cited in Lesson xxv.
_VII. Creed of St. Athanasius._ Also "Plato's Republic"
and "Timaeus." Outlines
_VIII. The Arian Controversy._ of Lectures on the History
of Philosophy (Elmendorf's)
_IX. Origin of Metaphysical Difficulties._ Art. on
Plato and St. Augustine,
_X. Methods of Arriving at the Conception Chs. iv, v, vi, vii.
of "Pure Being."_
Moral and Metaphysical
_XI. Patristic Doctrine of God of Pagan Philosophy (Maurice).
Origin._ Art. Plato. St. Athanaus
and St Augustine, Vol. I. For
Orthodox Explanation of
Nicene and Athanasian
Principles, see Hodge's
"Commentary on the
Confession of Faith"
(Presbyterian), Ch. ii.
Also "The Nicene Creed,
a Manual for Candidates
for Holy Orders" (J. J. Lias,
M. A.), Chs. i-iv.
"A History of Christian
Councils, From Original
Documents," by
C. J. Hegele, D. D.
Translated from the
German by Wm. R. Clark.
_SPECIAL TEXT: "There shall be false teachers among you who privily
shall bring in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought
them." II Peter ii, 1._
_NOTES._
1. _The Nicene Creed:_ The next official formulation of alleged
Christian doctrine after the "Apostles Creed," was the creed drafted at
the council of Nicea, in Bithynia, 325 A. D., as follows:
"We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, creator of all things
visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God,
only-begotten of the Father, that is, of the substance of the Father,
God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made,
being of the same substance with the Father, by whom all things were
made in heaven and in earth, who for us men and for our salvation came
down from heaven, was incarnate, was made man, suffered, rose again the
third day, ascended into the heavens, and He will come to judge the
living and the dead; and in the Holy Ghost. Those who say there was a
time when He was not, and He was not before He was begotten, and He
was made of nothing (he was created), or who say that He is of another
hypostatis, or of another substance (than the Father), or that the
Son of God is created, that He is mutable, or subject to change, the
Catholic church anathematizes."[1]
2. _Creed of St. Athanasius:_ Nearly all Ecclesiastical writers
doubt of Athanasius being the author of the creed accredited to him;
but all agree, nevertheless, that it is an orthodox explanation of
the Nicene Creed. "This creed was evidently composed long after the
death of the great theologian whose name it bears, and after the
controversies closed and the definitions established by the councils of
Ephesus (A. D. 431), and Chalcedon (A. D. 451). It is a grand (?) and
unique (!) monument of the unchangeable faith of the whole Church as to
the great mysteries of Godliness, the Trinity of the Persons in the one
God, and the duality of natures in the one Christ." (Commentary on the
confession of Faith--Presbyterian--by Rev. A. A. Hodges, D. D., 1870.
Designed for Theological Students, ch. i, pp. 6, 7.) The creed follows:
"We worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity, neither
confounding the persons nor dividing the substance. For there is one
person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy
Ghost. But the Godhead of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost is all one;
the glory equal, the majesty co-eternal. Such as the Father is, such
is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost. The Father uncreate, the Son
uncreate, and the Holy Ghost uncreate. The Father incomprehensible,
the Son incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost incomprehensible. The
Father eternal, the Son eternal, and the Holy Ghost eternal. And yet
there are not three eternals, but one eternal. As also there are not
three incomprehensibles, nor three uncreate, but one uncreate and one
incomprehensible. So likewise the Father is almighty, the Son almighty,
and the Holy Ghost almighty; and yet they are not three almighties, but
one almighty. So the Father is God, the Son, is God, and the Holy Ghost
is God; and yet there are not three Gods, but one God."
"So, likewise, the Father is Lord, the Son Lord, and the Holy Ghost
Lord. And yet not three Lords; but one Lord. For likewise as we
are compelled by the Christian verity: to acknowledge every Person
by himself to be God and Lord. So are we forbidden by the Catholic
Religion to say: There be three Gods, or three Lords. The Father is
made of none, neither created, nor begotten. The Son is of the Father
alone; not made, nor created, but begotten. The Holy Ghost is of the
Father and of the Son; neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but
proceeding. So there is one Father; not three Fathers; one Son, not
three Sons; one Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts.
"And in this Trinity none is afore, or after, other; none is greater,
or less than another; but the whole three Persons are co-eternal
together, and co-equal. So that in all things, as is aforesaid, the
Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity is to be worshipped. He,
therefore, that will be saved, must thus think of the Trinity.
"Furthermore it is necessary to everlasting salvation; that he also
believe rightly the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. For the right
Faith is, that we believe and confess: that our Lord Jesus Christ,
the Son of God, is God and Man; God, of the Substance of the Father,
begotten before the worlds; and Man, of the Substance of his Mother,
born in the world; perfect God, and perfect man; of a reasonable soul
and human flesh subsisting; equal to the Father, as touching his
Godhead; and inferior to the Father, as touching his Manhood. Who,
although he be God and Man, yet he is not two, but one Christ; one, not
by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the Manhood
into God; one altogether, not by confusion of Substance, but by unity
of Person. For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God
and Man is one Christ; who suffered for our salvation; descended into
hell, rose again the third day from the dead. He ascended into heaven,
He sitteth on the right hand of the Father, God Almighty; from whence
He shall come to judge the quick and the dead. At Whose coming all men
shall rise again with their bodies, and shall give account for their
own works." (Common Prayer, Church of England.) (For comment upon this
creed, see Year Book II, Lesson xxxvii.)
3. _Pro Et Con of the Arian Controversy:_ The orthodox doctrine
of deity for the Patristic period, is found in the last two creeds
quoted, still it is well enough to give each side of the controversy,
out of which the creeds were born, opportunity to state its own case.
Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, Egypt, states the orthodox side. He
first represents Arius, leader of the opposition, as:
"Denying the divinity of our Saviour, pronounced him on a level with
all other creatures. He says that they held, there was a time when the
Son of God was not; and he who once had no existence, afterwards did
exist; and from that time was, what every man naturally is; for (say
they) [the Arians] 'God made all things of nothing, including the Son
of God, in this creation of all things, both rational and irrational;
and of course, pronouncing Him to be of a changeable nature, and
capable of virtue and of sin.'" Then, affirmatively, Alexander gives
his own views as follows:
"We believe, as the Apostolic Church does, in the only unbegotten
Father, who derived his existence from no one, and is immutable and
unalterable, always the same and uniform, unsusceptible of increase of
diminution; the giver of the law, and the prophets, and the gospels;
Lord of the patriarchs and apostles, and of all saints; and in one
Lord, Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, not begotten from
nothing, but from the living Father; and not after the manner of
material bodies, by separations and effluxes of parts, as Sabellius and
Valentinian supposed, but in an inexplicable and indescribable manner,
agreeably to the declaration before quoted: 'Who shall declare his
generation?' For His existence is inscrutable to all mortal beings,
just as the Father is inscrutable; because created intelligences are
incapable of understanding this divine generation from the Father--'No
one knoweth what the Father is, but the Son; and no one knoweth what
the Son is, but the Father.'
"He is unchangeable, as much as the Father; lacks nothing; is the
perfect Son, and the absolute likeness of the Father, save only that
He is not unbegotten. * * * Therefore, to the unbegotten Father, His
proper dignity must be preserved. And to the Son, also, suitable honor
must be given, by ascribing to Him an eternal generation from the
Father."
Arius, making complaint that he is persecuted by Alexander--states
first the position of his adversary thus: Arius and his friends are
persecuted--"Because we do not agree with him, publicly asserting that
God always was, and the Son always was; that He was always the Father,
always the Son; that the Son was of God himself." Then stating his own
position affirmatively, he says:
"We have taught, and still teach, that the Son is not unbegotten, nor
a portion of the unbegotten, in any manner; nor was He formed out of
any subjacent matter, but that in will and purpose, he existed before
all times and before all worlds, perfect God, the only begotten,
unchangeable; and that before He was begotten, or created, or purposed,
or established, He was not; for He was never unbegotten. We are
persecuted, because we say, the Son had a beginning, but God was
without beginning. We are also persecuted, because we say, that He is
from nothing; and this we say, inasmuch as He is not a portion of God,
nor formed from any subjacent matter. Therefore we are persecuted. The
rest you know." (Mosheim, Vol. I, p. 288--Notes).
_The Differences Summed Up:_ Summing up the differences between the
two parties, Murdock, the able translator and annotator of Mosheim,
says: "According to these statements, both the Arians and the orthodox
considered the Son of God the Saviour of the World, as a derived
existence, and as generated by the Father. But they differed on two
points. (1.) The orthodox believed His generation was from eternity, so
that he was coeval with the Father. But the Arians believed there was
a time when the Son was not. (2.) The orthodox believed the Son to be
derived of and from the Father; so that He was of the same essence with
the Father. But the Arians believed that He was formed out of nothing,
by the creative power of God. Both, however, agreed in calling Him God,
and in ascribing to Him divine perfections. As to His offices, or His
being the Saviour of sinful men, it does not appear that they differed
materially in their views." (Ibid).
4. _Origin of These Metaphysical Difficulties:_ Undoubtedly it was
contact with Oriental and Greek philosophical vagaries, and seeking to
harmonize the facts of revelation, with these vagaries, that led to the
intellectual difficulties of patristic Christianity. The temptation to
seek such harmony, was strong. Already a similar work had been done for
the Jews at Alexandria, under the leadership of Philo. He found, in
the lofty speculations of Plato, the wisdom of Moses and of Solomon;
and in the second century of the Christian Era, Numenius could ask
"What is Plato but Moses talking Attic?" "The arms of Macedonians,"
remarks Gibbon," diffused over Asia and Egypt the language and learning
of Greece"; and with that language and learning, and as part of the
latter, went the philosophy of Plato, until among the learned and
influential it was largely the ground plan of their thinking. The
Christians, in the first three centuries of their existence, had
been despised sectaries, with no standing among those who made any
pretensions to learning; so that when there came opportunity to show
identity between the holy trinity of the Christian faith, and the
supposed trinity of Plato's philosophy; and identity of the "word"
of John's Gospel with the "Logos" of Plato's divine "being," it was
seized upon with avidity, not alone, it is to be feared, because of the
semblance of truth that was seen in the two things, but also because of
the advantages that struggling Christianity would secure by linking the
theology of the church with the philosophy of the Academy. "The lofty
speculations," says Gibbon, "which neither convinced the understanding
nor agitated the passions of the Platonists themselves, were carelessly
overlooked by the idle, the busy, and even the studious part of
mankind. But after the 'Logos' had been revealed as the sacred object
of the faith, the hope, and the religious worship of the Christians,
the mysterious system was embraced by a numerous and increasing
multitude in every province of the Roman world. Those persons who, from
their age, or sex, or occupations, were the least qualified to judge,
who were the least exercised in the habits of abstract reasoning,
aspired to contemplate the economy of the divine nature; and it is the
boast of Tertullian, that a Christian mechanic could easily answer
such questions as had perplexed the wisest of the Grecian sages. Where
the subject lies so far beyond our reach, the difference between
the highest and the lowest of human understandings may indeed be
calculated as infinitely small, yet the degree of weakness may perhaps
be measured by the degree of obstinacy and dogmatic confidence." What
more is necessary to know upon this topic, can be learned from the note
entitled "Patristic Doctrine of God of Pagan Rather than of Christian
Origin," and Lesson xxxvii, in Year Book II.
5. _The Manner of Apprehending "That Which Is"--God:_ The manner
of apprehending God--"that which is"--by the Christian Fathers, is
very similar to the method of the pagan philosophers in apprehending
"being"--or the "absolute." Take two examples of this process; the
first from Plato's "Republic," a conversation between teacher and
pupil; the second from the confessions of Augustine; where the father
describes how he came to his apprehension of God:
It is necessary first to remind the student that in Plato's philosophy
the "supreme being" is "being absolutely bare of quality." Of Him
it can only be said that he is not _what_ he is. In Timaeus,
Plato says: "We say, indeed, that 'he was,' 'he is,' 'he will be,'
but the truth is that 'he is;' alone truly expresses him." (Jowett's
Translation, Vol. 2, p. 530.) And now as to the method of arriving at
the apprehension of the "infinite being," or the "absolute," through
the medium of finite or relative things; and which, in the case here
quoted from Plato, is from "relative beauty" to "absolute beauty"; the
same process, however, may be followed from "finite being" to "infinite
being."
