CHAPTER I

THE METAPHYSICS OF THE UNDERSTANDING

Metaphysics is what reaches after substance, and this implies that one

unity, one thought is maintained in opposition to dualism, just as Being

was amongst the ancients. In metaphysics itself we have, however, the

opposition between substantiality and individuality. What comes first

is the spontaneous, but likewise uncritical, metaphysics, and it is

represented by Descartes and Spinoza, who assert the unity of Being and

thought. The second stage is found in Locke, who treats of the opposition

itself inasmuch as he considers the metaphysical Idea of experience, that

is the origin of thoughts and their justification, not yet entering on

the question of whether they are absolutely true. In the third place we

have Leibnitz’s monad—the world viewed as a totality.

A. FIRST DIVISION.

We here encounter the innate ideas of Descartes. The philosophy of

Spinoza, in the second place, is related to the philosophy of Descartes

as its necessary development only; the method is an important part of

it. A method which stands alongside of Spinozism and which is also a

perfected development of Cartesianism, is, in the third place, that by

which Malebranche has represented this philosophy.

1. DESCARTES.

René Descartes is a bold spirit who re-commenced the whole subject

from the very beginning and constituted afresh the ground-work on which

Philosophy is based, and to which, after a thousand years had passed, it

once more returned. The extent of the influence which this man exercised

upon his times and the culture of Philosophy generally, cannot be

sufficiently expressed; it rests mainly in his setting aside all former

presuppositions and beginning in a free, simple, and likewise popular

way, with popular modes of thought and quite simple propositions, in his

leading the content to thought and extension or Being, and so to speak

setting up this before thought as its opposite. This simple thought

appeared in the form of the determinate, clear understanding, and it

cannot thus be called speculative thought or speculative reason. There

are fixed determinations from which Descartes proceeds, but only of

thought; this is the method of his time. What the French called exact

science, science of the determinate understanding, made its appearance at

this time. Philosophy and exact science were not yet separated, and it

was only later on that this separation first took place.

To come to the life of Descartes—he was born in 1596, at La Haye in

Touraine, of an ancient and noble race. He received an education

of the usual kind in a Jesuit school, and made great progress; his

disposition was lively and restless; he extended his insatiable zeal

in all directions, pursued his researches into all systems and forms;

his studies, in addition to ancient literature, embraced such subjects

as philosophy, mathematics, chemistry, physics, and astronomy. But the

studies of his youth in the Jesuit school, and those studies which

he afterwards prosecuted with the same diligence and strenuous zeal,

resulted in giving him a strong disinclination for learning derived from

books; he quitted the school where he had been educated, and yet his

eagerness for learning was only made the keener through this perplexity

and unsatisfied yearning. He went as a young man of eighteen to Paris,

and there lived in the great world. But as he here found no satisfaction,

he soon left society and returned to his studies. He retired to a suburb

of Paris and there occupied himself principally with mathematics,

remaining quite concealed from all his former friends. At last, after

the lapse of two years, he was discovered by them, drawn forth from his

retirement, and again introduced to the great world. He now once more

renounced the study of books and threw himself into the affairs of actual

life. Thereafter he went to Holland and entered the military service;

soon afterwards, in 1619, and in the first year of the Thirty Years’ War,

he went as a volunteer with the Bavarian troops, and took part in several

campaigns under Tilly. Many have found learning unsatisfying; Descartes

became a soldier—not because he found in the sciences too little, but

because they were too much, too high for him. Here in his winter quarters

he studied diligently, and in Ulm, for instance, he made acquaintance

with a citizen who was deeply versed in mathematics. He was able to carry

out his studies even better in winter quarters at Neuberg on the Danube,

where once more, and now most profoundly, the desire awoke in him to

strike out a new departure in Philosophy and entirely reconstruct it;

he solemnly promised the Mother of God to make a pilgrimage to Loretto

if she would prosper him in this design, and if he should now at last

come to himself and attain to peace. He was also in the battle at Prague

in which Frederick the Elector-Palatine lost the Bohemian crown. Yet

since the sight of these wild scenes could not satisfy him, he gave up

military service in 1621. He made several other journeys through the rest

of Germany, and then proceeded to Poland, Prussia, Switzerland, Italy

and France. On account of its greater freedom he withdrew to Holland, in

order there to pursue his projects; here he lived in peace from 1629 to

1644—a period in which he composed and issued most of his works, and

also defended them against the manifold attacks from which they suffered,

and which more especially proceeded from the clergy. Queen Christina

of Sweden finally called him to her court at Stockholm, which was the

rendezvous for all the most celebrated men of learning of the time, and

there he died in 1650.[154]

As regards his philosophic works, those which contain his first

principles have in particular something very popular about their method

of presentation, which makes them highly to be recommended to those

commencing the study of philosophy. Descartes sets to work in a quite

simple and childlike manner, with a narration of his reflections as they

came to him. Professor Cousin of Paris has brought out a new edition of

Descartes in eleven octavo volumes; the greater part consists of letters

on natural phenomena. Descartes gave a new impetus to mathematics as well

as to philosophy. Several important methods were discovered by him, upon

which the most brilliant results in higher mathematics were afterwards

built. His method is even now an essential in mathematics, for Descartes

is the inventor of analytic geometry, and consequently the first to point

out the way in this field of science to modern mathematics. He likewise

cultivated physics, optics, and astronomy, and made the most important

discoveries in these; we have not, however, to deal with such matters.

The application of metaphysics to ecclesiastical affairs, investigations,

etc., has likewise no special interest for us.

1. In Philosophy Descartes struck out quite original lines; with him the

new epoch in Philosophy begins, whereby it was permitted to culture to

grasp in the form of universality the principle of its higher spirit in

thought, just as Boehme grasped it in sensuous perceptions and forms.

Descartes started by saying that thought must necessarily commence from

itself; all the philosophy which came before this, and specially what

proceeded from the authority of the Church, was for ever after set aside.

But since here thought has properly speaking grasped itself as abstract

understanding only, in relation to which the more concrete content still

stands over on the other side, the determinate conceptions were not

yet deduced from the understanding, but taken up only empirically. In

Descartes’ philosophy we have thus to distinguish what has, and what

has not universal interest for us: the former is the process of his

thoughts themselves, and the latter the mode in which these thoughts are

presented and deduced. Yet we must not consider the process as a method

of consistent proof; it is indeed a deep and inward progress, but it

comes to us in an ingenuous and naïve form. In order to do justice to

Descartes’ thoughts it is necessary for us to be assured of the necessity

for his appearance; the spirit of his philosophy is simply knowledge as

the unity of Thought and Being. And yet on the whole there is little to

say about his philosophy.

a. Descartes expresses the fact that we must begin from thought as such

alone, by saying that we must doubt everything (_De omnibus dubitandum

est_); and that is an absolute beginning. He thus makes the abolition

of all determinations the first condition of Philosophy. This first

proposition has not, however, the same signification as Scepticism,

which sets before it no other aim than doubt itself, and requires that

we should remain in this indecision of mind, an indecision wherein mind

finds its freedom. It rather signifies that we should renounce all

prepossessions—that is, all hypotheses which are accepted as true in

their immediacy—and commence from thought, so that from it we should in

the first place attain to some fixed and settled basis, and make a true

beginning. In Scepticism this is not the case, for with the sceptics

doubt is the end at which they rest.[155] But the doubting of Descartes,

his making no hypotheses, because nothing is fixed or secure, does not

occur in the interests of freedom as such, in order that nothing should

have value except freedom itself, and nothing exist in the quality of

an external objective. To him everything is unstable indeed, in so

far as the Ego can abstract from it or can think, for pure thought is

abstraction from everything. But in consciousness the end is predominant,

and it is to arrive at something fixed and objective—and not the moment

of subjectivity, or the fact of being set forth, known and proved by me.

Yet this last comes along with the other, for it is from the starting

point of my thought that I would attain my object; the impulse of freedom

is thus likewise fundamental.

