The surrender of the Hanoverian army at Langensalza, on June 29, 1866,
left Von Falckenstein free to operate against the armies of the South
German States. His army, now designated “The Army of the Maine,”
numbered 45,000 men and 97 guns.
Opposed to him were the Bavarian Corps, numbering 40,000 men and 136
guns, and the VIIIth Federal Corps, numbering 46,000 men and 134 guns.
The former, under the command of Prince Charles of Bavaria, had
concentrated at Schweinfurt; the latter, under the command of Prince
Alexander of Hesse, at Frankfort.
Having been informed that the Hanoverians were marching on Fulda,
Prince Charles began a forward movement, to effect a junction with
them at that point; but receiving later news to the effect that the
occupation of Hesse-Cassel had caused the Hanoverians to turn off
towards Mühlhausen, and that Prussian forces were concentrating at
Eisenach, he decided to direct his march more to the right, so as to
be able to operate either by way of Fulda or the Thuringian Forest
[_Thüringer Wald_], as circumstances might decide. The march of the
Bavarians was begun on June 22d; but much was wanting to complete their
organization and equipment, and their progress was so slow that on the
26th their most advanced division had only reached Neustadt, on the
Saale, scarcely twenty miles from Schweinfurt.
A prompt union of the separated forces of the allies was of the utmost
importance. Yet the most precious time was aimlessly wasted, and it
was not until June 26th that any definite steps were taken towards
effecting a junction of the Bavarians and the VIIIth Corps. On that day
Prince Charles and Prince Alexander held a conference, at which it was
decided to move forward and effect the junction of the two corps at
Hersfeld, about twenty-one miles north of Fulda. They overlooked the
important fact that they were twice as far away from the designated
point as the Prussians were.
Nothing but the most energetic action on the part of the allies could
overcome the disadvantages of their strategical situation. Yet Prince
Charles, learning that negotiations were being conducted between
the Hanoverians and the Prussians, delayed his march, evidently
losing confidence in the sincerity of his allies, and fearing that a
surrender of the Hanoverians might leave him to contend alone with
Von Falckenstein. For three days the Bavarians remained inactive;
then, hearing of the battle of Langensalza, Prince Charles advanced
towards Gotha. On June 30th the Bavarians had advanced to Meiningen,
Schleusingen and Hildburghausen, where they received news of the
surrender of the Hanoverian army. The VIIIth Corps, in the meantime,
had continued its march towards Hersfeld.
The march of Prince Charles towards Gotha had been utterly fruitless.
He had not only failed to assist the Hanoverians, but time had been
lost, and the direction of his march had carried him away from, instead
of towards, the VIIIth Corps. The latter corps was now at Friedburg,
more than 80 miles from Meiningen, and the problem of effecting a
junction now presented many difficulties. The union of the two corps
could have been easily and safely effected by falling back to the line
of the Maine; and this should have been done, though it was feared
that a retreat, at the beginning of the campaign, and before the enemy
had been seen, might have an injurious effect on the _morale_ of the
troops. To effect a junction without falling back would necessitate a
flank march of more than 80 miles, over difficult mountain roads, in
the immediate front of the enemy. Such a hazardous movement should not
have been undertaken except as a last resort.
Nevertheless, Prince Charles decided to form line at Meiningen,
facing Eisenach, hoping to join the VIIIth Corps _via_ Hilders-Fulda
and Geisa-Hünfeld, and requesting Prince Alexander to draw towards
him with all available forces, partly _via_ Hanau-Fulda-Hünfeld, and
partly by rail from Frankfort to Gemünden, and thence _via_ Hammelburg
to Kissingen. The commander of the VIIIth Corps consented to move on
Fulda, but did not see fit to send a force _via_ Kissingen to the
neighborhood of Schweinfurt, evidently for the military reason that he
did not wish to divide his force while executing a dangerous movement,
and for the political reason that the movement urged by Prince Charles,
while it would cover Bavaria, would expose the territories of the
contingents which composed the VIIIth Corps. Prince Charles showed a
disposition to ignore the interests of his allies; Prince Alexander
exhibited decided insubordination; both commanders displayed a lack of
military ability; and the want of hearty coöperation between the two
generals already portended disaster to the allied cause.