"This is the distinction which I draw between the sight-loving,
art-loving, practical class, and those of whom I am speaking, and who
are alone worthy of the name of philosophers.
"How do you distinguish them? he said.
"The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond
of fine tones and colors and forms, and all the artificial products
that are made out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or
loving absolute beauty.
"That is true, he replied.
"Few are they who are able to attain the sight of absolute beauty.
"Very true.
"And he who, having a sense of beautiful things, has no sense of
absolute beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that
beauty, is unable to follow--of such an one, I ask, Is he awake or in a
dream only? * * * *
"I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.
"But take the case of the other, who recognizes the existence of
absolute beauty, and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects
which participate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place
of the idea nor the idea in the place of the objects--is he a dreamer?
or is he awake?
"He is the reverse of a dreamer, he replied.
"And may we not say that the mind of the one has knowledge, and that
the mind of the other has opinion only?
"Certainly."
And how Augustine, the Christian father, spoken of as "the brightest,
clearest, most comprehensive" of Christian philosophers. ("Lectures on
the History of Christian Philosophy"--Elmendorf--p. 92):
"And I inquired what iniquity was, and found it to be no substance, but
the perversion of the will, turned aside from Thee, O God, the Supreme,
towards these lower things, and casting out its bowels, and puffed up
outwardly.
"And I wondered that I now loved Thee, and no phantasm for thee. And
yet did I not press on to enjoy my God; but was borne up to Thee by Thy
beauty, and soon borne down from Thee by mine own weight, sinking with
sorrow into these inferior things. This weight was carnal custom. Yet
dwelt there with me a remembrance of Thee; nor did I any way doubt,
that there was One to Whom I might cleave, but that I was not yet such
as to cleave to Thee; for that 'the body which is corrupted, presseth
down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind that
museth upon many things.' And most certain I was, that 'Thy invisible
works from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood
by the things that are made, even Thy eternal power and God-head.' For
examining whence it was that I admired the beauty of bodies celestial
or terrestrial; and what aided me in judging soundly on things mutable,
and pronouncing, 'This ought to be thus, this not'; examining, I say,
whence it was that I so judged, seeing I did so judge, I had found the
unchangeable and true Eternity of Truth above my changeable mind. And
thus, by degrees, I passed from bodies to the soul, which through the
bodily senses perceives; and thence to its inward faculty, to which
the bodily senses represent things external, whitherto reaches the
faculties of beasts; and thence again to the reasoning faculty, to
which what is received from the senses of the body, is referred to be
judged. Which, finding itself also to be in me a thing variable, raised
itself up to its own understanding, and drew away my thoughts from the
power of habit, withdrawing itself from those troops of contradictory
phantasms; that so it might find what that light was, whereby it was
bedewed, when, without all doubting, it cried out:
"'That the unchangeable was to be preferred to the changeable'; whence
also it knew _That Unchangeable_, which, unless it had in some way
known, it had had no sure ground to prefer it to the changeable. And
thus with the flash of one trembling glance it arrived at _That Which
Is_. And then I saw 'Thy invisible things understood by the things
which are made.'"
6. _Patristic Doctrine of God of Pagan Rather Than of Christian
Origin--Data Not in the Old Testament:_ The data for the doctrine
that God is "pure being," "being absolutely bare of all quality,"
are not found in the Old Testament, for that teaches the plainest
anthropomorphic ideas respecting God. It ascribes to Him a human form,
and many qualities and attributes possessed by man, which, in the minds
of orthodox Christian philosophers, limit Him who must be, to their
thinking, without any limitation whatsoever, either as to essence,
or form, or passion, or quality; and ascribes relativity to Him who,
according to their conceptions, must not be relative but absolute.
The passage usually depended upon as giving the data for this "being
absolutely bare of quality," and that is held to identify the ground
plan of the philosophy of Moses and Plato--_"I am that I am"_--the
God who appeared to Moses in the burning bush; and Who replied when
the Hebrew prophet asked what he should say when the Egyptians and
Israel should ask who had sent him--"Say, I Am sent me;" that is the
Self-Existing One sent me. This passage, I say, does not furnish
the data for the Orthodox Christian conception of God, that He is
"being, absolutely free from all quality"; not material (the "without
body" of the creeds), without parts, and without passions; for to be
self-existent does not demand the absence of quality; indeed, to be
without quality, run to its last analysis, would mean non-existence.
_Data Not in the New Testament:_ The data for the doctrine of
God's absolute "simplicity," or, "being absolutely without quality,"
do not come from the New Testament; for the writers of that volume of
scripture accept the doctrine of the Old Testament respecting God, and
even emphasize its anthropomorphic ideas, by representing that the man
Christ Jesus was in the "express image" of God, the Father's person;
was, in fact, God manifest in the flesh (1 Tim. 3: 16); "the image of
the invisible God" (Col. 1: 5); God, the Word, who was made flesh, and
dwelt among men, and they beheld His glory (St. John 1:1-14). Hence
the Orthodox Christian doctrine of God's "simplicity" cannot claim the
warrant of New Testament authority.
_Data Found in Pagan Doctrines:_ It is easy, however, to trace this
doctrine to Pagan sources. Plato, in his Timaeus (Jowett's translation,
p. 530), incidentally referring to God, in connection with the creation
of the universe, says: "We say indeed that 'he was,' 'he is,' 'he will
be,' but the truth is that 'he is' alone truly expresses him, and that
'was' and 'will be' are only to be spoken of generation in time."
Here, then, is the Orthodox Christian doctrine of "pure being," "most
simple," "not compound."
Again: "We must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which
is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving
anything into itself from without, nor itself giving out to any other,
but invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the sight
is granted to intelligence only." (Ibid. p. 454). Here the Orthodox
Christian may find his God, 'who cannot change with regard to his
existence, nor with regard to his mode of existence.' Also his God who
can only be seen with the 'soul's intellectual perception, elevated
by a supernatural influx from God.' Dr. Mosheim, in his account of
Plato's idea of God, says: "He considered the Deity, to whom he gave
the supreme governance of the universe, as a being of the highest
wisdom and power, and totally unconnected with any material substance."
(Mosheim's "Historical Commentaries on the State of Christianity,
During the First Three Hundred Years," Vol. 1. p. 37).
To the same effect, also, Justin Martyr (second Christian century)
generalizes and accepts as doctrine what may be gathered from the
sixth book of Plato's "Republic," with reference to God. To the Jew,
Trypho, Justin remarks: "The Deity, Father, is not to be viewed by the
organs of sight, like other creatures, but He is to be comprehended by
the mind alone, as Plato declares, and I believe him. * * * * Plato
tells us that the eye of the mind is of such a nature, and was given
us to such an end, as to enable us to see with it by itself, when
pure, that Being who is the source of whatever is an object of the
mind itself, who has neither color, nor shape, nor size, nor anything
which the eye can see, but who is above all essence, who is ineffable,
and undefinable, who is alone beautiful and good, and who is at once
implanted into those souls who are naturally well born, through their
relationship to and desire of seeing him."
Athanasius (third Christian century) quotes the same definition (Contra
Gentes, ch. 2), almost verbatim. Turning again to the Timaeus of
Plato, this question is asked: "What is that which always is and has
no becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and has never
any being? That which is apprehended by reflection and reason [God]
always is; and is the same; that on the other hand which is conceived
by opinion, with the help of sensation without reason [the material
universe], is in a process of becoming and perishing but never really
is. * * * * Was the world [universe], always in existence and without
beginning? or created and having a beginning? Created, I reply." In
this, the orthodox Christians may find their God of pure "being," that
never is "becoming," but always is; also the creation of the universe
out of nothing.
_Pagan Origin of Doctrine of God Admitted:_ "In his great work
on the 'History of Christian Doctrine,' Mr. William G. T. Shedd says
(Vol. I, p. 56): "The early Fathers, in their defenses of Christianity
against their pagan opponents, contend that the better pagan writers
themselves agree with the new religion in teaching that there is one
Supreme Being. Lactantius (Institutiones, 1, 5), after quoting the
Orphic Poets, Hesiod, Virgil, and Ovid, in proof that the heathen
poets taught the unity of the supreme deity, affirms that the better
pagan philosophers agree with them in this. 'Aristotle,' he says,
'although he disagrees with himself, and says many things that are
self-contradictory, yet testifies that one supreme mind rules over
the world. Plato, who is regarded as the wisest philosopher of them
all, plainly and openly defends the doctrine of a divine monarchy, and
denominates the supreme being, not ether, nor reason, nor nature, but
as he is, God; and asserts that by him this perfect and admirable world
was made. And Cicero follows Plato, frequently confessing the deity,
and calls him the supreme being, in his Treatise on the Laws.'"
"It is conceded by Christian writers that the Christian doctrine of
God is not expressed in New Testament terms, but in the terms of Greek
and Roman metaphysics, as witness the following from the very able
article in the Encyclopedia Britannica on 'Theism,' by the Rev. Dr.
Flint, Professor of Divinity, University of Edinburgh: 'The proposition
constitutive of the dogma of the Trinity--the propositions in the
symbols of Nice, Constantinople and Toledo, relative to the immanent
distinctions and relations in the Godhead--were not drawn directly
from the New Testament, and could not be expressed in New Testament
terms. They were the product of reason speculating on a revelation to
faith--the New Testament representation of God as a Father, a Redeemer
and a Sanctifier--with a view to conserve and vindicate, explain and
comprehend it. They were only formed through centuries of effort, only
elaborated by the aid of the conceptions, and formulated in the terms
of Greek and Roman metaphysics.' The same authority says: 'The massive
defense of theism, erected by the Cambridge school of philosophy,
against atheism, fatalism, and the denial of moral distinctions, was
avowedly built on a Platonic foundation.'" (See note).
Guizot, the eminent stateman and historian of France, in one of
his lectures of which this is a sub-division of the title--"Of the
Transition from Pagan Philosophy to Christian Theology"--says, in
concluding his treatment of this theme: "I have thus exhibited the
fact which I indicated in the outset, the fusion of Pagan philosophy
with Christian theology, the metamorphosis of the one into the other.
And it is remarkable, that the reasoning applied to the establishment
of the spirituality of the soul is evidently derived from the ancient
philosophy, rather than from Christianity, and that the author seems
more especially to aim a convincing the theologians, by proving to them
that the Christian faith has nothing in all this which is not perfectly
reconcilable with the results derived from pure reason."
"In method of thought also, no less than in conclusions, the most
influential of the Christian fathers on these subjects followed the
Greek philosophers rather than the writers of the New Testament.
'Platonism, and Aristotelianism,' says the author of the 'History of
Christian Doctrine,' exerted more influence upon the intellectual
methods of men, taking in the whole time since their appearance, than
all other systems combined. They certainly influenced the Greek mind,
and Grecian culture, more than all the other philosophical systems.
They reappear in Roman philosophy--so far as Rome had any philosophy.
We shall see that Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero exerted more influence
than all other philosophical minds united, upon the greatest of the
Christian Fathers; upon the greatest of the Schoolmen; and upon the
theologians of the Reformation, Calvin and Melanchthon. And if we look
at European philosophy as it has been unfolded in England, Germany
and France, we shall perceive that all the modern theistic schools
have discussed the standing problems of human reason, in very much the
same manner in which the reason of Plato and Aristotle discussed them
twenty-two centuries ago. Bacon, Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant, so
far as the first principles of intellectual and moral philosophy are
concerned, agree with their Grecian predecessors. A student who has
mastered the two systems of the Academy and Lyceum, will find in modern
philosophy (with the exception of the department of natural science)
very little that is true, that may not be found for substance, and
germinally, in the Greek theism."