In the propositions in which Descartes gives in his own way the ground

of this great and most important principle, there is found a naïve and

empirical system of reasoning. This is an example: “Because we were born

as children, and formed all manner of judgments respecting sensuous

things before we had the perfect use of our reason, we are through many

preconceived ideas hindered from the knowledge of the truth. From these

we appear not to be able to free ourselves in any other way but by once

in our lives striving to doubt that respecting which we have the very

slightest suspicion of an uncertainty. Indeed it is really desirable to

hold as false everything in respect to which we have any doubt, so that

we may find more clearly what is most certain and most knowable. Yet

this doubt has to be limited to the contemplation of the truth, for in

the conduct of our life we are compelled to choose the probable, since

there the opportunity for action would often pass away before we could

solve our doubts. But here, where we have only to deal with the search

for truth, we may very reasonably doubt whether any thing sensuous and

perceptible exists—in the first place because we find that the senses

often deceive us and it is prudent not to trust in what has even once

deceived us, and then because every day in dreaming we think we feel or

see before ourselves innumerable things which never were, and to the

doubter no signs are given by which he can safely distinguish sleeping

from waking. We shall hereby likewise doubt everything else, even

mathematical propositions, partly because we have seen that some err

even in what we hold most certain, and ascribe value to what to us seems

false, and partly because we have heard that a God exists who has created

us, and who can do everything, so that He may have created us liable to

err. But if we conceive ourselves not to derive our existence from God,

but from some other source, perhaps from ourselves, we are all the more

liable, in that we are thus imperfect, to err. But we have so far the

experience of freedom within us that we can always refrain from what is

not perfectly certain and well founded.”[156] The demand which rests

at the basis of Descartes’ reasonings thus is that what is recognized

as true should be able to maintain the position of having the thought

therein at home with itself. The so-called immediate intuition and inward

revelation, which in modern times is so highly regarded, has its place

here. But because in the Cartesian form the principle of freedom as such

is not brought into view, the grounds which are here advanced are for the

most part popular.

b. Descartes sought something in itself certain and true, which should

neither be only true like the object of faith without knowledge, nor the

sensuous and also sceptical certainty which is without truth. The whole

of Philosophy as it had been carried on up to this time was vitiated by

the constant presupposition of something as true, and in some measure,

as in the Neo-Platonic philosophy, by not giving the form of scientific

knowledge to its matter, or by not separating its moments. But to

Descartes nothing is true which does not possess an inward evidence

in consciousness, or which reason does not recognize so clearly and

conclusively that any doubt regarding it is absolutely impossible.

“Because we thus reject or declare to be false everything regarding which

we can have any doubt at all, it is easy for us to suppose that there is

no God, no heaven, no body—but we cannot therefore say that we do not

exist, who think this. For it is contradictory to say that what thinks

does not exist. Hence the knowledge that ‘I think, therefore I am,’ is

what we arrive at first of all, and it is the most certain fact that

offers itself to everyone who follows after philosophy in an orderly

fashion. This is the best way of becoming acquainted with the nature of

spirit and its diversity from body. For if we inquire who we are who can

set forth as untrue everything which is different from ourselves, we

clearly see that no extension, figure, change of position, nor any such

thing which can be ascribed to body, constitutes our nature, but only

thought alone; which is thus known earlier and more certainly than any

corporeal thing.”[157] ‘I’ has thus significance here as thought, and

not as individuality of self-consciousness. The second proposition of

the Cartesian philosophy is hence the immediate certainty of thought.

Certainty is only knowledge as such in its pure form as self-relating,

and this is thought; thus then the unwieldy understanding makes its way

on to the necessity of thought.

Descartes begins, just as Fichte did later on, with the ‘I’ as

indubitably certain; I know that something is presented in me. By this

Philosophy is at one stroke transplanted to quite another field and

to quite another standpoint, namely to the sphere of subjectivity.

Presuppositions in religion are given up; proof alone is sought for,

and not the absolute content which disappears before abstract infinite

subjectivity. There is in Descartes likewise a seething desire to

speak from strong feeling, from the ordinary sensuous point of view,

just as Bruno and so many others, each in his own fashion, express as

individualities their particular conceptions of the world. To consider

the content in itself is not the first matter; for I can abstract from

all my conceptions, but not from the ‘I.’ We think this and that, and

hence it is—is to give the common would-be-wise argument of those

incapable of grasping the matter in point; that a determinate content

exists is exactly what we are forced to doubt—there is nothing absolutely

fixed. Thought is the entirely universal, but not merely because I

can abstract, but because ‘I’ is thus simple, self-identical. Thought

consequently comes first; the next determination arrived at, in direct

connection with it, is the determination of Being. The ‘I think’ directly

involves my Being; this, says Descartes, is the absolute basis of all

Philosophy.[158] The determination of Being is in my ‘I’; this connection

is itself the first matter. Thought as Being and Being as thought—that

is my certainty, ‘I’; in the celebrated _Cogito, ergo sum_ we thus have

Thought and Being inseparably bound together.

On the one hand this proposition is regarded as a syllogism: from thought

Being is deduced. Kant more especially has objected to this that Being

is not contained in thinking, that it is different from thinking. This

is true, but they are still inseparable, or constitute an identity;

their difference is not to the prejudice of their unity. Yet this maxim

of pure abstract certainty, the universal totality in which everything

implicitly exists, is not proved;[159] we must therefore not try to

convert this proposition into a syllogism. Descartes himself says:

“There is no syllogism present at all. For in order that there should be

such, the major premise must have been ‘all that thinks exists’”—from

which the subsumption would have followed in the minor premise, ‘now

I am.’ By this the immediacy which rests in the proposition, would be

removed. “But that major premise” is not set forth at all, being “really

in the first instance derived from the original ‘I think, therefore, I

am.’”[160] For arriving at a conclusion three links are required—in this

case we ought to have a third through which thought and Being should have

been mediated, and it is not to be found here. The ‘Therefore’ which

binds the two sides together is not the ‘Therefore’ of a syllogism; the

connection between Being and Thought is only immediately posited. This

certainty is thus the _prius_; all other propositions come later. The

thinking subject as the simple immediacy of being-at-home-with-me is

the very same thing as what is called Being; and it is quite easy to

perceive this identity. As universal, thought is contained in all that

is particular, and thus is pure relation to itself, pure oneness with

itself. We must not make the mistake of representing Being to ourselves

as a concrete content, and hence it is the same immediate identity which

thought likewise is. Immediacy is, however, a one-sided determination;

thought does not contain it alone, but also the determination to mediate

itself with itself, and thereby—by the mediation being at the same time

the abrogation of the mediation—it is immediacy. In thought we thus have

Being; Being is, however, a poor determination, it is the abstraction

from the concrete of thought. This identity of Being and Thought,

which constitutes the most interesting idea of modern times, has not

been further worked out by Descartes; he has relied on consciousness

alone, and for the time being placed it in the fore-front. For with

Descartes the necessity to develop the differences from the ‘I think’ is

not yet present; Fichte first applied himself to the deduction of all

determinations from this culminating point of absolute certainty.

Other propositions have been set against that of Descartes.

Gassendi,[161] for example, asks if we might not just as well say

_Ludificor, ergo sum_: I am made a fool of by my consciousness, therefore

I exist—or properly speaking, therefore I am made a fool of. Descartes

himself recognized that this objection merited consideration, but he

here repels it, inasmuch as it is the ‘I’ alone and not the other

content which has to be maintained. Being alone is identical with pure

thought, and not its content, be it what it may. Descartes further says:

“By thought I, however, understand all that takes place in us within

our consciousness, in as far as we are conscious of it; thus will,

conception, and even feeling are identical with thought. For if I say

‘I see,’ or ‘I walk out,’ and ‘therefore I am,’ and understand by this

the seeing and walking which is accomplished by the body, the conclusion

is not absolutely certain, because, as often happens in a dream, I may

imagine that I can see or walk even if I do not open my eyes nor move

from my place, and I might also possibly do so supposing I had no body.

But if I understand it of the subjective feeling or the consciousness of

seeing or walking itself, because it is then related to the mind that

alone feels or thinks that it sees or walks, this conclusion is perfectly

certain.”[162] “In a dream” is an empirical mode of reasoning, but there

is no other objection to it. In willing, seeing, hearing, &c., thought is

likewise contained, it is absurd to suppose that the soul has thinking

in one special pocket, and seeing, willing, &c., in others. But if I say

‘I see,’ ‘I walk out,’ there is present on the one hand my consciousness

‘I,’ and consequently thought, on the other hand, however, there is

present willing, seeing, hearing, walking, and thus a still further

modification of the content. Now because of this modification I cannot

say ‘I walk, and therefore I am,’ for I can undoubtedly abstract from

the modification, since it is no longer universal Thought. Thus we must

merely look at the pure consciousness contained in the concrete ‘I.’ Only

when I accentuate the fact that I am present there as thinking, is pure

Being implied, for only with the universal is Being united.

“In this it is implied,” says Descartes, “that thought is more certain to

me than body. If from the fact that I touch or see the earth I judge that

it exists, I must more certainly judge from this that my thought exists.