On July 1st the Bavarians concentrated at Meiningen, and began their
march to Fulda. Prince Alexander, marching east, occupied Lauterbach
and Alsfeld on July 3d. His force had been diminished by detachments
left on the Lahn, both to cover Frankfort from a possible attack from
the direction of Cassel, and to protect the flank and rear of the army
marching towards Fulda.
On July 3d a Bavarian advanced-guard found Dermbach in possession of
the Prussians, and was driven back with some loss. On the other hand,
a Prussian detachment was driven out of Wiesenthal. Von Falckenstein
had advanced from Eisenach on July 1st, and he was now in the immediate
front of the Bavarians; Von Beyer’s division in and around Geisa; Von
Goeben’s division at Dermbach, and Von Manteuffel’s division following
in reserve.
On July 4th one of Von Goeben’s brigades struck a Bavarian division
at Zella [about 3 miles south of Dermbach], and an indecisive action
followed. With his other brigade, Von Goeben attacked another Bavarian
division at Wiesenthal. Encountering considerable resistance, and
having no immediate supports at hand, Von Goeben gave orders for the
withdrawal of his troops, after an action of some hours’ duration. At
the same time the Bavarians retreated, and the field was abandoned by
both armies.
During this time the other Prussian divisions continued their march on
Fulda, Von Beyer reaching Hünfeld, near which place his advanced-guard
had a remarkable combat with the Bavarian reserve cavalry, which had
been sent from Schweinfurt towards Vacha, to open communications
with the VIIIth Corps. The Bavarian advanced-guard consisted of two
regiments of cuirassiers and a detachment of horse artillery. On
meeting the Prussians the Bavarians opened on them with grape. The
artillery with Von Beyer’s advanced-guard quickly came into action,
and opened fire with astonishing results; for the first shot from the
Prussian guns sent the Bavarians back in a wild panic, the confusion
being rapidly conveyed from the advanced-guard to the main body,
until the entire force (consisting of three brigades) broke into a
headlong stampede. Several regiments retreated as far as Brückenau and
Hammelburg, and many troopers did not draw rein until they arrived at
the Maine, many miles from the scene of action. Several days elapsed
before the cavalry could be rallied at Brückenau. In this case the
Bavarians could neither plead surprise nor heavy loss. They saw their
enemy in time to open fire on him first; and their total loss was only
28 men. Only a few shots, from two guns, were fired by the Prussians
before the Bavarian cavalry had scampered beyond reach of harm.
The simultaneous retreat of both armies from Wiesenthal reminds one of
the _fiasco_ at Big Bethel in 1861; and had the Bavarians remained on
the field at Hünfeld long enough to dot the ground thickly with dead
and wounded, their action there might be worthy of comparison with that
of our undisciplined levies at Bull Run.
After the combat at Wiesenthal, Von Falckenstein seems to have felt
considerable anxiety; for the next day he withdrew Von Goeben through
Dermbach, recalled Von Beyer to Geisa, and brought up Von Manteuffel
in close support. This concentration was evidently made with a view to
fighting a defensive battle; but, on the 6th of July, the Prussians
discovered that they had won a victory on the 4th, the Bavarians being
in retreat. Von Falckenstein at once pushed forward towards Fulda.
After the actions of Zella and Wiesenthal Prince Charles saw that
the intended junction of the separated corps at Fulda could not be
made, unless he could open the road by defeating the Prussians. This
now seemed out of the question; and he, consequently, fell back on
Neustadt, and requested Prince Alexander to open communications with
him _via_ Brückenau and Kissingen. Prince Alexander, however, does
not seem to have been over-anxious either to comply with requests or
to obey orders. On July 5th he had advanced to within seven miles of
Fulda. Hearing of the Bavarian reverses, he fell back to Schlüchtern,
where he occupied an exceptionally favorable position at the entrance
of the Kinzig valley. The ground offered every facility for defense; he
could offer a stubborn resistance to the advance of Von Falckenstein;
his line of retreat to Frankfort was secure; and he might either wait
for the Bavarians to join him, or effect a junction with them on the
line Hammelburg-Gemünden.
While at Schlüchtern, Prince Alexander learned of the Austrian defeat
at Königgrätz; and, without considering his allies, his only thought
seems to have been to gain the line of the Maine, between Hanau and
Mayence, where he might protect the territories of Southwest Germany.
