(Private.) Vienna, August 24th, 1794.
DEAR DUKE OF PORTLAND,
It had been very much my intention to have written to you by our
messenger of the 16th instant, because, although our despatches
have been very much detailed, and have not, therefore, left much to
be said in private letters, it is upon these occasions, I know,
some satisfaction to hear that nothing remains behind, which is
material to the subject; but having been hitherto prevented, by the
very entire occupation of our time here, I take the opportunity of
writing to you, a little at large, by the messenger who is going to
England to-night.
You know that upon the slight view which the shortness of the time
allowed me to take of the business in question here, I was
persuaded that we probably might, in some degree, succeed in our
expedition; because, if the course of things here could not be
improved by our journey, yet I should consider the being able to
ascertain what that state was, as an object very useful to pursue,
and one which, if pursued with attention, we might probably succeed
in possessing ourselves of. How far we have already obtained this
information you will have seen by the communications which we have
made; and I much fear that our journey will not produce any
advantage of a more solid and substantial description. To say that
it might not be possible to procure from the Government here a
formal consent to such an arrangement as we have to propose, is
more than I would assert: although, the condition which they
positively insist upon of being paid for it by loan and subsidy, as
well as all the difficulties which they throw upon the subject of
the proposed barrier, and upon that of acting in the Netherlands,
might well seem to justify the opinion of its being improbable that
anything like the proposed arrangement would be consented to. But
the misfortune is, that--in my judgment, at least--the evil lies
much deeper, and is such as would leave me little hope of seeing
any effectual purpose served, even by the signature of a Convention
between the two Courts.
I do not know of any good ground for believing the common report of
treachery, either in the civil or military government of the
country; but I know, that if the principle upon which our
Government act in the prosecution of the war is not cordially felt
here--if the greatness of those interests, which we think now at
stake, is not to the same degree here considered as being of the
very essence and existence of all regulated government, a
Convention will not give them a livelier perception of this common
danger, or teach them to see in it a crisis such as demands greater
energy and exertions, than any other state of things could call
for. But this common principle is not all that is wanting in the
present case: we think, in England, that the preservation of the
Austrian Netherlands is an object important to us as providing a
defence for Holland, and important to the Court of Vienna as
forming a rich and considerable possession to the House of Austria,
and, therefore, making an object of common interest, though
touching Austria still more sensibly than England. If this obvious
view of the interests of both countries prevailed in the
Governments of both--as one might rationally expect that it
would--it would naturally furnish, by common consent, a very
leading and governing motive, as well to the operations of the war,
as to the ultimate issue of it. This, however, is not the view
which is entertained here, or which I can persuade myself is really
acted upon by those whose influence is decisive here.
M. de Thugut, the efficient Minister of this Court, is personally
very much disposed (and long has been so) to the old project of an
exchange of the Netherlands; and though that project appears to be
laid aside for the purpose of conciliating Great Britain and
Holland, yet it is evident that M. de Thugut's opinions are such as
lead him to set but little value upon the possession of the
Netherlands, and, therefore, that every circumstance, either of
expense or of military enterprise, which looks towards the
acquisition and defence of those provinces, is as much discouraged
by him as he can venture to do, without openly declaring the whole
bias of his mind: and it is very remarkable that, much as we have
made it our business to press this to him in all our conversations,
we have never yet been able to draw from him even a cold assent to
the idea of the Low Countries being of any real value in themselves
to the Emperor; though he sometimes feebly admits that, with a
considerable addition to them, they might be made so.
It may be said, that a Convention might engage them on this point,
whatever their inclinations may be; but the answer is, first, that
in point of fact they do object to bind themselves to the employing
one hundred thousand men _in the Netherlands_, though they have not
finally refused it; and secondly, that be there what agreement
there may, the only substantial security for a hearty co-operation
in fighting for that country, or for any manly system to be adopted
hereafter for the preservation of it, must arise from a sense--in
the owners--of the value of its possession, and not from the words
employed in any treaty respecting it. I am aware that part of the
indifference which I so much remark in M. de Thugut may be
affected, for the purpose of throwing the whole weight of the
defence of the Low Countries upon the Maritime Powers; but if that
is his policy, he must mean to support it by abstaining from any
vigorous exertions in behalf of it, and in the end, whether his
coolness and inactivity shall have been produced by a real or
disguised opinion, the result will equally have been fatal to that
earnest and animated concert, which is so much to be wished for on
this occasion.
