In the meantime the main armies had not been idle. The invasion of
Saxony was begun on the 16th of June by the Army of the Elbe and the
First Army. On the night of the 15th of June the Saxon army began its
retreat to Bohemia, detachments of pioneers tearing up the railroad
track between Rieza and Dresden, and between the latter city and
Bautzen. The work of destruction, except the burning of the bridge at
Rieza, was hurriedly and imperfectly done, and did not appreciably
delay the Prussian advance. The Army of the Elbe advanced from Torgau,
_via_ Wurzen, Dahlen and Strehla; a division to each road, and a
detachment from the right division moving _via_ Ostrau and Dobeln to
cover the right flank. The First Army advanced from the neighborhood
of Görlitz, through Löbau and Bautzen, a strong detachment being sent
out on the Zittau road, beyond Ostritz, to observe the passes of
Reichenberg and Gabel, for the army was making a flank march, and the
Austrians might attack through these passes. A cavalry detachment was
pushed out through Bischofswerda to feel the left of the Army of the
Elbe.
On the 18th of June the Army of the Elbe occupied Dresden, and pushed
its outposts beyond the city as far as Lockwitz and Pillnitz. On
the following day the junction of the two armies was perfected. The
1st Reserve Division was sent from Berlin to reinforce Herwarth Von
Bittenfeld, and the combined forces of the Army of the Elbe and the
First Army were placed under the command of Prince Frederick Charles.
To guard against a possible invasion of Saxony by the Bavarians,
measures were at once taken to fortify Dresden, which was occupied
by the 2nd Reserve Division from Berlin; Leipsic and Chemnitz were
occupied by Landwehr; and the Leipsic-Plauen railway beyond Werdau was
destroyed.
On the 17th of June the Emperor of Austria issued a manifesto, in which
he formally announced to his subjects the state of war existing between
Austria and Prussia. Italy declared war against Austria three days
later.
We can now see the immense results following from the thorough military
preparation of Prussia. Launching, as it were, a thunderbolt of
military force upon her enemies at the first moment of war, less than
two weeks sufficed for the complete conquest of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel
and Saxony. Indeed, four days had sufficed for the seizure of the
last two. The King of Hanover had been dethroned; the Elector of
Hesse-Cassel was a prisoner, and the King of Saxony was a fugitive with
his army in Bohemia. The military results were even greater than the
political consequences. The severed portions of the Prussian kingdom
were united. The Hanoverian army had been eliminated from the military
problem, and there was no longer any menace to Prussia from the rear.
Von Falckenstein was now free to turn his undivided attention to the
Bavarians and the Federal Corps, and the occupation of Saxony prevented
all possibility of a junction of the Bavarian and Saxon armies. But the
strategical advantages gained in regard to operations in Bohemia were
the grandest result of the occupation of Saxony.
We have seen that on the 14th of June the Army of the Elbe was
around Torgau, the First Army near Görlitz; and the Second Army in
the vicinity of Neisse; being thus separated from each other by from
100 to 125 miles. The Second Army covered Breslau, the Army of the
Elbe covered Berlin, and the First Army was in a position to support
either of the others. Geographical circumstances thus compelled the
separation of the Prussian armies, and only two of them were available
for the invasion of Bohemia. The occupation of Saxony changed matters
for the better. The distance between the Army of the Elbe and the First
Army was reduced to the extent of actual junction, and these combined
armies were only about 120 miles from Landshut, where the right of the
Second Army now rested, and with which there was communication by means
of the hill road of Schreiberschau. The entire force was now available
for the invasion of Bohemia; the northern passes of the Bohemian
frontier were secured; and if compelled to act upon the defensive,
Frederick Charles could find in the mountains of Southern Saxony many
advantageous positions for defensive battle.
The Prussian plan of operations required an advance of Frederick
Charles’ armies from Saxony into Bohemia, and an invasion of that
province by the Second Army, advancing from Silesia; both armies
to unite at Gitschin, or in its vicinity. It is clear that in thus
advancing from divergent bases, the Prussians gave to their adversary
the advantage of operating by interior lines; generally a serious
military error, as the general operating by interior lines, holding
one of the opponent’s armies by a containing force, and falling with
superior numbers upon the other, may defeat both in succession. Von
Moltke’s plan was, however, sound and proper, for the following reasons:
1. The geographical configuration of the Prussian frontier compelled
the separation of the Prussian armies, in order that Lusatia and
Silesia might both be protected from Austrian invasion; and the
only possible concentration that would not yield to the enemy the
advantage of the initiative, and permit him to invade Prussia, was a
concentration to the front, in the hostile territory.
2. The entire army “could not have advanced in effective order by one
set of mountain roads, but would have extended in columns so lengthened
that it would have been impossible to form to a front commensurate
with its numbers.”
3. The re-entering base of the Prussians would enable each of their
armies to cover its communications with its base, while one of these
armies would surely menace the communications of the Austrians, if Von
Benedek should advance against either.
