"Theism" (Mill), pp. 161-166[1]
(1) Luke x:21, 22;
John xvii.
(2) Acts xvii: 22-28.
Notes 4, 5, 6, 7.
_Special Text: "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that He shall stand
at the latter day upon the earth; and though after my skin worms shall
destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God." Job xix:25_.
_NOTES._
1. _Patristic Arguments:_ "The Patristic arguments for the Divine
Existence rest mainly upon the innate consciousness of the human
mind. They magnify the internal evidence for this doctrine. * * *
* God was conceived as directly manifesting himself to the moral
sense, through that Divine Word or Reason who, in their phraseology,
was the manifested Deity. In their view, God proved his existence by
his presence to the mind. In the Western Church, particularly, this
immediate manifestation and consequent proof of the Divine Existence
was much insisted upon. Augustine in his Confessions implies that
the Deity evinces His being and attributes by a direct operation--an
impinging, as it were, of Himself, upon the rational soul of His
creatures." (History of Christian Doctrine (Shedd) Vol. I, pp. 229-30.)
2. _The "Heart" Knowledge of God:_ "This _heart knowledge_
is, after all, to each individual who has it, the most direct form
of evidence for the existence of God--the personal intercourse with
Him of our personal spirit--the communion in virtue of which we can
say, 'I know that there is a God because I know him. I experience in
prayer and sacrament and meditation a conviction of His reality and His
presence which is quite as real to me as is the conviction that those
things exist which I can touch and see. This conviction is clearest
and strongest when I am at my best, and I attribute all that is best
and highest in my character to such communion, as thousands have done
before me.'
"This is the kind of Knowledge of God that cries aloud to us from the
Psalms and Prophecies, and underlies the other writings of the Old
Testament. And the perfection of this communion is to be found in Jesus
Christ as portrayed for us in the Synoptic Gospels (Lk. 10:22; cf. Mk.
13:32), but especially in St. John (5:19 cf. 10:15, 30; cf. 14:11,
etc.) and reaches its climax in the great high-priestly prayer of Jn.
17. After our Lord's Ascension and the descent of the Holy Spirit, it
takes the form, for Christ's members, of a fellowship with the blessed
Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Ghost. (2 Cor. 13:14; cf. 1 Jn. 1:3.)
"Being, however, in one sense, a purely personal and individual matter,
this sense of communion is commonly thought to be too subjective to
be adduced as an argument for the existence of God. It is always open
to an objector to say, 'You assert that you have this feeling; I am
willing to admit your sincerity, but you may be the victim of illusion.
All I can say is that I have no such feeling myself.' To such an
assertion it seems perhaps inadequate to reply, 'If you will but assume
first provisionally (as we have to assume many things in practical
life,) that existence which you cannot demonstrate, and then act upon
the assumption, conviction will come with experience.' Yet such a reply
may be enforced and corroborated with all the weight of more than
nineteen centuries of personal experience. Generation after generation
of martyrs and saints have testified in the strongest possible manner
to their conviction that God is, and is a rewarder of them that
diligently seek him.' (Heb. 11:6); and have been ready to seal the
conviction with their life's blood. ("Belief in God," Dummelow's
Commentary, p. c.)
_The General Sense of the Divine Existence Deepened by
Christianity:_ "The consciousness of the God in whom we live, move
and have our being. This, too, [by reason of Christianity] became,
in believers, a more living, a more profound sentiment. They [the
Christians] felt more strongly and vividly the all-pervading presence
of that God who made himself to be felt by them in nature, and whose
existence to the spirit is undeniable. It was to this undeniable
fact of consciousness, indeed, they appealed, in endeavoring to lead
the pagans away from the gods which they themselves had made to the
acknowledgment of the only true God. This appears to us as the one
common feature in the mode of expressing themselves on this subject,
which prevailed among the church fathers, amid all the differences of
form between those whose education had led them through the Platonic
philosophy, and such men as Tertullian, who--a stranger and an enemy to
philosophical culture--witnessed, in an original manner, of that which
had penetrated deeply into the vigorous but stern individuality of his
character." (History of the Christian Religion (Neander), Vol. I, pp.
55-66.)
2. _The Spirit of Man Intuitively Conscious of Truth:_ Somewhat
akin to this "Heart Knowledge" of God is the following very remarkable
passage in one of the revelations of God through Joseph Smith:
"Intelligence or the light of truth, was not created or made, neither
indeed can be. All truth is independent in that sphere in which God
has placed it, to act for itself, as all intelligence also, otherwise
here is no existence. Behold, here is the agency of man, and here is
the condemnation of man, because that which was from the beginning is
plainly manifest unto them, and they receive not the light. And every
man whose spirit receiveth not the light is under condemnation, for man
is spirit." (Doc. & Cov., Sec. xciii.) As if the Lord would say: Truth
is native to the spirit of man, when unrestrained by man's perverse
will--when he has not reached the point where he chooses darkness
rather than light because his deeds are evil--then Truth is native to
the spirit of man and will, when unrestrained, intuitively rise to meet
it as flame leaps toward its kindred flame and unites with it. And it
is because the spirit of man refuses to live true to this quality of
his spirit that he comes under condemnation when rejecting the truth.
The Prophet Joseph emphasized this doctrine in his public teachings.
On one occasion he said: "Every word that proceedeth from the mouth
of Jehovah has such an influence over the human mind--the logical
mind--that it is convincing without other testimony. Faith cometh by
hearing." (Hist. of the Ch. Vol. V, p. 526.)
3. _Defect of "Soul Consciousness" Argument:_ "They [who accept the
soul conscious argument] labor under the common infirmity that one man
cannot by proclaiming with ever so much confidence that he perceives
an object, convince other people that they see it too. If, indeed, he
laid claim to a divine faculty of vision, vouchsafed to him alone, and
making him cognizant of things which men, not thus assisted, have not
the capacity to see, the case might be different. Men have been able
to get such claims admitted; and other people can only require of them
to show their credentials. But when no claim is set up to any peculiar
gift, but we are told that all of us are as capable as the prophet of
seeing what he sees, feeling what he feels, nay, that we actually do
so, and when the utmost effort of which we are capable fails to make us
aware of what we are told we perceive, this supposed universal faculty
of intuition is but
'The dark lantern of the spirit
Which none see by but those who bear it;'
and the bearers may fairly be asked to consider whether it is not more
likely that they are mistaken as to the origin of an impression in
their minds, than that others are ignorant of the very existence of an
impression in theirs." "Theism" (Mill, p. 162.)
