Cleveland Row, June 1st, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,
I did not answer your letter earlier, because I waited to know the
opinion of others on the subject of the proposal which you mention.
I find that there is a very strong apprehension of creating by it
dissatisfaction among the Militia, and of impeding the future
raising and augmentation of that force. For it is reasoned thus:
although in the present moment the public spirit is so high that it
is probable a very large part would readily concur in a similar
proposition, yet there would certainly be many individuals, and
perhaps some bodies among them, who would be reluctant to alter
their original terms of service. These persons would hardly be
placed in a fair situation, because although the option would still
nominally be left to them; yet that would be attended with so much
odium, and would so much carry the appearance of backwardness, that
any persons in such a time as this, and particularly persons
engaged in military service, would naturally be very unwilling to
expose themselves to it. By this means, all security and confidence
in the original terms of enlistment would be lost, and both
officers and men, deliberating about entering into the Militia,
would do it with the idea that they might continually be called
upon to serve out of the kingdom, which would destroy the whole
Militia system.
Besides this, another objection strikes me, which I think perhaps
even stronger than the preceding. It is that of the loss of
security to this country, both in point of fact and opinion, from
rendering that force applicable otherwise than to the immediate
protection of Great Britain. I hope that in all cases we should
have done our best, according to such judgment as we could form at
the time: but I will fairly own to you that I do not myself believe
that England would have been now as secure as I trust it is, if we
had possessed the power of disposing of the Militia regiments for
Channel or Irish service, and much less if that power had also been
extended to the continent in general.
A third argument I think of little weight, but I know from what I
have heard in general conversation on the subject, that it would
make considerable impression among a particular class of men. The
Militia is now raised by a sort of direct burthen on the landed
interest, who are reconciled to it from the apparent and visible
protection which their property derives from it. Whereas, if it was
applied to purposes of more general, though possibly greater,
public advantage, that would be called _unfair_ upon the counties,
as the term now is, and we should infallibly have proposals for
throwing the whole burthen, in all its various shapes, more equally
on the general mass of property within the kingdom.
For all these reasons, tempting as it would be in the present state
of the war, to avail ourselves of the service of that which
constitutes the greatest part of our regular force for the purpose
of those operations, with the necessity of which we are thoroughly
impressed, yet I really do not think, nor is it thought by others,
that we can prudently attempt it.
A more limited idea has occurred to me, in which I think your zeal
might be useful in the way of example. It is this. In any case of
invasion (which is by no means to be put out of the question,
however the public love to flatter themselves about it) I think it
is evident that there might, and probably would be, much boat
service. It is by no means impossible that, even in the very act of
landing, they might have to be opposed by gun-boats, _et id genus
omne_, and that troops would be wanted for that service. If landed,
and having taken Dumourier's "_position on the coast_" to wait for
reinforcements and provisions, perhaps the General who commands our
force in that quarter may wish to attack them from the sea, without
waiting for the certain arm of starvation which would be hanging
over them. The same principle applies to the defence of our tide
rivers, harbours, &c. Now, for all this, I should think it would be
highly useful that our troops should in some degree be trained to
this boat work, and though perhaps an inland regiment of Militia
might not be thought the best to begin with, yet by suggesting this
idea to Sir W. Howe, and expressing your readiness and that of your
regiment to lend yourselves to it, an example might be set to
others and a very useful practice introduced.
I wrote this early in the morning and before the arrival of the
post, so that I do not know whether there will be any accounts from
Dublin. If there are, I will add them before I close this letter.
Those of yesterday were, as I understood from the Duke of P. and
King, perfectly good, but I did not see them. The only thing that
appears at all distressing is that the communication with the south
was still interrupted, and although this may arise from the
disturbed state of any one point through which the roads pass, yet
it is productive of uneasiness, and may afford opportunities for
spreading alarms in the south, the consequences of which might be
very serious. No disturbance had shown itself in the north.
Buonaparte is gone to Toulon instead of Rastadt, and it is now
publicly declared at Paris that his object is Cadiz, Portugal, or
Ireland. If we are not more than commonly unfortunate, _il trouvera
a qui parler en chemin_.
I do not think Pitt could avoid answering Fremy's call, and as it
has turned out it is certainly better as it is. One shudders to
think what might have happened.
Ever most affectionately yours,
G.
I do not enclose the "Gazette," because I conclude you have it.
There was nothing else of any importance from Ireland last night,
and nothing at all this morning.
In the month of June, Lord Cornwallis, upon whose military talents the
Cabinet placed great reliance, was appointed to succeed Lord Camden in
the government of Ireland; and the Irish Secretaryship was again offered
to Mr. Thomas Grenville, and declined.