How far he was influenced by his own judgment, and how far by the Diet
at Frankfort, is not known; but he abandoned his strong position at
Schlüchtern, and fell back to Frankfort, where he was joined by the
detachments which had been left on the Lahn. Instead of concentrating
to oppose the Prussians, the allies thus voluntarily widened the gap
between their forces, and willfully invited destruction.
The Prussians entered Fulda on the 7th of July, and rested there one
day. From Fulda, Von Falckenstein directed Von Goeben on Brückenau, and
sent Von Beyer out on the Frankfort road to Schlüchtern, Von Manteuffel
occupying Fulda. The movement to Schlüchtern was for the double purpose
of making a feint towards Frankfort, and gaining a separate road
for the advance of the division. From Schlüchtern Von Beyer marched
direct to the suburbs of Brückenau. Von Goeben marched through and
beyond Brückenau, and Von Manteuffel, following, occupied the town.
The Army of the Maine was now closely concentrated within nine miles
of the Bavarians, who were extended along the Saale, from Neustadt to
Hammelburg, occupying a line 22-1/2 miles long.
On July 10th Von Falckenstein directed Von Beyer on Hammelburg and Von
Goeben on Kissingen. Von Manteuffel was ordered to move on Waldaschach,
and then to follow Von Goeben. The Bavarians were encountered at
Hammelburg and Kissingen, and defeated with some loss. Minor actions,
with similar results, were fought on the same day at Friedrichshall,
Hausen and Waldaschach, up the river from Kissingen. The Bavarians
retreated to Schweinfurt and Würzburg, and the passes of the Saale
remained in the hands of the Prussians.
All military principles now dictated an advance against Schweinfurt,
for the purpose of giving the Bavarians a crushing defeat, and
disposing of them altogether. Such a move would, doubtless, have been
made by Von Falckenstein, had not political considerations been at
this time paramount. The Prussian victories in Austria rendered it
probable that peace conferences would soon be held; and, at the request
of Bismarck, Von Falckenstein was notified that it was of political
importance to be in actual possession of the country north of the
Maine, as negotiations would probably soon take place on the _statu
quo_ basis. Von Falckenstein, therefore, decided to move against the
VIIIth Corps, for the purpose of clearing the right bank of the Maine
entirely of the hostile forces.
Prince Alexander, thoroughly alarmed at the condition of affairs,
now sought to form a junction with the Bavarians at Würzburg, _via_
Aschaffenburg and Gemünden. As a preliminary to this movement, a
Hessian brigade was sent to Aschaffenburg, to secure the passage of the
Maine at that point, and to reconnoiter the Prussians. The contemplated
movement was hopeless from the start, unless the Bavarians could
render assistance by advancing to Gemünden; and, after the actions on
the Saale, they were not in a condition to do so. As it was, Prince
Alexander was endeavoring to cross the difficult mountain region
between Aschaffenburg and Gemünden, in the face of a victorious army,
superior to his own in numbers and _morale_, to effect a junction with
an ally who was unable to lend him a helping hand. It was the height of
folly; for the junction could have been easily and safely made south
of the Maine. True, this would have necessitated the sacrifice of
Frankfort; but defeat north of the Maine would compel the evacuation of
the city, and defeat was now practically invited.
Turning away from the Bavarians, Von Falckenstein moved down the
Maine; Von Goeben in advance, followed by Von Manteuffel, while Von
Beyer moved, by way of the Kinzig valley, on Hanau. On July 13th the
Hessian brigade was defeated by Von Goeben at Laufach, and fell back
on Aschaffenburg, to which place reinforcements were hurried by Prince
Alexander. On the following day the VIIIth Corps was defeated by Von
Goeben at Aschaffenburg. The brunt of the battle was borne by an
Austrian brigade attached to the Federal Corps; but few troops of the
Hessian contingents being engaged, and the Würtemberg and Baden troops
arriving too late. Had Prince Alexander concentrated his entire force
at Aschaffenburg, the result might have been bad for the Prussians, for
their march was so unskillfully conducted that Von Goeben was without
support; the other detachments of Von Falckenstein’s army being more
than thirty miles in rear. The Prussians did not pursue the enemy, but
contented themselves with remaining in possession of the field.
Prince Alexander was now convinced of the impossibility of effecting
a junction at Würzburg _via_ Aschaffenburg. He accordingly abandoned
the line of the Lower Maine and concentrated his force at Dieburg.