The proper answer to this argument is found in Note 2, this lesson.
4. _The Consent of Mankind:_ "As far back as Cicero in the first
century B. C. or even earlier, pagan thinkers had observed that
religion in some form or other is a universal trait in human nature.
And though in modern days apparent exceptions of 'atheistical tribes'
have been adduced to prove the contrary, the trend of anthropological
science may be said on the whole to support the judgment of antiquity.
There may indeed be savages (though the point has not been proved)
among whom no definite trace of religious observance can be discerned;
but are they normal representatives even of undeveloped humanity?
Is there no such thing as degradation? And have not even these poor
savages some vestige at least of the religious faculty? For that is
all our argument really requires. The world-wide progress of Christian
missions to the heathen seems to testify quite triumphantly that no
race or tribe of men, however degraded and apparently atheistic, lacks
that spark of religious capacity which may be fanned and fed into a
mighty flame.
"Granted, then, that the religious faculty is practically universal
among mankind, what is the significance of this fact? From ancient
times it has been regarded as an argument--often (wrongly) as a proof
that God exists. It is called the argument 'from the general consent of
mankind.'" (Belief in God, Dummelow's Commentary, p. ci.)
5. _Existence of Gods by Universal Consent:_ "In the question now
before us, the greater part of mankind have united to acknowledge
that which is most probable, namely, that there are Gods. * * * *
* * Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly
laid; for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind,
independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it
must necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our
minds, or, rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there
is a general agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true;
therefore it must be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have
the concurrence, not only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of
the ignorant and illiterate. It must be also confessed that the point
is established that we have naturally this idea, and as I said before,
or prenotion, of the existence of the Gods." (Tusculan Disputations
(Cicero) Yonge's Translation, pp. 225-6.)
6. _Cotta's Comment:_ On the matter of the foregoing note Cicero
represents "Cotta" the Academician, as commenting as follows:
"You have said that the general assent of men of all nations and all
degrees is an argument strong enough to induce us to acknowledge the
being of Gods. This is not only a weak, but a false, argument; for,
first of all, how do you know the opinions of all nations? I really
believe there are many people so savage that they have no thoughts of a
Deity." (Ibid. p. 231.)
7. _Spencer's Comment on Universality of Religious Ideas:_
"Religious ideas of one kind or other are almost universal. Admitting
that in many places there are tribes who have no theory of creation,
no word for a deity, no propitiatory acts, no ideas of another
life--admitting that only when a certain phase of intelligence is
reached do the most rudimentary of such theories make their appearance;
the implication is practically the same. Grant that among all races
who have passed a certain stage of intellectual development there
are found vague notions concerning the origin and hidden nature of
surrounding things; and there arises the inference that such notions
are necessary products of progressing intelligence. Their endless
variety serves but to strengthen this conclusion; showing as it does a
more or less independent genesis--showing how, in different places and
times, like conditions have led to similar trains of thought, ending
in analogous results. That these countless different, and yet allied,
phenomena presented by all religions are accidental or factitious, is
an untenable supposition. A candid examination of the evidence quite
negatives the doctrine maintained by some that creeds are priestly
inventions." ("First Principles," Appleton & Co.'s Edition of 1896, pp.
13, 14.)
Footnotes
1. As these works of reference may be somewhat difficult to obtain,
copious notes are made for this lesson.
LESSON IV.
(Scripture Reading Exercise.)
_III. MISCELLANEOUS EVIDENCES AND ARGUMENTS FOR THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.
(Continued.)_
_I. THE ARGUMENT FROM "A FIRST CAUSE."_
_ANALYSIS_ _REFERENCES._
_I. Definition of Cause._ "Theism" (Mill)
"Three Essays on Religion."
pp. 142-154.
_ II. Necessity of Causation to John Fisk's "Cosmic
Account for the External World._ Philosophy." Vol. I,
Chapter vi on "Causation."
"First Principles,"
Herbert Spencer, pp. 37-44
_ III. Mind as the Originator and pp. 95-96.
of Force._
_ IV. The Substitution of "Eternal (1) Note 1.
Cause" for "First Cause."_
(2) Notes 2 and 3.
(3) Notes 4, 5, 6, 7.
(4) Notes 8, 9.
_SPECIAL TEXT: Intelligence, or the Light of Truth, was not created or
made, neither indeed can be. (Doc. & Cov., Section cxiii, 30_)
_NOTES._
1. _Definition of Cause:_ "The power or efficient agent producing
anything or event; agent or agency; as gravitation is the cause of the
stone's falling; malice is a cause of crime. * * * In a comprehensive
sense, all the circumstances, (powers, occasions, actions, and
conditions) necessary for an event and necessarily followed by it; the
entire antecedent of an event. _Efficient Cause,_ the power or
agency producing anything or event; _Material Cause,_ the material
out of which by the efficient causes anything is made; _Formal
Cause,_ the pattern, place, or form according to which anything is
produced by the operation of efficient causes; _Final Cause,_--God
as uncaused and as the original source of all power, change, motion,
and life. Styled by Plato and Aristotle the "Prime Mover." (Standard
Dictionary, Funk and Wagnall.) The four last forms of the definition
are known as "Aristotelian Causes."
2. _Evidence of Causation in the External World:_ "The
consideration of the external world around him, even in its broadest
aspect, leads man up to the thought of an Eternal Cause; the study of
its phenomena in detail with its marvelous intricacy of harmonious
interaction produces the impression of design, and leads to the thought
of a Designer--i. e., of an Eternal Cause that is intelligent and free.
"Man finds in himself a principle of causality in the light of which he
interprets the external world. He cannot help regarding the succession
of phenomena which he observes as effects--attributing each to some
cause, When he examines that again he discovers it to be no true or
absolute cause, but itself the effect of something further back, and so
on. He finds in himself the nearest approach to a _vera causa._ Yet
he would recognize the absurdity of calling himself self-caused. And
the mind cannot rest in an endless chain of cause-effects. There must
be, he feels, if you go far enough back, a real cause, akin, in some
way, to man's own power of origination, yet transcending it--a cause
that owns no cause--no source of being--but itself." (Belief in God,
Dummelow's Commentary, p. ci.)