For it may very well happen that I judge the earth to exist, even if it

does not exist, but it cannot be that I judge this, and that my mind

which judges this does not exist.”[163] That is to say, everything which

is for me I may assert to be non-existent, but when I assert myself to be

non-existent, I myself _assert_, or it is _my_ judgment. For I cannot set

aside the fact that I judge, even if I can abstract from that respecting

which I judge. In this Philosophy has regained its own ground that

thought starts from thought as what is certain in itself, and not from

something external, not from something given, not from an authority,

but directly from the freedom that is contained in the ‘I think.’ Of all

else I may doubt, of the existence of bodily things, of my body itself;

or this certainty does not possess immediacy in itself. For ‘I’ is just

certainty itself, but in all else this certainty is only predicate; my

body is certain to _me_, it is not this certainty itself.[164] As against

the certainty we feel of having a body, Descartes adduces the empirical

phenomenon that we often hear of persons imagining they feel pain in

a limb which they have lost long ago.[165] What is actual, he says is

a substance, the soul is a thinking substance; it is thus for itself,

separate from all external material things and independent. That it is

thinking is evident from its nature: it would think and exist even if no

material things were present; the soul can hence know itself more easily

than its body.[166]

All else that we can hold as true rests on this certainty; for in order

that anything should be held as true, evidence is requisite, but nothing

is true which has not this inward evidence in consciousness. “Now the

evidence of everything rests upon our perceiving it as clearly and

vividly as that certainty itself, and on its so entirely depending from,

and harmonizing with this principle, that if we wished to doubt it we

should also have to doubt this principle likewise” (our _ego_).[167] This

knowledge is indeed on its own account perfect evidence, but it is not

yet the truth, or if we take that Being as truth, it is an empty content,

and it is with the content that we have to do.

c. What comes third is thus the transition of this certainty into

truth, into the determinate; Descartes again makes this transition

in a naïve way, and with it we for the first time begin to consider

his metaphysics. What here takes place is that an interest arises in

further representations and conceptions of the abstract unity of Being

and Thought; there Descartes sets to work in an externally reflective

manner. “The consciousness which merely knows itself to be certain now

however seeks to extend its knowledge, and finds that it has conceptions

of many things—in which conceptions it does not deceive itself, so long

as it does not assert or deny that something similar outside corresponds

to them.” Deception in the conceptions has meaning only in relation to

external existence. “Consciousness also discovers universal conceptions,

and obtains from them proofs which are evident, _e.g._ the geometric

proposition that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two

right angles is a conception which follows incontrovertibly from others.

But in reflecting whether such things really exist doubts arise.”[168]

That there is such a thing as a triangle is indeed in this case by

no means certain, since extension is not contained in the immediate

certainty of myself. The soul may exist without the bodily element, and

this last without it, they are in reality different; one is conceivable

without the other. The soul thus does not think and know the other as

clearly as the certainty of itself.[169]

Now the truth of all knowledge rests on the proof of the existence of

God. The soul is an imperfect substance, but it has the Idea of an

absolute perfect existence within itself; this perfection is not begotten

in itself, just because it is an imperfect substance; this Idea is thus

innate. In Descartes the consciousness of this fact is expressed by his

saying that as long as the existence of God is not proved and perceived

the possibility of our deceiving ourselves remains, because we cannot

know whether we do not possess a nature ordered and disposed to err

(_supra_, p. 226).[170] The form is rather a mistaken one, and it only

generally expresses the opposition in which self-consciousness stands to

the consciousness of what is different, of the objective; and we have

to deal with the unity of both—the question being whether what is in

thought likewise possesses objectivity. This unity rests in God, or is

God Himself. I shall put these assertions in the manner of Descartes:

“Amongst these various conceptions possessed by us there likewise is

the conception of a supremely intelligent, powerful, and absolutely

perfect Being; and this is the most excellent of all conceptions.” This

all-embracing universal conception has therefore this distinguishing

feature, that in its case the uncertainty respecting Being which appears

in the other conceptions, finds no place. It has the characteristic that

“In it we do not recognize existence as something merely possible and

accidental, as we do the conceptions of other things which we perceive

clearly, but as a really essential and eternal determination. For

instance, as mind perceives that in the conception of a triangle it is

implied that the three angles are equal to two right angles, the triangle

has them; and in the same way from the fact that mind perceives existence

to be necessarily and eternally implied in the Notion of the most

perfect reality, it is forced to conclude that the most perfect reality

exists.”[171] For to perfection there likewise pertains the determination

of existence, since the conception of a non-existent is less perfect.

Thus we there have the unity of thought and Being, and the ontological

proof of the existence of God; this we met with earlier (p. 63, _seq._)

in dealing with Anselm.

The proof of the existence of God from the Idea of Him is in this wise:

In this Notion existence is implied; and therefore it is true. Descartes

proceeds further in the same direction, in so far as after the manner

of empirical axioms he sets forth: (α) “There are different degrees of

reality or entity, for the substance has more reality than the accident

or the mode, and infinite substance has more than finite.” (β) “In the

Notion of a thing existence is implied, either the merely potential

or the necessary,” _i.e._ in the ‘I’ there is Being as the immediate

certainty of an other-being, of the not-I opposed to the I. (γ) “No

thing or no perfection of a thing which really exists _actu_ can have

the Nothing as original cause of its existence. For if anything could

be predicated of nothing, thought could equally well be predicated of

it, and I would thus say that I am nothing because I think.” Descartes

here arrives at a dividing line, at an unknown relationship; the Notion

of cause is reached, and this is a thought indeed, but a determinate

thought. Spinoza says in his explanation, “That the conceptions contain

more or less reality, and those moments have just as much evidence as

thought itself, because they not only say that we think, but how we

think.” These determinate modes as differences in the simplicity of

thought, had, however, to be demonstrated. Spinoza adds to this step in

advance that “The degrees of reality which we perceive in ideas are not

in the ideas in as far as they are considered merely as kinds of thought,

but in so far as the one represents a substance and the other a mere

mode of substance, or, in a word, in so far as they are considered as

conceptions of things.” (δ) “The objective reality of Notions” (_i.e._,

the entity of what is represented in so far as it is in the Notion),

“demands a first cause in which the same reality is contained not merely

objectively” (that is to say in the Notion), “but likewise formally or

even _eminenter_—formally, that is perfectly likewise: _eminenter_, more

perfectly. For there must at least be as much in the cause as in the

effect.” (ε) “The existence of God is known immediately”—_a priori_—“from

the contemplation of His nature. To say that anything is contained in

the nature or in the Notion of a thing is tantamount to saying that it

is true: existence is directly contained in the Notion of God. Hence

it is quite true to say of Him that existence pertains of necessity to

Him. There is implied in the Notion of every particular thing either a

possible or a necessary existence—a necessary existence in the Notion

of God, _i.e._ of the absolutely perfect Being, for else He would be

conceived as imperfect.”[172]

Descartes likewise argues after this manner: “Problem: to prove _a

posteriori_ from the mere Notion within us the existence of God. The

objective reality of a Notion demands a cause in which the same reality

is not merely contained objectively” (as in the finite), “but formally”

(freely, purely for itself, outside of us) “or _eminenter_” (as

original). (Axiom δ.) “We now have a Notion of God, but His objective

reality is neither formally nor _eminenter_ contained within us, and it

can thus be only in God Himself.”[173] Consequently we see that with

Descartes this Idea is an hypothesis. Now we should say we find this

highest Idea in us. If we then ask whether this Idea exists, why, this

is the Idea, that existence is asserted with it. To say that it is only

a conception is to contradict the meaning of this conception. But here

it is unsatisfactory to find that the conception is introduced thus: ‘We

have this conception,’ and to find that it consequently appears like an

hypothesis. In such a case it is not proved of this content in itself

that it determines itself into this unity of thought and Being. In the

form of God no other conception is thus here given than that contained

in _Cogito, ergo sum_, wherein Being and thought are inseparably bound

up—though now in the form of a conception which I possess within me.

The whole content of this conception, the Almighty, All-wise, &c., are

predicates which do not make their appearance until later; the content

is simply the content of the Idea bound up with existence. Hence we

see these determinations following one another in an empirical manner,

and not philosophically proved—thus giving us an example of how in _a

priori_ metaphysics generally hypotheses of conceptions are brought in,

and these become objects of thought, just as happens in empiricism with

investigations, observations, and experiences.

Descartes then proceeds: “Mind is the more convinced of this when it

notices that it discovers within itself the conception of no other thing

wherein existence is necessarily implied. From this it will perceive that

that idea of highest reality is not imagined by it, it is not chimerical,

but a true and unalterable fact which cannot do otherwise than exist,

seeing that existence is necessarily involved in it. Our prejudices

hinder us from apprehending this with ease, for we are accustomed to

distinguish in all other things the essence” (the Notion) “from the

existence.” Respecting the assertion that thought is not inseparable

from existence, the common way of talking is as follows: ‘If what men

think really existed, things would be different.’ But in saying this men

do not take into account that what is spoken of in this way is always a

particular content, and that in it the essential nature of the finality

of things simply signifies the fact that Notion and Being are separable.