Frankfort was thus left defenseless, and the remnants of the German
Diet fled to Augsburg. Prince Charles now proposed a junction of the
allies in the vicinity of Würzburg, the VIIIth Corps to move _via_
Miltenberg and Tauberbischofsheim, and the concentration to be effected
on the 20th of July. This movement necessitated a march of some ninety
miles for the VIIIth Corps, and the uncovering of Southwest Germany,
while the Bavarians had to march only a few miles, and continued
to cover their own territories; but the imminent danger which now
threatened the VIIIth Corps caused Prince Alexander to forget local
and personal jealousies, and strive to effect the junction which the
military situation imperatively demanded.
On the 16th of July the Prussians entered Frankfort, where they
remained until the 21st: Von Goeben’s division occupying the city,
Von Beyer’s division being stationed at Hanau, and Von Manteuffel’s
division holding Aschaffenburg. The entire region north of the Maine
was in the possession of the Prussians. Frankfort had been especially
antagonistic to Prussia, and it now felt the full force of the severity
of the conquerors. Von Falckenstein levied a contribution of $3,000,000
on the city, and soon followed this heavy exaction by a demand for
a second enormous contribution of $10,000,000. The King of Prussia,
however, remitted the second contribution after hearing the appeal and
protest of the citizens.
On the 16th of July Von Falckenstein was relieved from the command of
the Army of the Maine, and appointed military governor of Bohemia.
He was succeeded by Von Manteuffel, whose division was placed under
command of Von Flies. Reinforcements now raised the Army of the Maine
to a strength of 50,000 men and 121 guns.
The capture of Frankfort and the possession of the country north of
the Maine had been obtained at the sacrifice of the great strategic
advantage enjoyed by the Prussians. It was no longer possible to
prevent the concentration of the VIIIth Corps and the Bavarians, and on
the 22d of July this junction was completed; the former corps holding
the line of the Tauber, and the latter occupying a position between
that river and Würzburg.
Although the allied forces now numbered 80,000 men and 286 guns, Von
Manteuffel decided to move against them from Frankfort. The advantage
of the allies was in numbers alone; in _morale_, and in the strategic
situation, the advantage was with the Prussians. Von Manteuffel now
had a line of communication through Frankfort and Cassel. Though he
could no longer keep the allies asunder, he could, by marching to the
Tauber, compel them to “form front to a flank,” while his own front
securely covered his communications. His communications could be
intercepted only by a movement of the allies north of the Maine, which
would reciprocally expose their own.
The allies had hardly effected their junction, when a want of harmony
in the views of their commanders again became evident. An offensive
movement against the Prussians was agreed upon; but Prince Charles
wished to move by the left bank of the Maine on Frankfort, while Prince
Alexander preferred a movement by the right bank on Aschaffenburg. The
former was, doubtless, the better move--at all events it was the safer;
for the allies would have covered their communications better, and a
junction might, perhaps, have been effected with the large garrison
of Mayence--but, after two days of discussion and deliberation, the
latter movement was agreed upon. In the meantime, while the allies were
deliberating, Von Manteuffel was acting; and he was now moving rapidly
towards the Tauber.
On July 23d the Prussians touched the enemy. A slight and indecisive
action was fought by a Prussian advanced-guard with the Baden division
at Hundheim, and the advanced troops of the VIIIth Corps were pressed
back along their whole line. While the Prussians were thus closing
upon the Federal Corps, the Bavarians began the contemplated movement
by the right bank of the Maine; one division being sent by rail to
Gemünden, another to Lohr (on the right bank, farther down), and part
of a third to Wertheim. Thus the junction of the allies, which had
been effected with such difficulty, was voluntarily broken at the very
moment of contact with the enemy. The line of the allied forces, on the
evening of July 23d, was 36 miles in extent; while Von Manteuffel’s
army was closely concentrated in their immediate front. Prince
Alexander, finding himself beyond the immediate assistance of the
Bavarians, withdrew all his detachments behind the Tauber, where his
corps was spread over a space seven miles in breadth and nine in depth,
in a country full of deep ravines, which rendered prompt movements,
especially of cavalry and artillery, quite out of the question.