3. _The Mind and the Necessity of Causation:_ "The mind is
compelled to believe in the necessity of causation, and that the
cultivated mind, which can realize all the essential conditions of
the cause, is compelled to believe in its universality. For what is
the belief in the necessity and universality of causation? It is the
belief that every event must be determined by some preceding event and
must itself determine some succeeding event. And what is an event?
It is a manifestation of force. The falling of a stone, the union of
two gases, the blowing of a wind, the breaking of wood or glass, the
vibration of a cord, the expansion of a heated body, the sprouting of
a seed, the circulation of blood, the development of inflammation, the
contracting of a muscle, the thinking of a thought, the excitement of
an emotion,--all these are manifestations of force. To speak of an
event which is not a manifestation of force, is to use language which
is empty of significance. Therefore, our belief is that necessity and
universality of causation is the belief that every manifestation of
force must be preceded and succeeded by some equivalent manifestation.
Or, in an ultimate analysis, it is the belief that force, as manifested
to our consciousness, can neither arise out of nothing nor lapse into
nothing--can neither be created nor annihilated. And the negation of
this belief is unthinkable; since to think it would be to perform
the impossible task of establishing in thought an equation between
something and nothing."
4. _The "Eternal Cause":_ "The argument for a First Cause admits of
being (existence), and is, presented as a conclusion from the whole of
human experience. Everything that we know (it is argued) had a cause,
and owed its existence to that cause. How, then, can it be but that the
world, which is but a name for the aggregate of all that we know, has a
cause to which it is indebted for its existence?
"The fact of experience, however, when correctly expressed, turns out
to be, not that everything which we know derives its existence from a
cause, but only every event or change. There is in nature a permanent
element, and also a changeable; the changes are always the effects of
previous changes; the permanent existences, so far as we know, are not
effects at all.[1] It is true we are accustomed to say not only of
events, but of objects, that they are produced by causes, as water by
the union of hydrogen and oxygen. But by this we only mean that when
they begin to exist, their beginning is the effect of a cause. But
their beginning to exist is not an object, it is an event, i. e., the
uniting of the elements that make the water. If it be objected that
the cause of a thing's beginning to exist may be said with propriety
to be the cause of the thing itself, I shall not quarrel with the
expression. But that which in an object begins to exist, is that in it
which belongs to the changeable element in nature; and the outward form
and the properties depending on mechanical or chemical combinations of
its component parts. There is in every object another and a permanent
element, viz., the specific elementary substance or substances of which
it consists and their inherent properties. These are not known to us
as beginning to exist; within the range of human knowledge they had no
beginning, consequently no cause; though they themselves are causes
or con-causes of everything that takes place. Experience, therefore,
affords no evidences, not even analogies, to justify our extending
to the apparently unmutable, a generalization grounded only on our
observation of the changeable.
"As a fact of experience, then, causation cannot legitimately be
extended to the material universe itself, but only to its changeable
phenomena; of these, indeed, causes may be affirmed without any
exception. But what causes? The cause of every change is a prior
change, and such it cannot but be; for if there were no new antecedent,
there would not be a new consequent. If the state of facts which brings
the phenomenon into existence, had existed always or for an indefinite
duration, the effect also would have existed always or been produced
an indefinite time ago. It is thus a necessary part of the fact of
causation, within the sphere of our experience, that the causes as well
as the effects had a beginning in time, and were themselves caused.
It would seem, therefore, that our experience, instead of furnishing
an argument for a first cause, is repugnant to it; and that the very
essence of causation as it exists within the limits of our knowledge,
is incompatible with a First Cause.
"But it is necessary to look more particularly into the matter, and
analyze more closely the nature of the causes of which mankind have
experience. For if it should turn out that though all causes have a
beginning, there is in all of them a permanent element which had no
beginning, this permanent element may, with some justice, be termed a
first or universal cause, inasmuch as though not sufficient of itself
to cause anything, it enters as a _con_-cause into all causation.
Now it happens that the last result of physical inquiry, derived from
the converging evidences of all branches of physical science, does,
if it holds good, land us, so far as the material world is concerned,
in a result of this sort. Whenever a physical phenomenon is traced to
its cause, that cause when analyzed, is found to be a certain quantum
of Force, combined with certain collocations. And the last great
generalization of science, the 'Conservation of Force,' teaches us that
the variety in the effects depends partly upon the amount of the force,
and partly upon the diversity of the collocations. The force itself
is essentially one and the same; and there exists of it in nature a
fixed quantity, which, (if the theory be true), is never increased
or diminished. Here, then, we find, even in the changes of material
nature, a permanent element; to all appearances the very one of which
we were in quest. This it is apparently to which, if to anything, we
must assign the character of First Cause, the cause of the material
universe. For all effects may be traced up to it, while it cannot be
traced up, by our experience, to anything beyond; its transformations
alone can be so traced, and of them the cause always includes the
force itself; the same quantity of force, in some previous form. It
would seem, then, that in the only sense in which experience supports
in any shape the doctrine of a First Cause, viz, as the primaeval and
universal element in all causes, the First Cause can be no other than
Force." ("Theism" Mill. "Three Essays on Religion," pp. 142-145.)
5. _Of Mind as Originating Force:_ Mr. Mill in his treatise on
Theism, from which the foregoing note is quoted, recognizes the fact
that the conclusion with which our quotation ends, is not the last
word on the subject. On the contrary, he recognizes the fact that the
greatest stress of the argument comes forward at that point. "For,"
Mr. Mill goes on to say, "it is maintained that _mind_ is the only
possible cause of Force; or rather, perhaps, that Mind is a force, and
that all other forces must be derived from it inasmuch as mind is the
only thing which is capable of originating change. This is said to be
the lesson of human experience. In the phenomena of inanimate nature
the force which works is always a pre-existing force, not originated,
but transferred. One physical object moves another by giving out
to it the force by which it has first been itself moved. The wind
communicates to the waves, or to a windmill, or a ship, part of the
motion which has been given to itself by some other agent. In voluntary
action alone we see a commencement, an origination of motion; since
all other causes appear incapable of this origination, experience is
in favor of the conclusion that all the motion in existence owed its
beginning to this one cause, viz, _voluntary agency,_ if not that
of man, then of a more powerful Being." ("Theism" (Mill) p. 146.) The
fact is, however, that mind, spirit, intelligence (representing one
thing) is eternal, not first, since there can be no first. (See Notes 8
and 9.)
