The day after the battle of Königgrätz was occupied by the Prussians in
resting their fatigued troops, and in separating the mingled corps and
detachments of the different armies. Late in the afternoon the first
movements in advance began.
The fortresses of Josephstadt and Königgrätz were still in the hands
of the Austrians. They were well garrisoned, and could only be taken
by siege. Both were summoned to surrender, and both refused. These
fortresses were of the greatest importance, as they commanded the line
of railway on which the Prussians depended for supplies, and controlled
the passage of the Elbe in the vicinity of the battle field. Strong
detachments were, therefore, left to mask the fortresses, and on the
5th of July the Prussian armies marched to Pardubitz and Przelautsch,
at which points they crossed the Elbe. A division of Landwehr was sent
to Prague, which city surrendered, without resistance, on the 8th of
July. The Prussians were thus able to open communications with the rear
by rail, _via_ Pardubitz, Prague, Turnau and Reichenberg, in spite of
the fortresses of Theresienstadt, Königgrätz and Josephstadt.
After the battle of Königgrätz all touch with the Austrians had been
lost, and for three days the Prussians were completely in the dark
as to the direction taken by the retreating army. On July 6th it was
learned that Von Benedek, with the greater portion of his army, had
retreated upon Olmütz.
After the battle two lines of retreat were open to Von Benedek. It was
desirable to retreat upon Vienna, for the double purpose of protecting
the city, and effecting a junction with the victorious troops,
withdrawn from Italy for the defense of the capital.[24] But Vienna
was 135 miles distant; the army had been heavily defeated; and there
was danger that a retreat of such a distance would degenerate into a
demoralized rout. Olmütz was only half as far away; its fortress would
afford the necessary protection for reorganizing and resting the army;
and its position on the flank of the Prussians would be a serious
menace to their communications, in case of their advance on Vienna. Von
Benedek, therefore, retreated upon Olmütz, sending the Xth Corps by
rail to Vienna, and the greater part of his cavalry by ordinary roads
to the same point.
The situation was now favorable to Von Moltke. He had the advantage
of interior lines, and he did not hesitate to make use of them. Yet
the problem was by no means devoid of difficulties. The Austrian
army at Olmütz was still formidable in numbers; the extent of its
demoralization was not known; the Austrian troops had a high reputation
for efficiency, and for a capacity to present an undaunted front after
a defeat; and it was thought possible that Von Benedek might assume
the offensive. To leave such a formidable army unopposed on his flank
was not to be thought of; yet it was desirable to reach Vienna before
the arrival at that city of the troops recalled from Italy, or, at any
rate, before a considerable army could be concentrated for the defense
of the capital. A division of the Prussian forces was, therefore,
necessary. The Army of the Elbe and the First Army were directed upon
Vienna: the former to move _via_ Iglau and Znaym; the latter, _via_
Brünn. The Crown Prince was directed upon Olmütz to watch Von Benedek.
There were three courses open to the Austrian commander: 1. To attack
the flank of the First Army, between Olmütz and Vienna; 2. To withdraw
rapidly to the capital; 3. To attack the Crown Prince. In the first
case, the First Army would be supported by the Army of the Elbe, and
the combined forces would be able to take care of themselves. In the
second case, the Crown Prince was to attack the retiring army and
harass its march. In the third case, the Crown Prince, who, though
inferior in numbers, was superior in _morale_, might be more than
a match for the Austrians. In case of defeat, however, he was to
retreat into Silesia, where he would have the support of the Prussian
fortresses; while Von Moltke, freed from Von Benedek, could seize the
Austrian capital and command peace.
On July 7th the cavalry of the Second Army recovered touch with the
Austrians, and there was some skirmishing with their rear guards.
On July 8th the Austrian government made overtures for an armistice
of not less than eight weeks, nor more than three months; as a
condition to which the fortresses of Königgrätz and Josephstadt were
to be surrendered. The proposition was rejected by the Prussians, who
continued to advance.
Von Benedek was relieved from the chief command of the Austrian army,
being superseded by Archduke Albrecht, who had won the victory of
Custozza over the Italians. Von Benedek retained command, however,
until the arrival of his army on the Danube. The Austrians were now
straining every nerve to assemble an army at Vienna. Leaving only one
corps and one division in Italy, the Archduke’s army had been recalled
from Venetia, and was proceeding, by rail and by forced marches, to the
Danube.
