duke of
Hamilton, already mentioned; and, secondly, in that of the Duke of
Queensberry, who, 1719, asserted his right to a writ of summons in his
character of Duke of Dover. In both instances the decision was hostile
to the claim; but the point was finally set at rest by the admission of
the Duke of Hamilton to sit as Duke of Brandon under that patent.
If the Crown can now create a peer for life, so as to entitle him to a
seat in Parliament, it must necessarily have possessed that power 150
years ago; and, if so, every one of the Scottish peers might have been
called to the Upper House by the simple expedient of giving them new
patents for life. Such an attempt would undoubtedly have been considered
illegal, unconstitutional, and utterly subversive of the Union; and yet
we cannot see wherein such an attempt would have differed in principle
from that which is now made to introduce Lord Wensleydale to the House
of Lords. It is only by the consent of Queen, Lords, and Commons, that
the fundamental character of any of the three great Estates of the realm
can be altered; and the attempt to destroy or impair the independence of
one of them is ominous for the stability of the others.
_Printed by William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh._
-----
Footnote 1:
_A History of Rome from the Earliest Times to the Establishment of the
Empire._ By HENRY G. LIDDELL, D.D., Dean of Christchurch, Oxford, late
Head Master of Westminster School.
Footnote 2:
This was a law, passed after the battle of Cannæ, at the instance of
the tribune Oppius, “by which it was forbidden that any woman should
wear a gay-coloured dress, or have more than half an ounce of gold to
ornament her person, and that none should approach within a mile of
any city or town in a car drawn by horses.”—Vol. i. p. 363.
Footnote 3:
He had caused a fugitive and suppliant Gaul to be assassinated in his
own tent, where he was feasting with a favourite youth, in order that
the dying agonies of the man might afford an amusement to his unworthy
minion.—Vol. ii. p. 61.
Footnote 4:
_Histoire des Français des Divers Etats._ Victor Lecou, Libraire.
Paris, 1853.
Footnote 5:
One curious example of this kind of thing we remember to have seen in
the preface to the new edition of a work of some reputation. The
devout author, alluding to the success of his performance, offers his
grateful thanks to Providence and the Periodical Press.
Footnote 6:
Like some people nearer home, each of them (and many another besides
them) avers that his paper has the largest circulation of any journal
not only in America, but _in the world_. Of all statistics, the least
credible are those of newspaper proprietors.
Footnote 7:
We are fully prepared to find Mr Bennett attributing our unfavourable
remarks to a great “conspiracy” among the “aristocratic cliques” of
England against American institutions in general, and the _New York
Herald_ in particular. This is an old trick, but the American public
is too sensible any longer to be taken in by such nonsense. Mr
Bennett’s pretensions to represent the general sentiments of the
United States, have nowhere been more indignantly repudiated than in
New York. If we imagined that any American whose opinion is worth
considering, would interpret our criticism as implying any unkindly
feeling to his country, these pages should never have seen the light.
The objects of our criticism are individual men.
Footnote 8:
The _North American Review_ thanks Mr Parton warmly for his brave—his
noble book. Was the orthodox Grannie dozing when she read it?
Footnote 9:
The meaning of the words “Whig,” “Democrat,” &c., and the combination
in the same individuals of Whig and Protectionist, Conservative and
Democrat, are somewhat puzzling to those who have not studied the
complicated subject of American politics.
Footnote 10:
Of the printing-office and editorial rooms Mr Parton gives a minute
account, not failing to give us the names and describe the personal
attractions of all the leading officials, including the distinguished
foreman, Mr T. Rooker, who warns “_gentlemen_ desiring to wash and
soak their distributing matter,” to use the “metal galleys” he has
cast for that purpose! “It took the world,” says Mr P., “an unknown
number of thousand years to arrive at that word GENTLEMEN.” What a
pity that some smart man does not write a little book on “The
Flunkeyism of Democracy.”