6. _Mind not the Sole Originator of Force:_ "This argument," our
author suggests, "is a very old one, going back at least as far as
Plato, and is still a favorite argument with certain metaphysical
defenders of natural theology." But Mr. Mill holds that "if there be
truth in the doctrine that the total amount of force in the universe
remains constant, i. e., is not diminished nor increased, but remains
always the same (the fact is usually called the conservation of
force)--then "This doctrine does not change from true to false when it
reaches the field of voluntary agency." "The will," he goes on to say,
"does not any more than any other causes, create force; granting that
it originates motion, it has no means of doing so but by converting
into that particular manifestation a portion of force which already
existed in other forms. It is known that the source from which this
portion of force is derived, is chiefly, or entirely, the force evolved
in the processes of chemical composition and decomposition which
constitute the body of nutrition; the force so liberated becomes a
fund upon which every muscular and even every merely nervous action,
as of the brain in thought, is a draft. It is in this sense only, that
according to the best lights of science, volition is an originating
cause. Volition, therefore, does not answer to the idea of a 'First
Cause,' since Force must in every instance be assumed as prior to it;
and there is not the slightest color, derived from experience, for
supposing force itself to have been created by a volition. As far as
anything can be concluded from human experience force has all the
attributes of a thing eternal and uncreated.
7. _Volition Does Not Answer the Idea of a First Cause:_ Observe
the statement in the above note (6), "Volition, therefore, does
not answer to the idea of a First Cause; since force must in every
instance be assumed as prior to it." But why must Force "in every
instance be assumed as prior" to volition? May not eternal things
exist together as the two eternal things, matter and force, co-exist;
as duration and space co-exist? Indeed Mr. Mill in a tentative way
suggests the co-eternity of will and force as a possibility. "Whatever
verdict experience can give in the case," he remarks, "is against the
possibility that will ever originates force; yet if we can be assured
that neither does force originate will, will must be held to be an
agency, if not prior to force yet co-eternal with it; and if it be
true that will can originate, not indeed force but the transformation
of force from some other of its manifestations into that of mechanical
motion, and that there is within human experience no other agency
capable of doing so, the argument for a will as the originator, though
not of the universe, yet of the cosmos, or order of the universe,
remains unanswered." (Theism p. 148.)
8. _The "Eternal Cause."_ In the passage quoted in the above
note, Mr. Mill is very near the truth; and if only his term "will"
could be dropped for the term "Intelligence," which represents a
larger fact than volition merely, then Mr. Mill would be exactly
right. Intelligence stands for consciousness, self-consciousness and
consciousness of not-self; for reason; for judgment, the power that
after ratiocination determines that this state or thing is better than
that state or thing; and granting also that volition is a factor of
Intelligence, (and one sees not how it can be otherwise), grant this,
and also that intelligence is as eternal as force and matter, and you
have if not every element of a first cause, at least every element of
the "Eternal cause," which stands for the same thing--God!
But Mr. Mill insists, and very truly, that the statement last quoted
from him, in so far at least as it holds that "there is within human
experience no other agent capable of transforming force from some
other of its manifestations into that of mechanical motion," is not
conformable to fact. "Whatever volition can do," he says, "in the
way of creating motion out of other forms of force, and generally of
evolving force from a latent into a visible state, can be done by many
other causes. Chemical action, for instance, electricity, heat, the
mere presence of a gravitating body; all these are causes of mechanical
motion on a far larger scale than any volitions which experience
presents to us; and in most of the effects thus produced the motion
given by one body to another, is not, as in the ordinary cases of
mechanical action, motion that has first been given to that other by
some third body. The phenomenon is not a mere passing on of mechanical
motion, but a creation of it out of a force previously latent or
manifesting itself in some other form. Volition, therefore, regarded
as an agent in the material universe, has no exclusive privilege of
origination."
So let it be. But this does not diminish the value of that
transformation (and in a sense origination) of force by intelligence,
by reason of which order is brought forth from disorder--cosmos
from chaos. What matters it if great spaces of matter are "without
form and void," and "darkness is upon the face of the deep," if
only intelligence is there brooding over the mass to give purposive
direction to the forces there latent or blindly tumbling in chaotic
confusion, until light and orderly development shall bring forth worlds
to answer noble ends. And that the 'Eternal Cause' does thus operate
upon co-eternal force and eternal matter is witnessed by the orderly
universe, everywhere giving evidence of the reign of law. It is this
fact of an orderly universe, whose phenomena run backward through a
chain of causes that suggest a purposive Eternal Cause, back of it.
This necessity for an Eternal Cause makes that cause one of the sources
of man's knowledge of God.
9. _On the Use of the Phrase "Eternal Cause."_ It will be observed
that in the quotation made from the article "Belief in God," in
this lesson, (Note 2) that the term "Eternal Cause" is used instead
of "First Cause." It is used by the author of that Article without
explanation. Mr. Mill uses the term "First Cause" and "Eternal Cause"
interchangeably. The reason for our use of "Eternal Cause," instead of
"First Cause" will appear in part from the quotation made from Mill in
note 2, where the difficulty of arriving at a cause that is not itself
an effect to some preceding cause is pointed out; and where also it
is shown that "though all causes have a beginning, there is in all of
them a permanent element which had no beginning;" and "this permanent
element may with some justice be termed a first or universal cause."
In both Mormon Theism and Mormon philosophy, matter is eternal force,
the permanent element in all causation, according to the suggestion of
Mr. Mill, is eternal; and intelligence, with its power to direct force
to purposive ends, is eternal. "Intelligence, * * * was not created or
made, neither indeed can be." (Doc. and Cov. Sec. XCIII.) To talk of
"beginnings," then, or "firsts," in any absolute sense, in the midst of
these eternal things, is to talk nonsense.
As Mr. Herbert Spencer remarks, "We are no more able to form a
circumscribed idea of cause, than of space or time; and we are
consequently obliged to think of the cause which transcends the
limits of our thought as positive though indefinite. Just in the same
manner that on conceiving any bounded space there arrives a nascent
consciousness of space outside the bounds; so, when we think of any
definite cause, there arises a nascent consciousness of a cause behind
it; and in the one case as in the other, this nascent consciousness is
in substance like that which suggests it, though without form." (First
Principles, p. 95-6.)
It may be difficult, then, especially within the range of human
experience or even within human power of conception, to posit a cause
that is not itself an effect of some antecedent cause, in other words,
a "first cause;" but it is not difficult to apprehend an eternal cause,
co-existing with eternal matter and force; and by the interaction of
these eternal things an orderly universe under the reign of law is the
outcome. I say it is not difficult to apprehend an eternal cause. I
mean, of course, it is no more difficult to apprehend an eternal cause
than it is to apprehend any other eternal thing--matter or force or
extension.
