The geographical situation was unfavorable to Prussia. The map of
Germany, as it existed before the Austro-Prussian war, shows Rhineland
and Westphalia completely separated from the other provinces of Prussia
by the hostile territory of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, which, extending
from the north, joined the South German States which were in arms
against the northern kingdom. The Austrian province of Bohemia, with
the adjacent kingdom of Saxony, formed a salient, pushing forward,
as it were, into the Prussian dominions, and furnishing a base from
which either Silesia or Lusatia might be invaded. In the language of
the Prussian Staff History of the Campaign of 1866: “In one direction
stood the Saxon army as a powerful advanced guard only six or seven
marches distant from the Prussian capital, which is protected from the
south by no considerable vantage ground; in the other Breslau could
the more easily be reached in five marches, because, trusting to a
former federal compact with Austria, Schweidnitz had been given up as
a fortress.” The forces of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, numbering 25,000
men, could operate against the communications of the Prussian armies,
or withdraw to the south and unite with the Austrians or Bavarians. The
South German armies might form a junction in Saxony or Bohemia with the
Austro-Saxon army.
THE PLANS OF VON MOLTKE AND VON BENEDEK, AND THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE
OPPOSING ARMIES.
The Prussian army was commanded by the King. His chief-of-staff was
Baron Hellmuth Von Moltke, a soldier of reputation in Prussia, but as
yet almost unknown beyond the boundaries of his own country.
The object of Von Moltke was to protect the Prussian rear by defeating
the Hanoverian and Hessian troops; to prevent a junction of these
troops with their South German allies; to “contain” the latter with
as small a force as possible, and to hurl the crushing weight of the
Prussian forces upon the Austro-Saxon army.
On the 14th of June the Prussian armies were stationed as follows:
The “Army of the Elbe,” consisting of three divisions, two cavalry
brigades and 144 guns, in cantonments round Torgau, under command of
General Herwarth Von Bittenfeld;
The “First Army,” consisting of three army corps, a cavalry corps of
six brigades, and 300 guns, near Görlitz, under command of Prince
Frederick Charles;
The “Second Army,” consisting of four army corps, a cavalry division of
three brigades, and 336 guns, in the vicinity of Neisse, under command
of the Crown Prince.
Besides the three main armies, there were other forces stationed as
follows:
One division at Altona, in Holstein, under Von Manteuffel;
One division at Minden, under Vogel Von Falckenstein;
One division (made up principally of the Prussian garrisons withdrawn
from the Federal fortresses of Mayence, Rastadt and Frankfort) at
Wetzlar, under Von Beyer.
The Austrian “Army of the North” was posted as follows:
Ist Corps, at Prague, Teplitz, Theresienstadt and Josephstadt;
IInd Corps, near Bömisch Trübau;
IVth Corps, near Teschen;
VIth Corps, at Olmütz;
IIId Corps, at Brünn;
Xth Corps at Brünn;
VIIIth Corps, in the neighborhood of Austerlitz.
To these corps were attached five divisions of cavalry and more than
750 guns.
This army was under command of Field Marshal Von Benedek, an officer of
great experience and high reputation.
The Saxon army, 25,000 strong, with fifty-eight guns, was at Dresden,
under command of the Crown Prince of Saxony.
The Bavarian army was concentrating on the line of the Main between
Amberg and Würzburg. It numbered 52,000 men, and was under command of
Prince Charles of Bavaria.
The VIIIth Federal Corps was forming at Frankfort. It consisted of the
contingents of Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau, and an
Austrian division drawn from the Federal fortresses. It numbered about
42,000 men, and was under the command of Prince Alexander of Hesse.
The Vth, VIIth and IXth Austrian corps, under the Archduke Albrecht,
were in Venetia, opposed to an Italian army of four corps.
Von Benedek expected to assume the offensive and invade Prussia. He
had announced this intention before the beginning of hostilities, even
going so far as to prescribe rules for the behavior of his soldiers
while in the enemy’s country. It is hard to understand (in the light of
subsequent events) the slight esteem in which the Austrians held their
opponents before the commencement of hostilities. In a general order
issued to his army on June 17, 1866, the Austrian commander says: “We
are now faced by inimical forces, composed partly of troops of the line
and partly of Landwehr. The first comprises young men not accustomed
to privations and fatigue, and who have never yet made an important
campaign; the latter is composed of doubtful and dissatisfied elements,
which, rather than fight against us, would prefer the downfall of their
government. In consequence of a long course of years of peace, the
enemy does not possess a single general who has had an opportunity of
learning his duties on the field of battle.”
Von Benedek’s unfavorable opinion of his adversaries was probably
shared by many other prominent European soldiers; for the excellence of
the military system of Prussia was, as yet, not appreciated by other
nations. Absurd as Von Benedek’s order now appears, it seems to have
excited no unfavorable comment at the time of its appearance; and, in
fact, the expectation of Austrian success was quite general in Europe.
On the 15th of June the Austrian outposts were notified of the
intention of the Prussians to begin hostilities, and war was formally
declared against Hanover, Hesse-Cassel and Saxony. Within twenty-four
hours after the declaration of war, the invasion of each of these minor
states was begun.