But how can one argue from finite things to the infinite? “This Notion,”

Descartes continues, “is furthermore not made by us.” It is now declared

to be an eternal truth which is revealed in us. “We do not find in

ourselves the perfections which are contained in this conception. Thus

we are certain that a first cause in which is all perfection, _i.e._

God as really existent, has given them to us; for it is certain to us

that from nothing, nothing arises” (according to Boehme God derived the

material of the world from Himself), “and what is perfect cannot be the

effect of anything imperfect. From Him we must thus in true science

deduce all created things.”[174] With the proof of the existence of God

the validity of and evidence for all truth in its origin is immediately

established. God as First Cause is Being-for-self, the reality which is

not merely entity or existence in thought. An existence such as this

first cause (which is not what we know as a thing) rests in the Notion of

the not-I, not of each determinate thing—since these as determinate are

negations—but only in the Notion of pure existence or the perfect cause.

It is the cause of the truth of ideas, for the aspect that it represents

is that of their Being.

d. Fourthly, Descartes goes on to assert: “We must believe what is

revealed to us by God, though we cannot understand it. It is not to

be wondered at, since we are finite, that there is in God’s nature as

inconceivably infinite, what passes our comprehension.” This represents

the entrance of a very ordinary conception. Boehme on the other hand says

(_supra_, p. 212): ‘The mystery of the Trinity is ever born within us.’

Descartes, however, concludes: “Hence we must not trouble ourselves with

investigations respecting the infinite; for seeing that we are finite, it

is absurd for us to say anything about it.”[175] This matter we shall

not, however, enter upon at present.

“Now the first attribute of God is that He is true and the Giver of all

light; it is hence quite contrary to His nature to deceive us. Hence the

light of nature or the power of acquiring knowledge given us by God can

affect no object which is not really true in as far as it is affected by

it” (the power of acquiring knowledge) “_i.e._ as it is perceived clearly

and distinctly.” We ascribe truth to God. From this Descartes goes on to

infer the universal bond which exists between absolute knowledge and the

objectivity of what we thus know. Knowledge has objects, has a content

which is known; we call this connection truth. The truth of God is just

this unity of what is thought by the subject or clearly perceived, and

external reality or existence. “Thereby an end is put to doubt, as if it

could be the case that what appears quite evident to us should not be

really true. We can thus no longer have any suspicion of mathematical

truths. Likewise if we give heed to what we distinguish by our senses in

waking or in sleeping, clearly and distinctly, it is easy to recognize

in each thing what in it is true.” By saying that what is rightly and

clearly thought likewise is, Descartes maintains that man comes to know

by means of thought what in fact is in things; the sources of errors lie

on the other hand in the finitude of our nature. “It is certain, because

of God’s truth, that the faculty of perceiving and that of assenting

through the will, if it extends no further than to that which is clearly

perceived, cannot lead to error. Even if this cannot be in any way

proved, it is by nature so established in all things, that as often as we

clearly perceive anything, we assent to it from ourselves and can in no

wise doubt that it is true.”[176]

All this is set forth very plausibly, but it is still indeterminate,

formal, and shallow; we only have the assertion made to us that this is

so. Descartes’ method is the method of the clear understanding merely.

Certainty with him takes the first place; from it no content is deduced

of necessity, no content generally, and still less its objectivity as

distinguished from the inward subjectivity of the ‘I.’ At one time we

have the opposition of subjective knowledge and actuality, and at another

their inseparable union. In the first case the necessity of mediating

them enters in, and the truth of God is asserted to be this mediating

power. It consists in this, that His Notion contains reality immediately

in itself. The proof of this unity then rests solely upon the fact of its

being said that we find within us the idea of complete perfection; thus

this conception here appears simply as one found ready to hand. With this

is compared the mere conception of God which contains no existence within

it, and it is found that without existence it would be imperfect. This

unity of God Himself, of His Idea, with His existence, is undoubtedly

the Truth; in this we find the ground for holding as true what is for us

just as certain as the truth of ourselves. As Descartes proceeds further

we thus find that in reality everything has truth for him only in so far

as it is really an object of thought, a universal. This truth of God has

been, as we shall see, expressed even more clearly and in a more concise

way by a disciple of Descartes, if one may venture to call him so—I mean

Malebranche (who might really be dealt with here),[177] in his _Recherche

de la vérité_.

The first of the fundamental determinations of the Cartesian metaphysics

is from the certainty of oneself to arrive at the truth, to recognize

Being in the Notion of thought. But because in the thought “I think,”

I am an individual, thought comes before my mind as subjective;

Being is hence not demonstrated in the Notion of thought itself, for

what advance has been made is merely in the direction of separation

generally. In the second place the negative of Being likewise comes

before self-consciousness, and this negative, united with the positive

I, is so to speak implicitly united in a third, in God. God, who before

this was a non-contradictory potentiality, now takes objective form to

self-consciousness, He is all reality in so far as it is positive, _i.e._

as it is Being, unity of thought and Being, the highest perfection of

existence; it is just in the negative, in the Notion of this, in its

being an object of thought, that Being is contained. An objection to

this identity is now old—Kant urged it likewise—that from the Notion of

the most perfect existence more does not follow than that _in_ thought

existence here and now and the most perfect essence are conjoined, but

not _outside_ of thought. But the very Notion of present existence is

this negative of self-consciousness, not out of thought,—but the thought

of the ‘out of thought.’

2. Descartes accepts Being in the entirely positive sense, and has

not the conception of its being the negative of self-consciousness:

but simple Being, set forth as the negative of self-consciousness,

is extension. Descartes thus separates extension from God, remains

constant to this separation, unites the universe, matter, with God in

such a way as to make Him its creator and first cause: and he has the

true perception that conservation is a continuous creation, in so far

as creation as activity is asserted to be separated. Descartes does

not, however, trace extension in a true method back to thought; matter,

extended substances, stand over against the thinking substances which

are simple; in as far as the universe is created by God, it could not

be as perfect as its cause. As a matter of fact the effect is less

perfect than the cause, since it is that which is posited, if we are to

remain at the conception of cause pertaining to the understanding. Hence

according to Descartes extension is the less perfect. But as imperfect

the extended substances cannot exist and subsist through themselves or

their Notion; they thus require every moment the assistance of God for

their maintenance, and without this they would in a moment sink back into

nothing. Preservation is, however, unceasing reproduction.[178]

Descartes now proceeds to further particulars, and expresses himself as

follows: “We consider what comes under consciousness either as things or

their qualities, or as eternal truths which have no existence outside

our thought”—which do not belong to this or that time, to this or that

place. He calls those last something inborn within us, something not

made by us or merely felt,[179] but the eternal Notion of mind itself

and the eternal determinations of its freedom, of itself as itself. From

this point the conception that ideas are inborn (_innatæ ideæ_) hence

proceeds; this is the question over which Locke and Leibnitz dispute. The

expression “eternal truths” is current even in these modern times, and it

signifies the universal determinations and relations which exist entirely

on their own account. The word ‘inborn’ is however a clumsy and stupid

expression, because the conception of physical birth thereby indicated,

does not apply to mind. To Descartes inborn ideas are not universal,

as they are to Plato and his successors, but that which has evidence,

immediate certainty, an immediate multiplicity founded in thought

itself—manifold conceptions in the form of a Being, resembling what

Cicero calls natural feelings implanted in the heart. We would rather say

that such is implied in the nature and essence of our mind and spirit.

Mind is active and conducts itself in its activity in a determinate

manner; but this activity has no other ground than its freedom. Yet if

this is the case more is required than merely to say so; it must be

deduced as a necessary product of our mind. We have such ideas, for

instance, in the logical laws: “From nothing comes nothing,” “A thing

cannot both be and not be,”[180] as also in moral principles. These are

facts of consciousness which Descartes however soon passes from again;

they are only present in thought as subjective, and he has thus not yet

inquired respecting their content.