"It is hoped that enough is said here to establish the fact that the
conception of God as 'pure being,' 'immaterial,' 'without form,' 'or
parts or passions,' as held by orthodox Christianity, has its origin
in Pagan philosophy, not in Jewish nor Christian revelation." (Mormon
Doctrine of Deity--Roberts--pp. 114-119).
Footnotes
1. For a brief account of the Arian controversy which resulted in the
formulation of this creed, see notes in Year Book II, Lesson xxxvii;
also note 3, this Lesson.
LESSON XXVII.
(Scripture Reading Exercise.)
_MEDIAEVAL CONCEPTIONS OF GOD._
_ANALYSIS._ _REFERENCES._
_I. The Mediaeval Period and Schools The works cited in
of Thought._ Lessons xxv and xxvi
will be helpful in this
_II. Definitions._ Lesson under the topics
of the analysis; and of
_III. Representative Doctors of the Various course the authorities
Schools of Thought:_ cited in the notes of this
lesson.
1. Erigena, Extreme Realist.
2. Roscelina, of Compiegne, Extreme
Nominalist.
3. Anselm, Realist.
4. Thomas Aquinas, Properly Neither
Realist nor Nominalist,
Scholastic.
5. Eckhart, Mystic.
_SPECIAL TEXT: "And without controversy, great is the mystery of
Godliness." I. Tim. iii, 16_.
_NOTES._
1. _The Mediaeval Period:_ The Patristic Period, according to
our announced grouping of the Christian Fathers, extended to 750 A.
D. and included in the enumeration of the fathers John of Damascus.
The Mediaeval Period will extend from the above date to the middle
of the sixteenth century, which brings us to the establishment of
Protestantism, and the commencement, theologically, of the modern
world. This gives us a period of eight hundred years. "Of this period,"
says Shedd, "not more than four centuries witnessed any great activity
of the theological mind."
The "Orthodox Christian" doctrine of God for this period, and for
matter of that, for all subsequent periods, was fixed by the Nicene
Creed and the creed of St. Athanasius, quoted in Lesson 26. The effort
of the Christian scholars of the Mediaeval Period was to maintain,
first, the truthfulness of these creeds against skepticism and doubts
within the Church itself; and, second, to reconcile the creeds with
reason, and develop patristic philosophy into something like system
(History of Philosophy--Elmendorf--p. 102). However, "As there is never
a proper end to reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation," to
quote Cicero, the efforts of the schoolmen were not very successful,
and resulted in multiplying systems of philosophy, rather than in
bringing the patristic doctrine into harmony with reason. The systems
of thought developed by these efforts may be classed under three heads:
Realism, Nominalism, and Mysticism. A brief definition of each will be
necessary.
2. _Definitions--"Realism:"_ Realism divides into two classes,
extreme and moderate. (1) "Extreme realism taught that universals were
substances or things, existing independently of and separate from
particulars; this was the essence of Plato's ideas." (Cent. Dict.) The
thinking process of the realist is admirably depicted in Note 5, Lesson
xxvi, where St. Augustine describes his rise from the conception of the
"changeable" to the "Unchangeable," and "thus with the flash of one
trembling glance," arrived at the conception of "that which is"--to the
real--to the universal--to the apprehension of "God."
"Moderate Realism also taught that universals were substances, but
only as dependent upon and inseparable from individuals, in which each
inhered; that is, each universal inhered in each of the particulars
ranged under it. This was the theory of Aristotle, who held that
the individual thing was the first essence, while universals were
only second essences, real in a less complete sense than first
essences. He thus reversed the Platonic doctrine, which attributed the
fullest reality to universals only, and a participative reality to
individuals." (Cent. Dict.)
Elmendorf represents moderate realism as recognizing that
"the universal has objective reality, as to its contents, in
individuals"--(i. e., the universal is expressed through individuals).
_Nominalism:_ Nominalism also divides into two classes, extreme
and moderate. "Extreme nominalism taught that universals had no
substantive or objective existence at all, but were merely empty
names or words. Moderate nominalism or 'conceptualism' taught that
universals have no substantive existence at all, but yet are more than
mere names signifying nothing; and that they exist really, though only
subjectively, as concepts in the mind, of which names are the vocal
symbols." (Cent. Dict.).
_Mysticism:_ "Mysticism is a phase of thought, or rather perhaps
of feeling, which from its very nature is hardly susceptible of exact
definition. It appears in connection with the endeavor of the human
mind to grasp the divine essence or the ultimate reality of things,
and to enjoy the blessedness of actual communication with the Highest.
More specifically, a form of religious belief which is founded upon
mysticism, spiritual experience, not discriminated or tested and
systematized in thought. 'Mysticism and rationalism' represent opposite
poles of theology, rationalism regarding the reason as the highest
faculty of man and the sole arbiter in all matters of religious
doctrine; mysticism, on the other hand, declaring that spiritual
truth cannot be apprehended by the logical faculty, nor adequately
expressed in terms of the understanding." (Cent. Dict.). Mysticism
may also be regarded as the result of "a despair of reason, a refuge
in higher intuitions." (Elmendorf.) These definitions may be regarded
as difficult, but I know of no way by which the ideas considered can
be more simply explained. The definitions should be discussed until
mastered. Perhaps they will grow in clearness after considering the
rest of the notes of this lesson.
3. _Explanatory:_ Limiting our inquiry concerning the philosophy
of this mediaeval period to the doctrine of God, and selecting an
expression of that doctrine from an illustrious representative of
each school of thought, may be of assistance in forming a clearer
understanding of the definitions given in previous notes, and likewise
represent the leading conceptions of God that obtained in the period
under consideration.
4. _John Scotus Erigena:_ Extreme realist, and something of a
Mystic; "Man finds not God, but God finds himself in man," (Elmendorf)
is the keynote of this philosopher's teaching. Erigena was born in
Ireland, 800 A. D. Made a pilgrimage to the birthplace of Plato and
Aristotle A. D. 825; "and indulged the hope of uniting philosophy and
religion in the manner proposed by the ecclesiastics who were studying
in Spain."
"From Eastern sources, John Erigena had learned the doctrines of the
eternity of matter, and even of the creation, with which, indeed, he
confounded the Deity Himself. He was therefore a Pantheist, accepting
the Oriental ideas of emanation and absorption, not only as respects
the soul of man, but likewise all material things. In his work 'On
the Nature of things,' his doctrine is, 'That, as all things were
originally contained in God, and proceeded from Him into the different
classes by which they are now distinguished, so shall they finally
return to Him, and be absorbed in the source from which they came; in
other words, that as, before the world was created, there was no being
but God, and the causes of all things were in Him, so after the end of
the world, there will be no being but God, and the causes of all things
in Him. This final resolution he denominated deification, or theosis.
He even questioned the eternity of hell, saying, with the emphasis of
a Saracen, 'There is nothing eternal but God.' It was impossible under
such circumstances, that he should not fall under the rebuke of the
Church." (Draper's "Intellectual Development," Vol II, p. 9.)
5. _Roscelin of Compiegne:_ Extreme Nominalist. Sometimes credited
with being the originator of the system; but he was "not the originator
of the system," says Elmendorf, "but its clearest exponent and sharpest
defender in the eleventh century." The same authority says that he
regarded "universals" as "merely universal names." A title "for the
totality of things. This be applied to the doctrine of the Trinity in
the form of tritheism. There are three divine essences or substances,
like one another; for only individuals have a real existence"--(Hist.
of Philosophy--Elmendorf--pp. 105-6.) "Roscellinus taught that whatever
exists as a real thing or substance, exists as one self-identical
whole, and is not susceptible of division into parts. This was the
part of his teaching which created so much scandal when applied to
the doctrine of the Trinity. Roscellinus maintained that it is merely
a habit of speech which prevents our speaking of the three persons
as three substances, or three Gods. If it were otherwise, and the
three persons were really one substance or thing, we should be forced
to admit that the Father and the Holy Spirit became incarnate along
with the Son. Roscellinus seems to have put forward this doctrine in
perfect good faith, and to have claimed for it at first the authority
of Lanfranc and Anselm. In 1092, however, a council convoked by the
Archbishop of Rheims, condemned his interpretation, and Roscellinus,
who was in danger of being lynched by the orthodox populace, recanted
his error. As his enforced penitence did not prove lasting, his
opinions were condemned by a second council (1094), and he himself fled
to England. Forced by a fresh persecution to return to France at a
later date, he taught at Tours and Loc-menach in Brittany (where he had
Abelard as a pupil), and resided latterly as canon at Besancon." (Ency.
Brit.).
_6. St. Anselm, Realist:_ Born at or near Aosta, Italy, 1033,
A. D.; died at Canterbury, 1109. Credited with being the founder of
scholastic theology. He held that faith is not the pre-requisite, and
the regulator of knowledge, but leads to it. Also that "God can be
known through reason, attempts ontological, a priori proof, from the
concept of the objective existence. That than which a greater cannot be
conceived cannot exist in intellect alone; for then a greater can be
conceived." His doctrine is set forth in detail by Shedd: "The human
mind possesses the idea of the most perfect Being conceivable. But
such a being is necessarily existent; because a being whose existence
is contingent, who may or may not exist, is not the most perfect that
we can conceive of. But a necessarily existent Being is one that
cannot be conceived of as non-existent, and therefore is an actually
existent Being. Necessary existence implies actual existence. In
conceiving, therefore, of a being who is more perfect than all others,
the mind inevitably conceives of a real, and not an imaginary, being;
in the same manner as in conceiving of a figure having three sides,
it inevitably conceives of a figure having three angles." (History of
Christian Doctrine--Shedd--Vol. I, pp. 231-2.)
This argument of Anselm's was attacked by a Catholic Monk of the name
of Gaunilo, whose main point is that the existence of an idea of a
thing does not prove the existence of the thing itself. Shedd, in order
to exhibit the strength of Anselm's argument, suggests throwing it into
dialogue form, thus:
_Anselm:_ "I have the idea of the most perfect being conceivable."
_Guanilo:_ "True; but it is a mere idea, and there is no being
corresponding to it."
_Anselm:_ "But if there is no being answering to my idea, then my
idea of the most perfect being conceivable is that of an imaginary
being; but an imaginary being is not the most perfect being that I can
conceive of. The being who corresponds to my idea must be a real being.
If, therefore, you grant me my postulate, namely, that I have the
idea of the most perfect being conceivable, you concede the existence
of an actual being correspondent to it." (History of Christian
Doctrine--Shedd--Vol. I, p. 237.)
One feels, however, that this is but playing with and upon words, and
is much of kith and kin with that other abstraction, that "the thought
of God makes God." Maurice remarks upon this argument of Anselm's
for the divine existence, as follows: "In the present day, when the
arguments for the Divine existence from the constitution of the visible
world have displaced all others in the minds of theological advocates,
and when these are in their turn exposed to the severest criticism from
philosophers, such a subtlety as this of Anselm's would be dismissed
by both parties with indifference or scorn. Without participating in
either feeling, or pre-judging the question whether the argument is
tenable in itself, we may express our opinion, that in a time of clubs
and newspapers, it would be a serious moral offense to introduce into
discussion, upon a subject of the greatest interest to all men, that
which must appear to nine out of ten a play upon words, or a conjurer's
trick." (History of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, Vol. I, 524.)
7. _Abelard, Peter:_ A moderate nominalist, and usually regarded
as the founder of "Conceptualism." Born in Brittany, 1079. Moderate
nominalist. "Inspired by Aristotle, he taught * * * * that nothing
exists apart from the individual, and in it the individual only."
(Elmendorf History of Philosophy, p. 108.) Abelard also held that
there is "no believing antecedent to scientific understanding, and
consequently that the degree of posterior faith depends upon the degree
of anterior science." "Knowledge is prior to faith," was his dictum.
(See Shedd, Vol. I, pp. 163, 186 et seq.)
8. _St. Thomas Aquinas:_ Scholastic par-excellence. Born at
Acquino, in the kingdom of Naples, 1225. His great effort was to
reconcile faith and reason. Called the "Aristotle of the middle ages."
His doctrine respecting God, condensed by Elmendorf, is:
"In God is no composition of matter or form, nor any other. He is pure
actuality; for potentiality, in any sense, would imply an actuating
cause.