On the 24th Von Goeben defeated the Würtembergers at
Tauberbischofsheim, and the Baden division at Werbach. The retreat
of the Baden troops uncovered Prince Alexander’s right flank, and
there was now imminent danger of the Prussians again pushing in and
separating the VIIIth Corps from the Bavarians. Prince Alexander,
therefore, fell back to Gerchsheim, and the Bavarians withdrew to
Helmstadt. Prince Charles ordered the VIIIth Corps back to the line of
the Tauber, though the Bavarians could render no immediate assistance.
Prince Alexander, doubtless appreciating the folly of attempting,
without reinforcements, to dislodge the victorious Prussians from a
position which he had been unable to hold against them, seems to have
paid no attention to the order, for he proceeded at once to concentrate
his scattered divisions at Gerchsheim.
On July 25th Von Goeben formed the right of the Prussian line, Von
Beyer the center and Von Flies the left. Von Goeben was to attack the
VIIIth Corps in front, while Von Beyer turned its right and cut it off
from Würzburg. Von Flies was to keep his division concentrated on the
left; for nothing was known of the whereabouts of the Bavarians, and it
was surmised that they might be somewhere in that direction.
Von Beyer, moving against the VIIIth Corps, unexpectedly encountered a
Bavarian division at Helmstadt, and defeated it, after an engagement
which lasted some hours. While the Prussians were resting on the field,
after the action, a second Bavarian division suddenly appeared on the
crest of a hill in the rear of Von Beyer’s left wing. So completely
was Von Beyer without information as to the position of the Bavarians,
that he was in doubt whether these troops were friend or foe. The
Bavarians were in a similar quandary. In fact, they had accidentally
stumbled upon the Prussians, and the surprise was mutual. As soon as
he discovered that he was in the presence of a hostile force, Von
Beyer executed a change of front to the left, and succeeded in gaining
another victory.
While Von Beyer was engaged with the Bavarians, Von Goeben was battling
with the VIIIth Corps at Gerchsheim. Prince Alexander was again
defeated, and driven in rout on Würzburg.
The night after these actions Prince Charles held a council of war, and
finally decided to attack Von Flies, who, having advanced, was now
on the Prussian left. Learning, however, that his own left had been
uncovered by the defeat of the VIIIth Corps, the Bavarian commander
resolved to stand on the defensive on the plateau of Waldbüttelbrünn
(in rear of Rossbrünn[25]), and ordered Prince Alexander to take up a
position immediately in front of Würzburg, to cover the retreat of the
army across the Maine, should such a movement be necessary.
About 3 o’clock on the morning of July 26th, a simultaneous attempt
of the Bavarians and Von Flies to occupy some commanding ground which
lay between the outposts, brought on an action at Rossbrünn. While Von
Flies was engaged with the Bavarians, Von Beyer struck them heavily on
the flank, and by 10 o’clock the Bavarians were in full retreat. The
Prussians did not attempt a pursuit, and by 1 o’clock, P. M., Prince
Charles had rallied and concentrated his corps on the plateau of
Waldbüttelbrünn. In the meantime the VIIIth Corps had crossed the Maine.
The position of the Bavarians was now full of peril. Their allies
had been defeated, and were glad to place a river between themselves
and the Prussians. The Bavarians were, consequently, alone on the
left bank of the Maine; their losses had been considerable; their
_morale_ was shattered; their retreat across the defiles of the Maine
was insecure; and a defeat in their present position meant absolute
ruin. The Prussian Official History says: “A renewed attack on the
part of the Prussian main forces would necessarily have forced it
[the Bavarian Corps] to a struggle for life or death. The political
situation of affairs showed no reason for bringing on so desperate a
combat. The only object henceforth was to occupy as much territory of
the allies as possible, in order to facilitate peace negotiations with
them, and maneuvering against the enemy’s left flank would oblige him
to retreat without any hard struggle.” This apology for a failure to
complete the defeat of a shattered and unsupported hostile force seems
somewhat disingenuous. A complete defeat and surrender of the Bavarians
would have been quickly followed by the capture or dispersion of the
VIIIth Corps, and the entire South-German territory would have been
at the mercy of the Prussians. Certainly such a condition of affairs
would have “facilitated peace negotiations” by rendering further
resistance hopeless. Moreover, the same history states that the retreat
of the VIIIth Corps behind the Maine was not known at the Prussian
headquarters; and it seems probable that inefficient performance of
outpost and reconnoissance duties on the part of the Prussians, rather
than any considerations of politics or magnanimity, saved the Bavarians
from destruction. Late in the day, Prince Charles withdrew across the
Maine.
