you that all evils spring from ignorance; and that there are not many
who well know that they are sinning when they sin, and do not in the
least deceive themselves as to true pleasure, nor yet as to true
suffering. For it is certain that those who are incontinent judge
reasonably and rightly, and know that to be evil to which they are
prompted by their lusts in spite of duty, and therefore resist and set
reason against appetite, whence arises a conflict of pleasure and pain
against judgment. Conquered at last by too potent appetite, reason
yields, like a ship which resists awhile the buffetings of the sea, but
finally beaten by the too furious violence of the gale, with anchor and
rigging broken, suffers herself to be driven at fortune’s will, without
use of helm or any guidance of compass to save her.
“Therefore the incontinent commit their errours with a certain doubtful
remorse, and as it were in their own despite; which they would not do if
they did not know that what they are doing is evil, but would follow
appetite without restraint of reason and wholly uncontrolled, and would
then be not incontinent but intemperate, which is much worse. Thus
incontinence is said to be a diminished vice, because it has a grain of
reason in it; and likewise continence is said to be an imperfect virtue,
because it has a grain of passion in it. Therefore in this, methinks, we
cannot say that the errours of the incontinent proceed from ignorance,
or that they deceive themselves and that they do not sin, when they well
know that they are sinning.”
16.—My lord Ottaviano replied:
“In truth, messer Pietro, your argument is fine; yet to my thinking it
is specious rather than sound, for although the incontinent sin
hesitatingly, and reason struggles with appetite in their mind, and
although that which is evil seems evil to them,—yet they have no perfect
perception of it, nor do they know it so thoroughly as they need. Hence
they have a vague idea rather than any certain knowledge of it, and thus
allow their reason to be overcome by passion; but if they had true
knowledge of it, doubtless they would not err: since the thing by which
appetite conquers reason is always ignorance, and true knowledge can
never be overcome by passion, which is derived from the body and not
from the mind, and becomes virtue if rightly ruled and governed by
reason; if not, it becomes vice.
“But reason has such power that it always reduces the senses to
submission and enters in by wonderful means and ways, provided ignorance
does not seize that which it ought to possess. So that although the
spirits and nerves and bones have no reason in them, yet when a movement
of the mind starts in us, as if thought were spurring and shaking the
bridle on our spirits, all our members make ready,—the feet to run, the
hands to take or to do that which the mind thinks; and moreover this is
clearly seen in many who at times unwittingly eat some loathsome and
disgusting food, which to their taste seems very delicious, and then
learning what thing it was, not only suffer pain and distress of mind,
but the body so follows the mental sense, that they must perforce cast
up that food.”
17.—My lord Ottaviano was continuing his discourse further, but the
Magnifico Giuliano interrupted him and said:
“If I heard aright, my lord Ottaviano, you said that continence is an
imperfect virtue because it has a grain of passion in it; and when there
is a struggle waging in our minds between reason and appetite, I think
that the virtue which battles and gives reason the victory, ought to be
esteemed more perfect than that which conquers without opposition of
lust or passion; for there the mind seems not to abstain from evil by
force of virtue, but to refrain from doing evil because it has no
inclination thereto.”
Then my lord Ottaviano said:
“Which captain would you deem of greater worth, the one who fighting
openly puts himself in danger and yet conquers the enemy, or the one who
by his ability and skill deprives them of their strength, reducing them
to such straits that they cannot fight, and thus conquers them without
any battle or danger whatever?”
“The one,” said the Magnifico Giuliano, “who more safely conquers is
without doubt more to be praised, provided this safe victory of his do
not proceed from the cowardice of the enemy.”
My lord Ottaviano replied:
“You have judged rightly; and hence I tell you that continence may be
likened to a captain who fights manfully, and although the enemy be
strong and powerful, still conquers them, albeit not without great
difficulty and danger. While temperance unperturbed is like that captain
who conquers and rules without opposition, and having not only abated
but quite extinguished the fire of lust in the mind where she abides,
like a good prince in time of civil strife, she destroys her seditious
enemies within, and gives reason the sceptre and whole dominion.