You see that I have so far considered the Convention, as taking
place upon the terms proposed by us; but you will have known, long
before you receive this letter, that they have persisted from the
first in asking, as indispensable conditions, that their loan must
be completely satisfied in England to enable them to answer the
demands of this year, and that they must receive from England a
considerable subsidy for next campaign, if it is expected that they
should act vigorously in the prosecution of the war, which they
assert themselves to be utterly unable to do without pecuniary
assistance from England. We have urged them very ineffectually on
this point: they declare that they have good hopes of M. de Merey's
succeeding in obtaining these demands at London, and the
negotiation actually hangs upon the report which they hourly expect
from him on this subject; though we have repeatedly told them that
their expectation was hopeless, and that, meanwhile, the delay
occasioned by it might be fatal to those exertions which required
immediate action and enterprise.
What decision the Cabinet will make upon this heavy demand of
subsidy, is doubtless a very important question, of which they will
be the fit and competent judges; but if that question simply turned
upon the supposed probability of our being able to purchase, even
at that dear rate, a proportionate degree of energy and activity in
the war from this Government, I confess I do not hesitate to say
that, from what I see here, I should not believe, if the experiment
is tried, it will well answer their expectations. There is no soul
in the bodies of these men--none, at least, which is alive to the
magnitude of all the objects now at stake, or which leads them to
share with you, as it ought the great points of common danger and
common interest; and while these mainsprings are wanting, it is in
vain to look for such movements and effects as cannot be produced
without them. If this radical defect did not exist; if the
Government here was as earnest as it ought to be in its
contemplation of this war, but really was without the means of
prosecuting it; if it acknowledged and took its proper interest in
the possession of the Netherlands, and asked your assistance to
that object, only because they had exhausted all their own
resources, there might be great inducements to hope that, in
furnishing to them the supply which they wish, you might on your
side expect all the active effects which ought to be produced by
it; but I know not how to hope that a subsidy will give vigour to
their councils or enterprise to their armies; still less can I hope
that a subsidy, given for the preservation of the Netherlands, will
teach them to put a proper value upon those possessions on their
own account, though it certainly would teach them how highly you
value their retaining them on your account.
All M. de Thugut's conversation, even upon the idea of the subsidy
taking place, is evidently adverse to the prosecuting of the war in
the Netherlands; and even when the danger of Holland is urged as a
powerful argument for this course, he very coldly answers that,
supposing the French to succeed in Holland for a time, they would
be glad enough to relinquish it if the arms of the allies were
successful in the interior of France. How, then, can one easily
hope that the payment of a subsidy will reconcile views so
remote--as I apprehend these are--from the wishes of the English
Cabinet, or prevent much of thwarting and contradiction in the
operations of the campaign? I confess that I suspect this
disinclination to the defence of the Netherlands to arise, not only
from a habit of undervaluing them, but partly, too, from a
persuasion that the Maritime Powers must and will, at their own
expense, protect them; and partly, also, from a narrow and timid
view of collecting the whole Austrian force on the German frontier,
so as to be more immediately ready for the defence of the imperial
dominions, as well as to have less reason to fear in their jealousy
of the intentions of the King of Prussia.
Upon this latter point the difficulties are, perhaps, much more
likely to be increased than to be relieved, by transferring the
Prussian subsidy to the army of Austria, because the Court of
Berlin will doubtless express great dissatisfaction at that
measure; and everything which excites their apprehension here, will
naturally more or less interfere with the energy of their
operations against France. I do not mean that these arguments would
be stated as reasons against their acting up to the conditions of
the subsidy; but I fear they would nevertheless be found to have
too much influence and effect in practice.
The objections which have seemed to me to arise against a large
subsidy to Austria--from the little hope which I should have of its
producing from hence that exertion of force, and that course of
military operations which, with a view to Holland, we should think
ourselves fully entitled to--are of course much increased by my
apprehension of the bad and dangerous consequences which would
affect our Government at home, from a second disappointment of so
costly an experiment, which I must hope need not be considered as
necessary to the prosecution of the war.