On July 27th the Prussians moved on Würzburg. Their artillery exchanged
shots with the citadel of Marienberg (on the left bank of the Maine,
opposite Würzburg), and succeeded in setting fire to the arsenal, but
withdrew without effecting anything of moment.
The contending armies now faced each other, each in an almost
impregnable position. The situation was, however, altogether in
favor of the Prussians. Their communications were secure, while
the communications of the allies with Hesse, Baden and Würtemburg
were intercepted, and those with Bavaria were endangered, by the
position of the Army of the Maine. Moreover, the Prussian IId Reserve
Corps had moved from Saxony _via_ Leipsic, Plauen and Hof, and was
now approaching Baireuth. In the language of the Prussian Official
History: “The position of the Bavarian army at Würzburg had now become
untenable. It could only extricate itself from its present position
either by assuming the offensive against the Prussian army--which was
scarcely possible at this point--or by a retrograde movement up the
Maine, so as to face the army to the north and re-establish its base on
the Bavarian territory in its rear.”
But the bitterness of extreme defeat was not pushed home to the allies;
for on July 28th news of the peace preliminaries between Prussia
and Austria, and of an armistice with Bavaria, was received. Though
the truce with Bavaria was not to go into effect until August 2d,
hostilities were suspended, the only movement of importance being the
occupation of Nuremberg by the Prussian IId Reserve Corps.
Peace was concluded on August 13th with Würtemberg, on the 17th with
Baden, and on the 22d with Bavaria.
It is hardly possible to contemplate the operations of the armies
in Western Germany, in 1866, with any feeling of admiration. In the
strategical operations of Von Falckenstein and Von Manteuffel are
found the only redeeming features of the campaign. Von Falckenstein
especially, in pushing in between the two armies of the allies, and
defeating them in succession, displayed generalship of no mean order;
but the want of harmony between the allied leaders removed every
obstacle from the path of Prussian success. The Prussians seem to
have been often completely in the dark as to the designs, and even
in regard to the positions, of the allies. We find the Army of the
Maine waiting, in a defensive position, nearly two days, in ignorance
of its own victory at Wiesenthal. We find the Prussians winning a
victory at Aschaffenburg, when their own unskillful march invited a
defeat, and their success was due solely to the greater blunders of
their opponents. Before, and even during, the battle of Helmstadt the
Prussians seem to have been in complete ignorance of the position and
movements of Prince Charles, and Von Beyer’s escape from disaster
when surprised by the Bavarians, was due solely to the fact that
the surprise was accidental and mutual. Advanced-guard, outpost and
reconnoissance duties seem to have been performed with the grossest
inefficiency. In almost every action the Prussians seem to have been
unaware of the extent of their victory, or to have shown an incapacity
to organize a pursuit. Gneisenau and his famous order to “pursue to
the last breath of horse and man” seem to have been forgotten in the
Army of the Maine; and we find Prince Charles, after the battle of
Rossbrünn, quietly slipping back, without molestation, to an almost
impregnable position, when a simple frontal attack by the Prussians
would have completed the discomfiture and insured the destruction of
the Bavarian army.
As to the allies, every adverse criticism that can be made on their
opponents, applies to them in a still higher degree. Their leaders
rarely rose to the level of respectable mediocrity. The junction of
the allied corps, which was imperative from the first, was made only
when they were practically herded together by the movements of the
Prussians. As soon as they had been forced into the long-desired
junction, they voluntarily undertook an ill-advised movement which
separated them again, at the very moment of their contact with the
enemy. Incapacity and jealousy were characteristics of both the
allied commanders; and to these defects Prince Alexander added the
greater fault of insubordination. It would be hard to find among the
improvised “political generals” who appeared on the stage of war in the
earlier part of the American conflict, a single one who possessed in
a greater degree than Prince Charles or Prince Alexander a genius for
blundering--an eminent capacity for invariably doing the wrong thing.
It may be said of the two generals of the allied armies, that their
operations afford a fine demonstration of the principles of war by the
method of _reductio ad absurdum_.