Dropmore, Sept. 27th, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,
I received your letter here yesterday, and write this because what
you say on two material points of the public situation of affairs,
impels me to it, though I well know how impossible it is within the
compass of a letter to discuss such questions, or even to state the
mere grounds of the considerations on which they depend. I see so
much all around us of the gloomiest colour, that I am on that
account, perhaps, more sensible to the manner in which you seem to
view our situation. I cannot, however, be much surprised at the
confidence which you seem to feel as to the possibility of our
seeing the storm break all round us, and remaining untouched by it,
because such appears to be the prevailing sentiment here, as well
as in every other part of Europe: every country, and almost every
individual, seeming to reason and to act in the hope of such an
exception being made in their favour during the general ruin which
they see impending over others. I am, however, not the less
convinced of the truth of my own opinion, which is unhappily
already confirmed by too many instances of the effects which this
delusive security, as I think it, has produced, and is daily
producing. I can see no grounds, in the state of this country, to
hope for such an exception in our favour, and I do verily believe
that we must prepare to meet the storm here, and that we must not
count upon the continuance of a state of domestic tranquillity
which has already lasted so much beyond the period usually allotted
to it in the course of human events. I trust that we shall at least
meet it with more firmness than our neighbours, but even in order
to do this, we ought not to blind ourselves at the moment of its
approach. It seems too probable that it is decreed by Providence
that a stop should be put (for reasons probably inscrutable to us)
to the progress of arts and civilization among us. It is a
melancholy reflection to be born to the commencement of such a
scene, and to be called to bear a principal share in it, but I
trust we may hope that our strength may be proportioned to our
trial.
With respect to what you say of Ireland, I am not ignorant of the
reports upon the subject, though perhaps a little mortified at the
facility with which you seem to have given credit to them. I know
of no such measure as you say we _have adopted_. I have never
varied in my opinion as to the impolicy of the conduct held in
Ireland during the time of Lord Rockingham's Administration, nor
do I believe that any one is disposed to repeat that conduct now.
On the other hand, I must say that I think we, least of all people,
and yourself less than any man existing, have reason to feel any
particular interest in a system which experience has always shown,
at least in our time, to be neither able nor disposed to carry any
support to English Government whenever England can think such
support material. It has long appeared to me, and I believe to you
also, that to make the connexion with Ireland permanently useful to
Great Britain, that connexion must be strengthened by a systematic
plan of measures, well considered and steadily pursued. Whether the
present moment, or any other moment that is in near prospect, would
be favourable to such a plan, is another and a more difficult
question; but I am sure that every year that is lost increases the
hazard of our situation as with respect to Ireland. These points I
feel as those which are truly important to England, are not
questions of power or advantage to Lord Shannon, or Mr. Ponsonby,
or any other individual, or set of individuals there. And with this
impression, I certainly have not for one consented, as you express
it, to surrender Ireland to the Duke of P. and Lord F. under the
government of Mr. Ponsonby; but neither can I conceive what other
interest you or I have, or ought to have, on that subject, except
that Ireland should be so managed, if possible, as not to be an
additional difficulty in our way, when so many others are likely to
occur.
I have not often as much leisure as I have found to-day to put
these ideas on paper. Do not think me dispirited by what has
happened. I see the extent of our danger, and think that danger
much greater than it is commonly apprehended; but the effect of
that opinion on my mind is no other than that of increasing the
conviction with which I was before impressed, of the necessity of
perseverance and exertion. France and Spain and the Netherlands,
and Geneva, most of all (small as it is), show us that this danger
is not to be lessened by giving way to it, but that courage and
resolution are in this instance, as in most others, the surest
roads to self-preservation.
I have written this with more than usual seriousness, because such
is the state of my mind, which I am accustomed to open to you
without reserve, and such as it is at the moment of my writing or
conversing with you.
When are we likely to meet? I suppose that your campaign will not
last much beyond the King's journey. You will not, I hope, forget
that this place is your best inn, whether you go to Stowe or to
town; but you must give me a few days' notice, that I may be sure
to be here. God bless you.
The progress of the negotiations on the continent, and the weakness of
Austria and Prussia, mixed up with no inconsiderable amount of
indecision and duplicity, are freely commented upon in letters from Mr.
Grenville and Lord Malmesbury. Want of power, and want of will--fear,
hesitation, and imbecility--were so conspicuous in the conduct of these
Courts, as to destroy all confidence in their professions. The character
drawn by Lord Malmesbury of the King of Prussia--which the reader will
find confirmed in the subsequent communications of Mr. Grenville--shows
how little reliance, under any circumstances, could be placed on His
Majesty's co-operation.