If it is true--as it may, perhaps, be found--that much of the
languor and apathy of this Court arises out of a confidence in the
greatness of our exertions, which may allow them to be sparing of
their own, if (as there is reason to believe) they have still the
fair means of recruiting their armies and maintaining their present
military force, is it not to be hoped that the necessity of the
case will rouse them to the use of those means, when they see no
other prospect of safety open to them? They sometimes talk stoutly
of all that they would do by arming the empire, and other vigorous
measures, in case the French succeeded in forcing their way to
menace Germany. But why are these exertions to be reserved for any
other situation of things? and why are we to pay them a million and
a half, rather than put them to the full extent of all their own
exertions and resources? Nor is it, perhaps, to be overlooked, in
this view of the subject, that the crooked policy of Prussia would
perhaps acquiesce in the loss of his own subsidy much more readily,
if he does not see it given to Austria, but has the satisfaction of
seeing Austria fight her own battles with her own men and money.
They always insist here, too, that they are sure the King of
Prussia, even if his bargain should not be renewed with England,
will not withdraw entirely from the war, and still less will take a
part hostile to the combined Powers. And whether this speculation
of theirs is true or not, while they believe it, they are more at
liberty to act solely against France, without fearing any attack
from the quarter of Berlin.
The great danger, perhaps, of trying another campaign without
subsidizing either Prussia or Austria, might first be found with
respect to Holland (at least, if the Government here act as they
threaten in the case of being unsubsidized), by their withdrawing
of the Austrian army from the neighbourhood of Maestricht, and
contracting their defence to the limits of their German frontier.
But even if they did so--which may be much doubted--might not
England and Holland, at a smaller expense than that paid to the
King of Prussia, subsidize an army of auxiliary troops to act for
the defence of Holland, and for carrying on the war in the
Netherlands, and have that army really and effectually at their own
disposal, and doing the service which they were paid for. How far
this may be practicable, I do not pretend to judge. If it is so,
nobody could doubt that it would be an expense more grateful to the
public of our own country than that of paying for a force which we
cannot bring as we ought into action, and which we must consider as
compelled by their own interests to continue the war, whether we
pay them or not for doing so. By subsidizing Austria, we acquire no
greater force than that of the last campaign, and we put the
justification of that enormous expense upon the unpromising chance
of a vigour and energy on their part such as they appear to be
altogether incapable of exerting, unless under the pressure of such
a danger as would force them to act without hiring them to do so.
The length of this letter is such as I am really ashamed to add to.
Lord Spencer writes to Lord Grenville by the same opportunity.
Neither he nor I see much prospect of making ourselves useful in
the shape and with the views proposed, and we are therefore
naturally anxious to see the ordinary course resumed in some other
person, and any such arrangements taken as may admit of our return
as soon as without inconvenience might be. We speak the more
directly on this matter, from the entire and perfect agreement of
our view of it, and our opinions concerning it; at the same time,
if, in your determinations at home, it should seem to you that Lord
Spencer can and ought to stay longer, with any fair prospect of
such advantages to this great subject as his peculiar situation
alone could promise, I do not doubt but that he would consent to
protract his stay a little longer; and while he does, I certainly
will not ask to desert him, _bien entendu_, that I cannot think of
staying one hour after him.
Ever, my dear Duke,
Very truly and faithfully yours.
The session had been protracted to the beginning of July, not merely by
the interest of passing occurrences, but by the efforts of the
Opposition to damage the character and embarrass the action of
Ministers. The most remarkable of these movements was a string of
resolutions moved in the Upper House by the Duke of Bedford, and in the
Lower by Mr. Fox, and urged upon the consideration of both Houses with
an amount of ability that could not have failed of its object, had that
object been a sound one, or sustained by the public opinion of the
country. The main purpose was to obtain from Parliament a protest
against the war, and to compel the Government to enter into proposals
for a peace with France. After setting forth that the policy of the
Administration had been that of strict neutrality before the
commencement of hostilities, and that, after the declaration of war,
Ministers adopted the policy of resistance to the ambition and
aggrandisement of France, the resolutions went on to state, that at the
beginning of the war it was considered a matter of general concern in
which His Majesty was to have the cordial co-operation of the powers
united with him by the ties of interest and alliance; that His Majesty
had not received that co-operation; that Russia had not contributed in
any shape to the common cause; that Denmark and Sweden had coalesced to
defend themselves against any attempt to force them into it; that Venice
and Switzerland remained neuter; that Sardinia was subsidized merely to
act on the defensive; and that Great Britain was loaded with a subsidy
which ought properly to be borne by Prussia; and, finally, that the time
was now come when peace might be secured on a permanent basis, and that
it was the duty of His Majesty's Ministers to avail themselves of the
opportunity.