“Thus this virtue does not compel the mind, but infusing it by very
gentle means with a vehement belief that inclines it to righteousness,
renders it calm and full of rest, in all things equal and well measured,
and disposed on every side by a certain self-accord which adorns it with
a tranquillity so serene that it is never ruffled, and becomes in all
things very obedient to reason and ready to turn its every act thereto
and to follow wherever reason may wish to lead it, without the least
unwillingness; like a tender lambkin, which always runs and stops and
walks near its dam, and moves only with her.
“This virtue, then, is very perfect and especially befitting to princes,
because from it spring many others.”
18.—Then messer Cesare Gonzaga said:
“I do not know what virtues befitting to a lord can spring from this
temperance, if it is the one which removes the passions from the mind,
as you say. Perhaps this would be fitting in a monk or hermit; but I am
by no means sure whether it would befit a prince (who was magnanimous,
liberal and valiant in arms) never to feel, whatever might be done to
him, either wrath or hate or good will or scorn or lust or passion of
any kind, and whether he could without this wield authority over
citizens or soldiers.”
My lord Ottaviano replied:
“I did not say that temperance wholly removes and uproots the passions
from the human mind, nor would it be well to do this, for even the
passions contain some elements of good; but it reduces to the sway of
reason that which is perverse in our passions and recusant to right.
Therefore it is not well to extirpate the passions altogether, in order
to be rid of disturbance; for this would be like making an edict that no
one must drink wine, in order to be rid of drunkenness, or forbidding
everyone to run, because in running we sometimes fall. You know that
those who tame horses do not keep them from running and leaping, but
would have them do so seasonably and in obedience to the rider.
“Thus, when moderated by temperance, the passions are helpful to virtue,
like the wrath that aids strength, hatred of evil-doers aids justice,
and likewise the other virtues are aided by the passions; which, if they
were wholly removed, would leave the reason very weak and languid, so
that it could effect little, like the master of a vessel abandoned by
the winds in a great calm.
“Now do not marvel, messer Cesare, if I have said that many other
virtues are born of temperance, for when a mind is attuned to this
harmony, it then through the reason easily receives true strength, which
makes it bold, and safe from every peril, and almost superior to human
passions. Nor is this less true of justice (unspotted virgin, friend of
modesty and good, queen of all the other virtues), because she teaches
us to do that which it is right to do, and to shun that which it is
right to shun; and therefore she is most perfect, because the other
virtues perform their works through her, and because she is helpful to
whomsoever possesses her, both to himself and to others: without whom
(as it is said) Jove himself could not rule his kingdom rightly.
Magnanimity also follows these and enhances them all; but she cannot
stand alone, for whoever has no other virtue, cannot be magnanimous.
Then the guide of these virtues is foresight, which consists in a
certain judgment in choosing well. And in this happy chain are joined
liberality, magnificence, thirst for honour, gentleness, pleasantness,
affability and many others which there is not now time to name.
“But if our Courtier will do that which we have said, he will find them
all in his prince’s mind, and will daily see spring therefrom beautiful
flowers and fruits, such as all the delightful gardens in the world do
not contain; and he will feel within him very great content when he
remembers that he gave his prince, not that which fools give (which is
gold or silver, vases, raiment, and the like, whereof the giver has very
great dearth, and the recipient very great abundance), but that faculty
which of all things human is perhaps the greatest and rarest—that is,
the manner and mode of ruling and reigning rightly: which would of
itself alone suffice to make men happy and to bring back once more to
earth that age of gold which is said to have been when Saturn reigned.”
19.—My lord Ottaviano having here made a little pause as if to rest, my
lord Gaspar said:
“Which do you think, my lord Ottaviano, the happier rule, and the more
able to bring back to earth that age of gold which you have
mentioned,—the rule of so good a prince, or the government of a good
republic?”