"In Him essence and being are one.
"In Him is no imperfection, because no potentiality; all perfections
which earthly things possess, being from Him, are in Him, one and
indivisible.
"From God as Absolute Intelligence, follows, necessarily, the concept
of God as Absolute Will. He wills what is not Himself freely, because
it is not necessary to His perfection and beatitude. From this follows
His Omnipotence.
"His Providence is the ordering of all things, both universal and
singular, with reference to an end, for it extends as far as His
knowledge and causality.
"The casual is with respect to a particular cause, not to the universal.
"Ills, corruptions, defects, are permitted in particular things,
contributing to the greater good of the whole." (History of
Philosophy--Elmendorf--p. 121.)
"The system of philosophical theology set forth in the writings of St.
Thomas Aquinas, is of supreme importance in Ecclesiastical History, not
only as intellectually perhaps the most perfect work of the Scholastic
age, but because it has been adopted as the authoritative standard of
doctrine in the Roman Catholic Church. Such pre-eminence is reported to
have been assigned to Thomas by the saying of his great master, Albert,
that he had "put an end to all labor even unto the world's end." * * *
"In the great controversy of the schools, Aquinas cannot be ranked
strictly with either the Realists or the Nominalists; his position has
been described as an Aristotelian Realist. Like the orthodox in general
he ranged himself with the modern section of the Realists, who while
holding that Universals--namely, genera and species--are more than mere
mental abstractions, and have a real existence, yet limited them to
an existence in the individual, and refused to attribute to them any
antecedent or independent existence." * * * *
"In this work of buttressing authority by philosophy, and vindicating
orthodoxy by the light of nature, as the way was led by Albert, so his
greater pupil carried it on to perfection; and the consequence has been
that the stately edifice of Systematic Theology, reared in the Church
of the West by the labors of the Schools, repose on the foundation
laid by the great luminary of Pagan Greece." (Smith's Students'
Ecclesiastical History, Vol. II, pp. 512-515.)
_Eckhart, Mystic:_ Born, it is thought, at Strasburg, 1250 A. D.
Taught and preached through Germany. Follows to some extent Erigena,
tending, unconsciously, to emanistic pantheism. "The inner ground of
man's soul is Divine, a 'spark' of Deity; knowledge is a real union of
subject and object. The soul's highest power is an immediate intuition
of the 'Godhead' transcending the determinate.
"The Absolute is impersonal, concealed even from thought; of the
'Godhead' no predicates may be used; it is hidden in eternal darkness.
In the act of self-knowledge, God is developed as the Trinity, the
form of 'Godhead' which beholds itself with love;--the subject is the
Father, the object is the Son, the love is the Holy Spirit. * * * *
"God is the essence of all essences, which are ever in Him; in sending
forth His Son, He sends forth all things (ideal world). In space and
time, natura naturata, are the Three Persons of the Trinity, eternal as
the world is, but in natura non naturata is only the 'Godhead.'
"Apart from God, the world is nonentity; God is in all things, and
is all things, for creatures have no essence except God. Yet He is
not nature, but above it, for the world of space and time is created
out of nothing. The motive of God's goodness, which necessarily
extends itself; and, by the same necessity, creation is continuous,
eternal. Different from this, as the realizing of the ideal by
the artist, is the creation out of nothing, in time." (History of
Philosophy--Elmendorf--pp. 136-137.)
LESSON XXVIII.
(Scripture Reading Exercise.)
_MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF GOD._
_ANALYSIS._ _REFERENCES._
_I. The Period--State of Philosophy._ Many of the authorities
cited in Lessons xxv,
_II. Modern Schools of Philosophy:_ xxvi and xxvii will be
available in this; also
1. Empiricism; the works of Bacon,
Locke, Hobbes, Descartes,
2. Idealism; Spinoza, Hamilton,
Berkeley, Hume,
3. Rationalism; Mill; also Kant, Fichte,
Hegel and Spencer.
4. Pantheism;
It may be that the
5. Materialism; works of these masters
may only be available to
6. Monism; those within reach of
reference libraries. The
7. Mormonism--Eternalism. following, however, are
one-volume works that
would be of great service
in studying this lesson:
John Fiske's Studies
in Religion; History
of Philosophy, Elmemdorf;
"The Conception of
God"--Royce, Leconte,
Howison, Meze; "Typical
Modern Conceptions
of God," Leighton;
Haeckel's "Riddle of the
Universe;" ditto, "Wonders
of Life," and J. S. Mills'
"Theism and
Berkeley," and Roberts'
"Mormon Doctrine of
Deity."
_SPECIAL TEXT: "Gird up now thy loins like a man * * * and answer thou
me. Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Declare
if thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the measures thereof if
thou knowest, or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereon are the
foundations thereof fastened, or who laid the cornerstone thereof?"
Job xxxviii_.
_NOTES._
1. _The Period:_ The Modern period extends from the establishment
of Protestantism, in the middle of the sixteenth century, until the
present time. Necessarily the limits imposed upon our treatise can
admit only of a very limited presentation of the conceptions of God
during that important thought-revolutionary period, covering something
over 250 years. In this period philosophy occupies a most independent
position. It is no longer dominated by the Church; nor are its efforts
consecrated to the advocacy of the defense of "orthodox Christian"
dogma In fact, little is heard of that dogma. "Highest truths," writes
Elmendorf in his "History of Philosophy," "were to be determined
by reason alone; not even an appeal for verification to Christian
revelation (was) recognized. Ancient systems were reconstructed without
any reference to the teaching of the Church, or it was maintained that
philosophic truth might be false according to faith and conversely. *
* * * The sixteenth century was a period of transition, of confusion,
without settled method or principle; there was no predominating school,
no originality, but a vague following of every ancient school. Greek
thinkers were now read in the original, and men, no longer scholastics,
were Platonists, Peripatetics, etc.; but rather as scholars,
classicists, than with any comprehensive or productive grasp of the
principles which they professed.
"Without great names, there was a widening of the sphere of philosophy;
it was popularized, but the influence of classicism made the culture of
mere form as extreme as the neglect of it among the later schoolmen;
but philosophy at the same time exerted, particularly through the
'humanists', a more manifest influence on general literature, science,
and social life. * * * The invention of printing, together with the
increase of wealth in the free cities, widened immensely the interest
in philosophy, and brought it sensibly into general literary culture
and political life." (History of Philosophy--Elmendorf--pp. 142-3.)
There was a reversion in Europe to the speculations of Plato and
Aristotle, and the intellectual battles of the two Greeks were fought
over again in Europe, with sometimes one and sometimes the other
prevailing.
The effort of philosophical thinking, as already remarked, was not
now to either sustain or disprove the Divine Existence or the mode
of that existence, as expressed in the Orthodox Christian creeds;
but its aim was more especially to set forth the modes of divine
existence independent of theological conceptions. Is the Absolute to
be apprehended as "Will," "finding its completion in the intuition of
perfect attainment?" Or "Reason," "comprehending itself as the eternal
process of the world and finding that all is Good?" Or "Feeling,"
"which apprehends the unity of things in a single and immediate act
of self-consciousness?" Or merely "Blind Energy," "which seems in a
cross-section of time, as viewed by the average spectator, to have a
definite direction, but which in reality has neither a "whence nor
whither;" and no other goal than the meaningless eternal oscillation
between states of motion and states of rest." ("Typical Modern
Conceptions of God"--by Joseph Alexander Leighton--1901--Introduction,
p. 8.)
2. _Modern Schools of Philosophy:_ So extensive is the period now
under consideration, and so numerous the voices to be heard, that one
cannot hope in three lessons--to which space it is necessary that we
limit ourselves--to convey, even by quotation from typical philosophers
of the period, an adequate idea of the conceptions of God that have
obtained. It will be necessary for the individual student personally to
take up the subject in private study if he feels the necessity of wide
knowledge on the speculations of men on the Supreme Being and His modes
of existence.
Meantime, the numerous teachers of this period may be grouped under
general descriptive terms which relate either to their methods of
thought or the result of their thinking, sometimes to both.
"In the wave of philosophical inquiry which swept over Europe in the
middle of the seventeenth century, and is regarded as the beginning
of a new, scientific age of the world, there were two controlling,
but divergent forces, those, namely, represented by Bacon and
Descartes, the first the founder of the experimental, and the latter
the idealistic or dogmatic method of philosophizing. From the former
(Bacon), we may trace a continuous influence through Locke, Berkeley,
Hume down to Mill, Spencer, Darwin and Huxley; from the latter
(Descartes), the development of the modern idealism represented by
Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Lotze." (Introduction to the
Works of Spinoza, p. 5.)
From this it will appear that our modern philosophers are mainly
divided, as to their methods of thought, into Empirics and Idealists.
(a) _Empiricism:_ "The empirical character, or method; reliance
on direct, and especially individual, observation and experience, to
the exclusion of theories or assumed principles, and sometimes of
all reasoned processes, inductive or deductive. The doctrine that
all knowledge is derived from the senses, or experience through the
senses, or at least from the perception of simple historical fact;
experientialism; opposed to intuitionalism. Empiricism, as its name
imports, affirms that all our knowledge comes from experience, and
is therefore subject to all the imperfections and limitations of
experience." (Standard Dictionary.)
(b) _Idealism:_ "Idealism--that explanation of the world which
maintains that the only thing absolutely real is mind; that all
material and all temporal existences take their being from mind, from
consciousness that thinks and experiences; that out of consciousness
they all issue, to consciousness are presented, and that presence to
consciousness constitute their entire reality and entire existence."
(Prof. Howison, Conceptions of God,--1902--p. 84.)
(c) Rationalism: In philosophy means, "the doctrine that reason
furnishes certain elements that underlies experience, and without which
experience is impossible; opposed to empiricism or experientialism."
(Standard Dictionary.) "In metaphysics, the doctrine of a priori
cognitions; the doctrine that knowledge is not all produced by the
action of outward things upon themselves, but partly arises from the
natural adaption of the mind to think things that are true.
"The form of Rationalism which is now in the ascendant, resembles the
theory of natural evolution in this, that the latter finds the race
more real than the individual, and the individual to exist only in the
race; so the former looks upon the individual reason as but a finite
manifestation of the universal reason." (Cent. Dict.)
(d) _Rationalistic Elements and Methods:_ A fine description of
rationalistic elements and method of philosophizing, is given in one of
Ernest Haeckel's latest works.
"We must welcome as one of the most fortunate steps in the direction of
a solution of the great cosmic problems, the fact that of recent years
there is a growing tendency to recognize the two paths which alone
lead thereto--experience and thought, or speculation--to be of equal
value, and mutually complementary. Philosophers have come to see that
pure speculation--such, for instance, as Plato and Hegel employed for
the construction of their idealist systems--does not lead to knowledge
of reality. On the other hand, scientists have been convinced that
mere experience--such as Bacon and Mill, for example, made the basis
of their realist systems--is insufficient of itself for a complete
philosophy. * * *
"True knowledge is only acquired by combining the activity of the two.
Nevertheless there are still many philosophers who would construct
the world out of their own inner-consciousness, and who reject our
empirical science precisely because they have no knowledge of the
real world. On the other hand, there are many scientists who still
contend that the sole object of science is 'the knowledge of facts,
the objective investigation of isolated phenomena;' that 'the age of
philosophy' is past, and science has taken its place. This one-sided
over-estimation of experience is as dangerous an error as the
converse exaggeration of the value of speculation." (Riddle of the
Universe--1900--pp. 18-19.)
(e) _Pantheism:_ "The metaphysical doctrine that God is
the only substance, of which the material universe and man are
only manifestations. It is accompanied with the denial of God's
personality." (Cent. Dict.) God and the universe are identical--the
universe is the only reality. (See also note 4, Lesson xx.)
(f) _Materialism:_ "The metaphysical doctrine that matter is
the only substance, and that matter and its motions constitute the
universe. Philosophical materialism holds that matter and the motions
of matter make up the sum total of existence, and that what we know as
physical phenomena in man and other animals, are to be interpreted in
an ultimate analysis as simply the peculiar aspect which is assumed by
certain enormously complicated motions of matter." (Cent. Dict.)