Footnotes
1. Such as space, duration, matter, force. See Seventy's Second Year
Book, all the notes of Lesson V, pp. 28-32.
LESSON V.
(Scripture Reading Exercise.)
SPECIAL LESSON.
_ARE THE SOURCES OF MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD, APART FROM REVELATION,
SUFFICIENT FOR AN INTELLIGENT FAITH IN GOD?_
_NOTES._
1. _The Reason For No Analysis:_ As in all these special lessons,
no analysis of the subject is given in this one, the design being, that
helped by the analysis of other lessons, the student will exercise his
own ingenuity in planning his treatment of the subject here presented.
2. _Suggestions to the Class Teacher:_ This subject may with
profit be allotted to two or even more speakers. Permission should
be given members of the class to ask questions which the speakers in
these special lessons rather than the teacher should be required to
answer. Answering questions will be found to be a most excellent mental
exercise.
3. _Treatment of the Subject:_ From the nature of the subject
its treatment must be argumentative. See the suggestions as to
argumentative discourse, Seventy's Year Book No. II, pp. 68-72.
4. _Introduction, Discussion, Conclusion:_ Each speaker to the
above important, and rich-with-opportunity question, should remember
our old formula of the First and Second Year Book in relation to
speeches, lectures and discourses--viz: In what you say be sure to have
a beginning, a middle, and an end. That is to say, an introduction, a
discussion and a conclusion. See Seventy's Year Book No. 1, pp. 59-60
and also pp. 86-87.
5. _Suggestions to the Speakers:_ In both the First and the Second
Seventy's Year Book, frequent use of suggestions is made from the
work of Mr. Pittinger on "Extempore Speech," referring therein to the
formation of discourses, methods of preparation, gathering materials,
thought-gatherings, and the like. In these special lessons occasion
will arise to quote him again on other phases of the art of expressing
thought; and I know of nothing now that could be of more benefit to the
young student than what he says in relation to the--
6. _First Moment of Speech:_ "Having completed all your
preparations, you now anxiously await the commencement of the
intellectual battle. This period is often a severe trial. Men who are
physically brave sometimes tremble in anticipation of speedily standing
before an audience. The shame of failure then may appear worse than
death itself. As the soldier feels more of cold and shrinking terror
when listening for the peal of the first gun, than afterward, when
the conflict deepens into blood around him, so the speaker usually
suffers more in this moment of expectancy than in any that follows. You
behold the danger in its full magnitude, without the inspiration that
attends it. Yet whatever effort it may cost, you must remain calm and
collected, for if not master of yourself, you cannot expect to rule
others. Your material must be kept well in hand, ready to be used at
the proper time, though it is not well to be continually conning over
your preparation. That would destroy the freshness of your matter and
bring you to the decisive test weary and jaded. You only need such an
occasional glance as will assure you that all your material remains
within reach. It is seldom possible by any means to banish all fear,
and it is to the speaker's advantage that he cannot. His timidity
arises from several causes, which differ widely in the effects they
produce. A conscious want of preparation, expecially when this arises
from any neglect or indolence, is one of the most distressing sources
of fear. A species of remorse then mingles with the embarrassment
natural to the moment. If the speaker has no other motive than to win
reputation--to minister to his own vanity--he will feel terrified,
as he realizes that shame instead of honor may be the result of his
rashness. That man is fortunate who can say, "I only speak because
I feel it to be a duty which I dare not refuse--a work that I must
perform whether well or ill. The lawyer who must defend his client, the
minister who feels that the hour of service has arrived, the teacher in
the presence of his class, are examples of those who speak under the
same kind of compulsion that calls a field laborer out into the burning
heat of a July noon whether he feels like it or not." (Extempore
Speech, pp. 187-8.)
LESSON VI.
(Scripture Reading Exercise.)
_IV. REVELATION._
_ANALYSIS._ _REFERENCES._
_I. Definition of Revelation and 1. Seventy's Year
Inspiration._ Book No. 1, pp. 140-142.
Notes 3 and 4 of that
_II. The Revelation of God in the Bible._ lesson should be made
part of this. Note 1.
_III. In the Book of Moses and the Book
of Abraham. Pearl of Great Price._ "The Gospel" (Roberts)
Third Edition, Ch. x.
_IV. In the Book of Mormon._ (Covers all divisions
of this lesson.)
(2) Notes 2, 3, 4, 5.
(3) Note 6.
(4) Note 7.
_SPECIAL TEXT: "No man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth
any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will
reveal him." Matt. xi:27_.
_NOTES._
1. _Revelation By Divers Means:_ "Revelation is the name of that
act by which God makes communication to men. Inspiration is the name
of that influence, that divine influence which operates upon the minds
of men under which they may be said to receive divine guidance."
(Cambridge Bible Helps). The inspiration may be strong or it may be
weak. It may be so over-powering in its character that the person for
the time being loses largely his own individuality and becomes the
mouthpiece of God, the organ through which the Divine speaks to the
children of men. There exist all degrees of inspiration, from human
intelligence and wisdom slightly influenced, up to that fulness of
inspiration of which I have spoken. Revelations may be made from God to
man in various ways. They may be made by God in his own proper person,
speaking for himself. On such occasions I take it that the revelation
would be most perfect. I know of no more beautiful or complete
illustration of such a perfect revelation than that great revelation
with which the dispensation of the fulness of times began, when God the
Father and Jesus the Christ, stood revealed in the presence of Joseph
Smith, when every veil was removed, and the glory of God extended
throughout the forest in which the Prophet had prayed; when he heard
the Father speak to him as one friend speaks to another, saying:
_"Joseph, this is My beloved Son; hear him."_
Then followed a conversation with this second Divine personage, to
whom he was thus so perfectly introduced, and from whom he received
the light and knowledge that laid the foundations of the great
latter-day work--Mormonism. There was no imperfection whatsoever in
that revelation; it was complete, overwhelming, and one of the most
remarkable revelations that God has deigned to give to the children of
men. Revelations may be made, and have been made, by the visitation
of angels, such as when Moroni came and revealed the existence of the
Nephite record, the American volume of scripture, the Book of Mormon;
and who afterwards from time to time, met with the Prophet of the last
dispensation and gave him knowledge and information as to the manner
in which the Church should be organized, and how its affairs should be
conducted. Then again, revelations may come through the operations of
the Holy Spirit upon the mind of man, as when the Prophet Joseph took
Urim and Thummim and with them and by their aid, under the influence
of the Holy Spirit, translated the Book of Mormon into the English
language. In a similar manner the Lord influences the minds of his
servants when preaching the gospel, and thus delivers his word to the
Church and to the world.