As regards things, on which Descartes now directs his attention, the

other side to these eternal verities, the universal determinations

of things are substance, permanence, order, &c.[181] He then gives

definitions of these thoughts, just as Aristotle draws up a list of the

categories. But although Descartes laid it down formerly as essential

that no hypotheses must be made, yet now he takes the conceptions, and

passes on to them as something found within our consciousness. He defines

substance thus: “By substance I understand none other than a thing

(_rem_) which requires no other something for existence; and there is

only one thing, namely God, which can be regarded as such a substance

requiring no other thing.” This is what Spinoza says; we may say that it

is likewise the true definition, the unity of Notion and reality: “All

other” (things) “can only exist by means of a concurrence (_concursus_)

of God”; what we still call substance outside of God thus does not exist

for itself, does not have its existence in the Notion itself. That is

then called the system of assistance (_systema assistentiæ_) which

is, however, transcendental. God is the absolute uniter of Notion and

actuality; other things, finite things which have a limit and stand in

dependence, require something else. “Hence if we likewise call other

things substances, this expression is not applicable both to them and

to God _univoce_, as is said in the schools; that is to say no definite

significance can be given to this word which would equally apply both to

God and to the creatures.”[182]

“But I do not recognize more than two sorts of things; the one is that

of thinking things, and the other that of things which relate to what

is extended.” Thought, the Notion, the spiritual, the self-conscious,

is what is at home with itself, and its opposite is contained in what

is extended, spatial, separated, not at home with itself nor free.

This is the real distinction (_distinctio realis_) of substances: “The

one substance can be clearly and definitely comprehended without the

other. But the corporeal and the thinking and creating substance can

be comprehended under this common notion, for the reason that they

are things which require God’s support alone in order to exist.” They

are universal; other finite things require other things as conditions

essential to their existence. But extended substance, the kingdom of

nature, and spiritual substance, do not require one another.[183]

They may be called substances, because each of them constitutes an

entire range or sphere, an independent totality. But because, Spinoza

concluded, each side, the kingdom of thought as well as nature, is one

complete system within itself, they are likewise in themselves, that is

absolutely, identical as God, the absolute substance; for thinking spirit

this implicit is thus God, or their differences are ideal.

Descartes proceeds from the Notion of God to what is created, to thought

and extension, and from this to the particular. “Now substances

have several attributes without which they cannot be thought”—that

signifies their determinateness—“but each has something peculiar to

itself which constitutes its nature and essence”—a simple universal

determinateness—“and to which the others all relate. Thus thought

constitutes the absolute attribute of mind,” thought is its quality;

“extension is” the essential determination of corporeality, and this

alone is “the true nature of body. What remains are merely secondary

qualities, modes, like figure and movement in what is extended,

imagination, feeling and will in thinking; they may be taken away or

thought away. God is the uncreated, thinking substance.”[184]

Descartes here passes to what is individual, and because he follows

up extension he arrives at matter, rest, movement. One of Descartes’

main points is that matter, extension, corporeality, are quite the same

thing for thought; according to him the nature of body is fulfilled in

its extension, and this should be accepted as the only essential fact

respecting the corporeal world. We say that body offers resistance, has

smell, taste, colour, transparency, hardness, &c., since without these

we can have no body. All these further determinations respecting what is

extended, such as size, rest, movement, and inertia, are, however, merely

sensuous, and this Descartes showed, as it had long before this been

shown by the Sceptics. Undoubtedly that is the abstract Notion or pure

essence, but to body or to pure existence, there likewise of necessity

pertains negativity or diversity. By means of the following illustration

Descartes showed that with the exception of extension, all corporeal

determinations may be annihilated, and that none can be absolutely

predicated. We draw conclusions respecting the solidity and hardness

of matter from the resistance which a body offers to our disturbance,

and by means of which it seeks to hold its place. Now if we admit that

matter as we touch it always gives way to us like space, we should have

no reason for ascribing to it solidity. Smell, colour, taste, are in

the same way sensuous qualities merely; but what we clearly perceive is

alone true. If a body is ground into small parts, it gives way, and yet

it does not lose its nature; resistance is thus not essential.[185] This

not-being-for-itself is however a quantitatively slighter resistance

only; the resistance always remains. But Descartes desires only to think;

now he does not think resistance, colour, &c., but apprehends them by the

senses only. Hence he says that all this must be led back to extension

as being special modifications of the same. It is undoubtedly to the

credit of Descartes that he only accepts as true what is thought; but the

abrogation of these sensuous qualities simply represents the negative

movement of thought: the essence of body is conditioned through this

thought, that is, it is not true essence.

Descartes now makes his way from the Notion of extension to the laws of

motion, as the universal knowledge of the corporeal in its implicitude;

he shows (α) that there is no vacuum, for that would be an extension

without bodily substance, _i.e._ a body without body; (β) that there are

no atoms (no indivisible independent existence), for the same reason,

viz., because the essence of body is extension. (γ) He further shows

that a body is set in motion by something outside of it, but of itself

it continues in a condition of rest, and likewise it must, when in a

condition of movement, be brought to rest by another outside of it—this

is the property of inertia.[186] These are unmeaning propositions, for

an abstraction is involved for instance in asserting simple rest and

movement in their opposition.

Extension and motion are the fundamental conceptions in mechanical

physics; they represent the truth of the corporeal world. It is thus

that ideality comes before the mind of Descartes, and he is far elevated

above the reality of the sensuous qualities, although he does not reach

so far as to the separation of this ideality. He thus remains at the

point of view of mechanism pure and simple. Give me matter (extension)

and motion and I will build worlds for you, is what Descartes virtually

says.[187] Space and time were hence to him the only determinations of

the material universe. In this, then, lies the mechanical fashion of

viewing nature, or the natural philosophy of Descartes is seen to be

purely mechanical.[188] Hence changes in matter are due merely to motion,

so that Descartes traces every relationship to the rest and movement

of particles, and all material diversity such as colour, and taste—in

short, all bodily qualities and animal phenomena—to mechanism. In living

beings processes such as that of digestion are mechanical effects which

have as principles, rest and movement. We here see the ground and origin

of the mechanical philosophy; but further on we find that this is

unsatisfactory, for matter and motion do not suffice to explain life.

Yet the great matter in all this is that thought goes forward in its

determinations, and that it constitutes from these thought-determinations

the truth of nature.

In his consideration of the system of the world and the movement of the

heavenly bodies, Descartes has worked out the mechanical view more fully.

He thus comes to speak of the earth, the sun, &c., and of his conception

of the circling motion of the heavenly bodies in the form of vortices:

of metaphysical hypotheses as to how small particles pass into, out of,

and through pores and act on one another; and finally to saltpetre and

gunpowder.[189]

Universal reflections should have the first claim on our attention; but

on the other hand the transition to the determinate is accomplished in a

system of Physics which is the result of observations and experiences,

and this is done entirely by means of the understanding. Descartes thus

mingles many observations with a metaphysic of this nature, and to us

the result is hence obscure. In this philosophy the thinking treatment

of empiricism is thus predominant, and a similar method has been adopted

by philosophers from this time on. To Descartes and others, Philosophy

had still the more indefinite significance of arriving at knowledge

through thought, reflection, and reasoning. Speculative cognition, the

derivation from the Notion, the free independent development of the

matter itself, was first introduced by Fichte, and consequently what

is now called philosophic knowledge is not yet separated in Descartes

from the rest of scientific knowledge. In those times all the knowledge

of mankind was called philosophy; in Descartes’ metaphysics we thus

saw quite empirical reflection and reasoning from particular grounds,

from experiences, facts, phenomena, being brought into play in the

naivest manner, and one has no sense of speculation in the matter. The

strictly scientific element here really consisted mainly in the method of

proof as it has long been made use of in geometry, and in the ordinary

method of the formal logical syllogism. Hence it likewise happens that

Philosophy, which ought to form a totality of the sciences, begins with

logic and metaphysics; the second part is composed of ordinary physics

and mathematics, mingled no doubt with metaphysical speculations, and

the third part, ethics, deals with the nature of man, his duties, the

state, the citizen. And this is the case with Descartes. The first part

of the _Principia philosophiæ_ treats _De principiis cognitionis humanæ_,

the second _De principiis rerum materialium_. This natural philosophy,

as a philosophy of extension, is, however, none other than what a quite

ordinary physics or mechanics might at that time be, and it is still

quite hypothetical; we, on the other hand, accurately distinguish

empirical physics and natural philosophy, even though the first likewise

pertains to thought.

3. Descartes never reached the third part, the philosophy of Mind, for,

while he made a special study of physics, in the region of ethics he

published one tract only, _De passionibus_. In this reference Descartes

treats of thought and human freedom. He proves freedom from the fact of

the soul thinking that the will is unrestrained, and of that constituting

the perfection of mankind. And this is quite true. In respect to the

freedom of the will he comes across the difficulty of how to reconcile it

with the divine prescience. As free, man might do what is not ordained of

God beforehand—this would conflict with the omnipotence and omniscience

of God; and if everything is ordained of God, human freedom would thereby

be done away with. Yet he does not solve the contradiction contained

in these two different aspects without falling into difficulty. But

conformably to the method which he adopts, and which we pointed out

above (pp. 238, 239), he says: “The human mind is finite, God’s power

and predetermination are infinite; we are thus not capable of judging of

the relationship in which the freedom of the human soul stands to the

omnipotence and omniscience of God—but in self-consciousness we have

the certainty of it given us as a fact. And we must hold only to what

is certain.”[190] When he proceeds further much appears to him still

incapable of explanation; but we see obstinacy and caprice likewise

exhibited in his stopping short at the assertion as to the best of his

knowledge. The method of knowledge as set forth by Descartes, takes the

form of a reasoning of the understanding, and is thus without special

interest.