Footnote 11:
On this subject the biography maintains, with one or two exceptions, a
prudent reserve. One pathetic description is attempted of the old
sinner, “as he stood in his editorial rooms in Nassau Street, _while
from his head was washed the blood that incarnadined the snows of
fifty winters_.” After the washing of his headpiece, the invincible
editor coolly sat down to narrate the “assassination” in his own
choice style for the benefit of his readers. The following may pass as
a specimen of his manner. “James Watson Webb,” editor of the _Courier
and Enquirer_, was an old comrade of the writer’s.
“As I was leisurely pursuing my business yesterday, in Wall Street,
collecting the information which is daily disseminated in the
_Herald_, James Watson Webb came up to me on the northern side of the
street—said something which I could not hear distinctly, then pushed
me down the stone steps leading to one of the broker’s offices, and
commenced fighting with a species of brutal and demoniac desperation
characteristic of a fury.
“My damage is a scratch, about three-quarters of an inch in length, on
the third finger of the left hand, which I received from the iron
railing I was forced against, and three buttons torn from my vest,
which any tailor will reinstate for a sixpence. His loss is a rent
from top to bottom of a very beautiful black coat, which cost the
ruffian 40 dollars, and a blow in the face, which may have knocked
down his throat some of his infernal teeth for anything I know.
Balance in my favour, 39 dollars, 94 cents.”
Footnote 12:
Mr Bennett, it would appear, is not indeed utterly free from the human
feeling of “love of approbation”—the approbation, however, of
“peculiar” characters. Mr O’Connell insulted him at a great Repeal
gathering in Dublin, by saying, when his card was presented, “We don’t
want him here. He is one of the conductors of one of the vilest
Gazettes ever published by infamous publishers.” Poor Bennett was “ill
for some days in Scotland”—probably, thinks the tender biographer, in
consequence of this unexpected repulse from a brother demagogue.
Footnote 13:
Gibbon.
Footnote 14:
_Report by the Commissioners for the British Fisheries of their
Proceedings in the Year ended 31st December 1854; being Fishing 1854._
Edinburgh, 1855.
Article “FISHERIES” in the current edition of the _Encyclopædia
Britannica_, vol. ix. Edinburgh, 1855.
Footnote 15:
This fearful loss, it may be borne in mind, fell not upon fishermen
and merchants, but upon the poor fishermen alone—most of the survivors
being thereby rendered destitute. “Of those who perished at Wick, 17
left widows and 60 children; at Helmsdale, the 13 drowned have left 9
widows and 25 children; of the 26 men belonging to Port Gordon and
Buckie, who perished at Peterhead, 8 have left widows and 22 children;
and, including the 13 widows and 54 children of the 19 men lost
belonging to Stonehaven and Johnshaven, there will be left 47 widows
and 161 children totally unprovided for—a calamity without precedent
in the annals of the British fisheries.”—CAPTAIN WASHINGTON’S
_Report_, p. xvii.
Footnote 16:
_Report—Fishing Boats_ (Scotland). Ordered by the House of Commons to
be printed, 28th July 1849.
Footnote 17:
The year above referred to was that of 1848. Still larger captures and
comparative increase in the quantity cured have since occurred. Thus,
in 1849, there were cured at Wick 140,505 barrels.
Footnote 18:
_Essays on the Trade, Commerce, Manufactures, and Fisheries of
Scotland_, vol. iii. p. 197. Edinburgh, 1778.
Footnote 19:
_Eighth Annual Report of the Board of Supervision for the Relief of
the Poor in Scotland._ Edinburgh, 1853.
Footnote 20:
Value of boats employed in the fisheries, £225,830
Do. of nets „ „ 303,666
Do. of lines „ „ 57,924
————
Total (for 1854), £587,420
Footnote 21:
The above numbers are exclusive of between _four and five thousand
men_ engaged in the _export_ fishing trade.
Footnote 22:
The following is the present constitution of the Board:
_Commissioners_—Lord Murray; Earl of Caithness; George Traill, M.P.;
James Wilson; Rear-Admiral Henry Dundas; Andrew Coventry; James T.
Gibson-Craig; Professor Traill; William Mitchell Innes; Lord Elcho,
M.P.; Sir James Matheson, M.P.; John Thomson Gordon; George Loch; with
Lord Advocate Moncreiff, and Solicitor-General Maitland, _Ex
officiis_.—Secretary, Hon. B. F. Primrose.