(g) Monism: "The doctrine which considers mind and matter as neither
separated nor as derived from each other, but as standing in an
essential and inseparable connection." Any system of thought which
seeks to deduce all the varied phenomena of both the physical and
spiritual worlds from a single principle. (Standard Dictionary, F. W.)
Ernest Haeckel, Monism's most illustrious disciple, if not its founder
thus defines it: "All the different philosophical tendencies may, from
the point of view of modern science, be ranged in two antagonistic
groups; they represent either a dualistic or a monistic interpretation
of the cosmos. The former is usually bound up with teleological and
idealistic dogmas, the latter with mechanical and realistic theories.
Dualism, in the widest sense, breaks up the universe into two entirely
distinct substances--the material world and an immaterial God, who is
represented to be its creator, sustainer and ruler. Monism, on the
contrary (likewise taken in its widest sense), recognizes one sole
substance in the universe, which is at once "God and nature;" body
and spirit (or matter and energy) it holds to be inseparable. The
extra-mundane God of dualism leads necessarily to theism; and the
intra-mundane God of the monist leads to pantheism.
"The different ideas of monism and materialism, and likewise the
essentially distinct tendencies of theoretical and practical
materialism, are still very frequently confused. As this and other
similar cases of confusion of ideas are very prejudicial, and give rise
to innumerable errors, we shall make the following brief observations,
in order to prevent misunderstanding:
"1. Pure monism is identical neither with the theoretical materialism
that denies the existence of a spirit, and dissolves the world into
a heap of dead atoms, nor with the theoretical spiritualism (lately
entitled 'energetic' spiritualism by Oswald) which rejects the notion
of matter, and considers the world to be a specially arranged group of
'energies,' or immaterial natural forces.
"2. On the contrary, we hold, with Goethe, 'that matter cannot exist
and be operative without spirit, nor spirit without matter.' We
adhere firmly to the pure, unequivocal monism of Spinoza: Matter, or
infinitely extended substance, and spirit (or energy), or sensitive and
thinking substance, are the two fundamental attributes or principle
properties of the all-embracing divine essence of the world, the
universal substance." (Riddle of the Universe, pp. 20-21.)
(h) _Mormonism--Eternalism:_ As a philosophical system, Mormonism
may not be classed under any of the titles so far employed. Eternalism,
I should select as the word best suited for its philosophical
conceptions. It is dualistic, but not in the sense that it "breaks up
the universe into two entirely distinct substances, the material world
and an immaterial God." (Haeckel, see note 8.) It is also monistic,
but not in the sense that in the last analysis of things it recognizes
no distinctions in matter, or that matter (gross material) and spirit
(mind, a finer and thinking kind of material)[1] are fused into one
inseparable "sole substance," which is at once "God and nature."
(Haeckel, note 8.) Its dualism is that which while recognizing an
"infinitely extended substance"--the universe, "unbounded and empty
in no part, but everywhere filled with substance" (Haeckel's Law of
Substance)--holds, nevertheless, that such substance exists in two
principal modes, having some qualities in common, and in others being
distinct. (1) Gross material, usually recognized as matter, pure and
simple. (2) A finer, thinking substance, usually regarded, by other
systems of thought, as spirit, i. e., immaterial substance. These
kinds of matter have existed from all eternity, and will exist to all
eternity in intimate relations. Neither produces the other, however;
they are eternal existences. They constitute the Book of Mormon "things
to act, and things to be acted upon." (2 Nephi, ch. 2 14.)
The Monism of Mormonism, while recognizing the universe as infinitely
extended substance, matter, and hence, in this respect monistic, yet
it also recognizes this substance as of two kinds; one gross material;
the other finer, or thinking material--mind; having some qualities in
common, with gross matter, and in others being distinct. After these
distinctions are made, and if constantly held in consciousness, so that
there shall not be a loss of distinction in things, we may hereafter
use the terms "Intelligence" and "Matter" as naming the two modes in
which for Mormonism, the eternal and infinitely extended substance--the
Universe--exists. To say that intelligence dominates matter, and
produces all the ceaseless changes going on in the universe, both of
creation and demolition[2] (or evolution and devolution)--is simply to
say that the superior dominates the inferior; that that which acts is
greater than that which is acted upon; that mind is the Eternal Cause
of the "ever becoming" in the universe--the Cause and Sustainer of
the cosmic world. It is also to say that mind is power; that mind is
thought, and will, and life, and love.
_--Modes of Existence of the Infinitely Extended Substance--The
Universe:_ As the gross material exists ultimately in final
particles--atoms, or something smaller, if you will--uncreated and
uncreatable; so the finer or thinking substance, intelligence, exists
in ultimate entities--uncreated and uncreatable.[3]
And as the gross material atoms exist some in organized worlds and
world-systems--the cosmos--and also others in chaotic mass; so the
finer or thinking substance--the intelligent entities, exist in
somewhat analogous states; some in the form of perfected, exalted men,
clothed upon with immortal bodies, participating in a nature that is
divine, having won their exaltation through the experiences, through
stress and trial in the various estates, or changes through which they
have passed. Other intelligencies exist in spirit-bodies, less advanced
than the first class, possessed of less experience and of power and of
dignity; still they are in the way of progress through other estates,
yet to be experienced by them. Other intelligent entities exist as
intelligences merely, not yet the begotten spirits, not yet united with
elements on the grosser substance, union with which is essential to the
highest development of intelligences.[4]
Such the Mormon view of the universe and the modes of existence in
it--briefly outlined. These existences, both of the thinking substance,
and the grosser materials, are subject to infinite changes and
developments, in which there are no ultimates. Each succeeding wave of
progress may attain higher, and ever higher degrees of excellence, but
never attain perfection--the ideal recedes ever as it is approached,
and hence progress is eternal, even for the highest existences.
As to methods of thinking, Mormon philosophizing is bound by no rules
prescribed by any of the schools of thought. Both idealistic and
empirical methods it employs; it recognizes both experience and thought
as avenues to knowledge; and "both channels of knowledge as mutually
indispensable." These subjects are somewhat elaborately discussed in
the writer's book "Joseph Smith, The Prophet Teacher."
Footnotes
1. I use the modifying terms of the brackets instead of "ponderable"
and "imponderable substance" (sometimes used in describing the ether),
because I am not sure as to "spirit substance" being without weight,
which it must not possess if it be described as "imponderable." Also
I use "gross material" and "finer material," because they are terms
most nearly suited--and indeed suggested--in the distinction made
by Joseph Smith when announcing, in the passage which follows, that
"All spirit is matter." "There is no such thing as immaterial matter
[substance]. All spirit is matter, but is more fine or pure, and can
only be discerned by purer eyes. We cannot see it [now]; but when our
bodies are purified we shall see that it is all matter." (Doc. & Cov.,
sec 131; 6-8.)
2. "There are many worlds that have passed away by the word of My
power. And there are many that now stand. * * * And as one earth
shall pass away, and the heavens thereof, even so shall another come;
and there is no end to My works." (The Lord to Moses, Pearl of Great
Price, pp. 6-7.) Hence the "creation and demolition," or evolution and
devolution of the text.
3. "Intelligence, or the light of truth, was not created or made,
neither indeed can be." (Doc. & Cov., Sec. 93; 29.)
4. "The elements [i. e., of the gross material] are eternal, and spirit
and element, inseparably connected [as in resurrected persons], receive
a fulness of joy; and when separated, man cannot receive a fulness of
joy." (Doc. & Cov., Sec. 93.)
LESSON XXIX.
(Scripture Reading Exercise.)
_TYPICAL MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF GOD._
_ANALYSIS._ _REFERENCES._
_I. Typical Views of God--Philosophers:_ The works cited in
Lessons xxvii and xxviii,
1. Spinoza: will be available in this
lesson; also the works
2. Locke; quoted in the notes. The
notes of this lesson aim
3. Berkeley; to convey in condensed
form the generalized
4. Fichte; view of each Philosophers
quoted. They make
5. Kant. difficult reading, but--well,
master them.
_SPECIAL TEXT: For these philosophers one might say: "Oh that I might
know where I might find Him! That I might come even to His seat * * * *
* Behold I go forward, but He is not there; and backward, but I cannot
perceive Him; on the left hand, where He doth work, but I cannot behold
Him. He hideth himself on the right hand, that I cannot see Him." Job
xxiii_.
_NOTES._
1. _Spinoza--Pantheist:_ Born in Amsterdam 1632, of Jewish parents,
who were refuges from the Spanish persecution of that period. He states
his conceptions of God in the following passages:
"By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a substance
consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and
infinite essentiality.
"Explanation: I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind;
for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may
be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its
essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation. * * *
* * * "God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute that
expresses the essence of substance can be denied, and he necessarily
exists: If any substance besides God were granted, it would have to be
explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the
same attribute would exist, which is absurd; therefore, besides God, no
substance can be granted or consequently, be conceived. If it could be
conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existent; but
this (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. Therefore, besides
God, no substance can be granted or conceived.
"Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and mind, and is
susceptible of passions. How far such persons have strayed from the
truth, is sufficiently evident from what has been said. But these
I pass over. For all who have in anywise reflected on the divine
nature, deny that God has a body. Of this they find excellent proof
in the fact, that we understand by body a definite quantity, so long,
so broad, so deep, bounded by a certain shape, and it is the height
of absurdity to predicate such a thing of God, a being absolutely
infinite. But, meanwhile, by the other reasons with which they try
to prove a point, they show that they think corporeal or extended
substance wholly apart from the divine nature, and say it was created
by God. Wherefrom the divine nature can have been created, they are
wholly ignorant; thus they clearly show, that they do not know the
meaning of their own words. I, myself, have proved sufficiently
clearly, at any rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. 6, and note 2,
Prop. 8), that no substance can be produced or created by anything
other than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. 14) that besides God no
substance can be granted or conceived. Hence, we drew the conclusion
that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God."
2. _Locke's View of God and Spirit:_ Locke regards God as an
infinite, immaterial spirit, present in all duration and as filling
immensity. Men derive their best knowledge of God, not by reason of
innate ideas of Him, but by thought and meditation. "It seems to me
plainly to prove the truest and best notions men had of God were not
imprinted, but acquired by thought and meditation, and a right use of
their faculties; since the wise and considerate men of the world, by
a right and careful employment of their thoughts and reason, attained
true notions in this, as well as other things; whilst the lazy and
inconsiderate part of men, making far the greater number, took up
their notions by chance, from common tradition and vulgar conceptions,
without much beating their heads about them." * * * * "God, every one
easily allows, fills eternity; and it is hard to find a reason why
anyone should doubt that he likewise fills immensity. His infinite
being is certainly as boundless one way as the other; and methinks it
ascribes a little too much to matter to say, where there is no body
there is nothing." * * * * "Motion cannot be attributed to God; not
because he is an immaterial, but because he is an infinite spirit."
(Locke's Works, Vol. I, pp. 195, 319.)