Through all these various means God speaks, and it is our good fortune
to be his witnesses, that he speaks in these various ways as well in
modern days as in ancient times.
2. _The Bible Revelation of God:_ "The knowledge of God with which
the Bible provides us is of a progressive character. It was revealed
'in many parts and in many modes' as men were able to receive it. We
therefore find a fuller knowledge in the New Testament than in the
Old, and among the Prophets than among the Patriarchs. Throughout the
Bible the existence of God is taken for granted; we are not supplied
with arguments to prove it. In earlier days men sometimes had doubts
as to whether God felt any interest or took any part in the affairs of
men, but they never doubted that He exists. The Bible teaches that the
knowledge of God is possible for us, not because he makes himself known
unto us; i. e. we are taught that there is such a thing as Revelation,
God has come forth, out of the "thick darkness" (I K 8:12) in which he
dwells, and has declared himself to His servants in such a way that we
may get a true knowledge of His character and of his purposes and of
his purposes for the world." (Cambridge Teachers Bible Dictionary.)
("Seventy's Bible," pp. 64-65).
3. _The Presence of God in the Bible:_ "The statements about God in
Holy Scripture are uttered with an air of authority, dogmatically; not
as the result of a long chain of reasoning: 'The Lord said' this--did
that--or more emphatically, in the form of a message, 'Thus saith
the Lord,' the teaching of the Bible is not the result of deductive
or inductive reasoning. No direct arguments are adduced to prove the
existence of God--that is assumed throughout. His attributes may
be the subject of argument; His existence, never. His justice, His
wisdom, His power may be momentarily obscured by the mystery of evil
in the world--as in the book of Job. Incidentally we may get arguments
dealing with the nature of the Deity, as e. g. the interesting a
fortiori argument from creature to Creator in Ps. 94. 'He that made
the eye, shall he not see?' etc., which logically carried out becomes
in inference of personality in God from man's personality--there are
arguments such as these either stated or suggested in Holy Scripture,
but the existence of God never comes within their scope. It lies
behind all else; it is the fundamental conception in the light of
which all else is viewed. Not only in the Pentateuch and the Prophets
and the Psalms, but in the historical narratives--in the brief and
apparently barren records of the accession, regnal years, and death
of the various kings, it is made clear that God's hand is at work
throughout the course of events, and that He is the ever-present Judge
by whom the actions of kind and subject alike are weighed. Even in the
Book of Esther, in which the divine name never once occurs, no doubt
is left upon the mind as to the providential over-rulings of events
both great and small. Nay, in those books which are least formally
theological--Job, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes, the works of the 'wise
man,' the humanists or philosophers of Israel--the thought of God is
present from first to last. They do not grope and search after Him
like the great pagan thinkers. They set out, not to discover, but to
recognize Him; to learn from His dealings with nature and human nature
more about that divine personality who is the primary presupposition
of all their system, and with whom their heart holds sacred communion
even while the intellect stands baffled before the insoluble problems
involved in His permission of evil in the world He rules." "Belief in
God." Dummelow's Commentary, R. C.
4. _The Bible "A Picture of the World With God at Work In It:"_
The Bible, as we have said, does not offer arguments to prove the
existence of the Deity, but it offers something which is far more
valuable to most of us than any abstract proof. It gives us a
concrete, experimental, descriptive theology. It shows us a picture
of the world with God at work in it, which the devout, appreciative
soul instinctively recognizes as truth. It offers us, largely
in the concrete form of narrative and history, a theory of the
universe which, rightly understood, is found to meet the demands
of hearts and minds alike; revealing a God whose character is such
and whose relation to man is such that in Him both our needs and
our aspirations find satisfaction. At the same time it incidentally
provides a theory of human nature (see especially Gen. 1-3) that
affords the only satisfactory key to the raison d'etre of those needs
and aspirations--the explanation of man's actual littleness and his
potential greatness."--Ibid. D. C.
5. _The Relations of the Testimony of Nature and Revelation:_
"In the first place, then, the indications of a Creator and of his
attributes which we have been able to find in nature, though so much
slighter and less conclusive even as to his existence than the pious
mind would wish to consider them, and still more unsatisfactory in the
formation they afford as to his attributes, are yet sufficient to give
to the supposition of a revelation a standing point which it would not
otherwise have had. The alleged Revelation is not obliged to build up
its case from the foundation; it has not to prove the very existence
of the being from whom it professes to come. It claims to be a message
from a being whose existence, whose power, and to a certain extent
whose wisdom and goodness, are, if not proved, at least indicated with
more or less of probability by the phenomena of nature. The sender
of the alleged message is not a sheer invention; there are grounds
independent of the message itself in his reality; grounds which, though
insufficient for proof, are sufficient to take away all antecedent
improbability from the supposition that a message may really have been
received from him. It is, moreover, much to the purpose to take notice,
that the very imperfection of the evidences which Natural Theology can
produce of the Divine attributes, removes some of the chief stumbling
blocks to the belief of a revelation; since the objections grounded on
imperfections in the revelation itself, however conclusive against it
if it is considered as a record of the acts or an expression of the
wisdom of a being of infinite power combined with infinite wisdom and
goodness, are no reason whatever against its having come from a being
such as the course of nature points to, whose wisdom is possibly, his
power certainly, limited, and whose goodness, though real, is not
likely to have been the only motive which actuated him in the work of
Creation." "Theism" (Mill). From "Three Essays on Religion." (1874).
The whole work can be studied with great profit as confirmation of many
revealed truths of our day to be found in Mr. Mill's deductions; also
upon the same line of thought may profitably be consulted, Book III of
Shedd's "History of Christian Doctrine," the chapter on "Evidence of
the Divine Existence."
6. _The Revelation of God in the Pearl of Great Price:_ The Book of
Moses and the Book of Abraham in the Pearl of Great Price [1] follow
the Bible in the peculiarity of making no argument for the existence of
God. That existence is assumed. The opening paragraphs of the Book of
Moses plunge one immediately into the very presence of God. Thus: "The
words of God, which he spake unto Moses at a time when Moses was caught
up into an exceeding high mountain, and he saw God, face to face, and
he talked with him, and the glory of God was upon Moses, therefore
Moses could endure his presence. And God spake unto Moses, saying:
Behold, I am the Lord God Almighty, and endless is my name; for I am
without beginning of days or end of years; and is not this endless?