These, then, are the principal points in the Cartesian system. Some

particular assertions made by Descartes, which have been specially

instrumental in giving him fame, have still to be mentioned—particular

forms which have been formerly considered in metaphysics, and likewise

by Wolff. For example, in the first place we gather that Descartes

regarded animals and other organisms as machines moved by another,

and not possessing the principle of the spontaneity of thought within

them[191]—a mechanical physiology, a cut and dry thought pertaining

to the understanding, which is of no further importance. In the sharp

opposition between thought and extension, the former is not considered

as sensation, so that the latter can isolate itself. The organic must as

body reduce itself to extension; any further development of this last

thus only proves its dependence on the first determinations.

In the second place, the relation between soul and body now becomes an

important question, that is, the return of the object within itself

in such a way that thought posits itself in another, in matter. As to

this, many systems are offered to us in metaphysics. One of these is

the _influxus physicus_, that the relation of spirit is of a corporeal

nature, that the object is related to mind as bodies are to one another—a

conception like this is very crude. How does Descartes understand the

unity of soul and body? The former belongs to thought, the latter to

extension; and thus because both are substance, neither requires

the Notion of the other, and hence soul and body are independent of

one another and can exercise no direct influence upon one another.

Soul could only influence body in so far as it required the same, and

conversely—that is, in so far as they have actual relation to one

another. But since each is a totality, neither can bear a real relation

to the other. Descartes consistently denied the physical influence

of one on the other; that would have signified a mechanical relation

between the two. Descartes thus established the intellectual sphere in

contradistinction to matter, and on it based the independent subsistence

of mind; for in his _cogito_ ‘I’ is at first only certain of itself,

since I can abstract from all. Now we find the necessity of a mediator

to bring about a union of the abstract and the external and individual.

Descartes settles this by placing between the two what constitutes the

metaphysical ground of their mutual changes, God. He is the intermediate

bond of union, in as far as He affords assistance to the soul in what

it cannot through its own freedom accomplish, so that the changes in

body and soul may correspond with one another.[192] If I have desires,

an intention, these receive corporeal realization; this association of

soul and body is, according to Descartes, effected through God. For

above (p. 239) we saw that Descartes says of God that He is the Truth of

the conception: as long as I think rightly and consistently, something

real corresponds to my thought, and the connecting link is God. God

is hereby the perfect identity of the two opposites, since He is, as

Idea, the unity of Notion and reality. In the Idea of Spinoza this is

worked out and developed in its further moments. Descartes’ conclusion

is quite correct; in finite things this identity is imperfect. Only the

form employed by Descartes is inadequate; for it implies that in the

beginning there are two things, thought or soul and body, and that then

God appears as a third thing, outside both—that He is not the Notion of

unity, nor are the two elements themselves Notion. We must not however

forget that Descartes says that both those original elements are created

substances. But this expression ‘created’ pertains to the ordinary

conception only and is not a determinate thought; it was Spinoza,

therefore, who first accomplished this return to thought.

2. SPINOZA.

The philosophy of Descartes underwent a great variety of unspeculative

developments, but in Benedict Spinoza a direct successor to this

philosopher may be found, and one who carried on the Cartesian principle

to its furthest logical conclusions. For him soul and body, thought and

Being, cease to have separate independent existence. The dualism of

the Cartesian system Spinoza, as a Jew, altogether set aside. For the

profound unity of his philosophy as it found expression in Europe, his

manifestation of Spirit as the identity of the finite and the infinite in

God, instead of God’s appearing related to these as a Third—all this is

an echo from Eastern lands. The Oriental theory of absolute identity was

brought by Spinoza much more directly into line, firstly with the current

of European thought, and then with the European and Cartesian philosophy,

in which it soon found a place.

First of all we must, however, glance at the circumstances of Spinoza’s

life. He was by descent a Portuguese Jew, and was born at Amsterdam in

the year 1632; the name he received was Baruch, but he altered it to

Benedict. In his youth he was instructed by the Rabbis of the synagogue

to which he belonged, but he soon fell out with them, their wrath having

been kindled by the criticisms which he passed on the fantastic doctrines

of the Talmud. He was not, therefore, long in absenting himself from the

synagogue, and as the Rabbis were in dread lest his example should have

evil consequences, they offered him a yearly allowance of a thousand

gulden if he would keep away from the place and hold his tongue. This

offer he declined; and the Rabbis thereafter carried their persecution

of him to such a pitch that they were even minded to rid themselves of

him by assassination. After having made a narrow escape from the dagger,

he formally withdrew from the Jewish communion, without, however, going

over to the Christian Church. He now applied himself particularly to the

Latin language, and made a special study of the Cartesian philosophy.

Later on he went to Rhynsburg, near Leyden, and from the year 1664 he

lived in retirement, first at Voorburg, a village near the Hague, and

then at the Hague itself, highly respected by numerous friends: he

gained a livelihood for himself by grinding optical glasses. It was

no arbitrary choice that led him to occupy himself with light, for it

represents in the material sphere the absolute identity which forms the

foundation of the Oriental view of things. Although he had rich friends

and mighty protectors, among whom even generals were numbered, he lived

in humble poverty, declining the handsome gifts offered to him time after

time. Nor would he permit Simon von Vries to make him his heir; he only

accepted from him an annual pension of three hundred florins; in the

same way he gave up to his sisters his share of their father’s estate.

From the Elector Palatine, Carl Ludwig, a man of most noble character

and raised above the prejudices of his time, he received the offer of a

professor’s chair at Heidelberg, with the assurance that he would have

liberty to teach and to write, because “the Prince believed he would not

put that liberty to a bad use by interfering with the religion publicly

established.” Spinoza (in his published letters) very wisely declined

this offer, however, because “he did not know within what limits that

philosophic liberty would have to be confined, in order that he might

not appear to be interfering with the publicly established religion.”

He remained in Holland, a country highly interesting in the history

of general culture, as it was the first in Europe to show the example

of universal toleration, and afforded to many a place of refuge where

they might enjoy liberty of thought; for fierce as was the rage of the

theologians there against Bekker, for example (Bruck. Hist. crit. phil.

T. IV. P. 2, pp. 719, 720), and furious as were the attacks of Voetius

on the Cartesian philosophy, these had not the consequences which they

would have had in another land. Spinoza died on the 21st of February,

1677, in the forty-fourth year of his age. The cause of his death was

consumption, from which he had long been a sufferer; this was in harmony

with his system of philosophy, according to which all particularity

and individuality pass away in the one substance. A Protestant divine,

Colerus by name, who published a biography of Spinoza, inveighs strongly

against him, it is true, but gives nevertheless a most minute and kindly

description of his circumstances and surroundings—telling how he left

only about two hundred thalers, what debts he had, and so on. A bill

included in the inventory, in which the barber requests payment due him

by M. Spinoza of blessed memory, scandalizes the parson very much, and

regarding it he makes the observation: “Had the barber but known what

sort of a creature Spinoza was, he certainly would not have spoken of his

blessed memory.” The German translator of this biography writes under

the portrait of Spinoza: _characterem, reprobationis in vultu gerens_,

applying this description to a countenance which doubtless expresses the

melancholy of a profound thinker, but is otherwise mild and benevolent.

The _reprobatio_ is certainly correct; but it is not a reprobation in the

passive sense; it is an active disapprobation on Spinoza’s part of the

opinions, errors and thoughtless passions of mankind.[193]

Spinoza used the terminology of Descartes, and also published an account

of his system. For we find the first of Spinoza’s works entitled “An

Exposition according to the geometrical method of the principles of the

Cartesian philosophy.” Some time after this he wrote his _Tractatus

theologico-politicus_, and by it gained considerable reputation. Great as

was the hatred which Spinoza roused amongst his Rabbis, it was more than

equalled by the odium which he brought upon himself amongst Christian,

and especially amongst Protestant theologians—chiefly through the medium

of this essay. It contains his views on inspiration, a critical treatment

of the books of Moses and the like, chiefly from the point of view that

the laws therein contained are limited in their application to the Jews.