In discussing the nature of man's spirit, Locke had not excluded the
idea of its being a thinking, material substance. Whereupon the Bishop
of Worcester took him to task about it; to which Locke said in his own
defense--and in his reply something further may be learned in relation
to his idea of God:
"Perhaps my using the word spirit for a thinking substance, without
excluding materiality out of it, will be thought too great a liberty,
and such as deserves censure, because I leave immateriality out of
the idea I make it a sign of. I readily own, that words should be
sparingly ventured on in a sense wholly new, and nothing but absolute
necessity can excuse the boldness of using any term in a sense whereof
we can produce no example. But in the present case, I think I have
great authorities to justify me. The soul is agreed, on all hands, to
be that in us which thinks. And he that will look into the first book
of Cicero's 'Tusculan Questions,' and into the sixth book of Virgil's
'Aeneid,' will find that these two great men, who, of all the Romans,
best understood philosophy, thought, or at least did not deny, the
soul to be a subtle matter, which might come under the name of aura,
or ignis, or ether, and this soul they both of them called spiritus;
in the notion of which, it is plain, they included only thought and
active motion, without the total exclusion of matter. Whether they
thought right in this I do not say--that is not the question; but
whether they spoke properly, when they called an active, thinking,
subtle substance, out of which they excluded only gross and palpable
matter, spiritus, spirit? * * * * * I would not be thought hereby to
say, that spirit never does signify a purely immaterial substance. In
that sense the Scripture, I take it, speaks, when it says 'God is a
spirit'; and in that sense I have used it, and in that sense I have
proved from my principles that there is a spiritual substance, and am
certain that there is a spiritual, immaterial substance; which is, I
humbly conceive, a direct answer to your lordship's question in the
beginning of this argument, viz: 'How we come to be certain that there
are spiritual substances supposing this principle to be true, that the
simple ideas, by sensation and reflection, are the soul-matter and
foundation of all our reasoning?' But this hinders not, but that if
God, that infinite, omnipotent, and perfectly immaterial spirit, should
please to give a system of very subtle matter, sense and motion, it
might with propriety of speech be called spirit, though materiality
were not excluded out of its complex idea. Your lordship proceeds:
'It is said, indeed, elsewhere, that it is repugnant to the idea of
senseless matter, that it would put into itself sense, perception, and
knowledge.' But this doth not reach the present case, which is not what
matter can do of itself, but what matter prepared by an Omnipotent hand
can do. And what certainty can we have that He hath not done it? We
can have none from the ideas, for those are given up in this case, and
consequently we can have no certainty, upon these principles, whether
we have any spiritual substance within us or not." (Works, Vol. II, pp.
388-9).
3. _Berkley's Views of the Doctrine of Diety:_ George Berkley was
born at Killkrin, Ireland, 1684; died at Oxford, 1753. I follow Locke
with Berkley because he stands somewhat in contrast with him, although
he was, like Locke, an experimentalist in method; but he regarded Locke
as a materialist, and he runs to the opposite extreme, as will appear
in what follows:
"Locke had allowed to pass the hypothesis that matter can think.
Berkley justly argued that if this were allowed, we could not affirm
the immateriality and perpetuity of the thinking principle in man.
For, with the disintegration of the matter there must be an end to
the individual. If it be allowed that matter can think, then, as
Locke offers no proof to the contrary, it might be inferred that our
thinking principle, the substratum of our thoughts, is but matter.
This, Berkeley undertook to combat. But how did he do so? By trying
to establish that there is no matter, that we can not affirm its
existence; and, hence, as something at least, is, as we do exist, that
the thinking principle in us, the soul, must be immaterial." (Truth of
Thought--Poland--pp. 24, 25).
"To counteract the influence of Locke's quasi-materialism, Berkley
crossed to the other extreme, in the exaltation of spirit which, of
course, he held to be immaterial. "The possibility that hereafter this
exaltation of spirit might lead to a denial of any Being higher than
man--that the universe might appear to him his own creation--scarcely
presented itself to the mind of Berkley. It was not the peril of his
time. A creator was not denied by any of the minute philosophers with
whom Berkeley contended. What he desired to impress them with was, the
belief that the Being who made the outward world was a Spirit, who took
cognizance of the thoughts and intents of the heart; that the words to
the poor woman who drew water at the well ascended above the philosophy
of the eighteenth century; that they were real and scientific, that it
was conversant with phantasies and shadows." (Moral and Metaphysical
Philosophy--Maurice--Vol. II, p. 457).
4. _Fichte's Conception of God--God as Will:_ Born 1762; died 1814.
There seems to be something of a distinction between Fichte's earlier
and later views. In his earlier writings he appears to hold to the
doctrine that God was manifest in "Will" alone, which was the cause of
the moral order. "The living and working moral order is God himself,
and we can conceive no other." He quotes with approval a passage from
Schiller, saying that it expressed his own views:
"And God is!--a holy Will that abides,
Though the human will may falter;
High over both Space and Time it rides,
The high Thought that will never alter;
And while all things in change eternal roll,
It endures, through change, a motionless soul."
For these views Fichte was charged with atheism, which he resented:
"He contends," says Leighton, "that his opponents regard God as a
particular substance. Substance means with them 'a sensible being
existing in time and space.' This God, extended in time and space,
they deduce from the sense-world. Fitche claims that extension or
corporeality cannot be predicated of the Diety. The sensuous world is
only the reappearance of the supersensuous, or moral world, through
our attempt to grasp the latter by means of our sensuous faculty of
presentation. The sensuous, is mere appearance, and can furnish no
ground for the existence of God. The Diety is not to be understood as
the underlying ground of phenomena, for, so conceived, he is made a
corporeal substrate. He is an order of events, not a substance. The
sensuous predicate of existence is not to be applied to Him, for the
supersensuous God alone is. He is not dead Being, but rather pure
action, the life and principle of the supersensuous World-Order. *
* * * * To characterize God as a spirit, is of negative value in
distinguishing Him from things material. It gives us no positive
information, for we know as little wherein the being of a spirit
consists as wherein the being of God consists. Inasmuch as all our
thinking is limited, God is inconceivable. To determine him is to make
him finite. If personality and consciousness are to be denied of God,
it is only in the sense in which we conceive ourselves as personal and
conscious. God is wider consciousness than we are, a pure intelligence,
spiritual life and actuality. He is neither one nor many, neither man
nor spirit."
In his later views he seems to add "Intelligence" to his "will," or
moral order. Leighton, summing up both the earlier and later views
of the philosopher, says: "When we put together what Fichte said at
different times and from various points of view, his doctrine becomes
a unity, and his thought exhibits a consistent development. He always
conceived God as immanent in the moral universe--the only universe
which he recognized. He consistently held that the human mind could
not conceive God in His transcendence. But he did not deny that
transcendence; and, indeed, in his later writings he emphasized it by
his doctrine of the 'Absolute Being.' While in his innermost nature he
[God] is beyond the reach of thought, God manifests Himself eternally
as active intelligence or Will, and by the free act of his own
intelligence, man can rise to an intuitive knowledge of God and enter
into union with Him. In the earlier form of the 'Science of Knowledge',
the Absolute I is the expression of God. In the final form which his
philosophy assumes, Fichte emphasizes the doctrine that God is more
than the Absolute I. The idea of God is more fully defined. Beyond His
manifestation of Himself, He exists as Absolute Being. He alone is. But
this Being is not an abstract motionless One. Fichte says again and
again, in the 'Way to the Blessed Life,' that the nature of Being is to
manifest itself, that it is ever-active, ever-living and loving. 'Being
and Life are one and the same.' 'The Divine is thinking and living in
one organic unity.' Being becomes conscious of itself in Existence.
The universal form in which the Divine Essence appears, is 'Knowing,
the Concept, Freedom,' and these are all equivalent expressions.
Knowing is the first image or scheme of the Divine Being. We have not
yet reached self-consciousness. But free Knowing, or the Concept,
understands or becomes conscious of itself in life, and Life appears in
the Multiplicity of finite, self-conscious individuals." (Conceptions
of God--Leighton--pp. 27-28).
5. _Kant:_ Born at Konigsburg, 1724; died 1804. It is said that
Kant's influence in the world of thought is second only, if second, to
Aristotle's (Elmendorf).
"Kant's Organon--[a code of rules or principles for scientific
investigation--Kant uses the term to denote the particular rules for
acquiring the Knowledge of a given class of objects.--Cent. Dict.]
is immeasurably more severe than Aristotle's or than Bacon's. At
times, everything which we think we have gained when we entered upon
this division of our subject, appears again to be slipping from us.
God--Immortality, Freedom--these we find to be the ideas or postulates
of the reason. We have them; they are with us. But what are they? Can
we proceed to reason from them, to build any conclusions upon the
fact that such ideas are? If we do, we at once involve ourselves in
contradictions. They are ideas assuredly--fundamental principles; but
they cannot be treated as realities external to the mind. They are
only within it. If the Atheist, or the denier of immortality, begins
to dispute with me, I can defy him to prove a negative. But I can go
no further. I cannot make that into an object which exists in me,
the subject. If I do, I shall invest it with some of the conditions
and limitations of my own nature, or I shall call in experience to
represent to me that which is above experience.
"Are, then, senses, understanding, reason, all equally at fault? Are
they, all alike, prone to deception, all alike, unproductive? If that
is the case, let no one dream that he can help out our weakness by
speaking of a divine communication--a revelation from above. We have
nothing which can receive such a communication; nothing which can turn
it to any account. The voice may speak, there is no ear which can take
it in. But Kant does not leave us in this utter desolation of heart
and hope. No results can follow from trying to speculate with those
ideas of the reason. They will only turn round and round upon us; we
can never get them outside of us to act upon us. But let us look at
them practically. I have the idea of freedom, and I want a law over
me--over me, this being who has this demand for freedom. A law; that
is, something which commands me--something which I did not make for
myself. If it is not imperative, it is nothing; if I may alter it
according to some taste or fancies of mine, it is nothing. Yet, it
must be the law of a free being; this idea of freedom, if it is only
negative, affirms so much. And the law must tell me what is right--what
I, with my freedom, ought to do. The freedom calls for the law, the
law respects the freedom. Now contemplate those other ideas of God and
Immortality in this light, and see whether they remain ineffectual and
barren. The idea of God becomes that of the lawgiver; the lawgiver who
commands what is right. But such an idea involves an actual Being--one
who is right--one who is not under our limitations in the exercise
of right--one who will make right prevail. The idea of immortality
combines itself with this idea of God. The limitations of our mind
interferes with the full accomplishment of His purpose. We demand an
unlimited range for the success of the right will, for the attainment
of what is implied in our freedom and in our sense of law. God stands
out before us as the eternal and absolutely good Being. The happiness
of man must consist in the pursuit of that goodness, in the conformity
to it. Happiness in any sense but this, in any sense which it is merely
identical with eudaemonism[1]--good luck or good fortune--never can be
the end of any creature constituted as man is constituted.
"We have thus been driven--fairly driven--to a ground beyond those
conditions which appear to limit all our knowledge, our acts, and
our hopes. Let the reader observe carefully how Kant has been led to
transgress those boundaries which no one had so rigorously defined as
himself, which it was part--this should always be kept in mind--of
his function as a transcendental philosopher to define. It is not
from any passion for the excesses of the reason; it is not from any
weariness of the restraint of laws. He is in the act of prohibiting
the excesses of the reason when the discovery of this necessity bursts
upon him. He accepts it, because he can find no laws that are adequate
to hold fast human creatures, if he does not. He has listened to the
discussions and demonstrations of those who think they can establish
the existence of a Creator of nature from the facts of nature. They
appear to him feeble and unsatisfactory; but, were they ever so strong,
such a Creator, so setting in motion the machinery of the universe,
could not satisfy him. He has examined the metaphysical reasonings
which lead to the same conclusion, or which are urged in support of
the immortality of the soul. He can make nothing of them; but if he
could, what God, what immortality, would they establish? Leaving, then,
dogmatists and skeptics to conduct these controversies, and to arrive
at any results they can--being convinced inwardly that they will arrive
at no result, that each can say just enough to make the conclusions of
the other untenable--he falls back upon this moral law, this law for
free creatures. Once admitting that, he can, nay, he must, recognize
all nature as subject to the same Righteous Being; he must contemplate
the world as a moral world, the universe as designed for a good end."
(Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, Vol. II, pp. 631-633.)
The doctrine of Kant, summed up by Elmendorf, stands: "God the moral
ruler of nature, and reconciler of it with reason, giving that harmony
to happiness and morality which nature does not provide. This postulate
also necessary to morality. These postulates are given by practical
reason, not as cognitions, not in the relations of phenomenon and
noumenon, but as realities serving practical ends. Rational faith is a
necessity of man's nature."
From all which, it appears that according to Kant, and especially
according to his treatise, "Critique of Practical Reason"--1788--the
ideas of "God, Human Liberty and Immortality, are postulates of
practical reason."
Footnotes
1. "The type of utilitarian ethical theory that makes the pursuit
enjoyment and production of happiness the supreme end in moral
conduct."--(Standard Dictionary.)
LESSON XXX.
(Scripture Reading Exercise.)