And, behold, thou art my son; wherefore look, and I will show thee the
workmanship of mine hands; but not all, for my works are without end,
and also my words, for they never cease. Wherefore, no man can behold
all my works, except he behold all my glory; and no man can behold all
my glory, and afterwards remain in the flesh on the earth." (Chapter 1.)
The Book of Abraham with equal force assumes the existence of God, and
its opening paragraphs deal with Abraham seeking his rights to the
Priesthood of God, and announcing himself as one who was a "follower of
righteousness," * * * "and desiring to receive instruction, and to keep
the commandments of God;" and so following. The existence of God is a
settled question; and the books here considered are chiefly of value
because, like the revelations of the Bible, they unfold the nature of
God, and his relationship to man, rather than argue for his existence.
7. _The Book of Mormon on the Existence of God:_ The Book of
Mormon, like the Bible, takes the existence of God as a thing granted;
and only in one remembered instance is the question of God's existence
argued. This is in the case of the controversy between Alma, the High
Priest, and the desperate Anti-Christ, Korihor. The latter denied
the existence of God; Alma affirmed it. Korihor demanded a sign in
attestation of the Divine existence. Alma appealed to the consciousness
of God in the soul of man as manifest in his own knowledge and the
experience of others that were present; to the testimony of the
prophets, to the scriptures, and to the creation, as being a witness
to the existence of a Creator--"all things denote there is a God; yea,
even the earth, and all things that are upon the face of it; yea, and
its motion; yea, and also the planets which move in their regular form,
(order)--* * * * * witness that there is a supreme Creator." And from
this basis of testimony he affirms the existence of God, and justifies
the Priesthood of God, and the Church, in the course that is pursued in
teaching faith in and obedience to God; (Alma XXX: 37-44) and the hope
of salvation through the atonement of the Messiah.
Footnotes
1. For the origin, contents, and character of this collection of
revelations see Seventy's First Year Book, Part V, Lessons V, VI and
VII.
LESSON VII.
(Scripture Reading Exercise.)
_IV. REVELATION.--(Continued.)_
_ANALYSIS._ _REFERENCES._
_V. Revelation of God in the Doctrine Doc. & Cov. Lectures
and Covenants._ on Faith, Lecture II,
also Sec. xx:17-28; also
_VI. The Revelation of God to Joseph Sec. lxxvi:1-24. Notes 1
Smith._ and 2.
"New Witnesses for
God," Vol. I, Ch. x. "History
of the Mormon
Church." Americana,
Vol. iv, (1909), Ch. v.
Pearl of Great Price,
Writings of Joseph
Smith, Ch. ii. Note 3.
_SPECIAL TEXT: I saw two personages, whose brightness and glory defy
all description, standing above me in the air. One of them spake unto
me calling me by name, and said, pointing to the other: "Joseph, this
is My beloved Son, hear Him." Joseph Smith, Pearl of Great Price, p.
85. (Edition of 1902.)_
_NOTES._
1. _The Doctrine and Covenants on the Existence of God:_ The
Doctrine and Covenants in the main is a collection of Revelations
given through Joseph Smith. The revelations are not a formal treatise
on theology. In all the revelations the existence of God, as would
naturally be expected, is assumed. "There is a God in heaven who
is infinite and eternal, from everlasting to everlasting, the same
unchangeable God, the framer of heaven and earth, and all things that
are in them." (Doc. & Cov. Sec. XX; 17). This declaration is made in
the revelation which directed the organization of the Church to be
made, on the 6th day of April, 1830. So all through the revelations,
God's existence is proclaimed, but never argued: "Hear, O Ye Heavens,
and give ear O Earth, and rejoice ye inhabitants thereof, for the
Lord is God, and beside Him there is no Savior. Great is His wisdom,
marvelous are His ways, and the extent of His doings none can find out.
His purposes fail not, neither are there any who can stay his hand;
from eternity to eternity he is the same and his years never fail. *
* * And now after the many testimonies which have been given of him,
this is the testimony last of all, which we give of him, that he lives;
for we saw Him, even on the right hand of God, and we heard the voice
bearing record that He is the Only Begotten of the Father--that by Him,
and through Him, and of Him the worlds are and were created and the
inhabitants thereof are begotten sons and daughters unto God." Doc. &
Cov., Sec. LXXVI. This kind of proclamation recurs at times in other
revelations.
2. _The Lectures on Faith:_ In the fore part of the Doctrine and
Covenants there is a series of six lectures on faith. The lectures, of
course, are not on the same level of authority with the revelations.
They constitute a treatise on the subject of their title drawn up by
a committee appointed from among the Elders of the Church by the High
Council at Kirtland, on the 24th of September, 1834. The committee
consisted of Joseph Smith, Oliver Cowdery, Sidney Rigdon and Frederick
G. Williams. (History of the Church, Vol. II, p. 165.) The lectures
were first delivered to a class of elders at Kirtland during the winter
of 1834-5, under the title of "Lectures on Theology." The Prophet
alludes to the circumstance in his journal as follows, under date of
December 1st, 1834: "Our school for the Elders was now well attended,
and with the lectures on theology, which were regularly delivered
absorbed for the time being, everything else of a temporal nature."
(Hist. of the Church, Vol. II, pp. 175-6.) On the first of January
following he refers to the same subject as follows: "During the month
of January I was engaged in the school of the Elders and in preparing
the lectures on theology for publication in the Book of Doctrine and
Covenants which the committee [above named] appointed last September
were now compiling."
The following is a foot note from page 176 of the History of the
Church, Volume II: These "Lectures on Theology" here referred to were
afterwards prepared by the Prophet, (See p. 180), and published in the
Doctrine and Covenants under the title "Lectures on Faith." They are
seven in number, and occupy the first seventy-five pages in the current
editions of the Doctrine and Covenants. They are not to be regarded
as of equal authority in matters of doctrine with the revelations of
God in the Doctrine and Covenants, but as stated by Elder John Smith,
who, when the book of Doctrine and Covenants was submitted to the
several quorums of the Priesthood for acceptance, (August 17, 1835,)
speaking in behalf of the Kirtland High Council, "bore record that
the revelations in said book were true, and that the lectures were
judicially written and compiled, and were profitable for doctrine."