Later Christian theologians have written critically on this subject,

usually making it their object to show that these books were compiled at

a later time, and that they date in part from a period subsequent to the

Babylonian captivity; this has become a crucial point with Protestant

theologians, and one by which the modern school distinguishes itself from

the older, greatly pluming itself thereon. All this, however, is already

to be found in the above-mentioned work of Spinoza. But Spinoza drew the

greatest odium upon himself by his philosophy proper, which we must now

consider as it is given to us in his Ethics. While Descartes published

no writings on this subject, the Ethics of Spinoza is undoubtedly his

greatest work; it was published after his death by Ludwig Mayer, a

physician, who had been Spinoza’s most intimate friend. It consists of

five parts; the first deals with God (_De Deo_). General metaphysical

ideas are contained in it, which include the knowledge of God and nature.

The second part deals with the nature and origin of mind (_De natura

et origine mentis_). We see thus that Spinoza does not treat of the

subject of natural philosophy, extension and motion at all, for he passes

immediately from God to the philosophy of mind, to the ethical point of

view; and what refers to knowledge, intelligent mind, is brought forward

in the first part, under the head of the principles of human knowledge.

The third book of the Ethics deals with the origin and nature of the

passions (_De origine et natura affectuum_); the fourth with the powers

of the same, or human slavery (_De servitute humana seu de affectuum

viribus_); the fifth, lastly, with the power of the understanding, with

thought, or with human liberty (_De potentia intellectus seu de libertate

humana_).[194] Kirchenrath Professor Paulus published Spinoza’s works

in Jena; I had a share in the bringing out of this edition, having been

entrusted with the collation of French translations.

As regards the philosophy of Spinoza, it is very simple, and on the

whole easy to comprehend; the difficulty which it presents is due

partly to the limitations of the method in which Spinoza presents his

thoughts, and partly to his narrow range of ideas, which causes him in

an unsatisfactory way to pass over important points of view and cardinal

questions. Spinoza’s system is that of Descartes made objective in the

form of absolute truth. The simple thought of Spinoza’s idealism is this:

The true is simply and solely the one substance, whose attributes are

thought and extension or nature: and only this absolute unity is reality,

it alone is God. It is, as with Descartes, the unity of thought and

Being, or that which contains the Notion of its existence in itself. The

Cartesian substance, as Idea, has certainly Being included in its Notion;

but it is only Being as abstract, not as real Being or as extension

(_supra_, p. 241). With Descartes corporeality and the thinking ‘I’ are

altogether independent Beings; this independence of the two extremes

is done away with in Spinozism by their becoming moments of the one

absolute Being. This expression signifies that Being must be grasped as

the unity of opposites; the chief consideration is not to let slip the

opposition and set it aside, but to reconcile and resolve it. Since then

it is thought and Being, and no longer the abstractions of the finite

and infinite, or of limit and the unlimited, that form the opposition

(_supra_, p. 161), Being is here more definitely regarded as extension;

for in its abstraction it would be really only that return into itself,

that simple equality with itself, which constitutes thought (_supra_, p.

229). The pure thought of Spinoza is therefore not the simple universal

of Plato, for it has likewise come to know the absolute opposition of

Notion and Being.

Taken as a whole, this constitutes the Idea of Spinoza, and it is

just what τὸ ὄν was to the Eleatics (Vol. I. pp. 244, 252). This Idea

of Spinoza’s we must allow to be in the main true and well-grounded;

absolute substance is the truth, but it is not the whole truth; in

order to be this it must also be thought of as in itself active and

living, and by that very means it must determine itself as mind. But

substance with Spinoza is only the universal and consequently the

abstract determination of mind; it may undoubtedly be said that this

thought is the foundation of all true views—not, however, as their

absolutely fixed and permanent basis, but as the abstract unity which

mind is in itself. It is therefore worthy of note that thought must

begin by placing itself at the standpoint of Spinozism; to be a follower

of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all Philosophy. For as we

saw above (Vol I. p. 144), when man begins to philosophize, the soul

must commence by bathing in this ether of the One Substance, in which

all that man has held as true has disappeared; this negation of all

that is particular, to which every philosopher must have come, is the

liberation of the mind and its absolute foundation. The difference

between our standpoint and that of the Eleatic philosophy is only this,

that through the agency of Christianity concrete individuality is in the

modern world present throughout in spirit. But in spite of the infinite

demands on the part of the concrete, substance with Spinoza is not yet

determined as in itself concrete. As the concrete is thus not present in

the content of substance, it is therefore to be found within reflecting

thought alone, and it is only from the endless oppositions of this last

that the required unity emerges. Of substance as such there is nothing

more to be said; all that we can do is to speak of the different ways

in which Philosophy has dealt with it, and the opposites which in it

are abrogated. The difference depends on the nature of the opposites

which are held to be abrogated in substance. Spinoza is far from having

proved this unity as convincingly as was done by the ancients; but what

constitutes the grandeur of Spinoza’s manner of thought is that he is

able to renounce all that is determinate and particular, and restrict

himself to the One, giving heed to this alone.

1. Spinoza begins (Eth. P. I pp. 35, 36) with a series of definitions,

from which we take the following.

a. Spinoza’s first definition is of the Cause of itself. He says: “By

that which is _causa sui_, its own cause, I understand that whose

essence” (or Notion) “involves existence, or which cannot be conceived

except as existent.” The unity of existence and universal thought is

asserted from the very first, and this unity will ever be the question

at issue. “The cause of itself” is a noteworthy expression, for while we

picture to ourselves that the effect stands in opposition to the cause,

the cause of itself is the cause which, while it operates and separates

an “other,” at the same time produces only itself, and in the production

therefore does away with this distinction. The establishing of itself as

an other is loss or degeneration, and at the same time the negation of

this loss; this is a purely speculative Notion, indeed a fundamental

Notion in all speculation. The cause in which the cause is identical

with the effect, is the infinite cause (_infra_, p. 263); if Spinoza had

further developed what lies in the _causa sui_, substance with him would

not have been rigid and unworkable.

b. The second definition is that of the finite. “That thing is said to be

finite in its kind which can be limited by another of the same nature,”

For it comes then to an end, it is not there; what is there is something

else. This something else must, however, be of a like nature; for those

things which are to limit each other must, in order to be able to limit

each other, touch each other, and consequently have a relation to each

other, that is to say they must be of one nature, stand on a like basis,

and have a common sphere. That is the affirmative side of the limit.

“Thus a thought is” only “limited by another thought, a body by another

body, but thoughts are not limited by bodies nor” conversely “bodies by

thoughts.” We saw this (p. 244) with Descartes: thought is an independent

totality and so is extension, they have nothing to do with one another;

they do not limit each other, each is included in itself.

c. The third definition is that of substance. “By substance I understand

that which exists in itself and is conceived by itself, _i.e._ the

conception of which does not require the aid of the conception of any

other thing for its formation (_a quo formari debeat_);” otherwise it

would be finite, accidental. What cannot have a conception formed of it

without the aid of something else, is not independent, but is dependent

upon that something else.

d. In the fourth place Spinoza defines attributes, which, as the moment

coming second to substance, belong to it. “By attribute I understand

that which the mind perceives as constituting the essence of substance;”

and to Spinoza this alone is true. This is an important determination;

the attribute is undoubtedly a determinateness, but at the same time it

remains a totality. Spinoza, like Descartes, accepts only two attributes,

thought and extension. The understanding grasps them as the reality of

substance, but the reality is not higher than the substance, for it

is only reality in the view of the understanding, which falls outside

substance. Each of the two ways of regarding substance—extension and

thought—contains no doubt the whole content of substance, but only in one

form, which the understanding brings with it; and for this very reason

both sides are in themselves identical and infinite. This is the true

completion; but where substance passes over into attribute is not stated.

e. The fifth definition has to do with what comes third in relation to

substance, the mode. “By mode I understand the affections of substance,

or that which is in something else, through the aid of which also it

is conceived.” Thus substance is conceived through itself; attribute

is not conceived through itself, but has a relation to the conceiving

understanding, in so far as this last conceives reality; mode, finally,

is what is not conceived as reality, but through and in something else.