_TYPICAL MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF GOD--(Continued)._
_ANALYSIS._ _REFERENCES._
_I. Typical Views of God--Philosophers:_ The works cited in
Lesson xxvii and xxviii,
6. Schleiermacher; will be available in this
lesson; also the works
7. Hegel; quoted in the notes of
this lesson.
8. Schelling;
The notes aim to convey
9. Spencer; in condensed form
the generalized view of
10. Fiske. each Philosopher quoted.
They make difficult
reading, but--master
them.
_SPECIAL TEXT: "I gave my heart to seek and search out by wisdom
concerning all things that are done under heaven; this sore travail
hath God given to the sons of men to be exercised therewith." Solomon:
Ecclesiastes, Ch. i, 13_.
_NOTES._
1. _Schleiermacher's Conception of God:_ Schleiermacher was born
at Breslau, 1768; died at Berlin, 1834. The primary thought of God
for Schleiermacher, is that of Feeling, which apprehends the unity of
things in a single and immediate act of consciousness. "He regards
the God-consciousness as immediate. The direct organ of the Knowledge
of God is feeling." * * * * "The infinite is not outside the world
of phenomena. On the contrary the latter exists within the 'Infinite
One.' The 'Infinite One' is the completion of the series of conditioned
existences, and not something separated from them. 'The Infinite exists
in the finite.' The Infinite One 'is a living Spirituality, dynamically
conceived, in which thought holds the primacy.'" (Modern Conception of
God--Leighton--p. 93).
Schleiermacher is contrasted with Spinoza, by one author, in the
following manner (For Spinoza views see note I, Lesson XXIX.):
"Spinoza's Absolute is the static indifference-point of an infinite
number of attributes, of which two, thought and extension, are
known to us. Moreover, Schleiermacher's most original and important
philosophical doctrine, that of the worth of individuality, separated
him from Spinoza. Whilst the latter holds that Body and Soul are
related only in and through the Divine substance, Schleiermacher
regards every human individual as a unique manifestation of the
unity of the ideal and the real, of thought and being. Hence, human
individuality is with him a sacred and significant manifestation of the
Absolute." (Ibid, p. 94).
2. _Hegel--Extreme Idealist:_ Born at Stuttgart, 1770. "Hegel
gives to idealism its full systematic development" (Elmendorf). He
conceives the Absolute "as wholly immanent in the temporal world of
human experience. He labors to subjugate all spheres of existence,
every phase of human experience to the dominion of the immanent
Divine Reason" (Leighton, "Typical Modern Conceptions of God,"
Introduction). "A reason-derived Knowledge of God is the highest
problem of philosophy." (Wallace, "The Logic of Hegel," p. 73). "God
is for him [Hegel] the self-conditioning, self-centered totality
of all that is, i. e., the ultimate unity" (Leighton, "Typical
Conceptions of God," p. 35). "Truth, for him, is the agreement of a
thought content with itself; i. e., self-consistency" (Ibid, p. 36).
"Hegel analyzes the notion of self-consciousness, and puts it forward
with courageous anthropomorphism as the ultimate explanation of the
universe" (Ibid, p. 42). "The task of philosophy is to know God. * *
* * Immediate Knowledge tells us that God is not what he is. But if
God is not an empty Being beyond the stars, He must be present in the
communion of human spirits, and, in His relation to them, He is the
One Spirit Who pervades reality and thought. Hence, there can be no
final separation between our immediate consciousness of Him and our
mediate Knowledge of reality" (Ibid, pp. 46-47). "The three aspects
of God are treated respectively under the realm of the Father; the
realm of the Son; the realm of the Spirit; God is the absolute eternal
Idea Who exists under these aspects" (Ibid, p. 50). "The question has
been raised as to whether Hegel's God is not better described as a
society than as a single person. Now, Hegel's God is certainly not an
individual spirit, existing in single blessedness apart from all the
contents of His universe. He therefore is not a single person in the
sense in which we are individuals. But He is forever the unity of the
society of individual finite spirits. In Him the scattered rays of
light which issue from the multitude of finite selves, converge to a
single point--to the unstained purity and translucency of an absolute
self-consciousness. God, then, is the unity of spirits. The society of
finite individuals exists as the object of his thought. Without them
his life would be blind. Without Him they would be chaos, and anarchy,
and naught."
In brief, "God," in Hegel's philosophy, "is the universal
self-consciousness which comprehends within itself all concrete
differences, men and things--'God is a spirit in His own concrete
differences, of which every finite spirit is one.' Man truly knows
God when he sees nature and himself as manifestations of God, and
recognizes himself as the highest of these manifestations, capable of
grasping in thought the whole of which he is a part.
"It has been doubted whether there is any place in Hegel's system for
individuals. It seems to me that the most insistent note in Hegel's
writings, is the emphasis on the concrete individual. He never wearies
of attacking abstractions like 'being' and 'substance.' The movement
of the 'Logic' is towards the category of individuality." (Modern
Conceptions of God, pp. 65-66.)
3. _Schelling Conceptions:_ Born in Wurtemburg, 1775; died 1854.
The philosopher of "identity"--i. e., he identifies subject and object
as one. Schelling is best understood by being placed in contrast with
Fichte. I quote from Maurice: "Fichte, combining the enthusiasm of
the French revolution with a cordial acceptance of the lessons he had
learned in Konigsberg, was, from the beginning of his life to the
end of it, asking what was needful to make him a free man--to enable
him to do the work which he had to do--to be what he was meant to
be. He was sure that he could find the answer to that question. He
said boldly that neither he nor any man could find the answer to any
other. What was not himself he must leave. It sounded like atheistical
doctrine. People said it was atheistical doctrine. But in demanding
what was needful to make him true, he found that he needed a true
God. His rivals charged him with inconsistency. He had taken into
his doctrine that which did not belong to it--he was borrowing from
them. That did not signify. He must have what he required. That was
his consistency. He was happy, not only in the nobleness of his life,
but in the opportunity of his death. He died just as his country
became free--before it was again reduced into slavery by monarchs
and system-mongers. Schelling was the thinker who most denounced
Fichte's methods and Fichte's departures from his own maxims. For
he had been led to feel profoundly the worth of that which Fichte
ignored--the worth of a method which he [Fichte] thought impossible.
He [Schelling] could not start from that which he is, or thinks, or
knows, or believes. He could not forget that a whole world is presented
to us. He must proceed from that which is given; he must see how that
affects the man, meets the demands of man, prevents him from losing
himself in himself. He must have a nature-philosophy. That Schelling
thinks, will include all things, be the end of all things. Is not
that atheism? cry his opponents. Is not Nature taking the place of
God? He replies to them vehemently, contemptuously. He does not want
to make all the shifting forms of nature into God. There is a Being
working through these, working behind them. To know that Being is what
man requires. He must have an object for all his search. That Object
cannot only be an Object. It must be a subject--thinking as well as
thought of. In that confession of a Subject-Object is a depth which a
Nature-philosophy might disclose, but which it could not contain. It
must, as some of Schelling's critics said--at first exciting only his
scorn by the remark--lie beyond the bounds of philosophy; it must be
that which philosophy asks for. Perhaps Schelling may have discovered
afterwards, or partly discovered, that they were right. If he did,
it was by faithfully pursuing his inquiry as far as it would go, by
holding fast to the thought that man's first demand is for a revelation
of something. If of a Subject-Object, perhaps 'something' does not
exactly meet the demand; perhaps the thing will not be able to reveal
itself, or to make persons know what is revealed. We are not careful
to inquire what the conclusions were at which Schelling ultimately
arrived. He often angrily discouraged the attempts of his disciples
and of his opponents to explain those conclusions; not unnaturally or
unreasonably, it seems to us, if he felt that the explanations were to
be fitted into a compact system, and if he knew that what he had done,
supposing he had done anything, was to point to that which is, or to
Him Who is, above all systems--to the only ground, as well as the only
end, of knowledge.
"It is clear, at all events, that we are once more in that ocean of
Being, which our guides of the eighteenth century were so anxious
that we should avoid. Being and Not Being, Being and Becoming, are,
as in the days of Plato, the watchwords which will be rung in our
ears; to which we may shut our ears if we please, but which will
encounter us when we least expect them." (Moral and Metaphysical
Philosophy--Maurice--Vol. II, pp. 655-6).
"God" for Schelling, says Elmendorf, "is the absolute indifference of
contraries; the unity of being and thought, of subject and object, of
ideal and real; this is the potentiality of the actual from which the
two opposites differentiate themselves without losing their unity in
the absolute." (History of Philosophy, p. 257).
4. _Herbert Spencer:_ God unknown, and unknowable, would be the
description of Spencer's conception of the "Absolute Being." "Spencer's
primary doctrine is evolution, both in psychical and physical
phenomenon"; evolution he describes as a change from 'an indefinite,
incoherent homogeneity, to a definite coherent heterogeneity.'" "This
principle is an induction from experience, of which no further account
can be given, for the absolute in any form is unthinkable, although
there is an ultimate reality in which subject and object coincide; yet
our concept of the Absolute is positive though indefinite." (Elmendorf).
Spencer's own declarations of our inability to know the "unknowable,"
is as follows:
"Every religion, setting out, though it does, with the tacit assertion
of a mystery; and so asserts that it is not a mystery passing human
comprehension. But an examination of the solutions they severally
propound, shows them to be uniformly invalid. The analysis of
every possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is
sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even thinkable. And thus the
mystery which all religions recognize, turns out to be a far more
transcendent mystery than any of them suspect--not a relative, but an
absolute mystery.
"Here, then, is an ultimate religious truth of the highest possible
certainty--a truth in which religions in general are at one with each
other, and with a philosophy antagonistic to their special dogmas. And
this truth, respecting which there is a latent agreement among all
mankind, from the fetish-worshipper to the most stoical critic of human
creeds, must be the one we seek. If Religion and Science are to be
reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest,
and most certain of all facts--that the Power which the Universe
manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." (First Principles, pp. 47-48).
On this passage from Spencer, Leighton justly remarks:
"This, certainly is a species of knowledge unique in kind. How can we
know that we can know absolutely nothing about a conceivable object
of knowledge? Mr. Spencer's knowledge of the unknowability of the
ultimate reality is, so far as it goes, very positive. And, furthermore
he knows that the Unknowable is a Power, "an infinite and Eternal
Energy from which all things proceed. The certainty that such a power
exists, while, on the other hand, its nature transcends intuition,
is the certainty towards which intelligence has from the first been
progressing. Furthermore, we know the modes in which this inscrutable
Power manifests itself. 'The Power manifested throughout the universe
distinguished as material, is the same Power, which in ourselves, wells
up under the form of consciousness.' (Principles of Sociology, 3, p.
174). "Notwithstanding the antinomies which Mr. Spencer finds to be
involved in thinking 'Infinite' and 'Eternal' and notwithstanding that
the deepest nescience is the goal of human thought, he confidently
asserts that 'amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious
the more they are thought about, there will remain (to man) the one
absolute certainty, that he is ever in the presence of an Infinite and
Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed.'
"The positiveness of this conclusion, when compared with Mr. Spencer's
declaration of the impotence of knowledge when it is confronted with
ontological problems, is sufficient of itself to awaken doubts as to
the legitimacy of his procedure." (Modern Conceptions of God, pp.
104-105).
5. _John Fiske:_ I select John Fiske to represent what I take to
be the most recent conception of God in the Ultra intellectual world;
and it is to be noted that he marks a drift of thought (gradually
being emphasized by more recent writers), from what I shall call
ultra anti-anthropomorphic conceptions toward at least a thin
anthropomorphism. His most definite conception of God is found in the
following statement:
"We may hold that the world of phenomena is intelligible only
when regarded as the multiform manifestation of an Omnipresent
Energy that is in some way--albeit in a way quite above our finite
comprehension--anthropomorphic or quasi-personal. There is a
true objective reasonableness in the universe; its events have
an orderly progression, and, so far as those events are brought
sufficiently within our ken for us to generalize them exhaustively,
their progression is toward a goal that is recognizable by human
intelligence; 'the process of evolution is itself the working out of
a mighty teleology, of which our finite understandings can fathom but
the scantiest rudiments' (Cosmic Philosophy, Part 3, ch. 2); it is,
indeed, but imperfectly, that we can describe the dramatic tendency in
the succession of events, but we can see enough to assure us of the
fundamental fact that there is such a tendency; and this tendency is
the objective aspect of that which, when regarded on its subjective
side, we call Purpose. Such a theory of things is Theism. It recognizes
an Omnipresent Energy, which is none other than the living God."