The distinction which Elder John Smith here makes should be observed
as marking the difference between the Lectures on Faith and the
revelations of God in the Doctrine and Covenants. (See also Seventy's
First Year Book, Part V, Lesson I, pp. 135-138.)
3. _The Objective Reality of Joseph Smith Vision:_ Did the visions
of Joseph Smith have objective reality, or were they purely subjective,
mere creations of the mind? This question has been extensively debated.
Of course, from the Mormon point of view, the visions had objective
reality. That is to say, the Divine personages of the first vision were
tangible, bodily persons. One of them, in fact, was the risen Christ,
who, when he arose from the dead left a tomb empty; who, to some of
his doubting disciples, on appearing to a number of them after his
resurrection, said "handle me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and
bone as ye see me have." And who in further attestation of the reality
of his bodily existence ate of a fish and honey-comb in the presence
of these same disciples. And we have warrant even of the Athanasian
Greed that "such as the Father is, such is the son;" and conversely it
follows of necessity that as the Son is, so is the Father! Hence the
Father a tangible reality, a personage of flesh and bone as indeed was
and is the Christ.
_The Singularity of Joseph Smith's Vision of God:_ Joseph Smith's
vision of God is the most singular of any given to mortal man. The
only other vision that approaches it is that of Stephen described in
Acts VII. "He being full of the Holy Ghost looked up steadfastly unto
heaven, and saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing on the right hand
of God, and said, Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man
standing on the right hand of God." Then the Jews cried out with a
loud voice, stopped their ears that they might not hear his supposed
blasphemy, and ran upon him with one accord, and stoned him to death.
Stephens's vision of God, however, is not equal to Joseph Smith's
vision for distinctiveness of view, and definiteness of revelation of
the Father's person. Hitherto it could be said--"And no man knoweth * *
* * the Father save the Son, and He to whomsoever the Son will reveal
Him (Matt. xi:27); also "No man hath seen God at any time; the only
begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared
him." (John i:18.) The Father according to these sayings--except for
the vision of Stephen--had kept in the background of revelation; for
the Jehovah of the Jews--God--was but the pre-existent spirit of the
Christ of the New Testament. (See also revelation of Moriancumer,
the brother of Jared, Ether III.) But when the "dispensation of the
Fulness of Times" was being ushered in, it was fitting that a fulness
of knowledge of God should be revealed to the first great witness and
prophet of that dispensation. Fitting, too, that the Father should
introduce the son to that witness and prophet. Nowhere else is there a
vision of God so perfect, and glorious as in that vision with which the
dispensation of the fulness of times opens--the dispensation in which
it is promised that all things shall be gathered together in one--"all
things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are in earth, even
to him. (Eph. I:10).
LESSON VIII.
(Scripture Reading Exercise.)
_THE LIMITATIONS OF OUR REVELATIONS._
_ANALYSIS._ _REFERENCES._
_I. The Earth and its Relations to the Gen. i, ii. Doc. & Cov.,
Universe._ Sec. 88:42-61. New Witnesses
for God, Vol. I.
_II. The Revelations of God to Moses (Treatise on Joseph Smith.)
Limited to Our Earth and Related Chs. xxviii, xxix,
Spheres._ xxx. Notes 1, 2, 3, 4.
Book of Moses, Chs. i,
ii. Seventy's Year Book
No. II, Lesson V, note
10. Notes, this lesson,
5, 6.
_SPECIAL TEXT: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.
And the earth was without form, and darkness was upon the face of the
deep; and the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." Gen.
i_:1, 2.[1]
_NOTES._
1. _View of the Universe, (a) Mediaeval:_ In past ages what was
called the geocentric theory, that is, earth-center theory, respecting
the universe prevailed. It was believed that the earth was in shape
flat, and the immovable center of the universe; that about it circled
sun, moon and stars in regular order. Indeed it was supposed that the
specific and only purpose for which the sun was formed was to give
light and heat to the earth; and the moon and stars were formed to give
light by night in the absence of the sun. Above the earth was bent the
vast dome of the blue sky, its edges apparently resting on the supposed
circumfluous waters. Above the blue sky was heaven, the abode of God
and the blest; and under the earth was the dark region of hell, into
which was thrust the wicked--the damned. It was believed that God,
about six thousand years ago, created by a word, out of nothing, all
this universe--earth, sun, moon, stars, and all things in the earth.
That man and all living creatures were moulded from the dust, and
then had breathed into them the spirit of life, and so became living
creatures. This was the view "authoritatively asserted by the church."
(Draper.)
2. _Views of the Universe, (b) Modern:_ The views expressed in
note 1, however, by our modern knowledge is changed. The modern view
enforced by absolute knowledge respecting the universe is thus stated
by John W. Draper: "As there are other globes like our earth, so, too,
there are other worlds like our solar system. There are self-luminous
suns exceeding in number all computation. The dimensions of the earth
pass into nothingness in comparison with the dimensions of the solar
system, and that system, in its turn, is only an invisible point if
placed in relation with the countless hosts of other systems which
form, with it, clusters of stars. Our solar system, far from being
alone in the universe, is only one of an extensive brotherhood, bound
by common laws and subject to like influences. Even on the very verge
of creation, where imagination might lay the beginning of the realms
of chaos, we see unbounded proofs of order, a regularity in the
arrangement of inanimate things, suggesting to us that there are other
intellectual creatures like us, the tenants of those islands in the
abysses of space. "Though it may take a beam of light a million years
to bring to our view those distant worlds, the end is not yet. Far
away in the depths of space we catch the faint gleams of other groups
of stars like our own. The finger of a man can hide them in their
remoteness. Their vast distances from one another have dwindled into
nothing. They and their movements have lost all individuality; the
innumerable suns of which they are composed blend all their collected
light into one pale milky glow."
"Thus extending our view from the earth to the solar system, from
the solar system to the expanse of the group of stars to which we
belong, we behold a series of gigantic nebula creations rising up one
after another, and forming greater and greater colonies of worlds.
No numbers can express them, for they make the firmament a haze of
stars. Uniformity, even though it be the uniformity of magnificence,
tires at last, and we abandon the survey, for our eyes can only behold
a boundless prospect, and conscience tells us our own unspeakable
insignificance." Draper's Intellectual Development of Europe, Vol.
II, p. 299. New Witnesses for God, Vol. I (Treatise on Joseph Smith)