[1] These guns were classed, not according to the weight of the
projectile, but according to the diameter of the bore. Thus the gun
firing a 15-lb. shell was rated as a 6-pdr., because the diameter of
its bore was the same as that of a 6-pdr. smooth-bore gun.
[2] See frontispiece map.
[3] It may be of assistance to the reader, in the following pages, to
note that the divisions in the Prussian army are numbered consecutively
throughout the several army corps. Thus, the Ist Corps consists of the
1st and 2d Divisions; the IId Corps, of the 3d and 4th Divisions; the
VIth Corps, of the 11th and 12th Divisions, and so on.
[4] Derrécagaix and the Prussian Official History both condemn Von
Clausewitz’s delay. Adams, however, finds an excuse for it. He says:
“The first question that arises is, should Clausewitz have occupied
Trautenau? Mondl was up, in all probability, and he would have been
deeply engaged before Grossmann [commanding the right column] came
up, against orders. He could not have been acquainted with the
situation, for Bonin himself was not, and it is difficult, therefore,
to attach blame to him. The cause of Grossmann’s delay is said to
have been the hilly character of the road. Mondl, on the other hand,
reaching Hohenbrück about 7:30, seems to have halted there to form.
The Austrian official account states that he had occupied the heights
since 9:15, and before this he had reached Hohenbrück at 7:45. When
he had formed--that is to say, waited to mass his brigade before
deploying--the position must have been taken up by him between 8:30 and
9:15. Had Clausewitz advanced, it would have taken three-quarters of
an hour to debouch in force south of Trautenau, so that he would have
had to continue his march without halting to cross the Aupa, and push
forward from Trautenau, contrary to orders, in order to engage Mondl on
the very strong ground he by that time had fully occupied.
“Probably the latter was informed ... that no immediate danger was
impending, or he would not have waited leisurely to form. The first
duty of the advance, on coming into collision with the enemy, is to
occupy rapidly such localities as may prove of use in the impending
action.”
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the heights were unoccupied when
Von Clausewitz arrived at Parschnitz; and it was _his_ duty, as well
as that of Mondl, on coming into collision with the enemy, to occupy
rapidly such localities as might have proved of use in the impending
action. As to engaging Mondl “on the very strong ground he by that
time had fully occupied,” it is sufficient to state that he had only a
brigade, while Von Clausewitz had a division. A subordinate commander
assumes a grave responsibility when he violates or exceeds his orders;
but it is hardly to be expected that an able division commander will
fetter himself by observing the strict letter of an order, when he
knows, and his superior does not know, that the condition of affairs
in his front is such as to offer an opportunity for a successful and
valuable stroke, even though that stroke be not contemplated in the
orders of his chief. Von Alvensleben understood matters better when
he marched without orders to assist Von Fransecky at Königgrätz.
If a division commander were never expected to act upon his own
responsibility when a movement is urged by his own common sense, it is
evident that the position of general of division could be filled by a
man of very limited abilities.
[5] “While this was going on a staff-officer ... of General
Beauregard’s headquarters ... came up to General Bragg and said,
‘The General directs that the pursuit be stopped; the victory is
sufficiently complete; it is needless to expose our men to the fire
of the gun-boats.’ General Bragg said, ‘My God! was a victory ever
sufficiently complete?’”--_Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol.
I., p. 605._
[6] The above criticism on the delay of Frederick Charles is based
mainly on the comments of Major Adams, in his “Great Campaigns in
Europe.” Hozier, who, in the main, follows the Prussian Staff History
of the war, has nothing but praise for the Prince. The absence of
adverse criticism on the action of Frederick Charles in the Prussian
Official History is, perhaps, explained by the high military and
social position of that general. Adams seems to think that a forward
movement by Frederick Charles would have caused Clam-Gallas to abandon
Münchengrätz at once, and does not seem to consider that if the
Austro-Saxons had not been dislodged, Clam-Gallas would have had the
Prussian communications by the throat, while covering his own, and
that this advantage might have compensated him for his separation from
Von Benedek. It may be urged in objection to these comments, that
Frederick Charles did not know the exact condition of affairs in his
front at the time. To this it may be replied that ability to appreciate
a strategical advantage, and power to form a correct estimate of the
enemy’s dispositions, are a test of a general’s merits as a strategist.
McClellan is not excused for believing that, when Lee was attacking
his right at Gaines’ Mill, the enemy was in strong force between the
Federal army and Richmond; and Hamley is not gentle in his comments on
Napoleon’s failure to estimate correctly the force and dispositions
of the Prussians at Jena; though, being an Englishman, he does not
hesitate to adopt another standard of criticism when he finds it
necessary to defend Wellington for his error in leaving at Hal 17,000
men so sorely needed at Waterloo.--[See Hamley’s “Operations of War,”
p. 94 _et seq._, and p. 198].
[7] It should be remembered that, in addition to the four corps
immediately opposed to the Crown Prince, the IIId and IId Austrian
Corps were at Von Benedek’s disposal; the latter being scarcely more
than two marches distant from Josephstadt.