4. The certainty that the Prussian armies could act with celerity, and
the probability that the Austrian army was not yet fully prepared for
prompt offensive maneuvers, justified the hope that the concentration
might be effected at a point some distance in front of the enemy’s
line. The distance from Görlitz and Neisse to Gitschin was less than
the distance from Olmütz, Brünn and Bömisch Trübau to the same point,
and there was an excellent prospect of being able to concentrate before
Von Benedek could get his army well in hand to strike the Prussian
armies separately.
5. By keeping up telegraphic communication between the two separated
armies, their co-operation and simultaneous action could be assured.
6. If the Prussians could reach the Iser and the Elbe without serious
check, the contracted theatre of operations would render Von Benedek’s
interior position one of danger, rather than one of advantage. Von
Moltke himself, in commenting upon his strategical combination, says:
“If it is advantageous for a general to place his army on an interior
line of operation, it is necessary, in order that he may profit by
it, to have sufficient space to enable him to move against one of
his adversaries at a distance of several days’ march, and to have
time enough then to return against the other. If this space is very
contracted, he will run the risk of having both adversaries on his
hands at once. When an army, on the field of battle, is attacked in
front and on the flank, it avails nothing that it is on an interior
line of operations. That which was a strategical advantage becomes a
tactical disadvantage. If the Prussians were allowed to advance to the
Iser and to the Elbe, if the several defiles which it was necessary to
pass fell into their power, it is evident that it would be extremely
perilous to advance between their two armies. In attacking one, the
risk would be incurred of being attacked in rear by the other.” The
combination, on the field of battle, of the two armies operating from
divergent bases, would admit of just such a front and flank attack
as would convert Von Benedek’s strategical advantage into a serious
tactical disadvantage. It would be a repetition of Waterloo.
7. A failure to unite before encountering the main force of the enemy,
though unfortunate, would not necessarily have been disastrous.
According to Jomini, the advantages of an interior position diminish as
the armies operating increase in size; for the following reasons:
(a). “Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary
to bring a very large force into action on the day of the battle, an
army of 130,000 or 140,000 men may easily resist a much larger force.
(b). “If driven from the field, there will be at least 100,000 men to
protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with one of
the other armies.
(c). “The central army ... requires such a quantity of provisions,
munitions, horses and _materiel_ of every kind, that it will possess
less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts from one part of
the zone to another; to say nothing of the impossibility of obtaining
provisions from a region too restricted to support such numbers.
(d). “The bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold
in check two armies of 135,000 men each must be very strong (from
80,000 to 90,000 each); and, being of such magnitude, if they are drawn
into a serious engagement, they will probably suffer reverses, the
effect of which might outweigh the advantages gained by the principal
army.”
Finally, the increased defensive power given to infantry by the
introduction of breech-loading rifles might be counted upon to increase
greatly the probability of either of the Prussian armies being able to
fight successfully a _purely defensive_ battle against the entire army
of Von Benedek, armed, as it was, with muzzle-loaders.
In view of these reasons, Von Moltke’s strategy was not only
justifiable, but perfect. The Prussian objective was the Austrian army,
wherever it might be.
Before the commencement of hostilities Von Benedek had, as we have
seen, announced his intention of invading Prussia. Two routes offered
themselves to his choice: one by way of Görlitz and Bautzen to Berlin;
the other by way of the valley of the Oder into Silesia. The latter
route was obstructed by the fortresses of Glatz, Neisse and Kosel;
the former would have led to the unobstructed occupation of Saxony,
and would have enabled the Bavarian army to concentrate, _via_ the
passes of the Saale and Wittenberg, with the Austrians and Saxons.
But, at a time when minutes were worth millions, Von Benedek was slow;
and the preparation and energy of the Prussians enabled them to take
the initiative and throw the Austrians upon the defensive in Bohemia.
Von Benedek then decided to concentrate his army in the vicinity of
Josephstadt and Königinhof; to hold the strong defiles of the Iser or
the Elbe with comparatively weak detachments, and throw his main army
upon the Crown Prince or Frederick Charles, as circumstances might
decide.
Von Benedek’s concentration began on the 18th of June; and on the 25th
his army stood as follows:
The Ist Corps, with one brigade of the IIIrd Corps and a cavalry
division, on the left bank of the Iser, from Turnau, through
Müchengrätz to Jung Buntzlau, where the retreating Saxons formed on the
left.
The Xth Corps, with one cavalry division, at Jaromir.
The IVth Corps at Opocno.
The VIth Corps at Solnitz.
The IIIrd Corps on the left of the VIth, at Tynist.
The VIIIth Corps at Wamberg.
The IId Corps at Geyersberg.
Four cavalry divisions were at Gabel, Leitomischel, Abtsdorf and
Policzka, respectively.
The force on the Iser, under Count Clam-Gallas, was thus opposed to
the entire army of Frederick Charles; while Von Benedek confronted
the Crown Prince with six corps. The Austrian line extended beyond
Gitschin, the point at which the Prussian armies were to concentrate.