My lord Ottaviano replied:
“I should always prefer the rule of a good prince, because such dominion
is more accordant with nature, and (if it is allowed to compare small
things with infinitely great) more like that of God, who governs the
universe singly and alone.
“But leaving this aside, you see that in those things that are wrought
by human skill,—such as armies, great fleets, buildings and the
like,—the whole is referred to one man who governs to his liking. So too
in our body all the members labour and are employed at the command of
the heart. Moreover it seems fitting that the people should be ruled by
one prince, as is the case also with many animals, to whom nature
teaches this obedience as a very salutary thing. You know that stags,
cranes and many other birds, when on their flight, always set up a
leader, whom they follow and obey; and the bees obey their king as it
were by process of reason, and with as much reverence as the most
obedient people on earth; and hence all this is very strong proof that
the dominion of princes is more accordant with nature than that of
republics.”
20.—Then messer Pietro Bembo said:
“Yet it seems to me that since liberty has been given us by God as a
supreme gift, it is not reasonable that we should be deprived of it, nor
that one man should have a larger share of it than another: which
happens under the dominion of princes, who for the most part hold their
subjects in closest bondage. But in rightly ordered republics this
liberty is fully preserved: besides which, both in judgments and in
councils, it more often happens that one man’s opinion singly is wrong,
than that of many; because disturbance arising from anger or scorn or
lust more easily enters the mind of one man than that of the many, who
are almost like a great body of water, which is less liable to
corruption than a small one.
“I say, too, that the example of the animals does not seem to me
apposite; for stags, cranes and the rest do not always set up the same
one to follow and obey, but on the contrary change and vary, giving the
dominion over them now to one, now to another, and thus come to be a
kind of republic rather than a monarchy; and this may be called true and
equal liberty, when those who command to-day in turn obey to-morrow.
Neither does the example of the bees seem to me pertinent, for that king
of theirs is not of their own species; and therefore whoever would give
men a truly worthy lord, would need to find one of another species and
of more excellent nature than that of men, if men must of reason obey
him, like the herds which obey not an animal of their own kind but a
herdsman, who is a man and of higher species than theirs.
“For these reasons, my lord Ottaviano, I think the rule of a republic is
more desirable than that of a king.”
21.—Then my lord Ottaviano said:
“Against your opinion, messer Pietro, I wish to cite only one argument;
which is, that of the modes of ruling people well, three kinds only are
to be found: one is monarchy; another, the rule of the good, whom the
ancients called optimates; the other, popular government. And the excess
and opposite extreme, so to speak, wherein each one of the forms of rule
falls to ruin and decay, is when monarchy becomes tyranny; and when the
rule of the optimates changes to government by a few powerful and bad
men; and when popular government is seized by the rabble, which breaks
down distinctions and commits the government of the whole to the caprice
of the multitude. Of these three kinds of bad government, it is certain
that tyranny is the worst of all, as could be proved by many arguments;
then it follows that monarchy is the best of the three kinds of good
government, because it is the opposite of the worst; for, as you know,
the results of opposite causes are themselves opposite.
“Now as to what you said about liberty, I reply that we ought not to say
that true liberty is to live as we like, but to live according to good
laws. Nor is it less natural and useful and necessary to obey than it is
to command; and some things are born and thus appointed and ordained by
nature to command, as certain others are to obey. True it is that there
are two modes of ruling: the one imperious and violent, like that of
masters towards their slaves, and in this way the soul commands the
body; the other more mild and gentle, like that of good princes by means
of laws over their subjects, and in this way the reason commands the
appetite: and both of these modes are useful, for the body is by nature
created apt for obedience to the soul, and so is appetite for obedience
to reason. Moreover there are many men whose actions have to do only
with the use of the body; and such as these are as far from virtuous as
the soul from the body, and although they are rational creatures, they
have only such share of reason as to recognize it but not to possess or
profit by it. These, therefore, are naturally slaves, and it is better
and more profitable for them to obey than to command.”