[8] At the battle of Königgrätz, Frederick Charles had 123,918 men.
His losses at Gitschin aggregated 2,612 men. It seems, therefore, that
130,000 men is a high estimate of the maximum force which he would have
been able to oppose to Von Benedek at Gitschin, had the latter made a
junction with Clam-Gallas at that point.
[9] Col. C. B. Brackenbury, R. A., who accompanied the Austrian
headquarters during the campaign, says that on one occasion he heard
Von Benedek say, hotly, to his disputing staff, “For God’s sake do
something!” and mentions the following incident: “After the battles of
Nachod and Trautenau the second officer of the Intelligence Department
examined all the prisoners, and obtained clear information of the
whereabouts of all the columns of the Crown Prince, then struggling
through the mountain passes. He wrote his report and took it to the
officer who had been sent to Benedek to decide the strategy of the
campaign. At that time several Austrian corps were close by. The
General looked at the paper and had all the facts explained to him. He
then dismissed the Captain, who, however, remained and said, probably
in that tone of distrust which prevailed, ‘Now, Herr General, I have
shown you that the Crown Prince can be beaten in detail if attacked by
our great force within half a day’s march; may I ask what you propose
to do with the Austrian army?’ The General replied, ‘I shall send it
against Prince Frederick Charles.’ The Captain put his hands together
in an attitude of supplication and said, ‘For God’s sake, sir, do
not,’ but was ordered out of the room. I did not know this fact when
Benedek said, the day after the defeat of Königgrätz, ‘Did you ever
see such a fine army so thrown away?’”--“_Field Works_,” by Col. C. B.
Brackenbury, R. A., p. 205 and note.
[10] Gitschin, Jung Buntzlau, and Libau are shown on Map No. 6. The
positions of the other places here mentioned are, in reference to
Gitschin, as follows: Aulibitz, nearly 4 miles east; Chotec, about
7-1/2 miles east; Konetzchlum, about 6-1/2 miles east-south-east;
Milicowes, about 4-1/2 miles south-south-east; Podhrad, about 2 miles
south-west; Robaus, about 2 miles east; Dworetz, near, and north of,
Robaus.
[11] It is interesting to note the growth of great generals under the
influence of their actual experience in war. The Frederick of Rossbach
and Leuthen was very different from the Frederick of Mollwitz. In 1796
we find Napoleon calling a council of war before hazarding a second
attempt upon Colli’s position at St. Michel, and showing, even in
that vigorous and brilliant campaign, a hesitation never shown by the
Napoleon of Ulm and Austerlitz. The Grant of Vicksburg was not the
Grant of Shiloh; and Lee at Chancellorsville and Petersburg does not
seem like the same commander who conducted the impotent campaign of
1861 in West Virginia. The old saying, “Great generals are born, not
made,” is not altogether true. It would be more correct to say, “Great
generals are born, and then made.”
[12] The author’s own observations of the topography of the field
correspond, in the main, with the description given above. The
Bistritz, however, is not such a formidable obstacle as one might
infer from the description quoted. At the village of Sadowa it is a
mere ditch, not much larger than some of the _acequias_ in Colorado or
Utah. It is perhaps eight feet wide and three feet in depth. It could
hardly have been an obstacle to infantry. Its muddy bottom and marshy
banks doubtless rendered it a considerable obstacle for artillery, but
the eight villages through which it flows, within the limits of the
battle field, certainly could have furnished abundant material for
any number of small bridges required for crossing it. In the vicinity
of Nechanitz, the Bistritz, having received the waters of a tributary
creek, becomes a true obstacle, as it spreads out to a width of about
thirty yards, and the banks are swampy. It should be remarked that at
the time of the author’s visit to Königgrätz, there had been very heavy
rains, and the condition of the stream was probably the same as on the
day of the battle.
[13] A sketch of these operations is given in the appendices.
[14] The strength of the Union army at Gettysburg was 78,043. The
Confederate army numbered about 70,000. The Union army lost 3,072
killed, and 14,497 wounded. The Confederates lost 2,592 killed, and
12,709 wounded. In comparing the losses of Gettysburg with those of
Königgrätz, no account is here taken of the “missing” in either the
Union or the Confederate losses; though the missing (exclusive of
prisoners) are figured in with the killed and wounded of the Prussian
and Austrian armies. The figures in regard to Gettysburg are taken from
the tables (compiled from official records) in “Battles and Leaders of
the Civil War.” The figures in regard to Königgrätz are taken from the
Prussian Official History.
[15] See page 70.
[16] Although the above comment coincides in its main features with the
criticism of Hozier on the same subject, it is based upon the author’s
own observation of the views of the field afforded from the church
tower of Chlum, and from Von Benedek’s position near Lipa.
[17] For example, the formation of Sedgwick’s division at Antietam,
Meade’s at Fredericksburg, Pickett’s at Gettysburg, and Sheridan’s at
Chattanooga.
[18] See the interesting comments of General J. D. Cox on the assaults
in column at Kenesaw Mountain, p. 129, Vol. IX., (“Atlanta”),
Scribner’s “Army and Navy in the Civil War.”