On the 11th of July Von Benedek’s army was ordered to Vienna. This
army, after a continuous retreat of eight days duration, had just
completed its concentration at Olmütz; but the movement to Vienna
was begun without delay, the IIId Corps being sent on the day the
order was received. The withdrawal of the army from Olmütz to Vienna
was not an easy operation. The railway was, as yet, beyond the reach
of the Prussians; but the aid that it could lend was not great. It
was estimated that the withdrawal of the entire army by the single
line of railway would require a full month. Part of the troops were,
accordingly, hurried on by rail, and the bulk of the army was ordered
to march by the valley of the March to Pressburg. This was the most
direct route, and the one which offered the best roads for marching,
though by taking this line the Austrian army would expose a flank to
the attack of the Prussians. Above all things, celerity was necessary,
in order that the march might be completed without fatal interruption.
Von Benedek’s army marched in three echelons. The first, composed of
the IId and IVth Corps, with the greater part of the Saxon cavalry,
started on the 14th of July. The second, consisting of the VIIIth and
Ist Corps, left the next day; and the third, made up of the VIth Corps
and the Saxons, followed on the 16th.
The Austrian cavalry presented a bold front to the Prussian armies
moving on Vienna, and a sharp action was fought at Tischnowitz, on the
11th of July, between the cavalry of Frederick Charles’ advanced-guard
and a division of Austrian lancers, resulting in the defeat of the
latter. On the 12th Frederick Charles took possession of Brünn without
resistance. The next day, after some skirmishing with the Austrian
cavalry, the Army of the Elbe occupied Znaym.
After a rest of two days, the Army of the Elbe and the First Army
continued their march towards the Danube; the former being directed
towards Krems, the latter moving _via_ Nikolsburg.
The Austrian troops from Italy began to arrive at Vienna on the 14th
of July. In the meantime, the Crown Prince, hearing of Von Benedek’s
withdrawal from Olmütz, directed his march on Prerau, and, on the
14th, reached Prosnitz, about twelve miles south of Olmütz. The first
Austrian echelon, marching by the right bank of the March, just escaped
serious collision with the Crown Prince, the cavalry of the Second
Army skirmishing with the Saxon cavalry, and becoming engaged with a
battalion of infantry on the flank of the Austrian IId Corps.
On the following day Von Bonin, with the Ist Corps and Von Hartmann’s
cavalry division, attacked the second echelon of Von Benedek’s army,
and defeated it in the actions of Tobitschau and Rokienitz. As a result
of these actions, the right bank of the March was no longer available
for the Austrian retreat. Von Benedek had, however, succeeded in
slipping away from the Crown Prince, though at the expense of losing
his best and most direct road to Vienna.
Learning that large bodies of Austrians had been seen moving south
from Olmütz for some days, Von Moltke saw at once that it would
be impossible to bar Von Benedek’s path with the Second Army, and
immediately ordered the First Army to Lundenburg. The railway and
telegraph at Göding were cut by a detachment of Prussian cavalry, on
the 15th, and Frederick Charles occupied Lundenburg the next day.
This was a severe blow to Von Benedek, for he thus lost his railway
communication with Vienna, his march by the valley of the March was
headed by the Prussians, and he was compelled to make a detour by
crossing the Carpathian mountains and following the valley of the
Waag. To compensate, as far as possible, for the loss of the shorter
road, Von Benedek hastened his troops by forced marches. Von Moltke
did not deem it prudent to send the Second Army after Von Benedek
into the valley of the Waag, as communication between the Crown Prince
and Frederick Charles would thus be lost, and it was now desirable to
concentrate rather than separate. It was accordingly determined to
push forward with all available troops to the Danube. The Crown Prince
had already seen the impossibility of thwarting Von Benedek’s retreat,
and, as early as the 15th, had left the Ist Corps to mask Olmütz, had
directed the Vth Corps and a cavalry division to follow on the flank
of Von Benedek, and had pushed forward with the rest of his army upon
Brünn, where he arrived on the 17th. On the same day the Army of the
Elbe and the First Army were in the neighborhood of Nikolsburg.
On the 19th the heads of the Prussian armies were within less than two
days’ march of the Austrian capital, but part of the Prussian forces
were as far back as Brünn. Von Moltke did not know, to a certainty, how
much of Von Benedek’s army had been brought back from Olmütz before the
obstruction of the railway. A large part of it might already be in his
front; he knew that large bodies of troops had come in from Italy; the
fortifications of Florisdorf were extensive; and it seemed possible
that the Austrians might, by a last great effort, have assembled an
army large enough to enable them to push forward from Florisdorf, to
deliver battle on the Marchfeld for the defense of their capital.