There was some truth in these statements, although the general deduction
was erroneous, and the colouring throughout false. The allies had not
given that cordial co-operation to Great Britain which they were bound
to do, and Prussia had evaded the onus of the coalition. Mr. Thomas
Grenville's letter to the Duke of Portland discovers a great deal more
than was known to the Duke of Bedford or Mr. Fox in illustration of
these facts; and the correspondence that follows, which is of the
highest importance from the confidential character of its details,
confirms them. But the attempt to cast the responsibility of these
circumstances upon the English Cabinet was equally ungenerous and
unjust. The policy of Ministers had undergone no change, except that
which was contingent upon the altered situation of affairs. To preserve
a strict neutrality in the face of a declaration of war, was clearly
impossible; and to abandon the war, from an abstract desire for peace,
at a time when the common enemy had gained enormous advantages, and were
menacing the tranquillity and liberties of other nations, and
threatening an invasion of England, would have precipitated results the
very reverse of those contemplated by the Opposition. To have made
proposals to France on what the resolutions termed "equitable and
moderate conditions of reconciliation," would have involved two serious
difficulties--the negotiation, in the first place, with a Government of
anarchy which England had justifiably refused to treat with from the
outset; and, in the second place, the admission of the power of France
to dictate terms which England could not accept without degradation, or
refuse without aggravating the existing grounds of hostility.
Circumstances might arise--such as a change in the Government--to
obviate the former difficulty; but the latter was insuperable. It would
have been inconsistent with the principles upon which the war was
undertaken to have proposed or submitted to any conditions which France,
exulting over her recent successes, could have been expected to approve;
and the result of such a negotiation at such a moment must have been, in
any event, fruitless and inglorious. The decision of Parliament was
unequivocal and decisive. The Duke of Bedford's motion was lost on the
question of adjournment, and Mr. Fox's thrown out by a majority of 210
against 57 votes. The influence of the Opposition was overthrown. The
country was against them, and their ranks were daily weakened by
secessions. So strongly and unanimously had the Parliament pronounced
its judgment in favour of the maintenance of the war, that His Majesty
at the close of the session was enabled to urge both Houses "to
persevere with increased vigour and exertion in the present arduous
contest against a power irreconcilably hostile in its principles and
spirit to all regular and established government."
Immediately after the close of the session, some changes took place in
the _materiel_ of the Administration, arising out of the accession of
power the Ministry had obtained by the adhesion of some of the leading
Whigs. The Duke of Portland (to whom Mr. Thomas Grenville addressed his
first letters from Vienna) was appointed Third Secretary of State; Earl
Fitzwilliam, Lord President of the Council; Earl Spencer, Privy Seal;
and Mr. Wyndham, Secretary at War. Further changes took place before the
close of the year, when Lord Fitzwilliam accepted the Government of
Ireland, and was succeeded as President of the Council by Earl
Mansfield. Lord Spencer, at the same time, was placed at the head of the
Admiralty; and Lord Chatham, the brother of the Premier, who had for
some years occupied that department, was made Lord Privy Seal.
The junction with the Whigs was, as far as it went, a new coalition;
but, under the circumstances which led to it, a coalition of a very
different character from that which had been entered into by Mr. Fox and
Lord North. The old elements of the Cabinet still held the ascendancy;
and although some sincere friends of Mr. Pitt doubted the prudence of
admitting the Whigs to office, no actual disturbance of the existing
system was apprehended from it. All agreed upon the question of the
war--the one great question upon which agreement was essential to the
repose and security of the country. In forming this alliance, however,
another question had been overlooked, which was now daily rising into
importance, and upon which the Whigs differed widely from Mr. Pitt, not
so much in principles, as in the time and mode of their application.
That question, the clog and difficulty of every Administration, was
Ireland. But the moment had not yet arrived when the dangers of this
question became manifest.
The following series of letters trace the whole course of the
negotiations going forward on the continent, and exhibit in minute
detail the actual position in which England stood in her relation to the
rest of the allies, and the incessant energy she exerted in vain to
awaken them to a just sense of their obligations.