These last three moments Spinoza ought not merely to have established

in this way as conceptions, he ought to have deduced them; they are

especially important, and correspond with what we more definitely

distinguish as universal, particular and individual. They must not,

however, be taken as formal, but in their true concrete sense; the

concrete universal is substance, the concrete particular is the concrete

species; the Father and Son in the Christian dogma are similarly

particular, but each of them contains the whole nature of God, only under

a different form. The mode is the individual, the finite as such, which

enters into external connection with what is “other.” In this Spinoza

only descends to a lower stage, the mode is only the foregoing warped

and stunted. Spinoza’s defect is therefore this, that he takes the

third moment as mode alone, as a false individuality. True individuality

and subjectivity is not a mere retreat from the universal, not merely

something clearly determinate; for, as clearly determinate, it is at the

same time Being-for-itself, determined by itself alone. The individual,

the subjective, is even in being so the return to the universal; and

in that it is at home with itself, it is itself the universal. The

return consists simply and solely in the fact of the particular being

in itself the universal; to this return Spinoza did not attain. Rigid

substantiality is the last point he reached, not infinite form; this he

knew not, and thus determinateness continually vanishes from his thought.

f. In the sixth place, the definition of the infinite is also of

importance, for in the infinite Spinoza defines more strictly than

anywhere else the Notion of the Notion. The infinite has a double

significance, according as it is taken as the infinitely many or as

the absolutely infinite (_infra_, p. 263). “The infinite in its kind

is not such in respect of all possible attributes; but the absolutely

infinite is that to whose essence all belongs that expresses an essence

and contains no negation.” In the same sense Spinoza distinguishes in

the nine-and-twentieth Letter (Oper. T. I. pp. 526-532) the infinite of

imagination from the infinite of thought (_intellectus_), the actual

(_actu_) infinite. Most men, when they wish to strive after the sublime,

get no farther than the first of these; this is the false infinite, just

as when one says “and so on into infinity,” meaning perhaps the infinity

of space from star to star, or else the infinity of time. An infinite

numerical series in mathematics is exactly the same thing. If a certain

fraction is represented as a decimal fraction, it is incomplete; ⅐

is, on the contrary, the true infinite, and therefore not an incomplete

expression, although the content here is of course limited. It is

infinity in the incorrect sense that one usually has in view when

infinity is spoken of; and even if it is looked on as sublime, it yet is

nothing present, and only goes ever out into the negative, without being

actual (_actu_). But for Spinoza the infinite is not the fixing of a

limit and then passing beyond the limit fixed—the sensuous infinity—but

absolute infinity, the positive, which has complete and present in itself

an absolute multiplicity which has no Beyond. Philosophic infinity,

that which is infinite _actu_, Spinoza therefore calls the absolute

affirmation of itself. This is quite correct, only it might have been

better expressed as: “It is the negation of negation.” Spinoza here also

employs geometrical figures as illustrations of the Notion of infinity.

In his _Opera postuma_, preceding his Ethics, and also in the letter

quoted above, he has two circles, one of which lies within the other,

which have not, however, a common centre.

[Illustration]

“The inequalities of the space between A B and C D exceed every number;

and yet the space which lies between is not so very great.” That is to

say, if I wish to determine them all, I must enter upon an infinite

series. This “beyond” always, however, remains defective, is always

affected with negation; and yet this false infinite is there to hand,

circumscribed, affirmative, actual and present in that plane as a

complete space between the two circles. Or a finite line consists of

an infinite number of points; and yet the line is present here and

determined; the “beyond” of the infinite number of points, which are not

complete, is in it complete and called back into unity. The infinite

should be represented as actually present, and this comes to pass in the

Notion of the cause of itself, which is therefore the true infinity. As

soon as the cause has something else opposed to it—the effect—finitude

is present; but here this something else is at the same time abrogated

and it becomes once more the cause itself. The affirmative is thus

negation of negation, since, according to the well-known grammatical

rule, _duplex negatio affirmat_. In the same way Spinoza’s earlier

definitions have also the infinite already implied in them, for instance

in the case of the just mentioned cause of itself, inasmuch as he defines

it as that whose essence involves existence (_supra_, p. 258). Notion

and existence are each the Beyond of the other; but cause of itself, as

thus including them, is really the carrying back of this “beyond” into

unity. Or (_supra_, p. 259) “Substance is that which is in itself and is

conceived from itself;” that is the same unity of Notion and existence.

The infinite is in the same way in itself and has also its Notion in

itself; its Notion is its Being, and its Being its Notion; true infinity

is therefore to be found in Spinoza. But he has no consciousness of this;

he has not recognized this Notion as absolute Notion, and therefore has

not expressed it as a moment of true existence; for with him the Notion

falls outside of existence, into the thought of existence.

g. Finally Spinoza says in the seventh place: “God is a Being absolutely

infinite, _i.e._ a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of

which expresses an eternal and infinite essence.” Does substance, one

might here ask, possess an infinite number of attributes? But as with

Spinoza there are only two attributes, thought and extension, with which

he invests God, “infinite” is not to be taken here in the sense of the

indeterminate many, but positively, as a circle is perfect infinity in

itself.

The whole of Spinoza’s philosophy is contained in these definitions,

which, however, taken as a whole are formal; it is really a weak point

in Spinoza that he begins thus with definitions. In mathematics this

method is permitted, because at the outset we there make assumptions,

such as that of the point and line; but in Philosophy the content

should be known as the absolutely true. It is all very well to grant

the correctness of the name-definition, and acknowledge that the word

“substance” corresponds with the conception which the definition

indicates, but it is quite another question to determine whether this

content is absolutely true. Such a question is not asked in the case of

geometrical propositions, but in philosophic investigation it is the very

thing to be first considered, and this Spinoza has not done. Instead of

only explaining these simple thoughts and representing them as concrete

in the definitions which he makes, what he ought to have done was to

examine whether this content is true. To all appearance it is only the

explanation of the words that is given; but the content of the words is

held to be established. All further content is merely derived from that,

and proved thereby; for on the first content all the rest depends, and

if it is established as a basis, the other necessarily follows. “The

attribute is that which the understanding thinks of God.” But here the

question is: How does it come that besides the Deity there now appears

the understanding, which applies to absolute substance the two forms

of thought and extension? and whence come these two forms themselves?

Thus everything proceeds inwards, and not outwards; the determinations

are not developed from substance, it does not resolve itself into these

attributes.

2. These definitions are followed by axioms and propositions in which

Spinoza proves a great variety of points. He descends from the universal

of substance through the particular, thought and extension, to the

individual. He has thus all three moments of the Notion, or they are

essential to him. But the mode, under which head falls individuality,

he does not recognize as essential, or as constituting a moment of true

existence in that existence; for it disappears in existence, or it is not

raised into the Notion.

a. The main point then is that Spinoza proves from these Notions that

there is only One Substance, God. It is a simple chain of reasoning,

a very formal proof. “Fifth Proposition: There cannot be two or more

substances of the same nature or of the same attribute.” This is implied

already in the definitions; the proof is therefore a useless and

wearisome toil, which only serves to render Spinoza more difficult to

understand. “If there were several” (substances of the same attribute)

“they must be distinguished from one another either by the diversity of

their attributes or by the diversity of their affections” (modes). “If

they are distinguished by their attributes, it would be directly conceded

that there is only one substance having the same attribute.” For the

attributes are simply what the understanding grasps as the essence of the

one substance, which is determined in itself, and not through anything

else. “But if these substances were distinguished by their affections,

since substance is by nature prior to its affections it would follow that

if from substance its affections were abstracted and it were regarded

in itself, _i.e._ in its truth, it could henceforth not be regarded as

distinct from other substances.” “Eighth Proposition: All substance is

necessarily infinite. Proof: For otherwise it must be limited by another

substance of the same nature, in which case there would be two substances

of the same attribute, which is contrary to the fifth proposition.”

“Every attribute must be conceived for itself,” as determination

reflected on itself. “For attribute is what the mind conceives of

substance as constituting its essence, from which it follows that it

must be conceived through itself,” _i.e._ substance is what is conceived

through itself (see the fourth and third definitions). “Therefore we may

not argue from the plurality of attributes to a plurality of substances,

for each is conceived by itself, and they have all been, always and at

the same time, in substance, without the possibility of the one being

produced by the other.” “Substance is indivisible. For if the parts

retained the nature of the substance, there would be several substances

of the same nature, which is contrary to the fifth proposition. If not,

infinite substance would cease to exist, which is absurd.”[195]

“Fourteenth Proposition: No other substance than God can either exist or

be conceived. Proof: God is the absolutely infinite substance, to whom

can be denied no attribute which expresses the essence of substance,

and He exists necessarily; therefore if there were a substance other

than God, it must be explained by means of an attribute of God.”

Consequently the substance would not have its own being, but that of

God, and therefore would not be a substance. Or if it were still to be

substance, “then there would necessarily follow the possibility of there

being two substances with the same attribute, which according to the

fifth proposition is absurd. From this it then follows that the thing

extended and the thing that thinks” are not substances, but “are either

attributes of God, or affections of His attributes.” By these proofs and

others like them not much is to be gained. “Fifteenth, proposition: What

is, is in God, and cannot exist or be conceived without God.” “Sixteenth

proposition: By the necessity of the divine nature infinite things must

follow in infinite modes, _i.e._, all that can fall under the infinite

understanding. God is therefore the absolute First Cause.”[196]