With the double object of preparing to attack and being in readiness
to receive an attack, Von Moltke ordered the Army of the Elbe to
Wolkersdorf, the First Army to Wagram, and the Second Army in reserve
at Schönkirchen. The Prussian army was thus concentrated behind the
Russbach, in position to meet an attack of 150,000 Austrians from
Florisdorf; to reconnoiter and attack the Florisdorf entrenchments; or
to leave a corps of observation in front of them and push to the left
and seize Pressburg. The Second Army, with the exception of the Vth
Corps, was to be in position to support the other two by the 21st. The
Vth Corps was to be hurried up as rapidly as possible, in order that
the entire army might be concentrated for a decisive battle.
The only troops of Von Benedek’s army which had reached Vienna by
the 20th were the Xth and IIId Corps, part of the Saxons, and four
cavalry divisions, numbering altogether from 55,000 to 60,000 men. The
reinforcements from Italy which had arrived at the capital numbered
about 50,000 men.
Although the occupation of Pressburg was absolutely necessary to secure
the prompt junction of the divided Austrian armies, that important
point was held by only a single brigade. As soon as the Austrian IId
Corps had reached Tyrnau, its leading brigade was pushed forward
rapidly, in country carts, to reinforce the brigade at Pressburg,
and the rest of the corps hastened towards the same place by forced
marches. If Pressburg fell into the hands of the Prussians, the force
still with Von Benedek, constituting the bulk of his army, would not be
able to reach Vienna, and form a junction with the Archduke Albrecht,
except by making a long detour _via_ Komorn, and would probably be
delayed so long as to be helpless to prevent the capture of the capital.
On the 21st of July the Army of the Elbe and the First Army were in
position behind the Russbach, and the Second Army was drawing near, its
two advanced corps being not more than one day’s march distant. The
situation of the Austrians was critical. Their IId Corps had not yet
reached Pressburg, and that all-important point was still held by only
two brigades. The Ist, VIth and VIIIth Corps, and a division of Saxons,
had gotten no farther than Neustadtl and Trentschin, nearly sixty
miles from Pressburg. On the same day Von Fransecky, with the Prussian
IVth Corps and a cavalry division, crossed the March, in the vicinity
of Marchegg, advancing upon Pressburg. Everything portended to the
Austrians the loss of that valuable strategic point, and the consequent
cutting off of Von Benedek from Vienna. The Prussian army, numbering,
at least, 184,000 men, was concentrated and opposed to an army of not
more than 110,000 men, at most, at Vienna. The capture of the capital
seemed certain; and Von Moltke, with his forces augmented to 200,000
men, by the reinforcements that were pushing on to join him, could then
turn upon Von Benedek, and give a _coup de grace_ to the last remnant
of Austria’s military power.
At this junction, however, diplomacy stepped in, and, through the
mediation of France, a five days’ armistice, as a preliminary to peace,
was agreed upon; the armistice to go into effect at noon on the 22d of
July.
[Illustration: VALLEY OF THE MAINE.]
On the 22d Von Fransecky struck the two Austrian brigades at Blumenau,
just in front of Pressburg. While everything was going in favor
of the Prussians, and they seemed to be not only on the point of
defeating the Austrians, but of capturing their entire force, the
hour of noon arrived; the armistice went into effect, the action was,
with difficulty, broken off, and, after the sudden termination of the
battle, both armies bivouacked on the field.
The preliminary terms of peace were signed at Nikolsburg on the 26th
of July, and definitely ratified at Prague on the 30th of August. The
orders for the withdrawal of the Prussian armies were issued on the
25th of August, and the Austrian territory was entirely evacuated by
them by the 20th of September.
By the terms of the treaty of peace, Venetia was ceded to Italy; the
old Germanic confederation was dissolved; Schleswig-Holstein became
the property of Prussia; Austria consented to the formation of a North
German Confederation, and a union of the South German States, from both
of which confederations she was to be excluded; and the defeated power
agreed to pay 40,000,000 Prussian thalers to the victor. From this sum,
however, 15,000,000 thalers were deducted as the price of the Austrian
claims to Schleswig-Holstein, and 5,000,000 thalers for the free
maintenance of the Prussian army in the Austrian provinces from the
preliminary truce to the final establishment of peace. Peace with the
German allies of Austria was made at about the same time. As a result
of the war, Prussia annexed the territories of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel,
Nassau and the free city of Frankfort. The population of the victorious
kingdom was increased by 4,285,700 people; and its area, by nearly
25,000 square miles of land.