22.—Thereupon my lord Gaspar said:
“In what mode then are the discreet and virtuous, and those who are not
by nature slaves, to be ruled?”
My lord Ottaviano replied:
“With that gentle rule, kingly and civic. And to such men it is well
sometimes to give the charge of those offices for which they are fitted,
to the end that they too may be able to command and govern those less
wise than themselves, but in such manner that the chief rule shall
wholly depend upon the supreme prince. And since you said that it is an
easier thing for the mind of one man to be corrupted than for that of
many, I say that it is also an easier thing to find one good and wise
man than many. And to be good and wise ought to be deemed possible for a
king of noble race, inclined to worthiness by his natural instinct and
by the illustrious memory of his predecessors, and practised in good
behaviour; and if he be not of another species more than human (as you
said of the bee-king), being aided by the teachings and by the education
and skill of so prudent and excellent a Courtier as these gentlemen have
described,—he will be very just, continent, temperate, strong and wise,
full of liberality, magnificence, religion and clemency. In short, he
will be very glorious, and very dear to men and to God (by whose grace
he will attain that heroic worth which will make him exceed the limits
of humanity), and may be called a demigod rather than a mortal man.
“For God delights in and protects, not those princes who wish to imitate
Him by displaying great power and making themselves adored of men, but
those who, besides the power that makes them mighty, strive to make
themselves like Him in goodness and wisdom, whereby they wish and are
able to do good and to be His ministers, distributing for men’s weal the
benefits and gifts which they receive from Him. Thus, just as in heaven
the sun and moon and other stars show the world as in a mirrour some
likeness of God, so on earth a much liker image of God is found in those
good princes who love and revere Him, and show their people the shining
light of His justice and a reflection of His divine reason and mind; and
with such as these God shares His righteousness, equity, justice and
goodness, and those other happy blessings which I know not how to name,
but which display to the world much clearer proof of divinity than the
sun’s light, or the continual revolving of the heavens and the various
coursing of the stars.
23.—“Accordingly men have been placed by God under the ward of princes,
who for this reason ought to take diligent care of them, in order to
render Him an account of them like good stewards to their lord, and
ought to love them, and regard as personal to themselves every good and
evil thing that happens to them, and provide for their happiness above
every other thing. Therefore the prince ought not only to be good, but
also to make others good, like that square used by architects, which not
only is straight and true itself, but also makes straight and true all
things to which it is applied. And a very great proof that the prince is
good is when his people are good, because the prince’s life is law and
preceptress to his subjects, and upon his behaviour all the others must
needs depend; nor is it fitting for an ignorant man to teach, nor for an
unordered man to give orders, nor for one who falls to raise up others.
“Hence if the prince would perform these duties rightly, he must devote
every study and diligence to wisdom; then he must set before himself and
follow steadfastly in everything the law of reason (unwritten on paper
or metal, but graven upon his own mind), to the end that it may be not
only familiar to him, but ingrained in him, and abide with him as a part
of himself; so that day and night, in every place and time, it may
admonish him and speak inwardly to his heart, freeing him from those
disturbances that are felt by intemperate minds, which—because they are
oppressed on the one hand as it were by the very deep sleep of
ignorance, and on the other by the travail which they suffer from their
perverse and blind desires—are tossed by relentless fury, as a sleeper
sometimes is by strange and dreadful visions.