"It is this theistic doctrine which I hold myself, and which in the
present essay I have sought to exhibit as the legitimate outcome of
modern scientific thought." * * * * * * "As to the conception of
Deity, in the shape impressed upon it by our modern knowledge, I
believe I have now said enough to show that it is no empty formula or
metaphysical abstraction which we would seek to substitute for the
living God. The infinite and eternal Power that is manifested in every
pulsation of the universe is none other than the living God. We may
exhaust the resources of metaphysics in debating how far his nature may
fitly be expressed in terms applicable to the psychical nature of Man;
such vain attempts will only serve to show how we are dealing with a
theme that must ever transcend our finite powers of conception. But of
some things we may feel sure. Humanity is not a mere local incident in
an endless and aimless series of cosmical changes. The events of the
universe are not the work of chance, neither are they the outcome of
blind necessity. Practically there is a purpose in the world whereof
it is our highest duty to learn the lesson, however well or ill we may
fare in rendering a scientific account of it. When from the dawn of
life we see all things working together toward the evolution of the
highest spiritual attributes of Man, we know, however the words may
stumble in which we try to say it, that God is in the deepest sense a
moral Being. The everlasting source of phenomena is none other than
the infinite Power that makes for righteousness. Thou canst not by
searching find him out; yet put thy trust in Him, and against thee
the gates of hell shall not prevail; for there is neither wisdom nor
understanding nor counsel against the Eternal." ("Studies in Religion,"
pp. 93-94, 209).
LESSON XXXI.
(Scripture Reading Exercise.)
SPECIAL LESSON.
_THE PAGANIZATION OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF DEITY: WHAT PARTICULAR
TENDENCIES IN HUMAN NATURE LED TO THIS RESULT?_
(AN EXPOSITORY--ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE)
_NOTES._
1. _Character of the Proposed Discourse:_ For suggestion in
relation to expository and argumentative discourses, see Lesson XXV,
note 2, and the references there given to Seventy's Year Books Nos. I
and II.
2. _Sources of Information:_ For the Christian Doctrine of God,
see, of course, New Testament, especially the Fourth Gospel. Seventy's
Year Book No. II, Lesson XXXIV; notes 4, 5 and 6 (pp. 190-193). All of
Lesson 37; also Year Book III, Lesson XXV. Mormon Doctrine of Deity
(pp. 114-119); Also chs. 4 and 5 Orson Pratt's works, "The Kingdom of
God," Subdivision, "The Nature and Character of the King." Outlines of
Ecclesiastical History (Roberts), Part II, Section 5.
3. _Suggestions to the Speaker:_ In previous lessons under this
topic we have dealt with the "First Moments of Speech" and the
"Introduction." Having done with these, we come now to the main part of
the work--to the discussion of the subject. This can only be considered
in part in this lesson. I quote from Pittenger: "The passage from the
introduction to the discussion should be made smoothly and gradually.
To accomplish this, and to strike the subject at just the right angle,
continuing all the interest previously excited, is a most important
achievement. A definite object is a great assistance in this part of
the work. If the object is clearly in view, we go right up to it with
no wasted words, and the people follow our guidance because they see
that we are not proceeding at random. But with no strong purpose, we
are apt to steer about our subject without ever being quite ready to
enter upon it. The more brilliant the introduction, the more difficult
this transition will be. But all these difficulties may be overcome
with the aid of a well-constructed plan."
4. _Must be a Controlling Purpose in Discourse:_ "The whole
discourse must be animated with some controlling purpose, and in its
general character, tend upward, until its close. The law of climax
ought to be carefully considered by the speaker. There may be more than
one culmination of interest in an address, separated by an interval
less absorbing and powerful, but this decline should only be allowed in
order to prepare a second or third climax, grander than all before. To
violate this rule and have a speech 'flatten out' toward its close, is
a fearful error. Better reduce the length of the whole by one-half or
three-fourths, and maintain interest and attention to the end."
5. _Of Diffuseness:_ "Diffuseness is often supposed to be a
necessary quality of extemporaneous speech. Many speakers do fall into
it, but they need not. They are diffuse because they are unwilling or
unable to say exactly what they mean, but come near it, and continue
their efforts until they are satisfied. They furnish no clear view of
any idea, but only a kind of twilight illumination. This serious fault
may be overcome in spontaneous speech as readily as in writing. He who
thinks clearly and forcibly will talk in the same manner. Exquisite
finish and elaborate verbal arrangement are not to be looked for in
off-hand speech, but each idea may be expressed with great force,
vigor, and accuracy of shading.
"This ability to say precisely what we mean in few words, and at
the first effort, constitutes one of the great beauties of a spoken
style. The hearer is filled with grateful surprise when some new and
living idea is suddenly placed before him, clothed in a single word or
sentence. A diffuse speaker gives so many premonitions of his thought
that the audience have guessed it, and may even come to believe that
they have always known it, before he has made his formal presentment.
Of course, they are wearied, and never give him credit for an original
conception.
"If troubled with this fault, frequently forecast what to say; drive
it into the smallest number of vivid, expressive words; then, without
memorizing the language, reproduce the same briefly in the hurry of
speech. If not successful in making it as brief as before, repeat the
effort. This exercise will, in time, give the ability to condense. But
to exercise it, the temptation to fine language must be overcome. No
sentence should be introduced for mere glitter or sparkle; a single
unnecessary word may require others to justify or explain it, and thus
may ruin a whole discourse. The danger of showy language in speech is
far greater than in writing, for if the writer be drawn too far away
from his subject, he can strike out the offending sentences and begin
again, while the speaker has but one trial. If beauty lies in his way,
well; but if not, he should never abandon his course to seek it."
_Concluding the Speech:_ "There are three principal ways of
concluding a speech. (1). One of the most graceful is to condense a
clear view of the whole argument and tendency of the address into a few
words, and leave the summing up thus made to produce its own effect.
Discourses aiming principally to produce conviction may very well be
concluded in this manner.
(2). "Another and very common mode is to close with an application or
with practical remarks. When the address is a sermon, this form of
closing is frequently termed an exhortation, and the whole speech is
made to bear upon the duty of the moment.
(3). "A third method of closing is to simply break off when the last
item is finished. The full development of the discourse is thus made
its ending, care being taken that the last item discussed shall be of
weight and dignity. This is by no means the easiest form of conclusion
but rightly managed it is one of the most effective.
(4). "A conclusion should always be short and contain no new matter.
Few things are more disastrous than the practice of drawing toward an
end and then launching out into a new discussion. All good things that
have been said, all previous favorable impressions, are obliterated by
this capital fault." (Extempore Speech, Pittenger, ch 8).
4. _Strength:_ We have already considered three means of promoting
strength of expression. The third suggestion was, that care be taken to
have the last word of a sentence a forcible one. The same holds good as
to the members of a sentence: "Strength requires that, when the members
of a sentence differ in length, the shorter should have precedence of
the longer; and, when they are of unequal force, that the weaker be
placed before the stronger. Both of these principles are violated in
the following sentence:
_Example:_ "In this state of mind, every employment of life becomes
an oppressive burden, and every object appears gloomy."
_Corrected:_ How much more forcible does it become when the shorter
and weaker member is placed first: "In this state of mind, every object
appears gloomy, and every employment of life becomes an oppressive
burden."
This arrangement of the members of a sentence constitutes what is
defined among the rhetorical figures as _Climax_. What is most
emphatic is brought last, in order that a strong impression may be left
on the reader's mind.
"This principle, also, requires us to avoid terminating a sentence with
a succession of unaccented words; such as, 'with', 'it', 'in it', 'on
it', etc.
_Example:_ "This is a proposition which I did not expect; and I
must ask time for privilege of reflecting on it."
_Corrected:_ The last member would be more forcible thus: "This
is a proposition which I did not expect; and I must ask time for
reflection." (Quackenbos' Rhetoric.)
PART III.
The True Doctrine of Deity.
LESSON XXXII.
(Scripture Reading Exercise.)
_THE EXISTENCE OF GOD._[1]
_ANALYSIS._ _REFERENCES._
_I. Evidences for the Divine Existence Part I. Ten Lessons.
Found In--_
Lesson i. References
1. Tradition; and Notes.
2. Creation, the Evidence of Design Lesson ii. References
in Nature; and Notes.
3. Innate Consciousness of God in Lesson iii. References
the Human Soul; and Notes.
4. The General Consent of Mankind; Lesson iv. References
and Notes.
5. The Necessary Presence of an
Eternal Cause in the World; Lessons vi, vii. References
and Notes.
6. Revelation--Limitation of
Revelation. Lessons viii, ix. References
and Notes.
Lesson x.
_SPECIAL TEXT: "The Scriptures are laid before thee, yea, and all
things denote there is a God; yea, the earth and all things that are
upon the face of it; yea, and its motion; yea, and also all the planets
which move in their regular form [order], do witness that there is a
Supreme Creator." Alma, Ch. xxx._
_NOTES._
Owing to the volume of information supplied in Part I--Ten Lessons--on
the various subdivisions of this lesson, it is not thought necessary to
add more notes here.
Footnotes
1. It is suggested that this lesson be made simply a review of Part I,
and that two sessions of the class could be profitably used for this
purpose.
LESSON XXXIII.
(Scripture Reading Exercise.)
_THE FORM OF GOD._
_ANALYSIS._ _REFERENCES._
_I. Jesus Divine-Hence God._ The New Testament
and Book of Mormon
1. Dependent Upon Revelation and Doctrine and Covenants.
for Knowledge of Form and
Nature of God. Psalms xix, Rom. i,
Note 1.
2. World's Need of a Revelation
of God. Note 2.
3. Scripture Evidence of the Divinity See collection of passages
of Jesus: of Scripture,
Richards and Little's
--Jesus Christ is Called God in Compendium title,
Revelation--Hence God; "True and Living God,"
pp. 187-191.
--Jesus Declares Himself to be
God--The Son of God; Note 3 and contexts of
passages of Scripture
--Jesus is to be Worshipped--Hence cited.
God;
Note 4.
--Jesus Christ is Creator--Hence
God; Note 5.
_II. Jesus the Express Image of the Note 6.
Father's Person._
Note 7.
Hebrews i and Notes
8, 9, 10, 11 and the
Scripture References
within the notes.
_SPECIAL TEXT: "For it pleased the Father that in Him [the Christ]
should all fulness dwell. * * * For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of
the Godhead bodily." Colossians._
_NOTES._
The notes of this Lesson are taken from two discourses by the author:
one the "Mormon Doctrine of Deity"; the other "Jesus Christ, the
Revelation of God," hence the personal character and direct address
style that appears in the notes.
1. _Need of Revelation for Definite Knowledge of God:_ We are
dependent upon that which God has been pleased to reveal concerning
Himself for what we know of Him; especially as to His form, nature and
attributes. While it is true, in a certain sense, that the heavens
declare God's glory; and "the invisible things of Him from the creation
of the world," in a certain sense, "are clearly seen, being understood
by the things that are made"; and while the spirit in man may be
intuitively conscious of the being of God; while the general consent of
mankind may confirm man's own consciousness of the divine existence,
yet nothing definitely is learned or can be learned concerning the
form, nature, or attributes of God from these sources. Now, as of old,
man by searching cannot find out God. He cannot "find out the Almighty
unto perfection." (Job II, 7.) This can only be learned by revelation.
It is the revealed law of the Lord that is perfect, "converting the
soul;" it is the statutes of the Lord that are right, "rejoicing the
heart;" it is the commandment of the Lord that is pure, "enlightening
the eyes;" it is the judgments of the Lord that are "true and righteous
altogether." "More to be desired are they than gold, yea, than much
fine gold; sweeter also than honey and the honey comb. Moreover, by
them is My servant warned, and in the keeping of them there is great
reward." (Psalms 19.)