[19] The following remarks of Captain F. N. Maude, R. E., on “The
Tactics of the American War” sustain the views expressed above, and are
interesting as showing an able English military critic’s appreciation
of the advanced tactical development of the American armies:
“It is curious to note how little attention has been devoted to the
study of the fighting of this most bloody of modern wars; and yet it
would seem that the records of these campaigns fought out to the bitter
end by men of our own Anglo-Saxon races, would be a far more likely
source of information, from which to deduce the theory of an attack
formation specially designed to meet our needs, than the histories
of struggles between French and Germans, or Russians and Turks. Von
Moltke is reported to have said that ‘nothing was to be learnt from
the struggle of two armed mobs.’ If that is really the case, which we
venture to doubt exceedingly, the great strategist must ere this have
been sorry he ever spoke, for, armed mobs or not, both Southern and
Northern troops bore, and bore victoriously, a per centage of loss
before which even the best disciplined troops in Germany, the Prussian
Guard Corps, failed to make headway. It is of no relevance to the
argument to say that the breech-loader was not then in use. When a man
is hard hit himself, or sees his comrade rolled over, it never enters
his head to consider whether the hit was scored by muzzle-loader or
breech-loader; the fact itself, that he or the other man is down, is
the only one he concerns himself with, and when the percentage of hits
in a given time rises high enough, the attack collapses equally, no
matter against what weapon it may be delivered.
“Actually, though the armament was inferior, the per centage of hits
was frequently far higher than in breech-loading campaigns. There is no
action on record during recent years in which the losses rose so high,
and in so short a time, as in the American fights.”
After a brief description of Meagher’s attack at Fredericksburg, and
Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg, Captain Maude continues:
“Surely, Moltke never spoke of such gallant soldiers as an armed mob,
seeing that they succeeded in driving an attack home against four
times the per centage of loss that stopped the Prussian guard at St.
Privat.... And assuming, for the moment, that the saying attributed to
him is really true, we cannot help fancying that he must have often
bitterly regretted it when watching his own men in the manœuvers of
late years, attacking in what is really, practically the same formation
which the armed mobs worked out for themselves.
“The points of contrast between ourselves and the Americans are far
too numerous to be dismissed without comment. They began the war with
a drill book and system modeled on our own, and they carried it out to
its conclusion, with only a few modifications of detail, but none of
principle. The normal prescribed idea of an attack appears to have been
as follows: A line of scouts, thickened to skirmishers according to the
requirements of the ground; from 2 to 300 paces in rear, the 1st line,
two deep, precisely like our own, then in rear a 2d line and reserve.
Of course, their lines did not advance with the steady precision of our
old peninsula battalions. Their level of instruction was altogether
too low, and besides, the extent of fire-swept ground had greatly
increased. Eye witnesses say that after the first few yards, the line
practically dissolved itself into a dense line of skirmishers, who
threw themselves forward generally at a run as far as their momentum
would carry them; sometimes, if the distance was short, carrying the
position at the first rush, but more generally the heavy losses brought
them to a halt and a standing fire fight ensued. They knew nothing of
Scherff’s great principle, on which the ‘Treffen Abstande’ or distances
between the lines are based, but they generally worked it out in
practice pretty successfully. The second line came up in the best order
they could and carried the wreck of the first on with them; if they
were stopped, the reserve did the same for them, and either broke too,
or succeeded.
* * * * *
“It will be seen that except in its being more scientifically put
together, this German attack is, practically, precisely similar to
that employed by the Americans, with the sole difference that the
breech-loader has conferred on the assailants the advantage of being
able to make a more extended use of their weapons, and has reduced to a
certain extent the disadvantage of having to halt.
* * * * *
“Had we, in 1871, been thoroughly well informed as to the methods
employed across the Atlantic, we should have seen at once that the new
weapons did not necessarily entail any alteration in principle in our
drill book, and with a little alteration in detail, have attained at
one bound to a point of efficiency not reached even in Germany till
several years after the war.”--“_Tactics and Organization_,” by Capt.
F. N. Maude, R. E., p. 299, _et seq._
[20] See pp. 42 and 78.
[21] In Clery’s “Minor Tactics” occurs the following astonishing
passage: “The use made of entrenchments by the Turks was not the least
remarkable feature of the war of 1877. Field works, as aids in defense,
had been used with advantage in previous wars, but no similar instance
exists of an impregnable system of earthworks being improvised under
the very noses of the enemy.” Col. Clery’s book is an evidence of his
intelligent study and thorough knowledge of European military history;
yet, as late as 1885, this professor of tactics at the Royal Military
College at Sandhurst seems not to have heard of Johnston’s works at
Kenesaw Mountain, or the fortifications constructed at Spottsylvania
and Petersburg.
[22] May’s “Tactical Retrospect.”
[23] For a description of the American military telegraph, see Grant’s
Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 205, _et seq._ See also the comments on the
military telegraph, in Sherman’s Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 398.