Footnote 23:
_Twentieth Report from the Board of Public Works, Ireland_, p. 236.
London, 1852.
Footnote 24:
_Report of the Commissioners of Fisheries, Ireland, for 1853._ Dublin,
1854.
Footnote 25:
Ibid. 1854. Dublin, 1855.
Footnote 26:
_Report of the Commissioners of Fisheries, Ireland, for 1854_, p. 12.
The above quotation refers to the herring fishery carried on at Howth.
We think it right to state that the schedules appended to the report
bear testimony “to the peaceable and orderly habits of the fishermen,
and to the total absence of any conflicts or disturbance of any kind.”
It is, unfortunately, added, that “it is much to be deplored that
nearly all agree in describing an unexampled state of depression as
extending to all parts of the coast.”—_Ibid._, p. 6.
Footnote 27:
_Ibid._, p. 6. As the law now stands, there is no regulation in
respect to the size of the mesh of nets used in Ireland for the
capture of fish other than of the salmon species.
Footnote 28:
Letter from Mr Methuen to the Lord Advocate; _Edinburgh Evening
Courant_, February 6, 1856.
Footnote 29:
We have recently received the _Commercial Circular_ of Messrs
Plüddeman and Kirstein of Stettin, of date the 20th January 1856.
Referring to the increased consumption of our herrings in the
Continental markets during the last season, they attributed it chiefly
to the high prices of all descriptions of _meat_, as a consequence of
the high value of rye, and all other grains, caused by the blockade of
the Russian ports, and the failure of the Continental crops. The
following is their summary of the importation of Scotch herrings, into
their own and neighbouring districts, during the last four years:—
┌──────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────┬───────────┐
│ Years. │ Stettin. │ Harburg. │ Hamburg. │ Dantzic. │Königsberg.│
├──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼──────────┼───────────┤
│ │ Barrels. │ Barrels. │ Barrels. │ Barrels. │ Barrels. │
│ 1852│ 121,290│ 10,000│ 44,000│ 22,146│ about 4000│
│ 1853│ 123,537│ 26,000│ 22,000│ 44,272│ about 5000│
│ 1854│ 118,800│ 52,400│ 25,550│ 28,009│ 2758│
│ 1855│ 154,961│ 59,769│ 26,500│ 66,122│ 15,070│
└──────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────┴──────────┴───────────┘
The above transmissions for 1855 give a total of 322,422 barrels of
Scotch herrings, of which the price to our curers, for such as were
full crown branded, varied from L.1, 1s. to L.1, 4s. each, producing,
with such as were of a somewhat inferior quality and price, an
enormous aggregate of income from the Prussian ports alone.
We may here add, that there is an immediate prospect of the duty on
our herrings being greatly reduced in Belgium. It is at present 13
francs (or about 11s.) per barrel—a tax which quite prohibits
importation. When the great cities of Brussels, Ghent, Liège, Louvain,
Antwerp, Bruges, Mons, Namur, Malines, &c., are open to our produce,
what may we not hope for from the appetites of a Catholic and
therefore fish-eating population?
Footnote 30:
We have reason to believe that petitions to the Treasury for the
maintenance of the Board of Fisheries and its official brand, have
been presented or are in course of transmission from the following
twenty-one ports in this country, viz.:—Wick Town-Council, Wick
Chamber of Commerce, Helmsdale, Burghhead, Lossiemouth, Macduff,
Banff, Gardenstown, Whitehills, Portsoy, Fraserburgh, Peterhead,
Montrose, Anstruther, Leith Chamber of Commerce, Eyemouth, Burnmouth,
Coldingham, Berwick-upon-Tweed, &c., Glasgow, Greenock, Bute. The
following places on the Continent have sent in corresponding
petitions, viz.:—Stettin, Königsberg, Dantzic, Berlin, Breslau,
Dresden, Magdeburg, Harburg, Hamburg.
Footnote 31:
_Memoir of the Rev. Sydney Smith._ By his Daughter, LADY HOLLAND.
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