The greater part of the subject-matter of this volume was originally
given as a lecture to the officers at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry
School. The kindly reception accorded to the lecture has encouraged me
to revise and amplify it, and to publish it in its present form.
As to the narrative portion of the book, no other claim is made than
that it is based upon the story of the campaign as given in the
Prussian Official History of the Campaign of 1866, Hozier’s “Seven
Weeks’ War,” Derrécagaix’s “_La Guerre Moderne_,” and Adams’ “Great
Campaigns in Europe.” I have not deemed it necessary to cumber the
pages with notes of reference, but will here express my indebtedness
to the works mentioned, giving precedence to them in the order
named. Other works have been consulted, which are enumerated in the
bibliographical note at the end of the volume. I have also personally
visited the scene of the operations described, and, especially in
regard to the topography of the battle field of Königgrätz, I am able
to speak from my own observation.
My object has been: 1. To give a brief, but accurate, historical sketch
of a great campaign, to which but little attention has been given in
this country. 2. To make a comparison of some of the military features
of the War of Secession with corresponding features of the European war
which occurred one year later.
European critics have generally been loth to acknowledge the military
excellence displayed during the War of Secession; and, even when giving
full credit for the valor exhibited by our soldiers, have too often
regarded our veteran armies as mere “armed mobs.” Chesney, Adams,
Trench and Maude have recognized the value of the lessons taught
by the American armies, and Lord Wolseley has recently developed an
appreciation of such American generalship and soldierly worth as
he can see through Confederate spectacles. But European military
writers generally, and those of the Continent especially, still fail
to recognize in the developments of our war the germ, if not the
prototype, of military features which are regarded as new in Europe.
The remarks of Colonel Chesney still hold true: “There is a disposition
to regard the American generals, and the troops they led, as altogether
inferior to regular soldiers. This prejudice was born out of the
blunders and want of coherence exhibited by undisciplined volunteers at
the outset--faults amply atoned for by the stubborn courage displayed
by both sides throughout the rest of the struggle; while, if a man’s
claims to be regarded as a veteran are to be measured by the amount
of actual fighting he has gone through, the most seasoned soldiers
of Europe are but as conscripts compared with the survivors of that
conflict. The conditions of war on a grand scale were illustrated to
the full as much in the contest in America, as in those more recently
waged on the Continent.”
But it is not only among European critics that the military excellence
displayed by our armies has been depreciated. There is a small class
among the professional soldiers in our own country, who are wont to
bestow all possible admiration upon the military operations in recent
European wars, not because they were excellent, but because they were
European; and to belittle the operations in our own war, not because
they were not excellent, but because they were American. To this small
class, whose humility in regard to our national achievements is rarely
combined with individual modesty, this book is not addressed. It is
to the true American soldier that this little volume is offered, with
the hope that the views expressed may meet with his approval and be
sanctioned by his judgment.