24.—“Moreover, by adding greater power to evil wish, greater harm is
added also; and when the prince is able to do that which he wishes, then
there is great danger that he will not wish that which he ought. Hence
Bias well said that office shows what men are:[438] for just as vases
with some crack in them cannot easily be detected so long as they are
empty, yet if liquid be poured in they at once show where the flaw
is;—so corrupt and vicious minds seldom disclose their defects except
when they are filled with authority; because then they do not suffice to
bear the heavy weight of power, and hence run all lengths and scatter on
every side the greeds, the pride, the bad temper, the insolence, and
those tyrannical practices, which they have within them. Thus they
recklessly persecute the good and wise and exalt the wicked, and in
their cities they permit neither friendships nor unions nor
understandings among their subjects, but maintain spies, informers and
murderers, in order that they may frighten and make men cowardly, and
sow discords to keep men disunited and weak. And from these ways there
then ensue countless ruin and losses to the unhappy people, and often
cruel death (or at least continual fear) to the tyrants themselves;
because good princes are not afraid for themselves, but for those whom
they rule, while tyrants fear even those whom they rule; hence the
greater the number of people they rule and the more powerful they are,
so much the more do they fear and so many more enemies do they have.
“How frightened and of what uneasy mind do you think was Clearchus,
tyrant of Pontus,[439] every time he went into the market-place or
theatre, or to a banquet or other public place? who, as it is written,
was wont to sleep shut up in a chest. Or that other tyrant, Aristodemus
the Argive?[440] who made a kind of prison of his bed: for in his palace
he had a little room hung in air, and so high that it could be reached
only by a ladder; and here he slept with one of his women, whose mother
took away the ladder at night and replaced it in the morning.
“A wholly different life from this, then, ought that of the good prince
to be, free and safe and as dear to his subjects as their very own, and
so ordered as to partake both of the active and of the contemplative, as
much as may comport with his people’s weal.”
25.—Then my lord Gaspar said:
“And which of these two lives, my lord Ottaviano, seems to you more
fitting for the prince?”
My lord Ottaviano replied, laughing:
“Perhaps you think I imagine myself to be that excellent Courtier who
ought to know so many things and apply them to that good end which I
have set forth; but remember that these gentlemen have described him
with many accomplishments that are not in me. Therefore let us first
take care to find him, for I leave to him both this and all things else
that belong to a good prince.”
Then my lord Gaspar said:
“I think that if any of the accomplishments ascribed to the Courtier are
lacking in you, they are music and dancing and others of small
importance, rather than those that belong to the moulding of the prince
and to this end of Courtiership.”
My lord Ottaviano replied:
“None of those are of small importance that help to win the prince’s
favour, which is necessary (as we have said) before the Courtier risks
trying to teach him virtue; which I think I have proved can be learned,
and in which there is as much profit as there is loss in ignorance,
whence spring all sins, and especially that false esteem which men
cherish of themselves. But methinks I have said enough, and perhaps more
than I promised.”
Then my lady Duchess said:
“We shall be the more beholden to your courtesy, the more your
performance outstrips your promise; so do not weary of saying what
occurs to you about my lord Gaspar’s question; and by your faith, tell
us also everything that you would teach your prince if he had need of
instruction, and imagine yourself to have won completely his favour, so
that you are allowed to tell him freely what comes into your mind.”
26.—My lord Ottaviano laughed, and said:
“If I had the favour of a certain prince whom I know, and were to tell
him freely what I think, I fear that I should soon lose it; moreover, to
teach him, I myself should first need to learn.
“Yet since it pleases you to have me answer my lord Gaspar further
concerning this, I say that I think princes ought to lead both the two
lives, but more especially the contemplative life, because in their case
this is divided into two parts: one of which consists in perceiving
rightly and in judging; the other in commanding (justly and in those
ways that are fitting) things reasonable and those wherein they have
authority, and in requiring the same of such men as have in reason to
obey, and at appropriate times and places; and of this Duke Federico
spoke when he said that whoever knows how to command is always obeyed.
And as command is always the chief office of princes, they ought often
to see with their own eyes and be present at the execution of their
commands, and ought also sometimes to take part themselves, according to
the time and need; and all this partakes of action: but the aim of the
active life ought to be the contemplative, as peace is that of war,
repose that of toil.