St. James's Square, Feb. 1st, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,
The idea of augmentation which I think most practicable, is that of
militia cavalry, to be raised by volunteers, in the same manner as
the additional companies in the last war, but to a much larger
extent than you mention in your letter. Dundas told me two days
since that he had been looking for your plan of last year, but had
mislaid it. Have you a copy? It does not seem advisable to broach
this idea much in conversation or discussion with Lord-Lieutenants
and Colonels till it is to a degree matured; for the St. Albans'
meeting, though very good for supporting a measure resolved upon,
or even for arranging particular details of a plan, of which the
outlines are already fixed, is but a bad place to prepare the plan
itself. As far as I am capable of judging, I think that the natural
defence of this country against an enemy once landed, is by the
immense irregular cavalry that might be collected, and formed round
small bodies of disciplined horse. This, of course, does not
exclude the necessity of some infantry to oppose the enemy in
front, while the cavalry harass his flanks and rear, and while your
naval force, even supposing it unable to have prevented the
landing, cuts off all possibility of supplies from France. We are
preparing, partly with the latter view, and partly as a means of
defence where frigates cannot act, a formidable force of gun-boats.
You say that all this is superfluous, and that the attempt will not
be made. I think its being made or not depends wholly on the other
employment which we can find for their force, and this depends on
points which we cannot command; viz.: internal commotion, and the
exertions of the German Powers on the side of the Rhine.
That they are making preparations with a view to having the thing
in their power is unquestionable, and we should be very deficient
in our duty if we did not put the country in a state to be prepared
for all events.
The employment of Lord Moira's force, and its future destination,
depend on plans of continental operations, but in the meantime its
effect is almost beyond calculation in its present position,
menacing everything from Dunkirk to Brest, and defending everything
from Yarmouth to the Land's End. You will see this in a minute, if
you compare the facility of moving that force, either by land or
sea, with the efforts of the same sort that the enemy can make,
either offensively or defensively.
We cannot have too much force anywhere, but if I am not very
sanguine, Sir C. Grey has already a force beyond what the service
requires; and it is likely that he will still be reinforced without
breaking up Lord Moira's army, which I consider as the most
usefully employed, and telling the most effectually against the
enemy of any troops now in our service.